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IN TEN VOLUMES.



Boston:
WILLIAM VEAZIE.
1866.

One Hundred Copies printed on Large Paper.

Press of John Wilson and Son.

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

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IN THE

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CENTURIES.

By HENRY HALLAM, LL.D., F.R.A.S.,
FOREIGN ASSOCIATE OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE.

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KF 16630 (3)

CAMBRIDGE:
STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY JOHN WILSON AND SON.



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CONTENTS

OF

THE THIRD VOLUME.

PART III. (CONTINUED).

ON THE LITERATURE OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY FROM 1600 TO 1650.

	Page		Page
Subjects of this Chapter . . .	11	Time of its Conception . . .	33
Aristotelians and Ramists . . .	12	Instauratio Magna . . .	34
No Improvement till near the		First Part: Partitiones Scien-	
End of the Century . . .	13	tiarum . . .	34
Methods of the Universities . . .	13	Second Part: Novum Organum .	34
Scholastic Writers . . .	14	Third Part: Natural History . .	35
Treatises on Logic . . .	15	Fourth Part: Scala Intellectus .	36
Campanella . . .	16	Fifth Part: Anticipationes Phi-	
His Theory taken from Telesio .	16	losophiae . . .	37
Notion of Universal Sensibility .	17	Sixth Part: Philosophia Secunda	37
His Imagination and Eloquence .	18	Course of studying Lord Bacon .	36
His Works published by Adami	20	Nature of the Baconian Induc-	
Basson . . .	21	tion . . .	39
Berigard . . .	21	His Dislike of Aristotle . . .	42
Magnen . . .	21	His Method much required . .	42
Paracelsists . . .	22	Its Objects . . .	43
And Theosophists . . .	22	Sketch of the Treatise De Aug-	
Fludd . . .	22	mentis . . .	43
Jacob Boehmen . . .	23	History . . .	43
Lord Herbert, De Veritate . . .	24	Poetry . . .	44
His Axioms . . .	25	Fine Passage on Poetry . . .	44
Conditions of Truth . . .	25	Natural Theology and Meta-	
Instinctive Truths . . .	26	physics . . .	44
Internal Perceptions . . .	27	Form of Bodies . . .	45
Five Notions of Natural Religion	28	Might sometimes be inquired	
Remarks of Gassendi on Herbert	28	into . . .	45
Gassendi's Defence of Epicurus .	30	Final Causes too much slighted .	46
His chief Works after 1650 . .	31	Man not included by him in	
Preparation for the Philosophy		Physics . . .	47
of Lord Bacon . . .	31	Man, in Body and Mind . . .	47
His Plan of Philosophy . . .	32	Logic . . .	47

	Page		Page
Extent given it by Bacon . . .	48	Superiority of Descartes . . .	86
Grammar and Rhetoric . . .	48	Stewart's Remarks on Des-	
Ethics	48	cartes	87
Politics	49	Paradoxes of Descartes . . .	89
Theology	50	His just Notion of Definitions .	90
Desiderata enumerated by him .	50	His Notion of Substances . . .	92
Novum Organum: First Book . .	50	Not quite correct	93
Fallacies: Idola	51	His Notions of Intuitive Truth .	93
Confounded with Idols	51	Treatise on Art of Logic . . .	95
Second Book of Novum Orga-		Merits of his Writings	95
num	53	His Notions of Free-will . . .	96
Confidence of Bacon	54	Fame of his System, and At-	
Almost justified of late	55	tacks upon it	97
But should be kept within		Controversy with Voet	98
bounds	56	Charges of Plagiarism	99
Limits to our Knowledge by		Recent Increase of his Fame . .	101
Sense	56	Metaphysical Treatises of	
Inductive Logic; whether con-		Hobbes	101
fined to Physics	57	His Theory of Sensation . . .	102
Baconian Philosophy built on		Coincident with Descartes . . .	102
Observation and Experiment . .	58	Imagination and Memory . . .	103
Advantages of the Latter	59	Discourse or Train of Imagina-	
Sometimes applicable to Philo-		tion	104
sophy of Human Mind	60	Experience	105
Less so to Politics and Morals .	60	Unconceivableness of Infinity .	105
Induction less conclusive in		Origin of Language	106
these Subjects	61	His Political Theory interferes .	107
Reasons for this Difference . . .	61	Necessity of Speech exaggerated .	107
Considerations on the other Side		Use of Names	108
Result of the Whole	64	Names universal, not Realities .	108
Bacon's Aptitude for Moral		How imposed	109
Subjects	65	The Subject continued	110
Comparison of Bacon and Ga-		Names differently imposed . . .	111
lileo	66	Knowledge	112
His Prejudice against Mathe-		Reasoning	113
matics	69	False Reasoning	114
Bacon's Excess of Wit	70	Its Frequency	116
Fame of Bacon on the Continent		Knowledge of Fact not derived	
Early Life of Descartes	74	from Reasoning	117
His Beginning to philosophize . .	75	Belief	117
He retires to Holland	75	Chart of Science	118
His Publications	76	Analysis of Passions	119
He begins by doubting all	77	Good and Evil, relative Terms .	119
His first Step in Knowledge . . .	77	His Paradoxes	120
His Mind not Sceptical	78	His Notion of Love	120
He arrives at more Certainty . .	79	Curiosity	121
His Proof of a Deity	79	Difference of Intellectual Capa-	
Another Proof of it	79	cities	121
His Deductions from this	81	Wit and Fancy	122
Primary and Secondary Qualities		Differences in the Passions . . .	123
Objections made to his Medita-		Madness	123
tions	82	Unmeaning Language	123
Theory of Memory and Imagi-		Manners	124
nation	84	Ignorances and Prejudice . . .	124
Seat of Soul in Pineal Gland . .	85	His Theory of Religion	125
Gassendi's Attacks on the Me-		Its supposed Sources	126
ditations	86		

CONTENTS OF VOL. III.

v

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND OF JURIS- PRUDENCE FROM 1600 TO 1650.

	Page		Page
Casuistical Writers	181	Bellenden De Statu	156
Importance of Confession	181	Campanella's Politics	157
Necessity of Rules for the Con- fessor	182	La Mothe le Vayer	157
Increase of Casuistical Literature	182	Naude's Coups d'Etat	157
Distinction of Subjective and Ob- jective Morality	183	Patriarchal Theory of Govern- ment	158
Directory Office of the Confessor	183	Refuted by Suarez	158
Difficulties of Casuistry	184	His Opinion of Law	159
Strict and lax Schemes of it	184	Bacon	161
Convenience of the Latter	185	Political Economy	161
Favored by the Jesuits	185	Serra on the Means of obtaining Money without Mines	162
The Causes of this	186	His Causes of Wealth	162
Extravagance of the strict Ca- suists	186	His Praise of Venice	163
Opposite Faults of Jesuits	187	Low Rate of Exchange not es- sential to Wealth	164
Suarez, De Legibus	188	Hobbes : his Political Works	164
Titles of his Ten Books	188	Analysis of his Three Treatises	165
Heads of the Second Book	188	Civil Jurists of this Period	176
Character of such Scholastic Treatises	189	Suarez on Laws	177
Quotations of Suarez	140	Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis	177
His Definition of Eternal Law	140	Success of this Work	178
Whether God is a Legislator	142	Its Originality	179
Whether God could permit or commend Wrong Actions	142	Its Motive and Object	179
English Casuists: Perkins, Hall	148	His Authorities	179
Selden, De Jure Naturali juxta Hebræos	144	Foundation of Natural Law	180
Jewish Theory of Natural Law	144	Positive Law	161
Seven Precepts of the Sons of Noah	145	Perfect and imperfect Rights	182
Character of Selden's Work	145	Lawful Cases of War	182
Grotius and Hobbes	146	Resistance by Subjects unlawful	182
Charroon on Wisdom	146	All Men naturally have Right of War	184
La Mothe le Vayer: his Dia- logues	147	Right of Self-defence	184
Bacon's Essays	148	Its Origin and Limitations	185
Their Excellence	149	Right of Occupancy	186
Fekham's Resolves	150	Relinquishment of it	187
Browne's Religio Medici	151	Right over Persons. — By Gene- ration	187
Selden's Table Talk	152	By Consent	188
Osborn's Advice to his Son	152	In Marriage	188
John Valentine Andrea	153	In Commonwealths	188
Abandonment of Anti-monarchi- cal Theories	155	Right of alienating Subjects	188
Political Literature becomes his- torical	156	Alienation by Testament	188
		Rights of Property by Positive Law	189
		Extinction of Rights	189
		Some Casuistical Questions	190
		Promises	190

	Page		Page
Contracts	191	Rights by Law of Nations over	
Considered ethically	191	Enemies	204
Promissory Oaths	192	Prisoners become Slaves	205
Engagements of Kings towards		Right of Postliminium	205
Subjects	193	Moral Limitation of Rights in	
Public Treaties	193	War	206
Their Interpretation	194	Moderation required as to Spoil .	206
Obligation to repair Injury	196	And as to Prisoners	207
Rights by Law of Nations	196	Also in Conquest	207
Those of Ambassadors	197	And in Restitution to Right	
Right of Sepulture	197	Owners	207
Punishments	197	Promises to Enemies and Pirates	208
Their Responsibility	199	Treaties concluded by competent	
Insufficient Causes of War	200	Authority	209
Duty of avoiding it	200	Matters relating to them	209
And Expediency	201	Truces and Conventions	210
War for the Sake of other Sub-		Those of Private Persons	211
jects	201	Objections to Grotius, made by	
Allies	201	Paley, unreasonable	211
Strangers	201	Reply of Mackintosh	212
None to serve in an unjust War	202	Censures of Stewart	213
Rights in War	202	Answer to them	213
Use of Deceit	203	Grotius vindicated against Rous-	
Rules and Customs of Nations	203	seau	218
Reprisals	203	His Arrangement	219
Declarations of War	203	His Defects	220

CHAPTER V.

HISTORY OF POETRY FROM 1600 TO 1650.

Low Estimation of the Seicen-		Malherbe	235
tisti	221	Criticisms upon his Poetry	236
Not quite so great as formerly	221	Satires of Regnier	237
Praise of them by Rubbi	222	Racan; Maynard	237
Also by Salfi	222	Voiture	238
Adone of Marini	223	Sarrazin	238
Its Character	223	Low State of German Literature	239
And Popularity	224	Literary Societies	239
Secchia Rapita of Tassoni	225	Opitz	240
Chiabrera	226	His Followers	241
His Followers	228	Dutch Poetry	242
The Styles of Spanish Poetry	229	Spiegel	242
The Romances	229	Hooft; Cats; Vondel	242
The Brothers Argensola	230	Danish Poetry	243
Villegas	230	English Poets numerous in this	
Quevedo	231	Age	243
Defects of Taste in Spanish		Phineas Fletcher	244
Verse	232	Giles Fletcher	245
Pedantry and far-fetched Allu-		Philosophical Poetry	245
sions	233	Lord Brooke	246
Gongora	233	Denham's Cooper's Hill	246
The Schools formed by him	234	Poets called Metaphysical	247

CONTENTS OF VOL. III.

vii

	Page		Page
Donne	248	Milton	261
Crashaw	249	His Comus	261
Cowley	249	Lycidas	261
Johnson's Character of him	250	Allegro and Pensive	263
Narrative Poets: Daniel	250	Ode on the Nativity	263
Drayton's Polyolbion	250	His Sonnets	263
Browne's Britannia's Pastorals	251	Anonymous Poetry	264
Sir John Beaumont	252	Latin Poets of France	264
Davenant's Gondibert	252	In Germany and Italy	265
Sonnets of Shakspeare	253	In Holland: Heinsius	265
The Person whom they address	255	Casimir Sarbievius	265
Sonnets of Drummond and others	256	Barlaeus	267
Carew	257	Balde: Greek Poem of Heinsius	268
Ben Jonson	258	Latin Poets of Scotland: Jon-	
Witber	259	ston's Psalms	268
Habington	259	Owen's Epigrams	268
Earl of Pembroke	259	Alabaster's Roxana	268
Seckling	259	May's Supplement to Lucan	269
Lovelace	260	Milton's Latin Poems	270
Herick	260		

CHAPTER VI.

HISTORY OF DRAMATIC LITERATURE FROM 1600 TO 1650.

Decline of the Italian Theatre	271	Encouraged by James	290
Filli di Sciro	272	General Taste for the Stage	291
Translations of Spanish Dramas	273	Theatres closed by the Parlia-	
Extemporaneous Comedy	273	ment	292
Spanish Stage	274	Shakspeare's Twelfth Night	293
Calderon: Number of his Pieces	274	Merry Wives of Windsor	298
His Comedies	275	Measure for Measure	295
La Vida es Sueño	276	Lear	296
A Secreto Agravio Secreto Ven-		Timon of Athens	297
gança	278	Pericles	299
Style of Calderon	278	His Roman Tragedies: Julius	
His Merits sometimes overrated	279	Cæsar	300
Plays of Hardy	281	Antony and Cleopatra	300
The Cid	282	Coriolanus	300
Style of Corneille	283	His Retirement and Death	301
Les Horaces	284	Greatness of his Genius	302
Cinna	285	His Judgment	303
Polyeucte	285	His Obscurity	304
Rodogune	286	His Popularity	305
Pompey	286	Critics on Shakspeare	305
Heracles	287	Ben Jonson	306
Nicomède	287	The Alchemist	307
Faults and Beauties of Corneille	287	Volpone; or, The Fox	307
Le Menteur	288	The Silent Woman	308
Other French Tragedies	288	Sad Shepherd	309
Wenceslas of Rotrou	289	Beaumont and Fletcher	309
Popularity of the Stage under		Corrupt State of their Text	310
Elizabeth	290	The Maid's Tragedy	311
Number of Theatres	290	Philaster	312

Contracts	
Considered ethically	
Promissory Oaths	
Engagements of Kings	
Subjects	
Public Treaties	
Their Interpretation	
Obligation to repair Injuries	
Rights by Law of Nations	
Those of Ambassadors	
Right of Sepulture	
Punishments	
Their Responsibility	
Insufficient Causes of War	
Duty of avoiding it	
And Expediency	
War for the Sake of other Subjects	
Allies	
Strangers	
None to serve in an unjust War	
Rights in War	
Use of Deceit	
Rules and Customs of Nations	
Reprisals	
Declarations of War	

HISTORY

Low Estimation of the Historians	
Not quite so great as formerly	
Praise of them by Rubbi	
Also by Salfi	
Adone of Marini	
Its Character	
And Popularity	
Secchia Rapita of Tassoni	
Chiabrera	
His Followers	
The Styles of Spanish Poetry	
The Romances	
The Brothers Argensola	
Villegas	
Quevedo	
Defects of Taste in Spanish Verse	
Pedantry and far-fetched expressions	
Gongora	
The Schools formed by him	

CHAPTER VIII.

OF MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE FROM
1600 TO 1650.

	Page		Page
in 16th Century . . .	377	Other Discoveries by him . . .	393
Calculations . . .	378	Spots of the Sun discovered . .	394
Use of Logarithms . .	378	Copernican System held by Ga-	
Numbers discovered . .	378	lileo	394
.	378	His Dialogues, and Persecution .	396
Quantities	379	Descartes alarmed by this . . .	396
.	380	Progress of Copernican System .	396
and Briggs	380	Descartes denies general Gravita-	
Geometry	381	tion	397
in the Ancient	382	Cartesian Theory of the World .	398
eo	383	Transits of Mercury and Venus .	399
Galilei	383	Laws of Mechanics	399
Statics of Solids . . .	384	Statics of Galileo	400
Cycloid	384	His Dynamics	401
bra	385	Mechanics of Descartes	402
.	385	Laws of Motion laid down by	
.	386	Descartes	403
.	386	Also those of Compound Forces .	404
.	387	Other Discoveries in Mechanics .	404
of Algebra to	388	In Hydrostatics and Pneumatics .	404
Optics from Har- . . .	388	Optics: Discoveries of Kepler . .	405
.	388	Invention of the Telescope . . .	406
.	389	Of the Microscope	407
Optics not success- . .	389	Antonio de Dominis	407
.	390	Dioptrics of Descartes; Law of	
.	390	Refraction	408
.	392	Disputed by Fermat	408
.	392	Curves of Descartes	409
.	392	Theory of the Rainbow	409

CHAPTER IX.

OF SOME OTHER PROVINCES OF LITERATURE FROM
1600 TO 1650.

.	411	John and Gaspar Bauhin . . .	415
.	411	Parkinson	416
.	412	Valves of the Veins discovered .	416
.	412	Theory of the Blood's Circula-	
the Language of . . .	413	tion	417
.	413	Sometimes ascribed to Servetus .	417
.	415	To Columbus	418

	Page		Page
King and No King	312	Inferior to their Comedies . . .	324
The Elder Brother	313	Their Female Characters . . .	324
The Spanish Curate	314	Massinger: General Nature of	326
The Custom of the Country . .	315	his Dramas	326
The Loyal Subject	315	His Delineations of Character .	326
Beggar's Bush	316	His Subjects	327
The Scornful Lady	316	Beauty of his Style	328
Valentinian	317	Inferiority of his Comic Powers .	328
The Two Noble Kinsmen . . .	318	Some of his Tragedies particu-	
The Faithful Shepherdess . .	319	larized	328
Rule a Wife and Have a Wife .	320	And of his other Plays	329
Some other Plays	320	Ford	329
Origin of Fletcher's Plays . .	321	Shirley	331
Defects of their Plots	321	Heywood	331
Their Sentiments and Style		Webster	332
dramatic	322	His Duchess of Malfy	332
Their Characters	323	Vittoria Corombona	333
Their Tragedies	323		

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF POLITE LITERATURE IN PROSE FROM 1600 TO 1650.

Decline of Taste in Italy . . .	335	Raleigh's History of the World .	357
Style of Galileo	336	Daniel's History of England . .	358
Bentivoglio	337	Bacon	358
Boccalini's News from Parnassus	337	Milton	359
His Pietra del Paragone . . .	338	Clarendon	359
Ferrante Pallavicino	339	The Icon Basilice	359
Dictionary Della Crusca . . .	339	Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy	360
Grammatical Works: Buonmat-		Earle's Characters	361
tei Bartoli	340	Overbury's Characters	362
Tassoni's Remarks on Petrarch	340	Jonson's Discoveries	362
Galileo's Remarks on Tasso . .	341	Publication of Don Quixote . .	363
Sforza Pallavicino	341	Its Reputation	363
And other Critical Writers . .	341	New Views of its Design . . .	363
Prolusiones of Strada	342	Probably erroneous	365
Spanish Prose: Gracian	342	Difference between the two Parts	365
French Prose: Du Vair	343	Excellence of this Romance . .	368
Balzac	344	Minor Novels of Cervantes . .	368
Character of his Writings . . .	344	Other Novels: Spanish	368
His Letters	345	And Italian	368
Voiture: Hôtel Rambouillet . .	346	French Romances: Astrée . . .	369
Establishment of French Acade-		Heroic Romances: Gomberville .	369
my	348	Calprenède	370
Its Objects and Constitution . .	349	Scuderi	371
It publishes a Critique on the Cid	349	Argenis of Barclay	372
Vaugelas' Remarks on the		His Euphormio	373
French Language	351	Campanella's City of the Sun .	373
La Mothe le Vayer	351	Few Books of Fiction in England	374
Legal Speeches of Patru	352	Mundus Alter et Idem of Hall .	375
And of Le Maistre	353	Godwin's Journey to the Moon .	375
Improvement in English Style .	354	Howell's Dodona's Grove . . .	376
Karl of Essex	355	Adventures of Baron de Fœnesta	376
Knolles's History of the Turks .	355		

CHAPTER VIII.

HISTORY OF MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE FROM
1600 TO 1650.

	Page		Page
State of Science in 16th Century . . .	377	Other Discoveries by him . . .	393
Tediousness of Calculations . . .	378	Spots of the Sun discovered . . .	394
Napier's Invention of Logarithms . . .	378	Copernican System held by Ga-	
Their Nature	378	lileo	394
Property of Numbers discovered		His Dialogues, and Persecution . .	396
by Stifelius	378	Descartes alarmed by this . . .	396
Extended to Magnitudes . . .	379	Progress of Copernican System . .	396
By Napier	380	Descartes denies general Gravita-	
Tables of Napier and Briggs . . .	380	tion	397
Kepler's New Geometry . . .	381	Cartesian Theory of the World . .	398
Its Difference from the Ancient . .	382	Transits of Mercury and Venus . .	399
Adopted by Galileo	383	Laws of Mechanics	399
Extended by Cavalieri	383	Statics of Galileo	400
Applied to the Ratios of Solids . .	384	His Dynamics	401
Problem of the Cycloid	384	Mechanics of Descartes	402
Progress of Algebra	385	Laws of Motion laid down by	
Briggs; Girard	385	Descartes	408
Harriott	386	Also those of Compound Forces . .	404
Descartes	387	Other Discoveries in Mechanics . .	404
His Application of Algebra to		In Hydrostatics and Pneumatics . .	404
Curves	388	Optics: Discoveries of Kepler . . .	405
Suspected Plagiarism from Har-		Invention of the Telescope	406
riott	388	Of the Microscope	407
Fermat	389	Antonio de Dominis	407
Algebraic Geometry not success-		Dioptrics of Descartes; Law of	
ful at first	390	Refraction	408
Astronomy: Kepler	390	Disputed by Fermat	408
Conjectures as to Comets	392	Curves of Descartes	409
Galileo's Discovery of Jupiter's		Theory of the Rainbow	409
Satellites	392		

CHAPTER IX.

HISTORY OF SOME OTHER PROVINCES OF LITERATURE FROM
1600 TO 1650.

Aldrovandus	411	John and Gaspar Bauhin	415
Clusius	411	Parkinson	416
Piso and Marcgraf	412	Valves of the Veins discovered . .	416
Jonston	412	Theory of the Blood's Circula-	
Fabricius on the Language of		tion	417
Brutes	412	Sometimes ascribed to Servetus . .	417
Botany: Columna	415	To Columbus	418

	Page		Page
And to Casalpin	419	Purchas's Pilgrim	429
Generally unknown before Har-		Olearius and Pietro della Valle .	430
vey	420	Lexicon of Ferrari	430
His Discovery	420	Maps of Blaew	431
Unjustly doubted to be original .	421	Davila and Bentivoglio	431
Harvey's Treatise on Generation	422	Mendoza's Wars of Granada . .	432
Lacteals discovered by Asellius .	422	Mezeray	432
Optical Discoveries of Scheiner .	423	English Historians	432
Medicine: Van Helmont	423	English Histories	432
Diffusion of Hebrew	424	Universities	433
Language not studied in the best		Bodleian Library founded	433
Method	424	Casaubon's Account of Oxford .	434
The Buxtorfs	425	Catalogue of Bodleian Library .	435
Vowel-points rejected by Cappel	426	Continental Libraries	435
Hebrew Scholars	427	Italian Academies	436
Chaldee and Syriac	427	The Lincei	437
Arabic	428	Prejudice for Antiquity dimi-	
Erpenius	428	nished	438
Golius	428	Browne's Vulgar Errors	439
Other Eastern Languages	429	Life and Character of Peiresc . .	440

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

LITERATURE OF EUROPE

IN THE FIFTEENTH, SIXTEENTH, AND
SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES.

PART III. (CONTINUED).

ON THE LITERATURE OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, FROM 1600 TO 1660.

SECTION I.

*Aristotelian Logic — Campanella — Theosophists — Lord Herbert of Cherbury —
Gassendi's Remarks upon him.*

1. IN the two preceding periods, we have had occasion to excuse the heterogeneous character of the chapters that bear this title. The present is fully as much open to verbal criticism; and perhaps it is rather by excluding both moral and mathematical philosophy that we give it some sort of unity, than from a close connection in all the books that will come under our notice in the ensuing pages. But any tabular arrangement of literature, such as has often been attempted with no very satisfactory result, would be absolutely inappropriate to such a work as the present, which has already to labor with the inconvenience of more subdivisions than can be pleasing to the reader, and would interfere too continually with that general regard to chronology, without

which the name of history seems incongruous. Hence the metaphysical inquiries that are conversant with the human mind or with natural theology, the general principles of investigating truth, the comprehensive speculations of theoretical physics,—subjects very distinct, and not easily confounded by the most thoughtless,—must fall, with no more special distribution, within the contents of this chapter. But since, during the period which it embraces, men arose who have laid the foundations of a new philosophy, and thus have rendered it a great epoch in the intellectual history of mankind, we shall not very strictly, though without much deviation, follow a chronological order, and, after reviewing some of the less important laborers in speculative philosophy, come to the names of three who have most influenced posterity,—Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes.

2. We have seen in a former chapter how little progress had been made in this kind of philosophy during the sixteenth century. At its close, the schools of logic were divided, though by no means in equal proportion, between the Aristotelians and the Ramists: the one sustained by ancient renown, by civil or at least academical power, and by the common prejudice against innovation; the other deriving some strength from the love of novelty, and the prejudice against established authority, which the first age of the Reformation had generated, and which continued, perhaps, to preserve a certain influence in the second. But neither from one nor the other had philosophy, whether in material or intellectual physics, much to hope: the disputations of the schools might be technically correct; but so little regard was paid to objective truth, or at least so little pains taken to ascertain it, that no advance in real knowledge signalized either of these parties of dialecticians. According, indeed, to a writer of this age, strongly attached to the Aristotelian party, Ramus had turned all physical science into the domain of logic, and argued from words to things still more than his opponents.¹ Lord Bacon, in the bitterest language, casts on him a similar reproach.² It seems that he caused this branch of philosophy to retrograde rather than advance.

¹ Keckermann, *Præcognita Logica*, p. 129. This writer charges Ramus with plagiarism from Ludovicus Vives, placing the passages in apposition, so as to prove his case. Ramus, he says, never alludes

to Vives. He praises the former, however, for having attacked the scholastic party, being himself a genuine Aristotelian.

² *Ne vero, fili, cum hac contra Aristotelem sententiam sero, me cum rebell*

3. It was obvious, at all events, that from the universities, or from the church, in any country, no improvement in philosophy was to be expected; yet those who had strayed from the beaten track, a Paracelsus, a Jordano Bruno, even a Telesio, had but lost themselves in irregular mysticism, or laid down theories of their own, as arbitrary and destitute of proof as those they endeavored to supersede. The ancient philosophers, and especially Aristotle, were, with all their errors and defects, far more genuine high-priests of nature than any moderns of the sixteenth century. But there was a better prospect at its close, in separate though very important branches of physical science. Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, were laying the basis of a true philosophy; and they who do not properly belong to this chapter labored very effectually to put an end to all antiquated errors, and to check the reception of novel paradoxes.

No improvement till near the end of the century.

4. We may cast a glance, meantime, on those universities which still were so wise in their own conceit, and maintained a kind of reputation by the multitude of their disciples. Whatever has been said of the scholastic metaphysicians of the sixteenth century may be understood as being applicable to their successors during the present period. Their method was by no means extinct, though the books which contain it are forgotten. In all that part of Europe which acknowledged the authority of Rome, and in all the universities which were swayed by the orders of Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits, the metaphysics of the thirteenth century, the dialectics of the Peripatetic school, were still taught. If new books were written, as was frequently the case, they were written upon old systems. Brucker, who sometimes transcribes Morhof word for word, but frequently expands with so much more copiousness that he may be presumed to have had a direct acquaintance with many of the books he mentions, has gone most elaborately into this unpropitious subject.¹ The chairs of philosophy in Protestant

Methods of the universities.

quis quodam neoterico Petro Ramo conspiciamus augurare. Nullum mihi commercium cum hoc ignorantie latibulo, perniciolosissima literarum thesa, compendiarum patre, qui cum methodi sue et compendii vinculis res torquent et premat, res quidem, si qua fuit, elabitur protinus et exilis: ipse vero arides et desertissimas nugas stringit. Atque Aquinas quidam cum docto et socle etiam in non

rebus rerum varietatem effinxit, hic vero etiam in rebus non rerum solitudinem sequavit. Atque hoc hominis cum sit, humanos tamen usus in ore habet impudens, ut mihi etiam pro [præ?] sophistis prævaricari videatur. — Bacon, De Interpretatione Naturæ.

¹ Morhof, vol. II. l. 1, c. 12, 14; Brucker, iv. cap. 2, 3.

German universities, except where the Ramists had got possession of them, which was not very common, especially after the first years of this period, were occupied by avowed Aristotelians; so that, if one should enumerate the professors of physics, metaphysics, logic, and ethics, down to the close of the century, he would be almost giving a list of strenuous adherents of that system.¹ One cause of this was the "Philippic method," or course of instruction in the philosophical books of Melanchthon, more clear and elegant, and better arranged, than those of Aristotle himself or his commentators. But this, which long continued to prevail, was deemed by some too superficial, and tending to set aside the original authority. Brucker, however, admits, what seems at least to limit some of his expressions as to the prevalence of Peripateticism, that many reverted to the scholastic metaphysics, which raised its head about the beginning of the seventeenth century, even in the Protestant regions of Germany. The universities of Altdorf and Helmstadt were the chief nurseries of the genuine Peripateticism.²

5. Of the metaphysical writers whom the older philosophy brought forth we must speak with much ignorance. Scholastic writers. Suarez of Granada is justly celebrated for some of his other works; but of his *Metaphysical Disputations*, published at Mentz in 1614, in two folio volumes, and several times afterwards, I find no distinct character in Morhof or Brucker. They both, especially the former, have praised Lalemandet, a Franciscan, whose *Decisiones Philosophicæ*, on logic, physics, and metaphysics, appeared at Munich in 1644 and 1645. Lalemandet, says Morhof, has well stated the questions between the Nominalist and Realist parties; observing that the difference between them is like that of a man who casts up a sum of money by figures, and one who counts the coins themselves.³ Vasquez, Tellez, and several more names, without going for the present below the middle of the century, may be found in the two writers quoted. Spain was peculiarly the nurse of these obsolete and unprofitable metaphysics.

6. The Aristotelian philosophy, unadulterated by the figments of the schoolmen, had eminent upholders in the Italian universities, especially in that of Padua. Cæsar Cremonini

¹ Brucker, iv. 242.

² *Id.*, pp. 242-252.

³ Morhof, vol. ii. lib. i. cap. 14, sect. 15; Brucker, iv. 120.

taught in that famous city till his death in 1630. Fortunio Liceto, his successor, was as stanch a disciple of the Peripatetic sect. We have a more full account of these men from Gabriel Naudé, both in his recorded conversation, the *Naudæana*, and in a volume of letters, than from any other quarter. His twelfth letter, especially, enters into some detail as to the state of the University of Padua, to which, for the purpose of hearing Cremonini, he had repaired in 1625. He does not much extol its condition: only Cremonini and one more were deemed by him safe teachers; the rest were mostly of a common class; the lectures were too few, and the vacations too long. He observes, as one might at this day, the scanty population of the city compared with its size; the grass growing and the birds singing in the streets; and, what we should not find now to be the case, the "general custom of Italy, which keeps women perpetually locked up in their chambers, like birds in cages."¹ Naudé, in many of these letters, speaks in the most panegyric terms of Cremonini,² and particularly for his standing up almost alone in defence of the Aristotelian philosophy, when Telesio, Patrizi, Bruno, and others had been propounding theories of their own. Liceto, the successor of Cremonini, maintained, he afterwards informs us, with little support, the Peripatetic verity. It is probable, that, by this time, Galileo, a more powerful adversary than Patrizi or Telesio, had drawn away the students of physical philosophy from Aristotle; nor did Naudé himself long continue in the faith he had imbibed from Cremonini. He became the intimate friend of Gassendi, and embraced a better system without repugnance, though he still kept up his correspondence with Liceto.

7. Logic had never been more studied, according to a writer who has given a sort of history of the science Treatises
on logic. about the beginning of this period, than in the preceding age; and in fact he enumerates above fifty treatises on the subject between the time of Ramus and his own.³ The Ramists, though of little importance in Italy, in Spain, and even in France, had much influence in Germany, England, and Scotland.⁴ None, however, of the logical works of the sixteenth century obtained such reputation as those by Smig-

¹ *Naudæi Epistolæ*, p. 52 (edit. 1667)

² *P. 27, et alibi sæpius.*

³ Keckermann, *Præcognita Logica*, p. 110 (edit. 1606).

⁴ *Id.*, p. 147.

lecius, Burgersdicius, and our countryman Crakanthorp, all of whom flourished, if we may use such a word for those who bore no flowers, in the earlier part of the next age. As these men were famous in their generation, we may presume that they at least wrote better than their predecessors. But it is time to leave so jejune a subject, though we may not yet be able to produce what is much more valuable.

8. The first name, in an opposite class, that we find in descending from the sixteenth century, is that of Campanella. Thomas Campanella, whose earliest writings belong to it. His philosophy, being wholly dogmatical, must be classed with that of the paradoxical innovators whom he followed and eclipsed. Campanella, a Dominican friar, and, like his master Telesio, a native of Cosenza, having been accused, it is uncertain how far with truth, of a conspiracy against the Spanish government of his country, underwent an imprisonment of twenty-seven years; during which, almost all his philosophical treatises were composed and given to the world. Ardent and rapid in his mind, and, as has just been seen, not destitute of leisure, he wrote on logic, physics, metaphysics, morals, politics, and grammar. Upon all these subjects, his aim seems to have been to recede as far as possible from Aristotle. He had early begun to distrust this guide, and had formed a noble resolution to study all schemes of philosophy, comparing them with their archetype, the world itself, that he might distinguish how much exactness was to be found in those several copies, as they ought to be, from one autograph of nature.¹

9. Campanella borrowed his primary theorems from Telesio, but enlarged that Parmenidean philosophy by the inventions of his own fertile and imaginative genius. His theory taken from Telesio. He lays down the fundamental principle, that the perfectly wise and good Being has created certain signs and types (*statuas atque imagines*) of himself, all of which, severally as well as collectively, represent power, wisdom, and love, and the objects of these attributes, namely, existence, truth, and excellence, with more or less evidence. God first created space, the basis of existence, the primal substance, an immovable and incorporeal capacity of receiving body. Next he created matter without form or figure. In this cor-

¹ Cypriani Vita Campanella, p. 7.

poreal mass, God called to being two workmen, incorporeal themselves, but incapable of subsisting apart from body, the organs of no physical forms, but of their Maker alone. These are heat and cold, the active principles diffused through all things. They were enemies from the beginning, each striving to occupy all material substances itself; each therefore always contending with the other, while God foresaw the great good that their discord would produce.¹ The heavens, he says in another passage, were formed by heat out of attenuated matter, the earth by cold out of condensed matter: the sun, being a body of heat, as he rolls round the earth, attacks the colder substance, and converts part of it into air and vapor.² This last part of his theory Campanella must have afterwards changed in words, when he embraced the Copernican system.

10. He united to this physical theory another, not wholly original, but enforced in all his writings with singular confidence and pertinacity, the sensibility of all created beings. All things, he says, feel; else would the world be a chaos. For neither would fire tend upwards, nor stones downwards, nor waters to the sea; but every thing would remain where it was, were it not conscious that destruction awaits it by remaining amidst that which is contrary to itself, and that it can only be preserved by seeking that which is of a similar nature. Contrariety is necessary for the decay and reproduction of nature; but all things strive against their contraries, which they could not do if they did not perceive what is their contrary.³ God, who is primal power, wisdom, and love, has bestowed on all things the power of existence, and so much wisdom and love as is necessary for their conser-

Notion of
universal
sensibility.

¹ "In hac corporea mole tantæ materia statas, dixit Deus, ut nascerentur fabri duo incorporei, sed non potentes nisi a corpore subsistere, nullarum physicarum formarum organa, sed formatoris tantummodo. Idecirco nati calor et frigus, principia activa principalia, ideoque suæ virtutis diffusiva. Statim inimici fuerunt mutuo, dum uterque cupit totam substantiam materialem occupare. Hinc contra se invicem pugnare coeperunt, providente Deo ex hujusmodi discordia ingens bonum." — *Philosophia Realis Epilogistica* (Frankfort, 1623), sect. 4.

² This is in the *Compendium de Rerum Natura pro Philosophia humana*, published by Adams in 1617. In his *Apology for*

Galileo, in 1622, Campanella defends the Copernican system, and says that the modern astronomers think they cannot construct good ephemerides without it.

³ "Omnia ergo sentiunt; alias mundus esset chaos. Ignis enim non sursum tenderet, nec aqua in mare, nec lapides deorsum; sed res omnis ubi primo reperiretur, permaneret, cum non sentiret sui destructionem inter contraria nec sui conservationem inter similia. Non esset in mundo generatio et corruptio nisi esset contrarietas, sicut omnes physiologi affirmant. At si alterum contrarium non sentiret alterum sibi esse contrarium, contra ipsum non pugnaret. Sentiunt ergo singula." — *De Sensu Rerum*, l. i. c. 4.

vation during that time only for which his providence has determined that they shall be. Heat, therefore, has power and sense, and desire of its own being; so have all other things seeking to be eternal like God: and in God they are eternal; for nothing dies before him, but is only changed.¹ Even to the world as a sentient being, the death of its parts is no evil, since the death of one is the birth of many. Bread that is swallowed dies to revive as blood, and blood dies that it may live again in our flesh and bones; and thus, as the life of man is compounded out of the deaths and lives of all his parts, so is it with the whole universe.² God said, Let all things feel, some more, some less, as they have more or less necessity to imitate my being; and let them desire to live in that which they understand to be good for them, lest my creation should come to nought.³

11. The strength of Campanella's genius lay in his imagination, which raises him sometimes to flights of impressive eloquence on this favorite theme. "The sky and stars are endowed with the keenest sensibility; nor is it unreasonable to suppose that they signify their mutual thoughts to each other by the transference of light, and that their sensibility is full of pleasure. The blessed spirits that inform such living and bright mansions behold all things in nature and in the divine ideas: they have also a more glorious light than their own, through which they are elevated to a supernatural beatific vision."⁴ We can hardly

¹ "Igitur ipse Deus, qui est prima potentia, prima sapientia, primus amor, largitus est rebus omnibus potentiam vivendi, et sapientiam et amorem quantum sufficit conservationi ipsarum in tanto tempore necessarie, quantum determinavit ejus mens pro rerum regimine in ipso ente, nec præteriri potest. Calor ergo potest, sentit, amat esse: ita et res omnis, cupitque eternari sicut Deus, et Deo res nulla moritur, sed solummodo mutatur," &c. — I. II. c. 26.

² "Non est malus ignis in suo esse; terræ autem malus videtur, non autem mundo: nec vipera mala est, licet homini sit mala. Ita de omnibus idem prædico. Mors quoque rei unius si nativitas est multarum rerum, mala non est. Moritur panis manducatus, ut fiat sanguis, et sanguis moritur, ut in carnem, nervos et ossa vertatur ac vivat: neque tamen hoc universo displicet animal, quamvis partibus mors ipsa, hoc est, transmutatio dolorifica sit, displicetque. Ita utilis est mundo transmutatio eorum particularium noxia displicensque illis. Totus homo compositus est ex morte ac vita partialibus, quæ integrant vitam humanam. Sic mundus totus ex mortibus ac vitibus compositus est, quæ totius vitam efficiunt." — *Philosop. Reale*, c. 10.

³ "Sentiant alia magis, alia minus, prout magis minusque opus habent, ut me imitentur in essendo. Ibidem ament omnia vivere in proprio esse præcognito ut bono, ne corrumpat factura mea." — *Id.*, c. 10.

⁴ "Animæ beatæ habitantes sic vivas lucidasque mansiones, res naturales vident omnes divinasque ideas, habent quoque lumen gloriosius quo elevantur ad visionem supernaturalem beatificam, et veluti apud nos lucæ plurimæ sese mutuo tangunt, intersecant, decussant, sentiuntque, ita in cælo lucæ distinguuntur, ununtur, sentiunt." — *De Sensu Rerum*, I. III. c. 4.

read this without recollecting the most sublime passage, perhaps, in Shakspeare:—

"St. Jessica. Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold!
There's not the smallest orb, which thou behold'st,
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubim.
Such harmony is in immortal souls;
But, while this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close us in, we cannot hear it." ¹

12. "The world is full of living spirits," he proceeds; "and, when the soul shall be delivered from this dark cavern, we shall behold their subtle essences. But now we cannot discern the forms of the air, and the winds as they rush by us; much less the angels and demons who people them. Miserable as we are, we recognize no other sensation than that which we observe in animals and plants, slow and half extinguished, and buried under a weight that oppresses it. We will not understand that all our actions and appetites and motions and powers flow from heaven. Look at the manner in which light is diffused over the earth, penetrating every part of it with endless variety of operation, which we must believe that it does not perform without exquisite pleasure."² And hence there is no vacuum in nature, except by violent means; since all bodies delight in mutual contact, and the world no more desires to be rent in its parts than an animal.

13. It is almost a descent in Campanella from these visions of the separate sensibility of nature in each particle, when he seizes hold of some physical fact or analogy to establish a subordinate and less paradoxical part of his theory. He was much pleased with Gilbert's treatise on the magnet, and thought it, of course, a proof of the animation of the earth. The world is an animal, he says, sentient as a whole, and enjoying life in all its parts.³ It is not surprising that he

¹ Merchant of Venice, act v.

² "Prætervolant in conspectu nostro vasti et ær, at nihil eos videmus, multo minus videmus Angelos Demonesque, quorum plenus est mundus."

"Infelices qui sensum alium nullum agnoscimus, nihil obtusum animalium plantarumque, tardum, demortuum, aggratum, sepultum: nec quidem intelligere volumus omnem actionem nostram et appetitum et sensum et motum et vim a cælo manare. Ecce lux quanto acutissimo expanditur sensu super terram, quo multiplicatur, generatur, amplificatur, id-

que non sine magna efficere voluptate existimanda est."—l. lii. c. 5.

Campanella used to hear, as he tells us, whenever any evil was impending, a voice calling him by his name, sometimes with other words: he doubted whether this were his proper demon, or the air itself speaking. It is not wonderful that his imagination was affected by length of confinement.

³ "Mundum esse animal, totum sentiens, omnesque portiones ejus communi gaudere vita."—l. i. c. 9.

ascribes intelligence to plants; but he here remarks, that we find the male and female sexes in them, and that the latter cannot fructify without the former. This is manifest in siliquose plants and in palms (which on this account he calls in another place the wiser plants, *plantæ sapientiores*), in which the two kinds incline towards each other for the purpose of fructification.¹

14. Campanella, when he uttered from his Neapolitan prison these dulcet sounds of fantasy, had the advantage of finding a pious disciple who spread them over other parts of Europe. This was Tobias Adami, initiated, as he tells us, in the same mysteries as himself (*nostræ philosophiæ symmysta*), who dedicated to the philosophers of Germany his own *Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ*, prefixed to his edition of Campanella's *Compendium de Rerum Natura*, published at Frankfort in 1617. Most of the other writings of the master seem to have preceded this edition; for Adami enumerates them in his *Prodromus*.² Campanella did not fully obtain his liberty till 1629, and died some years afterwards in France, where he had experienced the kindness of Peiresc and the patronage of Richelieu. His philosophy made no very deep impression: it was too fanciful, too arbitrary, too much tinctured with marks of an imagination rendered morbid by solitude, to gain many proselytes in an age that was advancing in severe science. Gassendi, whose good nature led him to receive Campanella, oppressed by poverty and ill usage, with every courteous attention, was, of all men, the last to be seduced by his theories. No one, probably, since Campanella, aspiring to be reckoned among philosophers, has ventured to assert so much on matters of high speculative importance, and to prove so little. Yet he seems worthy of the notice we have taken of him, if it were only as the last of the mere dogmatists in philosophy. He is doubtless much superior to Jordano Bruno, and I should presume, except in mathematics, to Cardan.³

¹ "Inveniunt in plantis sexum masculinum et femininum, ut in animalibus, et feminam non fructificare sine masculi congressu. Hoc patet in siliquis et in palmis, quarum mas feminaque inclinatur mutuo alter in alterum et sese ceculantur, et femina impregnatur, nec fructificat sine mare: immo conspicitur dolens, squallida mortuæque, et pulvere illius et odore reviviscit."

² [*Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ* is only a titlepage. Adami contributed a preface to this edition of Campanella's work; but the words *Prodromus*, &c., are meant for the latter, and not for any thing written by the editor. See *Notes and Queries*, vol. iv. p. 275. — 1853.]

³ Brucker (vol. v. pp. 106-144) has given a laborious analysis of the philosophy of Campanella.

15. A less important adversary of the established theory in physics was Sebastian Basson, in his "*Philosophiæ Naturalis adversus Aristotelem Libri XII.*, in quibus abstrusa veterum physiologia restauratur, et Aristotelis errores solidis rationibus refelluntur. Genevæ, 1621." This book shows great animosity against Aristotle, to whom, what Lord Bacon has himself insinuated, he allows only the credit of having preserved fragments of the older philosophers, like pearls in mud. It is difficult to give an account of this long work. In some places we perceive signs of a just philosophy; but in general his explanations of physical phenomena seem as bad as those of his opponents; and he displays no acquaintance with the writings and the discoveries of his great contemporaries. We find also some geometrical paradoxes; and, in treating of astronomy, he writes as if he had never heard of the Copernican system.

16. Claude Berigard, born at Moulins, became professor of natural philosophy at Pisa and Padua. In his *Circuli Pisanii*, published in 1643, he attempted to revive, as it is commonly said, the Ionic or corpuscular philosophy of Anaxagoras, in opposition to the Aristotelian. The book is rare; but Brucker, who had seen it, seems to have satisfactorily repelled the charge of atheism, brought by some against Berigard.¹ Another Frenchman domiciled in Italy, Magnen, trod nearly the same path as Berigard; professing, however, to follow the modification of the corpuscular theory introduced by Democritus.² It seems to be observable as to these writers, Basson and the others, that coming with no sufficient knowledge of what had recently been discovered in mathematical and experimental science, and following the bad methods of the universities, even when they deviated from their usual doctrines, dogmatizing and asserting when they should have proved, arguing synthetically from axioms and never ascending from particular facts, they could do little good to philosophy, except by contributing, so far as they might be said to have had any influence, to shake the authority of Aristotle.

17. This authority, which at least required but the defer-

¹ Brucker, iv. 400; Nicéron, xxxi., where he is inserted by the name of Beau-regard, which is probably more correct, but against usage.

² Brucker (p. 504) thinks that Magnen

misunderstood the atomic theory of Democritus, and substituted one quite different in his *Democritus Revisio*, published in 1646.

ence of modest reason to one of the greatest of mankind, was ill exchanged, in any part of science, for the unintelligible dreams of the school of Paracelsus, which had many disciples in Germany, and a very few in England. Germany, indeed, has been the native soil of mysticism in Europe. The tendency to reflex observation of the mind, characteristic of that people, has exempted them from much gross error, and given them insight into many depths of truth, but at the expense of some confusion, some liability to self-deceit, and to some want of strictness in metaphysical reasoning. It was accompanied by a profound sense of the presence of Deity; yet one which, acting on their thoughtful spirits, became rather an impression than an intellectual judgment, and settled into a mysterious indefinite theopathy, when it did not even evaporate in Pantheism.

18. The founder, perhaps, of this sect, was Tauler of Strasburg, in the fourteenth century, whose sermons in the native language—which, however, are supposed to have been translated from Latin—are full of what many have called by the vague word mysticism,—an intense aspiration for the union of the soul with God. An anonymous work generally entitled the German Theology, written in the fifteenth century, pursues the same track of devotional thought. It was a favorite book with Luther, and was translated into Latin by Castalio.¹ These, indeed, are to be considered chiefly as theological; but the study of them led readily to a state of mental emotion, wherein a dogmatic pseudo-philosophy, like that of Paracelsus, abounding with assertions that imposed on the imagination, and appealing frequently both to scriptural authority and the evidence of inward light, was sure to be favorably received. The mystics, therefore, and the theosophists, belonged to the same class; and it is not uncommon to use the names indifferently.

19. It may appear not here required to dwell on a subject scarcely falling under any province of literary history; but two writers within this period have been sufficiently distinguished to deserve mention. One of these was Robert Fludd, an English physician, who died in 1637; a man of indefatigable diligence in collecting the dreams and

¹ Episcopius places the author of the *Theologia Germanica*, with Henry Nicolas and David George, among mere enthusiasts.

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than their own, bespeaks either ignorance of philosophical literature, or a supercilious neglect of it.

22. Lord Herbert lays down seven primary axioms:—
 1. Truth exists; 2. It is coeval with the things to which it relates; 3. It exists everywhere; 4. It is self-evident;¹ 5. There are as many truths as there are differences in things; 6. These differences are made known to us by our natural faculties; 7. There is a truth belonging to these truths,—“*Est veritas quædam harum veritatum.*” This axiom he explains as obscurely as it is strangely expressed. All truth he then distinguishes into the truth of the thing or object, the truth of the appearance, the truth of the perception, and the truth of the understanding. The truth of the object is the inherent conformity of the object with itself, or that which makes every thing what it is.² The truth of appearance is the conditional conformity of the appearance with the object. The truth of perception is the conditional conformity of our senses (*facultates nostras prodromas*) with the appearances of things. The truth of understanding is the due conformity between the aforesaid conformities. All truth therefore is conformity; all conformity, relation. Three things are to be observed in every inquiry after truth,—the thing or object, the sense or faculty, and the laws or conditions by which its conformity or relation is determined. Lord Herbert is so obscure, partly by not thoroughly grasping his subject, partly by writing in Latin, partly perhaps by the *sphalmata et errata in typographo, quædam fortasse in seipso*, of which he complains at the end, that it has been necessary to omit several sentences as unintelligible; though what I have just given is far enough from being too clear.

23. Truth, he goes on to say, exists as to the object, or outward thing itself, when our faculties are capable of determining every thing concerning it; but, though this definition is exact, it is doubtful, he observes, whether any such truth exists in nature. The first condition of discerning truth in things is that they should have a relation to ourselves (*ut intra nostram stet analogiam*); since multitudes of things may exist which the senses cannot discover. The

¹ “*Hæc veritas est in se manifesta.*” He observes that what are called false appearances are true as such, though not true according to the reality of the object: “*Sed veritas apparentiæ falsæ inest,* verè enim ita apparebit, verè tamen ex veritate rei non erit.”
² “*Inherens illa conformitas rei cum seipso, sive illa ratio, ex qua res unaquæque sibi constat.*”

lecius, Burgersdicius, and our countryman Crakanthorp, all of whom flourished, if we may use such a word for those who bore no flowers, in the earlier part of the next age. As these men were famous in their generation, we may presume that they at least wrote better than their predecessors. But it is time to leave so jejune a subject, though we may not yet be able to produce what is much more valuable.

8. The first name, in an opposite class, that we find in descending from the sixteenth century, is that of Campanella. Thomas Campanella, whose earliest writings belong to it. His philosophy, being wholly dogmatical, must be classed with that of the paradoxical innovators whom he followed and eclipsed. Campanella, a Dominican friar, and, like his master Telesio, a native of Cosenza, having been accused, it is uncertain how far with truth, of a conspiracy against the Spanish government of his country, underwent an imprisonment of twenty-seven years; during which, almost all his philosophical treatises were composed and given to the world. Ardent and rapid in his mind, and, as has just been seen, not destitute of leisure, he wrote on logic, physics, metaphysics, morals, politics, and grammar. Upon all these subjects, his aim seems to have been to recede as far as possible from Aristotle. He had early begun to distrust this guide, and had formed a noble resolution to study all schemes of philosophy, comparing them with their archetype, the world itself, that he might distinguish how much exactness was to be found in those several copies, as they ought to be, from one autograph of nature.¹

9. Campanella borrowed his primary theorems from Telesio, but enlarged that Parmenidean philosophy by the inventions of his own fertile and imaginative genius. He lays down the fundamental principle, that the perfectly wise and good Being has created certain signs and types (*statuas atque imagines*) of himself, all of which, severally as well as collectively, represent power, wisdom, and love, and the objects of these attributes, namely, existence, truth, and excellence, with more or less evidence. God first created space, the basis of existence, the primal substance, an immovable and incorporeal capacity of receiving body. Next he created matter without form or figure. In this cor-

¹ Cypriani Vita Campanellae, p. 7.

poreal mass, God called to being two workmen, incorporeal themselves, but incapable of subsisting apart from body, the organs of no physical forms, but of their Maker alone. These are heat and cold, the active principles diffused through all things. They were enemies from the beginning, each striving to occupy all material substances itself; each therefore always contending with the other, while God foresaw the great good that their discord would produce.¹ The heavens, he says in another passage, were formed by heat out of attenuated matter, the earth by cold out of condensed matter: the sun, being a body of heat, as he rolls round the earth, attacks the colder substance, and converts part of it into air and vapor.² This last part of his theory Campanella must have afterwards changed in words, when he embraced the Copernican system.

10. He united to this physical theory another, not wholly original, but enforced in all his writings with singular confidence and pertinacity, the sensibility of all created beings. All things, he says, feel; else would the world be a chaos. For neither would fire tend upwards, nor stones downwards, nor waters to the sea; but every thing would remain where it was, were it not conscious that destruction awaits it by remaining amidst that which is contrary to itself, and that it can only be preserved by seeking that which is of a similar nature. Contrariety is necessary for the decay and reproduction of nature; but all things strive against their contraries, which they could not do if they did not perceive what is their contrary.³ God, who is primal power, wisdom, and love, has bestowed on all things the power of existence, and so much wisdom and love as is necessary for their conser-

Notion of
universal
sensibility.

¹ "In hac corporea mole tanta materia statim, dixit Deus, ut nascerentur fabri duo incorporei, sed non potentes nisi a corpore subsistere, nullarum physicarum formarum organa, sed formatoris tantummodo. Idcirco nati calor et frigus, principia activa principalia, ideoque suae virtutis diffusiva. Statim inimici fuerunt mutuo, dum uterque cupit totam substantiam materialem occupare. Hinc contra se invicem pugnare ceperunt, providente Deo ex huiusmodi discordia ingens bonum." — *Philosophia Reale Epilogistica* (Frankfort, 1623), sect. 4.

² This is in the *Compendium de Rerum Natura* pro *Philosophia humana*, published by Adams in 1617. In his *Apology* for

Galileo, in 1622, Campanella defends the Copernican system, and says that the modern astronomers think they cannot construct good ephemerides without it.

³ "Omnia ergo sentiunt; alias mundus esset chaos. Ignis enim non sursum tenderet, nec aquae in mare, nec lapides deorsum; sed res omnia ubi primo reperiretur, permaneret, cum non sentiret sui destructionem inter contraria nec sui conservationem inter similia. Non esset in mundo generatio et corruptio nisi esset contrarietas, sicut omnes physiologi affirmant. At si alterum contrarium non sentiret alterum sibi esse contrarium, contra ipsum non pugnaret. Sentiunt ergo singula." — *De Sensu Rerum*, l. i. c. 4.

vation during that time only for which his providence has determined that they shall be. Heat, therefore, has power and sense, and desire of its own being; so have all other things seeking to be eternal like God: and in God they are eternal; for nothing dies before him, but is only changed.¹ Even to the world as a sentient being, the death of its parts is no evil, since the death of one is the birth of many. Bread that is swallowed dies to revive as blood, and blood dies that it may live again in our flesh and bones; and thus, as the life of man is compounded out of the deaths and lives of all his parts, so is it with the whole universe.² God said, Let all things feel, some more, some less, as they have more or less necessity to imitate my being; and let them desire to live in that which they understand to be good for them, lest my creation should come to nought.³

11. The strength of Campanella's genius lay in his imagination, which raises him sometimes to flights of impressive eloquence on this favorite theme. "The sky and stars are endowed with the keenest sensibility; nor is it unreasonable to suppose that they signify their mutual thoughts to each other by the transference of light, and that their sensibility is full of pleasure. The blessed spirits that inform such living and bright mansions behold all things in nature and in the divine ideas: they have also a more glorious light than their own, through which they are elevated to a supernatural beatific vision."⁴ We can hardly

¹ "Igitur ipse Deus, qui est prima potentia, prima sapientia, primus amor, largitus est rebus omnibus potentiam vivendi, et sapientiam et amorem quantum sufficit conservationi ipsarum in tanto tempore necessariae, quantum determinavit ejus mens pro rerum regimine in ipso ente, nec præteriri potest. Calor ergo potest, sentit, amat esse: ita et res omnis, cupitque eternari sicut Deus, et Deo res nulla moritur, sed solummodo mutatur," &c. — I. ii. c. 26.

² "Non est malus ignis in suo esse; terræ autem malus videtur, non autem mundo: nec vipera mala est, licet homini sit mala. Ita de omnibus idem prædico. Mors quoque rei unius si natiuitas est multarum rerum, mala non est. Moritur panis manducatus, ut fiat sanguis, et sanguis moritur, ut in carnem, nervos et ossa vertatur ac vivat: neque tamen hoc universo displicet animal, quamvis partibus mors ipsæ, hoc est, transmutatio dolorifica sit, displicetque. Ita utilis est mundo transmutatio eorum particularium noxia displicensque illis. Totus homo compositus est ex morte ac vita partialibus, quæ integrant vitam humanam. Sic mundus totus ex mortibus ac vitibus compositus est, quæ totius vitam efficiunt." — Philosoph. Realis, c. 10.

³ "Sentiant alia magis, alia minus, prout magis minusque opus habent, ut me imitentur in essendo. Ibidem ament omnia vivere in proprio esse præcognito ut bono, ne corrumpat factura mea." — Id., c. 10.

⁴ "Animæ beatae habitantes sic vias lucidasque mansiones, res naturales vident omnes divinasque ideas, habent quoque lumen gloriosius quo eleuantur ad visionem supernaturalem beatificam, et veluti apud nos lucēs plurimæ esse mutuo tangunt, intersecant, decussant, sentiuntque, ita in celo lucēs distinguuntur, ununtur, sentiunt." — De Sensu Rerum, I. iii. c. 4.

read this without recollecting the most sublime passage, perhaps, in Shakspeare :—

"*St. Jessica. Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold!
There's not the smallest orb, which thou behold'st,
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubim.
Such harmony is in immortal souls;
But, while this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close us in, we cannot hear it.*"¹

12. "The world is full of living spirits," he proceeds; "and, when the soul shall be delivered from this dark cavern, we shall behold their subtle essences. But now we cannot discern the forms of the air, and the winds as they rush by us; much less the angels and demons who people them. Miserable as we are, we recognize no other sensation than that which we observe in animals and plants, slow and half extinguished, and buried under a weight that oppresses it. We will not understand that all our actions and appetites and motions and powers flow from heaven. Look at the manner in which light is diffused over the earth, penetrating every part of it with endless variety of operation, which we must believe that it does not perform without exquisite pleasure."² And hence there is no vacuum in nature, except by violent means; since all bodies delight in mutual contact, and the world no more desires to be rent in its parts than an animal.

13. It is almost a descent in Campanella from these visions of the separate sensibility of nature in each particle, when he seizes hold of some physical fact or analogy to establish a subordinate and less paradoxical part of his theory. He was much pleased with Gilbert's treatise on the magnet, and thought it, of course, a proof of the animation of the earth. The world is an animal, he says, sentient as a whole, and enjoying life in all its parts.³ It is not surprising that he

¹ Merchant of Venice, act v.

² "Prætervolant in conspectu nostro venti et aer, at nihil eos videmus, multo minus videmus Angelos Dæmonasque, quorum plenus est mundus.

"Infelices qui æceum alium nullum agnoscimus, nudi obtusum animalium plantarumque, tardum, demortuum, aggravatum, sepultum: nec quidem intelligere volumus omnem actionem nostram et appetitum et sensum et motum et vim a cæcis manare. Ecce lux quanto acutius expanditur sensu super terram, quo multiplicatur, generatur, amplificatur, id-

que non sine magna efficere voluptate existimanda est."—l. iii. c. 5.

Campanella used to hear, as he tells us, whenever any evil was impending, a voice calling him by his name, sometimes with other words: he doubted whether this were his proper demon, or the air itself speaking. It is not wonderful that his imagination was affected by length of confinement.

³ "Mundum esse animal, totum sentiens, omnesque portiones ejus communi gaudere vita."—l. i. c. 9.

ascribes intelligence to plants; but he here remarks, that we find the male and female sexes in them, and that the latter cannot fructify without the former. This is manifest in siliquose plants and in palms (which on this account he calls in another place the wiser plants, *plantæ sapientiores*), in which the two kinds incline towards each other for the purpose of fructification.¹

14. Campanella, when he uttered from his Neapolitan prison these dulcet sounds of fantasy, had the advantage of finding a pious disciple who spread them over other parts of Europe. This was Tobias Adami, initiated, as he tells us, in the same mysteries as himself (*nostræ philosophiæ symmysta*), who dedicated to the philosophers of Germany his own *Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ*, prefixed to his edition of Campanella's *Compendium de Rerum Natura*, published at Frankfort in 1617. Most of the other writings of the master seem to have preceded this edition; for Adami enumerates them in his *Prodromus*.² Campanella did not fully obtain his liberty till 1629, and died some years afterwards in France, where he had experienced the kindness of Peiresc and the patronage of Richelieu. His philosophy made no very deep impression: it was too fanciful, too arbitrary, too much tinctured with marks of an imagination rendered morbid by solitude, to gain many proselytes in an age that was advancing in severe science. Gassendi, whose good nature led him to receive Campanella, oppressed by poverty and ill usage, with every courteous attention, was, of all men, the last to be seduced by his theories. No one, probably, since Campanella, aspiring to be reckoned among philosophers, has ventured to assert so much on matters of high speculative importance, and to prove so little. Yet he seems worthy of the notice we have taken of him, if it were only as the last of the mere dogmatists in philosophy. He is doubtless much superior to Jordano Bruno, and I should presume, except in mathematics, to Cardan.³

¹ "Invenimus in plantis sexum masculinum et femininum, ut in animalibus, et feminam non fructificare sine masculi congressu. Hoc patet in siliquis et in palmis, quarum mas feminaque inclinantur mutuo alter in alterum et sese oculantur, et femina impregnatur, nec fructificat sine mare; immo conspiciuntur dolens, aqualida mortuaque, et pulvere illius et odore reviviscit."

² [*Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ* is only a titlepage. Adami contributed a preface to this edition of Campanella's work; but the words *Prodromus*, &c., are meant for the latter, and not for any thing written by the editor. See *Notes and Queries*, vol. iv. p. 275. — 1853.]

³ Brucker (vol. v. pp. 106-144) has given a laborious analysis of the philosophy of Campanella.

15. A less important adversary of the established theory in physics was Sebastian Basson, in his "*Philosophiæ Naturalis adversus Aristotelem Libri XII.*, in quibus abstrusa veterum physiologia restauratur, et Aristotelis errores solidis rationibus refelluntur. Geneva, 1621." This book shows great animosity against Aristotle, to whom, what Lord Bacon has himself insinuated, he allows only the credit of having preserved fragments of the older philosophers, like pearls in mud. It is difficult to give an account of this long work. In some places we perceive signs of a just philosophy; but in general his explanations of physical phenomena seem as bad as those of his opponents; and he displays no acquaintance with the writings and the discoveries of his great contemporaries. We find also some geometrical paradoxes; and, in treating of astronomy, he writes as if he had never heard of the Copernican system.

16. Claude Berigard, born at Moulins, became professor of natural philosophy at Pisa and Padua. In his *Circuli Pisani*, published in 1643, he attempted to revive, as it is commonly said, the Ionic or corpuscular philosophy of Anaxagoras, in opposition to the Aristotelian. The book is rare; but Brucker, who had seen it, seems to have satisfactorily repelled the charge of atheism, brought by some against Berigard.¹ Another Frenchman domiciled in Italy, Magnen, trod nearly the same path as Berigard; professing, however, to follow the modification of the corpuscular theory introduced by Democritus.² It seems to be observable as to these writers, Basson and the others, that coming with no sufficient knowledge of what had recently been discovered in mathematical and experimental science, and following the bad methods of the universities, even when they deviated from their usual doctrines, dogmatizing and asserting when they should have proved, arguing synthetically from axioms and never ascending from particular facts, they could do little good to philosophy, except by contributing, so far as they might be said to have had any influence, to shake the authority of Aristotle.

17. This authority, which at least required but the defer-

¹ Brucker, iv. 469; Nicéron, xxxi., where he is inserted by the name of Beau-regard, which is probably more correct, but against usage.

² Brucker (p. 504) thinks that Magnen

misunderstood the atomic theory of Democritus, and substituted one quite different in his *Democritus Reviviscens*, published in 1648.

ence of modest reason to one of the greatest of mankind, was ill exchanged, in any part of science, for the Paracelsists unintelligible dreams of the school of Paracelsus, which had many disciples in Germany, and a very few in England. Germany, indeed, has been the native soil of mysticism in Europe. The tendency to reflex observation of the mind, characteristic of that people, has exempted them from much gross error, and given them insight into many depths of truth, but at the expense of some confusion, some liability to self-deceit, and to some want of strictness in metaphysical reasoning. It was accompanied by a profound sense of the presence of Deity; yet one which, acting on their thoughtful spirits, became rather an impression than an intellectual judgment, and settled into a mysterious indefinite theopathy, when it did not even evaporate in Pantheism.

18. The founder, perhaps, of this sect, was Tauler of And Theosophists. Strasburg, in the fourteenth century, whose sermons in the native language—which, however, are supposed to have been translated from Latin—are full of what many have called by the vague word mysticism,—an intense aspiration for the union of the soul with God. An anonymous work generally entitled the German Theology, written in the fifteenth century, pursues the same track of devotional thought. It was a favorite book with Luther, and was translated into Latin by Castalio.¹ These, indeed, are to be considered chiefly as theological; but the study of them led readily to a state of mental emotion, wherein a dogmatic pseudo-philosophy, like that of Paracelsus, abounding with assertions that imposed on the imagination, and appealing frequently both to scriptural authority and the evidence of inward light, was sure to be favorably received. The mystics, therefore, and the theosophists, belonged to the same class; and it is not uncommon to use the names indifferently.

19. It may appear not here required to dwell on a subject scarcely falling under any province of literary history; but two writers within this period have been sufficiently distinguished to deserve mention. One of these was Robert Fludd, an English physician, who died in 1637; a man of indefatigable diligence in collecting the dreams and

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than their own, bespeaks either ignorance of philosophical literature, or a supercilious neglect of it.

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1. Truth exists; 2. It is coeval with the things to which it relates; 3. It exists everywhere; 4. It is self-evident;¹ 5. There are as many truths as there are differences in things; 6. These differences are made known to us by our natural faculties; 7. There is a truth belonging to these truths,—“*Est veritas quædam harum veritatum.*” This axiom he explains as obscurely as it is strangely expressed. All truth he then distinguishes into the truth of the thing or object, the truth of the appearance, the truth of the perception, and the truth of the understanding. The truth of the object is the inherent conformity of the object with itself, or that which makes every thing what it is.² The truth of appearance is the conditional conformity of the appearance with the object. The truth of perception is the conditional conformity of our senses (*facultates nostras prodromas*) with the appearances of things. The truth of understanding is the due conformity between the aforesaid conformities. All truth therefore is conformity; all conformity, relation. Three things are to be observed in every inquiry after truth,—the thing or object, the sense or faculty, and the laws or conditions by which its conformity or relation is determined. Lord Herbert is so obscure, partly by not thoroughly grasping his subject, partly by writing in Latin, partly perhaps by the *sphalmata et errata in typographo, quædam fortasse in seipso*, of which he complains at the end, that it has been necessary to omit several sentences as unintelligible; though what I have just given is far enough from being too clear.

23. Truth, he goes on to say, exists as to the object, or outward thing itself, when our faculties are capable of determining every thing concerning it; but, though this definition is exact, it is doubtful, he observes, whether any such truth exists in nature. The first condition of discerning truth in things is that they should have a relation to ourselves (*ut intra nostram stet analogiam*); since multitudes of things may exist which the senses cannot discover. The

¹ “*Hæc veritas est in se manifesta.*” He observes that what are called false appearances are true as such, though not true according to the reality of the object: “*Sua veritas apparentiæ falsæ inest,*

verè enim ita apparebit, verà tamen ex veritate rei non erit.”

² “*Inherentis illi conformitas rei cum seipso, sive illa ratio, ex qua res unaquæque sibi constat.*”

three chief constituents of this condition seem to be, 1. That it should be of a proper size, neither immense nor too small; 2. That it should have its determining difference, or principle of individuation, to distinguish it from other things; 3. That it should be accommodated to some sense or perceptive faculty. These are the universally necessary conditions of truth (that is, of knowledge) as it regards the object. The truth of appearance depends on others, which are more particular; as that the object should be perceived for a sufficient time, through a proper medium, at a due distance, in a proper situation.¹ Truth of perception is conditional also; and its conditions are that the sense should be sound, and the attention directed towards it. Truth of understanding depends on the *κοινὰ νοήματα*, the common notions possessed by every man of sane mind, and implanted by nature. The understanding teaches us, by means of these, that infinity and eternity exist, though our senses cannot perceive them. The understanding deals also with universals; and truth is known as to universals, when the particulars are rightly apprehended.

24. Our faculties are as numerous as the differences of things; and thus it is, that the world corresponds by ^{instinctive} ~~truths.~~ perfect analogy to the human soul, degrees of perception being as much distinct from one another as different modes of it. All our powers may, however, be reduced to four heads; natural instinct, internal perception, external sensation, and reason. What is not known by one of these four means cannot be known at all. Instinctive truths are proved by universal consent. Here he comes to his general basis of religion, maintaining the existence of *κοινὰ νοήματα*, or common notions of mankind on that subject; principles against which no one can dispute, without violating the laws of his nature.² Natural instinct he defines to be an act of those faculties existing in every man of sane mind, by which the common notions as to the relations of things not perceived by the senses (*rerum internarum*), and especially such as tend to the conservation of the individual, of the species, and of the

¹ Lord Herbert defines appearance, "icetypum, seu forma vicaria rei, quæ sub conditionibus latis cum prototypo suo confirmata, cum conceptu deo sub conditionibus etiam suis, conformari et modo quodam spiritali, tanquam ab objecto derivata, etiam in objecti absentia conservari potest."

² "Principia illa sacrosancta, contra quæ disputare nefas." — p. 44. I have translated this in the best sense I could give it: but to use *fas* or *nefas*, before we have defined their meaning, or proved their existence, is but indifferent logic.

whole, are formed without any process of reasoning. These common notions, though excited in us by the objects of sense, are not conveyed to us by them: they are implanted in us by nature; so that God seems to have imparted to us not only a part of his image, but of his wisdom.¹ And whatever is understood and perceived by all men alike deserves to be accounted one of these notions. Some of them are instinctive, others are deduced from such as are. The former are distinguishable by six marks, — priority, independence, universality, certainty, so that no man can doubt them without putting off, as it were, his nature; necessity, that is, usefulness for the preservation of man; lastly, intuitive apprehension, for these common notions do not require to be inferred.²

25. Internal perceptions denote the conformity of objects with those faculties existing in every man of sane mind, which, being developed by his natural in-^{Internal perceptions.}stinct, are conversant with the internal relations of things in a secondary and particular manner, and by means of natural instinct.³ By this ill-worded definition he probably intends to distinguish the general power, or instinctive knowledge, from its exercise and application in any instance. But I have found it very difficult to follow Lord Herbert. It is by means, he says, of these internal senses that we discern the nature of things in their intrinsic relations, or hidden types of being;⁴ and it is necessary well to distinguish the conforming faculty in the mind, or internal perception, from the bodily sense. The cloudiness of his expression increases as we proceed, and in many pages I cannot venture to translate or abridge it. The injudicious use of a language in which he did not write with facility, and which is not very well adapted, at the best, to metaphysical disquisition, has doubtless increased the perplexity into which he has thrown his readers.

26. In the conclusion of this treatise, Herbert lays down the five common notions of natural religion, implanted, as he conceives, in the breasts of all mankind. 1. That there is a God; 2. That he ought to be worshipped; 3. That virtue and piety are the chief parts of worship; 4. That we

¹ P. 48.

² P. 60.

³ "Sensus interni sunt actus conformitatis objectorum cum facultatibus illis in omni homine anno et integro existentibus, quæ ab instinctu naturali expositæ,

circa analogiam rerum internam, particulariter, secundario, et ratione instinctus naturalis variantur." — p. 66.

⁴ "Circa analogiam rerum internam, sive signaturas et characteres rerum penitiores variantur." — p. 68.

are to repent, and turn from our sins; 5. That there are rewards and punishments in another life.¹ Nothing can be admitted in religion which contradicts these primary notions; but if any one has a revelation from heaven in addition to these, which may happen to him sleeping or waking, he should keep it to himself, since nothing can be of importance to the human race which is not established by the evidence of their common faculties. Nor can any thing be known to be revealed which is not revealed to ourselves; all else being tradition and historic testimony, which does not amount to knowledge. The specific difference of man from other animals, he makes, not reason, but the capacity of religion. It is a curious coincidence, that John Wesley has said something of the same kind.² It is also remarkable that we find in another work of Lord Herbert, *De Religione Gentilium*, which dwells again on his five articles of natural religion, essential, as he expressly lays it down, to salvation, the same illustration of the being of a Deity from the analogy of a watch or clock, which Paley has since employed. I believe that it occurs in an intermediate writer.³

27. Lord Herbert sent a copy of his treatise *De Veritate*, several years after its publication, to Gassendi. We have a letter to the noble author in the third volume of the works of that philosopher, showing, in the candid and sincere spirit natural to him, the objections that struck his mind in reading the book.⁴ Gassendi observes that the distinctions of four kinds of truth are not new; the *veritas rei* of Lord Herbert being what is usually called

¹ P. 222.

² I have somewhere read a profound remark of Wesley, that, considering the sagacity which many animals display, we cannot fix upon reason as the distinction between them and man: the true difference is that we are formed to know God, and they are not.

³ "Et quidem si horologium per diem et noctem integram horas signanter indicans, viderit quispiam non mente captus, id consilio arteque summa factum judicaverit. Nequis non planè demens, qui hanc mundi machinam non per viginti quatuor horas tantum, sed per tot secula circuitus suos obeuntem animadverterit, non id omne sapientiasimo utique potentissimoque alicui auctori tribuat?"—*De Relig. Gentil.*, cap. xiii.

[The original idea, as has been rightly pointed out to me by M. Alphonse Bor-

ghers, the translator of this work, as well as of my *History of the Middle Ages*, is in Cicero *de Nat. Deorum*, li. 34. "Quod si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam, spheram aliquis tulerit hanc, quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cujus singulæ conversiones idem efficiunt in sole, et in luna, et in quinque stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in celo singulis diebus et noctibus: quis in illa barbarie dubitet, quin ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione?" And, with respect to intermediate writers between Lord Herbert and Paley, I have been referred, by two other correspondents, to Hale's *Primitive Origination of Mankind*, where I had myself suspected it to be; and to Nieuwenyt's *Religious Philosopher* (English translation, 1730), p. xlv. of preface.—1842.]

⁴ Gassendi Opera, lib. iii.

substance, his *veritas apparentiæ* no more than accident, and the other two being only sense and reason. Gassendi seems not wholly to approve, but gives as the best, a definition of truth little differing from Herbert's, the agreement of the cognizant intellect with the thing known: "*Intellectus cognoscentis cum re cognita congruentia.*" The obscurity of the treatise *De Veritate* could ill suit an understanding like that of Gassendi, always tending to acquire clear conceptions; and, though he writes with great civility, it is not without smartly opposing what he does not approve. The aim of Lord Herbert's work, he says, is that the intellect may pierce into the nature of things, knowing them as they are in themselves, without the fallacies of appearance and sense. But, for himself, he confesses that such knowledge he has always found above him, and that he is in darkness when he attempts to investigate the real nature of the least thing; making many of the observations on this which we read also in Locke. And he well says, that we have enough for our use in the accidents or appearances of things, without knowing their substances, in reply to Herbert, who had declared that we should be miserably deficient, if, while nature has given us senses to discern sounds and colors and such fleeting qualities of things, we had no sure road to internal, eternal, and necessary truths.¹ The universality of those innate principles, especially moral and religious, on which his correspondent had built so much, is doubted by Gassendi on the usual grounds, that many have denied or been ignorant of them. The letter is imperfect, some sheets of the autograph having been lost.

28. Too much space may seem to have been bestowed on a writer who cannot be ranked high among metaphysicians. But Lord Herbert was not only a distinguished name, but may claim the priority among those philosophers in England. If his treatise *De Veritate* is not, as an entire work, very successful, or founded always upon principles which have stood the test of severe reflection, it is still a monument of an original, independent thinker, without rhapsodies of imagination, without pedantic technicalities, and, above all, bearing witness to a sincere love of the truth he sought to apprehend. The

¹ "Miserè nobiscum actum esset, si ad percipiendos colores, sonos et qualitates illas internas, æternas, necessarias sine erroribus adducere atque momentaneas sub-essent mediæ, nulla autem ad veritates erroris superasset via."

ambitious expectation that the real essences of things might be discovered, if it were truly his, as Gassendi seems to suppose, could not be warranted by any thing, at least, within the knowledge of that age. But, from some expressions of Herbert, I should infer that he did not think our faculties competent to solve the whole problem of *quiddity*, as the logicians called it, or the real nature of any thing, at least, objectively without us.¹ He is, indeed, so obscure, that I will not vouch for his entire consistency. It has been an additional motive to say as much as I have done concerning Lord Herbert, that I know not where any account of his treatise *De Veritate* will be found. Brucker is strangely silent about this writer, and Buhle has merely adverted to the letter of Gassendi. Descartes has spoken of Lord Herbert's book with much respect, though several of their leading principles were far from the same. It was translated into French in 1639, and this translation he found less difficult than the original.²

29. Gassendi himself ought, perhaps, to be counted wholly among the philosophers of this period; since many of his writings were published, and all may have been completed, within it. They are contained in six large folio volumes, rather closely printed. The *Exercitationes Paradoxicæ*, published in 1624, are the earliest. These contain an attack on the logic of Aristotle, the fortress that so many bold spirits were eager to assail. But, in more advanced life, Gassendi withdrew in great measure from this warfare; and his *Logic*, in the *Syntagma Philosophicum*, the record of his latest opinions, is chiefly modelled on the Aristotelian, with sufficient commendation of its author. In the study of ancient philosophy, however, Gassendi was impressed with an admiration of Epicurus. His physical theory, founded on corpuscles and a vacuum; his ethics, in their principle and precepts; his rules of logic, and guidance of the intellect,—

¹ "Cum facultates nostræ ad analogiam propriam terminatæ quidditates rerum intimas non penetrent: ideo quid res naturalis in seipso sit, tali ex analogia ad nos ut sit constituta, perfecte sciri non potest." —p. 166. In another place, he says it is doubtful whether any thing exist in nature, concerning which we have a complete knowledge. The eternal and necessary truths which Herbert contends for our knowing, seem to have been his *communes notions*, subjectively understood, rather than such as relate to external objects.

² Descartes, vol. viii. pp. 188 and 168. "J'y trouve plusieurs choses fort bonnes, *sed non publici saporis*; car il y a peu de personnes qui soient capables d'entendre la métaphysique. Et, pour le général du livre, il tient un chemin fort différent de celui que j'ai suivi. . . . Enfin, par conclusion, encore que je ne puisse m'accorder en tout aux sentimens de cet auteur, je ne laisse pas de l'estimer beaucoup au-dessus des esprits ordinaires."

seemed to the cool and independent mind of the French philosopher more worthy of regard than the opposite schemes prevailing in the schools, and not to be rejected on account of any discredit attached to the name. Combining with the Epicurean physics and ethics the religious element which had been unnecessarily discarded from the philosophy of the Garden, Gassendi displayed both in a form no longer obnoxious. The *Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri*, published in 1649, is an elaborate vindication of this system, which he had previously expounded in a commentary on the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius. He had already effaced the prejudices against Epicurus himself, whom he seems to have regarded with the affection of a disciple, in a biographical treatise on his life and moral character.

30. Gassendi died in 1656: the *Syntagma Philosophicum*, his greatest as well as last work, in which it is natural to seek the whole scheme of his philosophy, was published by his friend Sorbière in 1658. We may therefore properly defer the consideration of his metaphysical writings to the next period; but the controversy in which he was involved with Descartes will render it necessary to bring his name forward again before the close of this chapter.

His chief works after 1650.

SECTION II.

On the Philosophy of Lord Bacon.

31. It may be judged from what has been said in a former chapter, as well as in our last pages, that, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the higher philosophy, which is concerned with general truth and the means of knowing it, had been little benefited by the labors of any modern inquirer. It was become, indeed, no strange thing, at least out of the air of a college, to question the authority of Aristotle; but his disciples pointed with scorn at the endeavors which had as yet been made to supplant it, and asked whether the wisdom so long revered was to be set aside for the fanatical reveries of Paracelsus, the unin-

Preparation for the philosophy of

telligible chimeras of Bruno, or the more plausible but arbitrary hypotheses of Telesio.

32. Francis Bacon was born in 1561.¹ He came to years of manhood at the time when England was rapidly emerging from ignorance and obsolete methods of study, in an age of powerful minds, full himself of ambition, confidence, and energy. If we think on the public history of Bacon, even during the least public portion of it, philosophy must appear to have been but his amusement: it was by his hours of leisure, by time hardly missed from the laborious study and practice of the law and from the assiduities of a courtier's life, that he became the father of modern science. This union of an active with a reflecting life had been the boast of some ancients, — of Cicero and Antonine; but what comparison, in depth and originality, between their philosophy and that of Bacon?

33. This wonderful man, in sweeping round the champaign of universal science with his powerful genius, found as little to praise in the recent as in the ancient methods of investigating truth. He liked as little the empirical presumption of drawing conclusions from a partial experience as the sophistical dogmatism which relied on unwarranted axioms and verbal chicane. All, he thought, was to be constructed anew; the investigation of facts, their arrangement for the purposes of inquiry, the process of eliciting from them the required truth. And for this he saw, that, above all, a thorough purgation of the mind itself would be necessary, by pointing out its familiar errors, their sources and their remedies.

34. It is not exactly known at what age Bacon first conceived the scheme of a comprehensive philosophy; but it was, by his own account, very early in life.² Such noble ideas are most congenial to the sanguine spirit of

¹ Those who place Lord Bacon's birth in 1560, as Mr. Montagu has done, must be understood to follow the old style, which creates some confusion. He was born the 22d of January, and died the 9th of April, 1626, in the sixty-sixth year of his age, as we are told in his *Life* by Rawley, the best authority we have.

² In a letter to Father Fulgentio, which bears no date in print, but must have been written about 1624, he refers to a juvenile work about forty years before, which he had confidently entitled *The*

Greatest Birth of Time. Bacon says: "Equidem meminisse quadraginta abhinc annis juvenile opusculum circa has res confectum, quod magna prorsus fiducia et magnifico titulo, — 'Temporis Partum maximum' inscripsi." The apparent vanity of this title is somewhat extenuated by the sense he gave to the phrase, "Birth of Time." He meant that the lapse of time and long experience were the natural sources of a better philosophy, as he says in his dedication of the *Instauratio Magna*: "Ipse certe, ut ingenius fatetur, soleo anti-

youth, and to its ignorance of the extent of labor it undertakes. In the dedication of the *Novum Organum* to James, in 1620, he says that he had been about some such work near thirty years, "so as I made no haste." "And the reason," he adds, "why I have published it now, specially being imperfect, is, to speak plainly, because I number my days, and would have it saved. There is another reason of my so doing, which is to try whether I can get help in one intended part of this work; namely, the compiling of a natural and experimental history, which must be the main foundation of a true and active philosophy." He may be presumed at least to have made a very considerable progress in his undertaking before the close of the sixteenth century. But it was first promulgated to the world by the publication of his *Treatise on the Advancement of Learning* in 1605. In this, indeed, the whole of the Baconian philosophy may be said to be implicitly contained, except, perhaps, the second book of the *Novum Organum*. In 1623, he published his more celebrated Latin translation of this work, if it is not rather to be deemed a new one, entitled *De Augmentis Scientiarum*. I find,

maius hoc opus magis pro partu temporis quam ingenti. Illud enim in eo solummodo mirabile est, initia rei, et tantas de se quas invaluerunt suspiciones, allicui in mentem venire potuisse. Cetera non illibenter sequuntur."

He treats with this precise title appears. But we find prefixed to some of the short pieces a general title, *Temporis Partes Mærulæ, sive Instauratio Magna Imperii Universi in Humanum*. These treatises, however, though earlier than his great works, cannot be referred to so juvenile a period as his letter to Fulgentio intimates; and I should rather incline to suspect that the *opusculum* to which he there refers has not been preserved. Mr. Montagu is of a different opinion. See his Note I. to the *Life of Bacon* in vol. xvi. of his edition. The Latin tract, *De Interpretatione Naturæ*, Mr. M. supposes to be the germ of the *Instauratio*, as the *Cogitata et Visa* are of the *Novum Organum*. I do not dissent from this; but the former bears marks of having been written after Bacon had been immersed in active life. The most probable conjecture appears to be, that he very early perceived the meagreness and imperfection of the academical course of philosophy, and of all others which fell in his way, and formed the scheme of affording something better from his own resources; but that he did not

commit much to paper, nor had planned his own method till after he was turned of thirty, which his letter to the king intimates.

In a recent and very brilliant sketch of the Baconian philosophy (*Edinb. Review*, July, 1837), the two leading principles that distinguish it throughout all its parts are justly denominated *utility* and *progress*. To do good to mankind, and do more and more good, are the ethics of its inductive method. We may only regret, that the ingenious author of this article has been hurried sometimes into the low and contracted view of the deceitful word *utility*, which regards rather the enjoyments of physical convenience, than the general well-being of the individual and the species. If Bacon looked more frequently to the former, it was because so large a portion of his writings relates to physical observation and experiment. But it was far enough from his design to set up physics in any sort of opposition to ethics, much less in a superior light. I dissent also from some of the observations in this article, lively as they are, which tend to depreciate the originality and importance of the Baconian methods. The reader may turn to a note on this subject by Dugald Stewart, at the end of the present section.

upon comparison, that more than two-thirds of this treatise are a version, with slight interpolation or omission, from the Advancement of Learning; the remainder being new matter.

35. The *Instauratio Magna* had been already published in 1620, while Lord Bacon was still chancellor. Fifteen years had elapsed since he gave to the world his *Advancement of Learning*,—the first-fruits of such astonishing vigor of philosophical genius, that, inconceivable as the completion of the scheme he had even then laid down in prospect for his new philosophy by any single effort must appear, we may be disappointed at the great deficiencies which this latter work exhibits, and which he was not destined to fill up. But he had passed the interval in active life, and in dangerous paths; deserting, as in truth he had all along been prone enough to do, the “shady spaces of philosophy,” as Milton calls them, for the court of a sovereign, who, with some real learning, was totally incapable of sounding the depths of Lord Bacon’s mind, or even of estimating his genius.

36. The *Instauratio Magna*, dedicated to James, is divided, according to the magnificent groundplot of its author, into six parts. The first of these he entitles *Partitiones Scientiarum*, comprehending a general summary of that knowledge which mankind already possess; yet not merely treating this affirmatively, but taking special notice of whatever should seem deficient or imperfect; sometimes even supplying, by illustration or precept, these vacant spaces of science. This first part he declares to be wanting in the *Instauratio*. It has been chiefly supplied by the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; yet perhaps even that does not fully come up to the amplitude of his design.

37. The second part of the *Instauratio* was to be, as he expresses it, “the science of a better and more perfect use of reason in the investigation of things, and of the true aids of the understanding;” the new logic, or inductive method, in which what is eminently styled the Baconian philosophy consists. This, as far as he completed it, is known to all by the name of the *Novum Organum*. But he seems to have designed a fuller treatise in place of this; the aphorisms into which he has digested it being rather the heads or theses of chapters, at least in many

places, that would have been farther expanded.¹ And it is still more important to observe, that he did not achieve the whole of his summary that he had promised; but, out of nine divisions of his method, we only possess the first, which he denominates *prærogativæ instantiarum*. Eight others, of exceeding importance to his logic, he has not touched at all, except to describe them by name, and to promise more. "We will speak," he says, "in the first place, of prerogative instances; secondly, of the aids of induction; thirdly, of the rectification of induction; fourthly, of varying the investigation according to the nature of the subject; fifthly, of prerogative natures (or objects), as to investigation, or the choice of what shall be first inquired into; sixthly, of the boundaries of inquiry, or the synoptical view of all natures in the world; seventhly, on the application of inquiry to practice, and what relates to man; eighthly, on the preparations (*parascevæ*) for inquiry; lastly, on the ascending and descending scale of axioms."² All these, after the first, are wanting, with the exception of a few slightly handled in separate parts of Bacon's writings; and the deficiency, which is so important, seems to have been sometimes overlooked by those who have written about the *Novum Organum*.

38. The third part of the *Instauratio Magna* was to comprise an entire natural history, diligently and scrupulously collected from experience of every kind; ^{Third part: Natural History.} including under that name of natural history every thing wherein the art of man has been employed on natural substances, either for practice or experiment; no method of reasoning being sufficient to guide us to truth as to natural things, if they are not themselves clearly and exactly apprehended. It is unnecessary to observe, that very little of this immense chart of nature could be traced by the hand of Bacon, or in his time. His *Centuries of Natural History*, containing about one thousand observed facts and experiments, are a very slender contribution towards such a

¹ It is entitled by himself, *Partis secundæ Summa, digesta in Aphorismos*.

² "Dicemus itaque primo loco de præparativis instantiarum; secundo, de adjuvantibus inductionis; tertio, de rectificatione inductionis; quarto, de variatione inquisitionis pro natura subjecti; quinto, de prærogativis naturarum quatenus ad inquisitionem, sive de eo quod inquiren-

dum est prius et posterius; sexto, de terminis inquisitionis, sive de synopsi omnium naturarum in universo; septimo, de deductione ad praxin, sive de eo quod est in ordine ad hominem; octavo, de parascevis ad inquisitionem; postremo autem, de scala ascensoria et descensoria axiomatum."—*lib. II. 22.*

revealed to him. It was not published till 1641. He is said to have been a man of great goodness of heart, which his writings display; but, in literature, this cannot give a sanction to the incoherencies of madness. His language, as far as I have seen any extracts from his works, is colored with the phraseology of the alchemists and astrologers: as for his philosophy, so to style it, we find, according to Brucker, who has taken some pains with the subject, manifest traces of the system of emanation, so ancient and so attractive; and, from this and several other reasons, he is inclined to think the unlearned shoemaker of Gorlitz must have had assistance from men of more education in developing his visions.¹ But the emanative theory is one into which a mind absorbed in contemplation may very naturally fall. Behmen had his disciples, which such enthusiasts rarely want; and his name is sufficiently known to justify the mention of it even in philosophical history.

21. We come now to an English writer of a different class, little known as such at present, but who, without doing much for the advancement of metaphysical philosophy, had, at least, the merit of devoting to it, with a sincere and independent spirit, the leisure of high rank, and of a life not obscure in the world, — Lord Herbert of Cherbury. The principal work of this remarkable man is his Latin treatise, published in 1624, *On Truth as it is distinguished from Revelation, from Probability, from Possibility, and from Falsehood*. Its object is to inquire what are the sure means of discerning and discovering truth. This, as, like other authors, he sets out by proclaiming, had been hitherto done by no one; and he treats both ancient and modern philosophers rather haughtily, as being men tied to particular opinions, from which they dare not depart. "It is not from an hypocritical or mercenary writer that we are to look for perfect truth. Their interest is not to lay aside their mask, or think for themselves. A liberal and independent author alone will do this."² So general an invective, after Lord Bacon, and indeed after others like Campanella, who could not be charged with following any conceits rather

¹ Brucker, iv. 698.

² "Non est igitur a larvato aliquo vel stipendioso scriptore ut verum consummatum operariis: illorum apprimè in-

terest ne personam deponant, vel alter quidem sentiant. Ingenius et sui arbitri ista solummodo præstabit auctor." — *Epist. ad Lectorem*.

than their own, bespeaks either ignorance of philosophical literature, or a supercilious neglect of it.

22. Lord Herbert lays down seven primary axioms:—

1. Truth exists; 2. It is coeval with the things to which it relates; 3. It exists everywhere; 4. It is self-evident;¹ 5. There are as many truths as there are differences in things; 6. These differences are made known to us by our natural faculties; 7. There is a truth belonging to these truths,—“Est veritas quædam harum veritatum.” This axiom he explains as obscurely as it is strangely expressed. All truth he then distinguishes into the truth of the thing or object, the truth of the appearance, the truth of the perception, and the truth of the understanding. The truth of the object is the inherent conformity of the object with itself, or that which makes every thing what it is.² The truth of appearance is the conditional conformity of the appearance with the object. The truth of perception is the conditional conformity of our senses (*facultates nostras prodromas*) with the appearances of things. The truth of understanding is the due conformity between the aforesaid conformities. All truth therefore is conformity; all conformity, relation. Three things are to be observed in every inquiry after truth,—the thing or object, the sense or faculty, and the laws or conditions by which its conformity or relation is determined. Lord Herbert is so obscure, partly by not thoroughly grasping his subject, partly by writing in Latin, partly perhaps by the *sphalmata et errata in typographo, quædam fortasse in seipso*, of which he complains at the end, that it has been necessary to omit several sentences as unintelligible; though what I have just given is far enough from being too clear.

23. Truth, he goes on to say, exists as to the object, or outward thing itself, when our faculties are capable of determining every thing concerning it; but, though this definition is exact, it is doubtful, he observes, whether any such truth exists in nature. The first condition of discerning truth in things is that they should have a relation to ourselves (*ut intra nostram stet analogiam*); since multitudes of things may exist which the senses cannot discover. The

¹ “Hæc veritas est in se manifesta.” He observes that what are called false appearances are true as such, though not true according to the reality of the object: “Sed veritas apparentiæ falsæ inest,

verè enim ita apparebit, vera tamen ex veritate rei non erit.”

² “Inherens illa conformitas rei cum seipso, sive illa ratio, ex qua res unaquæque sibi constat.”

three chief constituents of this condition seem to be, 1. That it should be of a proper size, neither immense nor too small; 2. That it should have its determining difference, or principle of individuation, to distinguish it from other things; 3. That it should be accommodated to some sense or perceptive faculty. These are the universally necessary conditions of truth (that is, of knowledge) as it regards the object. The truth of appearance depends on others, which are more particular; as that the object should be perceived for a sufficient time, through a proper medium, at a due distance, in a proper situation.¹ Truth of perception is conditional also; and its conditions are that the sense should be sound, and the attention directed towards it. Truth of understanding depends on the *κοιναι εννοιαι*, the common notions possessed by every man of sane mind, and implanted by nature. The understanding teaches us, by means of these, that infinity and eternity exist, though our senses cannot perceive them. The understanding deals also with universals; and truth is known as to universals, when the particulars are rightly apprehended.

24. Our faculties are as numerous as the differences of things; and thus it is, that the world corresponds by perfect analogy to the human soul, degrees of perception being as much distinct from one another as different modes of it. All our powers may, however, be reduced to four heads; natural instinct, internal perception, external sensation, and reason. What is not known by one of these four means cannot be known at all. Instinctive truths are proved by universal consent. Here he comes to his general basis of religion, maintaining the existence of *κοιναι εννοιαι*, or common notions of mankind on that subject; principles against which no one can dispute, without violating the laws of his nature.² Natural instinct he defines to be an act of those faculties existing in every man of sane mind, by which the common notions as to the relations of things not perceived by the senses (*rerum internarum*), and especially such as tend to the conservation of the individual, of the species, and of the

¹ Lord Herbert defines appearance, "ketypum, seu forma vicaria rei, quæ sub conditionibus ipsis cum prototypo suo conformata, cum conceptu demum sub conditionibus etiam suis, conformari et modo quodam spiritali, tanquam ab objecto derivata, etiam in objecti absentia conservari potest."

² "Principia illa sacrosancta, contra quæ disputare nefas." — p. 44. I have translated this in the best sense I could give it: but to use *fas* or *nefas*, before we have defined their meaning, or proved their existence, is but indifferent logic.

whole, are formed without any process of reasoning. These common notions, though excited in us by the objects of sense, are not conveyed to us by them: they are implanted in us by nature; so that God seems to have imparted to us not only a part of his image, but of his wisdom.¹ And whatever is understood and perceived by all men alike deserves to be accounted one of these notions. Some of them are instinctive, others are deduced from such as are. The former are distinguishable by six marks, — priority, independence, universality, certainty, so that no man can doubt them without putting off, as it were, his nature; necessity, that is, usefulness for the preservation of man; lastly, intuitive apprehension, for these common notions do not require to be inferred.²

25. Internal perceptions denote the conformity of objects with those faculties existing in every man of sane mind, which, being developed by his natural instinct, are conversant with the internal relations of things in a secondary and particular manner, and by means of natural instinct.³ By this ill-worded definition he probably intends to distinguish the general power, or instinctive knowledge, from its exercise and application in any instance. But I have found it very difficult to follow Lord Herbert. It is by means, he says, of these internal senses that we discern the nature of things in their intrinsic relations, or hidden types of being;⁴ and it is necessary well to distinguish the conforming faculty in the mind, or internal perception, from the bodily sense. The cloudiness of his expression increases as we proceed, and in many pages I cannot venture to translate or abridge it. The injudicious use of a language in which he did not write with facility, and which is not very well adapted, at the best, to metaphysical disquisition, has doubtless increased the perplexity into which he has thrown his readers.

26. In the conclusion of this treatise, Herbert lays down the five common notions of natural religion, implanted, as he conceives, in the breasts of all mankind. 1. That there is a God; 2. That he ought to be worshipped; 3. That virtue and piety are the chief parts of worship; 4. That we

¹ P. 48.

² P. 60.

³ "Sensus interni sunt actus conformitatum objectorum cum facultatibus illis in omni homine anno et integro existentibus, quæ ab instinctu naturali expositæ,

circa analogiam rerum internam, particulariter, secundario, et ratione instinctus naturalis versantur." — p. 66.

⁴ "Circa analogiam rerum internam, sive signaturas et characteres rerum positiones versantur." — p. 68.

are to repent, and turn from our sins; 5. That there are rewards and punishments in another life.¹ Nothing can be admitted in religion which contradicts these primary notions; but if any one has a revelation from heaven in addition to these, which may happen to him sleeping or waking, he should keep it to himself, since nothing can be of importance to the human race which is not established by the evidence of their common faculties. Nor can any thing be known to be revealed which is not revealed to ourselves; all else being tradition and historic testimony, which does not amount to knowledge. The specific difference of man from other animals, he makes, not reason, but the capacity of religion. It is a curious coincidence, that John Wesley has said something of the same kind.² It is also remarkable that we find in another work of Lord Herbert, *De Religione Gentilium*, which dwells again on his five articles of natural religion, essential, as he expressly lays it down, to salvation, the same illustration of the being of a Deity from the analogy of a watch or clock, which Paley has since employed. I believe that it occurs in an intermediate writer.³

27. Lord Herbert sent a copy of his treatise *De Veritate*, several years after its publication, to Gassendi. We have a letter to the noble author in the third volume of the works of that philosopher, showing, in the candid and sincere spirit natural to him, the objections that struck his mind in reading the book.⁴ Gassendi observes that the distinctions of four kinds of truth are not new; the *veritas rei* of Lord Herbert being what is usually called

¹ P. 222.

² I have somewhere read a profound remark of Wesley, that, considering the sagacity which many animals display, we cannot fix upon reason as the distinction between them and man: the true difference is that we are formed to know God, and they are not.

³ "Ex quidem si horologium per diem et noctem integram horas signanter indicans, viderit quispiam non mente captus, id consilio arteque summa factum judicaverit. Equis non planè demens, qui hanc mundi machinam non per viginti quatuor horas tantum, sed per tot secula circuitus suos obeuntem animadverterit, non id omne sapientissimo utique potentissimoque alicui auctori tribuat?" — *De Relig. Gentil.*, cap. xiii.

[The original idea, as has been rightly pointed out to me by M. Alphonse Bor-

ghers, the translator of this work, as well as of my *History of the Middle Ages*, is in Cicero *de Nat. Deorum*, li. 34. "Quod si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam, spheram aliquis tulerit hanc, quam super familiaris noster efficit Posidonius, ejus singule conversiones idem efficiunt in sole, et in luna, et in quinque stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in celo singulis diebus et noctibus: quis in illa barbarie dubitet, quin ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione?" And, with respect to intermediate writers between Lord Herbert and Paley, I have been referred, by two other correspondents, to Hale's *Primitive Origination of Mankind*, where I had myself suspected it to be; and to Newenmyt's *Religious Philosopher* (English translation, 1730), p. xvi. of preface. — 1842.]

⁴ Gassendi Opera, iii. 411.

substance, his *veritas apparentiæ* no more than accident, and the other two being only sense and reason. Gassendi seems not wholly to approve, but gives as the best, a definition of truth little differing from Herbert's, the agreement of the cognizant intellect with the thing known: "*Intellectus cognoscentis cum re cognita congruentia.*" The obscurity of the treatise *De Veritate* could ill suit an understanding like that of Gassendi, always tending to acquire clear conceptions; and, though he writes with great civility, it is not without smartly opposing what he does not approve. The aim of Lord Herbert's work, he says, is that the intellect may pierce into the nature of things, knowing them as they are in themselves, without the fallacies of appearance and sense. But, for himself, he confesses that such knowledge he has always found above him, and that he is in darkness when he attempts to investigate the real nature of the least thing; making many of the observations on this which we read also in Locke. And he well says, that we have enough for our use in the accidents or appearances of things, without knowing their substances, in reply to Herbert, who had declared that we should be miserably deficient, if, while nature has given us senses to discern sounds and colors and such fleeting qualities of things, we had no sure road to internal, eternal, and necessary truths.¹ The universality of those innate principles, especially moral and religious, on which his correspondent had built so much, is doubted by Gassendi on the usual grounds, that many have denied or been ignorant of them. The letter is imperfect, some sheets of the autograph having been lost.

28. Too much space may seem to have been bestowed on a writer who cannot be ranked high among metaphysicians. But Lord Herbert was not only a distinguished name, but may claim the priority among those philosophers in England. If his treatise *De Veritate* is not, as an entire work, very successful, or founded always upon principles which have stood the test of severe reflection, it is still a monument of an original, independent thinker, without rhapsodies of imagination, without pedantic technicalities, and, above all, bearing witness to a sincere love of the truth he sought to apprehend. The

¹ "Misere nobiscum actum esset, si ad percipiendos colores, sonos et qualitates illas internas, æternas, necessarias sine erroribus caducis atque momentaneis subirent media, nulla autem ad veritates erroris superesset via."

ambitious expectation that the real essences of things might be discovered, if it were truly his, as Gassendi seems to suppose, could not be warranted by any thing, at least, within the knowledge of that age. But, from some expressions of Herbert, I should infer that he did not think our faculties competent to solve the whole problem of *quiddity*, as the logicians called it, or the real nature of any thing, at least, objectively without us.¹ He is, indeed, so obscure, that I will not vouch for his entire consistency. It has been an additional motive to say as much as I have done concerning Lord Herbert, that I know not where any account of his treatise *De Veritate* will be found. Brucker is strangely silent about this writer, and Buhle has merely adverted to the letter of Gassendi. Descartes has spoken of Lord Herbert's book with much respect, though several of their leading principles were far from the same. It was translated into French in 1639, and this translation he found less difficult than the original.²

29. Gassendi himself ought, perhaps, to be counted wholly among the philosophers of this period; since many of his writings were published, and all may have been completed, within it. They are contained in six large folio volumes, rather closely printed. The *Exercitationes Paradoxicæ*, published in 1624, are the earliest. These contain an attack on the logic of Aristotle, the fortress that so many bold spirits were eager to assail. But, in more advanced life, Gassendi withdrew in great measure from this warfare; and his *Logic*, in the *Syntagma Philosophicum*, the record of his latest opinions, is chiefly modelled on the Aristotelian, with sufficient commendation of its author. In the study of ancient philosophy, however, Gassendi was impressed with an admiration of Epicurus. His physical theory, founded on corpuscles and a vacuum; his ethics, in their principle and precepts; his rules of logic, and guidance of the intellect,—

¹ "Cum facultates nostræ ad analogiam propriam terminatæ quidditates rerum intimas non penetrant: ideo quid res naturalis in seipsum sit, tali ex analogia ad nos ut sit constituta, perfecte sciri non potest." — p. 166. In another place, he says it is doubtful whether any thing exist in nature, concerning which we have a complete knowledge. The eternal and necessary truths which Herbert contends for our knowing, seem to have been his *communes notions*, subjectively understood, rather than such as relate to external objects.

² Descartes, vol. viii. pp. 138 and 168. "J'y trouve plusieurs choses fort bonnes, *sed non publici saporis*: car il y a peu de personnes qui soient capables d'entendre la métaphysique. Et, pour le général du livre, il tient un chemin fort différent de celui que j'ai suivi. . . . Enfin, par conclusion, encore que je ne puisse m'accorder en tout aux sentimens de cet auteur, je ne laisse pas de l'estimer beaucoup au-dessus des esprits ordinaires."

seemed to the cool and independent mind of the French philosopher more worthy of regard than the opposite schemes prevailing in the schools, and not to be rejected on account of any discredit attached to the name. Combining with the Epicurean physics and ethics the religious element which had been unnecessarily discarded from the philosophy of the Garden, Gassendi displayed both in a form no longer obnoxious. The *Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri*, published in 1649, is an elaborate vindication of this system, which he had previously expounded in a commentary on the tenth book of *Diogenes Laertius*. He had already effaced the prejudices against Epicurus himself, whom he seems to have regarded with the affection of a disciple, in a biographical treatise on his life and moral character.

30. Gassendi died in 1656: the *Syntagma Philosophicum*, his greatest as well as last work, in which it is natural to seek the whole scheme of his philosophy, was published by his friend Sorbière in 1658. We may therefore properly defer the consideration of his metaphysical writings to the next period; but the controversy in which he was involved with Descartes will render it necessary to bring his name forward again before the close of this chapter.

His chief
works after
1650.

SECTION II.

On the Philosophy of Lord Bacon.

31. It may be judged from what has been said in a former chapter, as well as in our last pages, that, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the higher philosophy, which is concerned with general truth and the means of knowing it, had been little benefited by the labors of any modern inquirer. It was become, indeed, no strange thing, at least out of the air of a college, to question the authority of Aristotle; but his disciples pointed with scorn at the endeavors which had as yet been made to supplant it, and asked whether the wisdom so long revered was to be set aside for the fanatical reveries of Paracelsus, the unin-

Preparation
for the phil-
osophy of

telligible chimeras of Bruno, or the more plausible but arbitrary hypotheses of Telesio.

32. Francis Bacon was born in 1561.¹ He came to years of manhood at the time when England was rapidly emerging from ignorance and obsolete methods of study, in an age of powerful minds, full himself of ambition, confidence, and energy. If we think on the public history of Bacon, even during the least public portion of it, philosophy must appear to have been but his amusement: it was by his hours of leisure, by time hardly missed from the laborious study and practice of the law and from the assiduities of a courtier's life, that he became the father of modern science. This union of an active with a reflecting life had been the boast of some ancients, — of Cicero and Antonine; but what comparison, in depth and originality, between their philosophy and that of Bacon?

33. This wonderful man, in sweeping round the champaign of universal science with his powerful genius, found as little to praise in the recent as in the ancient methods of investigating truth. He liked as little the empirical presumption of drawing conclusions from a partial experience as the sophistical dogmatism which relied on unwarranted axioms and verbal chicane. All, he thought, was to be constructed anew; the investigation of facts, their arrangement for the purposes of inquiry, the process of eliciting from them the required truth. And for this he saw, that, above all, a thorough purgation of the mind itself would be necessary, by pointing out its familiar errors, their sources and their remedies.

34. It is not exactly known at what age Bacon first conceived the scheme of a comprehensive philosophy; but it was, by his own account, very early in life.² Such noble ideas are most congenial to the sanguine spirit of

¹ Those who place Lord Bacon's birth in 1560, as Mr. Montagu has done, must be understood to follow the old style, which creates some confusion. He was born the 22d of January, and died the 9th of April, 1626, in the sixty-sixth year of his age, as we are told in his Life by Rawley, the best authority we have.

² In a letter to Father Fulgentio, which bears no date in print, but must have been written about 1624, he refers to a juvenile work about forty years before, which he had confidently entitled *The*

Greatest Birth of Time. Bacon says: "*Equidem memini me quadraginta abhinc annis juvenile opusculum circa has res confectum, quod magna prorsus fiducia et magnifico titulo, — 'Temporis Partum maximum' inscripsi.*" The apparent vanity of this title is somewhat extenuated by the sense he gave to the phrase, "*Birth of Time*." He meant that the lapse of time and long experience were the natural sources of a better philosophy, as he says in his dedication of the *Instauratio Magna*: "*Ipsæ certè, ut ingenio fateror, solæ asti-*

youth, and to its ignorance of the extent of labor it undertakes. In the dedication of the *Novum Organum* to James, in 1620, he says that he had been about some such work near thirty years, "so as I made no haste." "And the reason," he adds, "why I have published it now, specially being imperfect, is, to speak plainly, because I number my days, and would have it saved. There is another reason of my so doing, which is to try whether I can get help in one intended part of this work; namely, the compiling of a natural and experimental history, which must be the main foundation of a true and active philosophy." He may be presumed at least to have made a very considerable progress in his undertaking before the close of the sixteenth century. But it was first promulgated to the world by the publication of his *Treatise on the Advancement of Learning* in 1605. In this, indeed, the whole of the Baconian philosophy may be said to be implicitly contained, except, perhaps, the second book of the *Novum Organum*. In 1623, he published his more celebrated Latin translation of this work, if it is not rather to be deemed a new one, entitled *De Augmentis Scientiarum*. I find,

maius hoc opus magis pro partu temporis quam ingredit. Illud enim in eo solummodo mirabile est, initia rei, et tantas de his que invaluerunt suspiciones, alicui in mentem venire potuisse. Cetera non illibenter sequuntur."

No treatise with this precise title appears. But we find prefixed to some of the short pieces a general title, *Temporis Partis Masculine, sive Instauratio Magna Imperii Universi in Humanum*. These treatises, however, though earlier than his great works, cannot be referred to so juvenile a period as his letter to Fulgentio Minsinger; and I should rather incline to suspect that the *opusculum* to which he there refers has not been preserved. Mr. Minsinger is of a different opinion. See his Note I. to the *Life of Bacon* in vol. xvi. of his edition. The Latin tract, *De Interpretatione Naturæ*, Mr. M. supposes to be the germ of the *Instauratio*, as the *Cogitata et Visa* are of the *Novum Organum*. I do not dissent from this; but the former bears marks of having been written after Bacon had been immersed in active life. The most probable conjecture appears to be, that he very early perceived the meagreness and imperfection of the academical course of philosophy, and of all others which fell in his way, and formed the scheme of affording something better from his own resources; but that he did not

commit much to paper, nor had planned his own method till after he was turned of thirty, which his letter to the king intimates.

In a recent and very brilliant sketch of the Baconian philosophy (*Edinb. Review*, July, 1837), the two leading principles that distinguish it throughout all its parts are justly denominated *utility* and *progress*. To do good to mankind, and do more and more good, are the ethics of its inductive method. We may only regret, that the ingenious author of this article has been hurried sometimes into the low and contracted view of the deceitful word *utility*, which regards rather the enjoyments of physical convenience, than the general well-being of the individual and the species. If Bacon looked more frequently to the former, it was because so large a portion of his writings relates to physical observation and experiment. But it was far enough from his design to set up physics in any sort of opposition to ethics, much less in a superior light. I dissent also from some of the observations in this article, lively as they are, which tend to depreciate the originality and importance of the Baconian methods. The reader may turn to a note on this subject by Dugald Stewart, at the end of the present section.

upon comparison, that more than two-thirds of this treatise are a version, with slight interpolation or omission, from the Advancement of Learning; the remainder being new matter.

35. The *Instauratio Magna* had been already published in 1620, while Lord Bacon was still chancellor.

Instauratio Magna. Fifteen years had elapsed since he gave to the world his Advancement of Learning,—the first-fruits of such astonishing vigor of philosophical genius, that, inconceivable as the completion of the scheme he had even then laid down in prospect for his new philosophy by any single effort must appear, we may be disappointed at the great deficiencies which this latter work exhibits, and which he was not destined to fill up. But he had passed the interval in active life, and in dangerous paths; deserting, as in truth he had all along been prone enough to do, the “shady spaces of philosophy,” as Milton calls them, for the court of a sovereign, who, with some real learning, was totally incapable of sounding the depths of Lord Bacon’s mind, or even of estimating his genius.

36. The *Instauratio Magna*, dedicated to James, is divided, according to the magnificent groundplot of its author, into six parts. The first of these he entitles *Partitiones Scientiarum*, comprehending a general summary of that knowledge which mankind already possess; yet not merely treating this affirmatively, but taking special notice of whatever should seem deficient or imperfect; sometimes even supplying, by illustration or precept, these vacant spaces of science. This first part he declares to be wanting in the *Instauratio*. It has been chiefly supplied by the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; yet perhaps even that does not fully come up to the amplitude of his design.

37. The second part of the *Instauratio* was to be, as he expresses it, “the science of a better and more perfect use of reason in the investigation of things, and of the true aids of the understanding;” the new logic, or inductive method, in which what is eminently styled the Baconian philosophy consists. This, as far as he completed it, is known to all by the name of the *Novum Organum*. But he seems to have designed a fuller treatise in place of this; the aphorisms into which he has digested it being rather the heads or theses of chapters, at least in many

First part:
Partitiones Scientiarum.

Second part:
Novum Organum.

places, that would have been farther expanded.¹ And it is still more important to observe, that he did not achieve the whole of his summary that he had promised; but, out of nine divisions of his method, we only possess the first, which he denominates *prærogative instantiarum*. Eight others, of exceeding importance to his logic, he has not touched at all, except to describe them by name, and to promise more. "We will speak," he says, "in the first place, of prerogative instances; secondly, of the aids of induction; thirdly, of the rectification of induction; fourthly, of varying the investigation according to the nature of the subject; fifthly, of prerogative natures (or objects), as to investigation, or the choice of what shall be first inquired into; sixthly, of the boundaries of inquiry, or the synoptical view of all natures in the world; seventhly, on the application of inquiry to practice, and what relates to man; eighthly, on the preparations (*parascève*) for inquiry; lastly, on the ascending and descending scale of axioms."² All these, after the first, are wanting, with the exception of a few slightly handled in separate parts of Bacon's writings; and the deficiency, which is so important, seems to have been sometimes overlooked by those who have written about the *Novum Organum*.

38. The third part of the *Instauratio Magna* was to comprise an entire natural history, diligently and scrupulously collected from experience of every kind; including under that name of natural history every thing wherein the art of man has been employed on natural substances, either for practice or experiment; no method of reasoning being sufficient to guide us to truth as to natural things, if they are not themselves clearly and exactly apprehended. It is unnecessary to observe, that very little of this immense chart of nature could be traced by the hand of Bacon, or in his time. His *Centuries of Natural History*, containing about one thousand observed facts and experiments, are a very slender contribution towards such a

¹ It is entitled by himself, *Partis secundæ Summa, digesta in Aphorismos*.

² "Dicemus itaque primo loco de prærogativis instantiarum; secundo, de auxiliis inductionis; tertio, de rectificatione inductionis; quarto, de variatione inquisitionis pro natura subjecti; quinto, de prærogativis naturarum quatenus ad inquisitionem, sive de eo quod inquirun-

dum est prius et posterius; sexto, de terminis inquisitionis, sive de synopse omnium naturarum in universo; septimo, de deductione ad praxin, sive de eo quod est in ordine ad hominem; octavo, de parascervis ad inquisitionem; postremo autem, de scala ascensoria et descensoria axiomatum."—*Ib.* li. 22.

description of universal nature as he contemplated: these form no part of the *Instauratio Magna*, and had been compiled before. But he enumerates one hundred and thirty particular histories which ought to be drawn up for his great work. A few of these he has given in a sort of skeleton, as samples rather of the method of collecting facts, than of the facts themselves; namely, the History of Winds, of Life and Death, of Density and Rarity, of Sound and Hearing.

39. The fourth part, called *Scala Intellectus*, is also wanting, with the exception of a very few introductory pages. "By these tables," says Bacon, "we mean, not such examples as we subjoin to the several rules of our method, but types and models, which place before our eyes the entire process of the mind in the discovery of truth, selecting various and remarkable instances."¹ These he compares to the diagrams of geometry, by attending to which the steps of the demonstration become perspicuous. Though the great brevity of his language in this place renders it rather difficult to see clearly what he understood by these models, some light appears to be thrown on this passage by one in the treatise *De Augmentis*, where he enumerates among the desiderata of logic what he calls *traditio lampadis*, or a delivery of any science or particular truth according to the order wherein it was discovered.² "The methods of geometers," he there says, "have some resemblance to this art;" which is not, however, the case as to the synthetical geometry with which we are generally conversant. It is the history of analytical investigation; and many beautiful illustrations of it have been given since the days of Bacon in all subjects to which that method of inquiry has been applied.

¹ "Neque de his exemplis loquimur, quæ singulis præceptis ac regulis illustrandi gratia adjiuntur, hoc enim in secunda operis parte abunde præstitimus, sed plane typos intelligimus ac plasmata, quæ universum mentis processum atque inveniendi continuatam fabricam et ordinem in certis subjectis, illisque variis et insignibus tanquam sub oculos ponant. Etenim nobis venit in mentem in mathematicis, astante machina, sequi demonstrationem facilem et perspicuam; contra atque hac commoditate omnia videri involuta et quam revera sunt subtiliora."
² Lib. vi. c. 2. "Scientia quæ aliis tanquam tela pertexendo traditur, eadem methodo, si fieri possit, animo alterius est insinuanda, quæ primitus inventa est.

Atque hoc ipsum fieri sane potest in scientiâ per inductionem acquisita: sed in anticipata ista et præmatura scientiâ, quæ utimur, non facile dicat quis quo itinere ad eam quam nactus est scientiam pervenerit. Attamen sane secundum majus et minus possit quis scientiam propriam revisere, et vestigia suæ cognitionis simul et consensus remetiri; atque hoc factæ scientiæ sic transplantare in animum alienum, sicut crevit in suo. . . . Cujus quidem generis traditionis, methodus mathematicorum in eo subjecto similitudinem quandam habet." I do not well understand the words, *in eo subjecto*: he may possibly have referred to analytical processes.

40. In a fifth part of the *Instauratio Magna*, Bacon had designed to give a specimen of the new philosophy which he hoped to raise, after a due use of his natural history and inductive method, by way of anticipation or sample of the whole. He calls it *Prodromi, sive Anticipationes Philosophiæ Secundæ*. And some fragments of this part are published by the names *Cogitata et Visa*, *Cogitationes de Natura Rerum*, *Filum Labyrinthi*, and a few more; being as much, in all probability, as he had reduced to writing. In his own metaphor, it was to be like the payment of interest till the principal could be raised; “*tanquam fœnus reddatur, donec sors haberi possit*.” For he despaired of ever completing a work by a sixth and last portion, which was to display a perfect system of philosophy, deduced and confirmed by a legitimate, sober, and exact inquiry according to the method which he had invented and laid down. “To perfect this last part is above our powers and beyond our hopes. We may, as we trust, make no despicable beginnings: the destinies of the human race must complete it; in such a manner, perhaps, as men, looking only at the present, would not readily conceive. For upon this will depend not only a speculative good, but all the fortunes of mankind, and all their power.” And, with an eloquent prayer that his exertions may be rendered effectual to the attainment of truth and happiness, this introductory chapter of the *Instauratio*, which announces the distribution of its portions, concludes. Such was the temple, of which Bacon saw in vision before him the stately front and decorated pediments, in all their breadth of light, and harmony of proportion; while long vistas of receding columns, and glimpses of internal splendor, revealed a glory that it was not permitted him to comprehend. In the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, and in the *Novum Organum*, we have less, no doubt, than Lord Bacon, under different conditions of life, might have achieved: he might have been more emphatically the high-priest of nature, if he had not been the chancellor of James I.; but no one man could have filled up the vast outline which he alone, in that stage of the world, could have so boldly sketched.

41. The best order of studying the Baconian philosophy would be to read attentively the *Advancement of Learning*; next, to take the treatise *De Augmentis*, comparing it all along

Fifth part:
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with the former; and afterwards to proceed to the *Novum Organum*. A less degree of regard has usually been paid to the *Centuries of Natural History*, which are the least important of his writings, or even to the other philosophical fragments, some of which contain very excellent passages; yet such, in great measure, as will be found substantially in other parts of his works. The most remarkable are the *Cogitata et Visa*. It must be said, that one who thoroughly venerates Lord Bacon will not disdain his repetitions, which sometimes, by variations of phrase, throw light upon each other. It is generally supposed that the Latin works were translated from the original English by several assistants, among whom George Herbert and Hobbes have been named, under the author's superintendence.¹ The Latin style of these writings is singularly concise, energetic, and impressive, but frequently crabbed, uncouth, and obscure; so that we read with more admiration of the sense, than delight in the manner of delivering it. But Rawley, in his *Life of Bacon*, informs us that he had seen about twelve autographs of the *Novum Organum*, wrought up and improved year by year, till it reached the shape in which it was published; and he does not intimate that these were in English, unless the praise he immediately afterwards bestows on his English style may be thought to warrant that supposition.² I do not know that we have positive evidence as to any of the Latin works being translations from English, except the treatise *De Augmentis*.

42. The leading principles of the Baconian philosophy are contained in the *Advancement of Learning*. These are amplified, corrected, illustrated, and developed in the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; from the fifth book of which, with some help from other parts, is taken the first book of the *Novum Organum*, and even a part of the second. I use this

¹ The translation was made, as Archbishop Tenison informs us, "by Mr. Herbert and some others who were esteemed masters in the Roman eloquence."

² "Ipse reperi in archivis dominationis sue, autographa plus minus duodecim Organi Novi de anno in annum elaborati, et ad lucem revocati, et singulis annis, ulteriore lima subinde politi et castigati, donec in illud tandem corpus adoleverat, quo in lucem editum fuit; sicut multa ex animalibus fetus lambere consueverunt usque quo ad membrorum similitudinem

eos perducant. In libris suis componendis verborum vigorem et perspicuitatem precipue sectabatur, non elegantiam aut concinnitatem sermonis, et inter scribendum aut dictandum sæpe interrogavit, num sensus ejus clare admodum et perspicue redditus esset? Quippe qui scribi sequum esse ut verba simularentur rebus, non res verbis. Et si in stylium forsitan politiores incidisset, siquidem apud nostrates eloqui Anglicani artifex habitus est, id evenit, quia evitare arduum et erat."

language, because, though earlier in publication, I conceive that the *Novum Organum* was later in composition. All that very important part of this fifth book which relates to *Experientia Litterata*, or *Venatio Panis*, as he calls it, and contains excellent rules for conducting experiments in natural philosophy, is new, and does not appear in the *Advancement of Learning*, except by way of promise of what should be done in it. Nor is this, at least so fully and clearly, to be found in the *Novum Organum*. The second book of this latter treatise he professes not to anticipate. "*De Novo Organo silemus*," he says, "*neque de eo quicquam prælibamus*." This can only apply to the second book, which he considered as the real exposition of his method, after clearing away the fallacies which form the chief subject of the first. Yet what is said of *Topica particularis*, in this fifth book *De Augmentis* (illustrated by "articles of inquiry concerning gravity and levity"), goes entirely on the principles of the second book of the *Novum Organum*.

43. Let us now see what Lord Bacon's method really was. He has given it the name of induction, but carefully distinguishes it from what bore that name in the old logic; that is, an inference from a perfect enumeration of particulars to a general law of the whole. For such an enumeration, though of course conclusive, is rarely practicable in nature, where the particulars exceed our powers of numbering.¹ Nor, again, is the Baconian method

Nature of the Baconian induction.

¹ "*Inductio quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem, res puerilis est, et præcario concipitur, et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria, et plerumque secundum pauciora quam par est, et ex his tantummodo quæ præsto sunt procedunt. At inductio quæ ad inventionem et demonstrationem scientiarum et artium erit utilis, naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ne deinde post negativas tot quot sufficiunt, super affirmativas concludere; quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentatum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone, qui ad exclusiones definitiones et ideas, hac certe forme inductionis aliquatenus utitur.*"—*Nov. Org.* i. 106. In this passage, Bacon seems to imply that the enumeration of particulars in any induction is or may be imperfect. This is certainly the case in the plurality of physical inductions; but it does not appear that the logical writers relied upon this as the primary and legitimate sense. Induction was distinguished

into the complete and incomplete. "The word," says a very modern writer, "is perhaps unhappy, as indeed it is taken in several vague senses; but to abolish it is impossible. It is the Latin translation of *ἐπαγωγή*, which word is used by Aristotle as a counterpart to *συλλογισμός*. He seems to consider it in a perfect or dialectic, and in an imperfect or rhetorical sense. Thus, if a genus (G.) contained four species (A. B. C. D.), syllogism would argue, that what is true of G. is true of any one of the four; but perfect induction would reason, that what we can prove true of A. B. C. D. separately, we may properly state as true of G., the whole genus. This is evidently a formal argument, as demonstrative as syllogism. But the imperfect or rhetorical induction will perhaps enumerate three only of the species, and then draw the conclusion concerning G., which virtually includes the fourth; or, what is the same thing, will argue, that

to be confounded with the less complete form of the inductive process, namely, inferences from partial experience in similar

what is true of the three is to be believed true likewise of the fourth."—Newman's Lectures on Logic, p. 78. (1837.) The same distinction between perfect and imperfect induction is made in the Encyclopédie Française, art. "Induction," and apparently on the authority of the ancients.

It may be observed, that this imperfect induction may be put in a regular logical form, and is only vicious in syllogistic reasoning when the conclusion asserts a higher probability than the premises. If, for example, we reason thus: Some serpents are venomous. — This unknown animal is a serpent. — Therefore this is venomous: we are guilty of an obvious paralogism. If we infer only, This may be venomous, our reasoning is perfectly valid in itself, at least in the common apprehension of all mankind, except dialecticians, but not regular in form. The only means that I perceive of making it so, is to put it in some such phrase as the following: All unknown serpents are affected by a certain probability of being venomous: This animal, &c. It is not necessary, of course, that the probability should be capable of being estimated, provided we mentally conceive it to be no other in the conclusion than in the major term. In the best treatises on the strict or syllogistic method, as far as I have seen, there seems a deficiency in respect to *probable* conclusions, which may have arisen from the practice of taking instances from universal or necessary, rather than contingent truths, as well as from the contracted views of reasoning which the Aristotelian school have always inculcated. No sophisms are so frequent in practice as the concluding generally from a partial induction, or assuming (most commonly tacitly) by what Archbishop Whately calls "a kind of logical fiction," that a few individuals are "adequate samples or representations of the class they belong to." These sophisms cannot, in the present state of things, be practised largely in physical science or natural history; but, in reasonings on matter of fact, they are of incessant occurrence. The "logical fiction" may indeed frequently be employed, even on subjects unconnected with the physical laws of nature: but to know when this may be, and to what extent, is just that which, far more than any other skill, distinguishes what is called a good reasoner from a bad one.

[I permit this note to remain as in former editions; but it might have been more fully and more correctly expressed. The proper nature of induction has been treat-

ed within a few years by Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh Review, vol. lvi.); by Archbishop Whately in his Elements of Logic; by the author of the article "Or-ganon" in the Penny Cyclopædia; by M. de Rémusat, Essai de Philosophie, vol. ii. p. 408; by Dr. Whewell in the History, and again in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences; and by Mr. Mill, System of Logic, vol. i. p. 352. The apparently various opinions of these writers, though in some degree resolving themselves into differences of definition, deserve attention from the philosophical reader; but it would be rather too extraneous from the character of the present work to examine them. I will only observe, that what has been called perfect induction, or a complete enumeration of particulars, is as barren of new truth as the syllogism itself, to which indeed, though with some variety in the formal rules, it properly belongs. For if we have already enumerated all species of fish, and asserted them to be cold-blooded, we advance not a step by saying this again of a herring or a haddock. Mr. Mill, therefore, has well remarked, that "Induction is a process of inference: it proceeds from the known to the unknown; and any operation involving no inference, any process in which what seems the conclusion is no wider than the premises from which it is drawn, does not fall within the meaning of the term."—System of Logic, vol. i. p. 353. But this inference is only rendered logically conclusive, or satisfactory to the reason, as any thing more than a probable argument, by means of a generalization which assumes, on some extra-logical ground, such as the uniformity of physical laws, that the partial induction might have been rendered universal. If the conclusion contains more than the premises *imply*, it is manifestly fallacious. But that the inductive syllogism, *ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς* (Analyt. Prin., l. ii. c. 23), can only lead, in form, to probable conclusions, even though the enumeration should be complete, appears from its being in the third figure; though after a general principle is once established by induction, when we come to apply it in new cases, the process will be in the first. Archbishop Whately and Sir W. Hamilton only differ in appearance as to this, since they look to different periods of reasoning: one, in which experience is generalized by the assumption of something unproved; another, in which a particular case is shown to fall within the generalization. But the second is not the induction of Aristotle. What

circumstances; though this may be a very sufficient ground for practical, which is probable, knowledge. His own method rests on the same general principle, namely, the uniformity of the laws of nature, so that, in certain conditions of phenomena, the same effects or the same causes may be assumed; but it endeavors to establish these laws on a more exact and finer process of reasoning than partial experience can effect. For the recurrence of antecedents and consequents does not prove a necessary connection between them, unless we can exclude the presence of all other conditions which may determine the event. Long and continued experience of such a recurrence, indeed, raises a high probability of a necessary connection: but the aim of Bacon was to supersede experience in this sense, and to find a shorter road to the result; and for this his methods of exclusion are devised. As complete and accurate a collection of facts, connected with the subject of inquiry, as possible, is to be made out by means of that copious natural history which he contemplated, or from any other good sources. These are to be selected, compared, and scrutinized, according to the rules of natural interpretation delivered in the second book of the *Novum Organum*, or such others as he designed to add to them; and, if experiments are admissible, these are to be conducted according to the same rules. Experience and observation are the guides through the Baconian philosophy, which is the handmaid and interpreter of nature. When Lord Bacon seems to decry experience, which in certain passages he might be thought to do, it is the particular and empirical observation of individuals, from which many rash generalizations had been drawn, as opposed to that founded on an accurate natural history. Such hasty inferences he reckoned still more pernicious to true knowledge

this was, I find nowhere more neatly delivered than in an Arabic treatise on optics, published, with a translation, in the eighth volume of the *Asiatic Researches*.

Induction is the process of collecting particulars for the purpose of establishing a general rule respecting the nature of the whole class. Induction is of two kinds, viz., perfect and imperfect. It is perfect induction when the general rule is obtained from an examination of all the parts. For example, all animals are either endowed with speech, or not endowed with speech. But those endowed and those not endowed are both sentient; therefore all animals are sentient. This is an example

of perfect induction, which produces certainty.

"It is imperfect induction when, a number of individuals of a class being overlooked or excluded, a general rule is thus established respecting the whole. For instance, if it should be assumed that all animals move the under-jaw in eating, because this is the case with man, horses, goats, and sheep, this would be an example of imperfect induction, which does not afford certainty, because it is possible that some animals may not move the under-jaw in eating, as it is reported of the crocodile."—p. 127.—1847.]

than the sophistical methods of the current philosophy; and in a remarkable passage, after censuring this precipitancy of empirical conclusions in the chemists, and in Gilbert's Treatise on the Magnet, utters a prediction, that if ever mankind, excited by his counsels, should seriously betake themselves to seek the guidance of experience, instead of relying on the dogmatic schools of the sophists, the proneness of the human mind to snatch at general axioms would expose them to much risk of error from the theories of this superficial class of philosophers.¹

44. The indignation, however, of Lord Bacon is more frequently directed against the predominant philosophy of his age, that of Aristotle and the schoolmen. His dislike of Aristotle. Though he does justice to the great abilities of the former, and acknowledges the exact attention to facts displayed in his History of Animals, he deems him one of the most eminent adversaries to the only method that can guide us to the real laws of nature. The old Greek philosophers, Empedocles, Leucippus, Anaxagoras, and others of their age, who had been in the right track of investigation, stood much higher in the esteem of Bacon than their successors, Plato, Zeno, Aristotle, by whose lustre they had been so much superseded, that both their works have perished, and their tenets are with difficulty collected. These more distinguished leaders of the Grecian schools were in his eyes little else than disputatious professors (it must be remembered that he had in general only physical science in his view), who seemed to have it in common with children, "ut ad garriendum prompti sint, generare non possint;" so wordy and barren was their miscalled wisdom.

45. Those who object to the importance of Lord Bacon's precepts in philosophy, that mankind have practised His method much required. many of them immemorially, are rather confirming their utility than taking off much from their originality, in any fair sense of that term. Every logical method is built on the common faculties of human nature, which have been exercised since the creation in discerning, better or worse, truth from falsehood, and inferring the unknown from the known. That men might have done this more correctly is manifest from the quantity of error into which, from want

¹ Nov. Organ., lib. i. 64. It may be doubted whether Bacon did full justice to Gilbert.

of reasoning well on what came before them, they have habitually fallen. In experimental philosophy, to which the more special rules of Lord Bacon are generally referred, there was a notorious want of that very process of reasoning which he has supplied. It is more than probable, indeed, that the great physical philosophers of the seventeenth century would have been led to employ some of his rules, had he never promulgated them; but I believe they had been little regarded in the earlier period of science.¹ It is also a very defective view of the Baconian method to look only at the experimental rules given in the *Novum Organum*. The preparatory steps of completely exhausting the natural history of the subject of inquiry by a patient and sagacious consideration of it in every light are at least of equal importance, and equally prominent in the inductive philosophy.

46. The first object of Lord Bacon's philosophical writings is to prove their own necessity, by giving an unfavorable impression as to the actual state of most ^{its objects} sciences, in consequence of the prejudices of the human mind, and of the mistaken methods pursued in their cultivation. The second was to point out a better prospect for the future. One of these occupies the treatise *De Augmentis*, and the first book of the *Novum Organum*. The other, besides many anticipations in these, is partially detailed in the second book, and would have been more thoroughly developed in those remaining portions which the author did not complete. We shall now give a very short sketch of these two famous works, which comprise the greater part of the Baconian philosophy.

47. The *Advancement of Learning* is divided into two books only; the treatise *De Augmentis*, into nine. ^{Sketch of the treatise De Augmentis.} The first of these, in the latter, is introductory, and designed to remove prejudices against the search after truth, by indicating the causes which had hitherto obstructed it. In the second book, he lays down his celebrated partition of human learning into history, poetry, and philosophy, according to the faculties of the mind ^{History} respectively concerned in them,—the memory, imagination, and reason. History is natural or civil, under the latter of which ecclesiastical and literary histories are com-

¹ It has been remarked, that the famous experiment of Pascal on the barometer, by carrying it to a considerable elevation, was "a crucial instance, one of the first, if not the very first, on record in physics."—Herschel, p. 226.

prised. These again fall into regular subdivisions; all of which he treats in a summary manner, and points out the deficiencies which ought to be supplied in many departments

of history. Poetry succeeds in the last chapter of the same book; but by confining the name to fictitious narrative, except as to ornaments of style, which he refers to a different part of his subject, he much limited his views of that literature; even if it were true, as it certainly is not, that the imagination alone, in any ordinary use of the word, is the medium of poetical emotion. The word "emotion," indeed, is sufficient to show that Bacon should either have excluded poetry altogether from his enumeration of sciences and learning, or taken into consideration other faculties of the soul than those which are merely intellectual.

48. Stewart has praised with justice a short but beautiful paragraph concerning poetry (under which title may be comprehended all the various creations of the faculty of the imagination, at least as they are manifested by words), wherein Bacon "has exhausted every thing that philosophy and good sense have yet had to offer on the subject of what has since been called the *beau idéal*." The same eminent writer and ardent admirer of Bacon observes, that D'Alembert improved on the Baconian arrangement by classing the fine arts together with poetry. Injustice had been done to painting and music, especially the former, when, in the fourth book *De Augmentis*, they were counted as mere *artes voluptariæ*, subordinate to a sort of Epicurean gratification of the senses, and only somewhat more liberal than cookery or cosmetics.

49. In the third book, science having been divided into theological and philosophical, and the former, or what regards revealed religion, being postponed for the present, he lays it down that all philosophy relates to God, to nature, or to man. Under natural theology, as a sort of appendix, he reckons the science or theory of angels and superhuman spirits; a more favorite theme, especially as treated independently of revelation, in the ages that preceded Lord Bacon, than it has been since. Natural philosophy is speculative or practical; the former divided into physics, in a particular sense, and metaphysics: "one of which inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; the other handleth the formal and final causes."

Fine passage on poetry.

Natural theology and metaphysics.

Hence physics, dealing with particular instances, and regarding only the effects produced, is precarious in its conclusions, and does not reach the stable principles of causation.

"Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit
Uno eodemque igni."

Metaphysics, to which word he gave a sense as remote from that which it bore in the Aristotelian schools as from that in which it is commonly employed at present, had for its proper object the investigation of forms. It was "a generally received and inveterate opinion, that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or true differences." "Formæ inventio," he says in another place, "habetur pro desperata." The word *form* itself, being borrowed from the old philosophy, is not immediately intelligible to every reader. "In the Baconian sense," says Playfair, "form differs ^{Form of} only from cause in being permanent, whereas we ^{bodies} apply cause to that which exists in order of time." Form (*natura naturans*, as it was barbarously called) is the general law, or condition of existence, in any substance or quality (*natura naturata*), which is wherever its form is.¹ The conditions of a mathematical figure, prescribed in its definition, might in this sense be called its form, if it did not seem to be Lord Bacon's intention to confine the word to the laws of particular sensible existences. In modern philosophy, it might be defined to be that particular combination of forces which impresses a certain modification upon matter subjected to their influence.

50. To a knowledge of such forms, or laws of essence and existence, at least in a certain degree, it might be possible, in Bacon's sanguine estimation of his own ^{Might some-}logic, for man to attain. Not that we could hope to ^{times be in-}understand the forms of complex beings, which are almost ^{quired into.}infinite in variety, but the simple and primary natures, which are combined in them. "To inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold, nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colors, of gravity and levity, of density and tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which, like

¹ "Licet enim in natura nihil vere existat præter corpora individua, essentia actus purus individuos ex lege, in doctrinis est tam ad sciendum quam operandum. Eam autem legem ejusque paragraphos Formarum nomine intelligimus; præsertim cum hoc vocabulum invaluerit et familiariter occurrat." - Nov. Org., li. 2.

description of universal nature as he contemplated: these form no part of the *Instauratio Magna*, and had been compiled before. But he enumerates one hundred and thirty particular histories which ought to be drawn up for his great work. A few of these he has given in a sort of skeleton, as samples rather of the method of collecting facts, than of the facts themselves; namely, the History of Winds, of Life and Death, of Density and Rarity, of Sound and Hearing.

39. The fourth part, called *Scala Intellectus*, is also wanting, with the exception of a very few introductory pages. "By these tables," says Bacon, "we mean, not such examples as we subjoin to the several rules of our method, but types and models, which place before our eyes the entire process of the mind in the discovery of truth, selecting various and remarkable instances."¹ These he compares to the diagrams of geometry, by attending to which the steps of the demonstration become perspicuous. Though the great brevity of his language in this place renders it rather difficult to see clearly what he understood by these models, some light appears to be thrown on this passage by one in the treatise *De Augmentis*, where he enumerates among the desiderata of logic what he calls *traditio lampadis*, or a delivery of any science or particular truth according to the order wherein it was discovered.² "The methods of geometers," he there says, "have some resemblance to this art;" which is not, however, the case as to the synthetical geometry with which we are generally conversant. It is the history of analytical investigation; and many beautiful illustrations of it have been given since the days of Bacon in all subjects to which that method of inquiry has been applied.

¹ "Neque de his exemplis loquimur, quæ singulis præceptis ac regulis illustrandi gratia adjiuntur, hoc enim in secunda operis parte abunde præstitimus, sed plane typos intelligimus ac plasmata, quæ universum mentis processum atque inveniendi continuatam fabricam et ordinem in certis subjectis, illisque variis et insignibus tanquam sub oculos ponant. Etenim nobis venit in mentem in mathematicis, astante machina, sequi demonstrationem facilem et perspicuam; contra atque hac commoditate omnia videri involuta et quam reuera sunt subtiliora."

² Lib. vi. c. 2. "Scientia quæ aliis tanquam tela pertexendo traditur, eadem methodo, si fieri possit, animo alterius est insinuanda, quæ primitus inventa est.

Atque hoc ipsum fieri sane potest in scientia per inductionem acquisita: sed in anticipata ista et præmatura scientia, quæ utimur, non facile dicat quis quo itinere ad eam quam nactus est scientiam pervenerit. Attamen sane secundum majus et minus possit quis scientiam propriam revivere, et vestigia suæ cognitionis simul et consensus remitti; atque hoc facto scientiam sic transplantare in animum alienum, sicut crevit in suo. . . . Cujus quidem generis traditionis, methodus mathematicorum in eo subjecto similitudinem quandam habet." I do not well understand the words, *in eo subjecto*: he may possibly have referred to analytical processes.

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39. The fourth part, called *Scala Intellectus*, is also wanting, with the exception of a very few introductory Fourth part: Scala Intellectus. pages. "By these tables," says Bacon, "we mean, not such examples as we subjoin to the several rules of our method, but types and models, which place before our eyes the entire process of the mind in the discovery of truth, selecting various and remarkable instances."¹ These he compares to the diagrams of geometry, by attending to which the steps of the demonstration become perspicuous. Though the great brevity of his language in this place renders it rather difficult to see clearly what he understood by these models, some light appears to be thrown on this passage by one in the treatise *De Augmentis*, where he enumerates among the desiderata of logic what he calls *traditio lampadis*, or a delivery of any science or particular truth according to the order wherein it was discovered.² "The methods of geometers," he there says, "have some resemblance to this art;" which is not, however, the case as to the synthetical geometry with which we are generally conversant. It is the history of analytical investigation; and many beautiful illustrations of it have been given since the days of Bacon in all subjects to which that method of inquiry has been applied.

¹ "Neque de his exemplis loquimur, quæ singulis præceptis ac regulis illustrandi gratia adjiciuntur. hoc enim in secunda operis parte abunde præstitimus, sed plane typos intelligimus ac plasmata, quæ universum mentis processum atque inveniendi continuatam fabricam et ordinem in certis subjectis, illaque variis et insignibus tanquam sub oculos ponant. Etenim nobis venit in mentem in mathematicis, astante machina, sequi demonstrationem facilem et perspicuam; contra abeque hac commoditate omnia videri involuta et quam revera sunt subtiliora."

² Lib. vi. c. 2. "Scientia quæ aliis tanquam tela pertexendo traditur, eodem methodo, si fieri possit, animo alterius est insinuanda, quæ primitus inventa est.

Atque hoc ipsum fieri sane potest in scientia per inductionem acquisita: sed in anticipata ista et præmatura scientia, quæ utimus, non facile dicat quis quo itinere ad eam quam nactus est scientiam pervenerit. Attamen sane secundum majus et minus possit quis scientiam propriam revivere, et vestigia suæ cognitionis simul et consensûs remetiiri; atque hoc facto scientiam sic transplantare in animum alienum, sicut crevit in suo. . . . Cujus quidem generis traditionis, methodus mathematicorum in eo subjecto similitudinem quandam habet." I do not well understand the words, *in eo subjecto*: he may possibly have referred to analytical processes.

40. In a fifth part of the *Instauratio Magna*, Bacon had designed to give a specimen of the new philosophy which he hoped to raise, after a due use of his natural history and inductive method, by way of anticipation or sample of the whole. He calls it *Prodromi, sive Anticipationes Philosophiæ Secundæ*. And some fragments of this part are published by the names *Cogitata et Visa, Cogitationes de Natura Rerum, Filum Labyrinthi*, and a few more; being as much, in all probability, as he had reduced to writing. In his own metaphor, it was to be like the payment of interest till the principal could be raised; "*tanquam fœnus reddatur, donec sors haberi possit.*" For he despaired of ever completing a work by a sixth and last portion, which was to display a perfect system of philosophy, deduced and confirmed by a legitimate, sober, and exact inquiry according to the method which he had invented and laid down. "To perfect this last part is above our powers and beyond our hopes. We may, as we trust, make no despicable beginnings: the destinies of the human race must complete it; in such a manner, perhaps, as men, looking only at the present, would not readily conceive. For upon this will depend not only a speculative good, but all the fortunes of mankind, and all their power." And, with an eloquent prayer that his exertions may be rendered effectual to the attainment of truth and happiness, this introductory chapter of the *Instauratio*, which announces the distribution of its portions, concludes. Such was the temple, of which Bacon saw in vision before him the stately front and decorated pediments, in all their breadth of light, and harmony of proportion; while long vistas of receding columns, and glimpses of internal splendor, revealed a glory that it was not permitted him to comprehend. In the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, and in the *Novum Organum*, we have less, no doubt, than Lord Bacon, under different conditions of life, might have achieved: he might have been more emphatically the high-priest of nature, if he had not been the chancellor of James I.; but no one man could have filled up the vast outline which he alone, in that stage of the world, could have so boldly sketched.

41. The best order of studying the Baconian philosophy would be to read attentively the *Advancement of Learning*; next, to take the treatise *De Augmentis*, comparing it all along

Fifth part:
Anticipationes
Philosophiæ.

Sixth part:
Philosophiæ
Secundæ.

with the former; and afterwards to proceed to the *Novum Organum*. A less degree of regard has usually been paid to the *Centuries of Natural History*, which are the least important of his writings, or even to the other philosophical fragments, some of which contain very excellent passages; yet such, in great measure, as will be found substantially in other parts of his works. The most remarkable are the *Cogitata et Visa*. It must be said, that one who thoroughly venerates Lord Bacon will not disdain his repetitions, which sometimes, by variations of phrase, throw light upon each other. It is generally supposed that the Latin works were translated from the original English by several assistants, among whom George Herbert and Hobbes have been named, under the author's superintendence.¹ The Latin style of these writings is singularly concise, energetic, and impressive, but frequently crabbed, uncouth, and obscure; so that we read with more admiration of the sense, than delight in the manner of delivering it. But Rawley, in his *Life of Bacon*, informs us that he had seen about twelve autographs of the *Novum Organum*, wrought up and improved year by year, till it reached the shape in which it was published; and he does not intimate that these were in English, unless the praise he immediately afterwards bestows on his English style may be thought to warrant that supposition.² I do not know that we have positive evidence as to any of the Latin works being translations from English, except the treatise *De Augmentis*.

42. The leading principles of the Baconian philosophy are contained in the *Advancement of Learning*. These are amplified, corrected, illustrated, and developed in the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; from the fifth book of which, with some help from other parts, is taken the first book of the *Novum Organum*, and even a part of the second. I use this

¹ The translation was made, as Archbishop Tenison informs us, "by Mr. Herbert and some others who were esteemed masters in the Roman eloquence."

² "Ipse reperi in archivis dominationis sue, autographa plus minus duodecim Organi Novi de anno in annum elaborati, et ad incudem revocati, et singulis annis, ulteriore lima subinde politi et castigati, donec in illud tandem corpus adoleverat, quo in lucem editum fuit; sicut multa ex animalibus fetus lambere consuecunt usque quo ad membrorum firmitudinem

eos perducant. In libris suis componendis verborum vigorem et perspicuitatem precipue sectabatur, non elegantiam aut concinnitatem sermonis, et inter scribendum aut dictandum sepe interrogavit, num sensus ejus clare admodum et perspicue redditus esset? Quippe qui scribere equum esse ut verba simularentur rebus, non res verbis. Et si in stylum forsitan politorem incidisset, aliquidem apud nostrates eloqui Anglicani artifex habitus est, id evenit, quia evitare arduum ei erat."

language, because, though earlier in publication, I conceive that the *Novum Organum* was later in composition. All that very important part of this fifth book which relates to *Experientia Litterata*, or *Venatio Panis*, as he calls it, and contains excellent rules for conducting experiments in natural philosophy, is new, and does not appear in the *Advancement of Learning*, except by way of promise of what should be done in it. Nor is this, at least so fully and clearly, to be found in the *Novum Organum*. The second book of this latter treatise he professes not to anticipate. "*De Novo Organo silemus*," he says, "*neque de eo quicquam prælibamus*." This can only apply to the second book, which he considered as the real exposition of his method, after clearing away the fallacies which form the chief subject of the first. Yet what is said of *Topica particularis*, in this fifth book *De Augmentis* (illustrated by "articles of inquiry concerning gravity and levity"), goes entirely on the principles of the second book of the *Novum Organum*.

43. Let us now see what Lord Bacon's method really was. He has given it the name of induction, but carefully distinguishes it from what bore that name in the old logic; that is, an inference from a perfect enumeration of particulars to a general law of the whole. For such an enumeration, though of course conclusive, is rarely practicable in nature, where the particulars exceed our powers of numbering.¹ Nor, again, is the Baconian method

Nature of the Baconian induction.

¹ "*Inductio quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem, res puerilis est, et præcario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria, et plerumque secundum pauciora quam par est, et ex his tantummodo quæ præsto sunt promittit. At inductio quæ ad inventionem et demonstrationem scientiarum et artium erit utilis, naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ne deinde post negativas tot quot sufficient, super affirmativas concludere; quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentatum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone, qui ad excutendas definitiones et ideas, hac certe forma inductionis aliquatenus utitur.*"—*Nov. Org.*, i. 106. In this passage, Bacon seems to imply that the enumeration of particulars in any induction is or may be imperfect. This is certainly the case in the plurality of physical inductions; but it does not appear that the logical writers looked upon this as the primary and legitimate source. Induction was distinguished

into the complete and incomplete. "The word," says a very modern writer, "is perhaps unhappy, as indeed it is taken in several vague senses; but to abolish it is impossible. It is the Latin translation of *ἐπαγωγή*, which word is used by Aristotle as a counterpart to *συλλογισμός*. He seems to consider it in a perfect or dialectic, and in an imperfect or rhetorical sense. Thus, if a genus (G.) contained four species (A. B. C. D.), syllogism would argue, that what is true of G. is true of any one of the four; but perfect induction would reason, that what we can prove true of A. B. C. D. separately, we may properly state as true of G., the whole genus. This is evidently a formal argument, as demonstrative as syllogism. But the imperfect or rhetorical induction will perhaps enumerate three only of the species, and then draw the conclusion concerning G., which virtually includes the fourth; or, what is the same thing, will argue, that

to be confounded with the less complete form of the inductive process, namely, inferences from partial experience in similar

what is true of the three is to be believed true likewise of the fourth."—Newman's Lectures on Logic, p. 78. (1837.) The same distinction between perfect and imperfect induction is made in the Encyclopédie Française, art. "Induction," and apparently on the authority of the ancients.

It may be observed, that this imperfect induction may be put in a regular logical form, and is only vicious in syllogistic reasoning when the conclusion asserts a higher probability than the premises. If, for example, we reason thus: Some serpents are venomous. — This unknown animal is a serpent. — Therefore this is venomous: we are guilty of an obvious paralogism. If we infer only, This may be venomous, our reasoning is perfectly valid in itself, at least in the common apprehension of all mankind, except dialecticians, but not regular in form. The only means that I perceive of making it so, is to put it in some such phrase as the following: All unknown serpents are affected by a certain probability of being venomous: This animal, &c. It is not necessary, of course, that the probability should be capable of being estimated, provided we mentally conceive it to be no other in the conclusion than in the major term. In the best treatises on the strict or syllogistic method, as far as I have seen, there seems a deficiency in respect to *probable* conclusions, which may have arisen from the practice of taking instances from universal or necessary, rather than contingent truths, as well as from the contracted views of reasoning which the Aristotelian school have always inculcated. No sophisms are so frequent in practice as the concluding generally from a partial induction, or assuming (most commonly tacitly) by what Archbishop Whately calls "a kind of logical action," that a few individuals are "adequate samples or representations of the class they belong to." These sophisms cannot, in the present state of things, be practised largely in physical science or natural history; but, in reasonings on matter of fact, they are of incessant occurrence. The "logical action" may indeed frequently be employed, even on subjects unconnected with the physical laws of nature; but to know when this may be, and to what extent, is just that which, far more than any other skill, distinguishes what is called a good reasoner from a bad one.

(I permit this note to remain as in former editions; but it might have been more fully and more correctly expressed. The proper nature of induction has been treat-

ed within a few years by Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh Review, vol. lvi.); by Archbishop Whately in his Elements of Logic; by the author of the article "Organon" in the Penny Cyclopædia; by M. de Rémusat, *Essais de Philosophie*, vol. ii. p. 408; by Dr. Whewell in the History, and again in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences; and by Mr. Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. i. p. 362. The apparently various opinions of these writers, though in some degree resolving themselves into differences of definition, deserve attention from the philosophical reader; but it would be rather too extraneous from the character of the present work to examine them. I will only observe, that what has been called perfect induction, or a complete enumeration of particulars, is as barren of new truth as the syllogism itself, to which indeed, though with some variety in the formal rules, it properly belongs. For if we have already enumerated all species of fish, and asserted them to be cold-blooded, we advance not a step by saying this again of a herring or a haddock. Mr. Mill, therefore, has well remarked, that "Induction is a process of inference: it proceeds from the known to the unknown; and any operation involving no inference, any process in which what seems the conclusion is no wider than the premises from which it is drawn, does not fall within the meaning of the term."—*System of Logic*, vol. i. p. 362. But this inference is only rendered logically conclusive, or satisfactory to the reason, as any thing more than a probable argument, by means of a generalization which assumes, on some extra-logical ground, such as the uniformity of physical laws, that the partial induction might have been rendered universal. If the conclusion contains more than the premises *imply*, it is manifestly fallacious. But that the inductive syllogism, *ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς* (Analyt. Prin., l. ii. c. 23), can only lead, in *form*, to probable conclusions, even though the enumeration should be complete, appears from its being in the third figure; though after a general principle is once established by induction, when we come to apply it in new cases, the process will be in the first. Archbishop Whately and Sir W. Hamilton only differ in appearance as to this, since they look to different periods of reasoning: one, in which experience is generalized by the assumption of something unproved; another, in which a particular case is shown to fall within the generalization. But the second is not the induction of Aristotle. What

circumstances; though this may be a very sufficient ground for practical, which is probable, knowledge. His own method rests on the same general principle, namely, the uniformity of the laws of nature, so that, in certain conditions of phenomena, the same effects or the same causes may be assumed; but it endeavors to establish these laws on a more exact and finer process of reasoning than partial experience can effect. For the recurrence of antecedents and consequents does not prove a necessary connection between them, unless we can exclude the presence of all other conditions which may determine the event. Long and continued experience of such a recurrence, indeed, raises a high probability of a necessary connection: but the aim of Bacon was to supersede experience in this sense, and to find a shorter road to the result; and for this his methods of exclusion are devised. As complete and accurate a collection of facts, connected with the subject of inquiry, as possible, is to be made out by means of that copious natural history which he contemplated, or from any other good sources. These are to be selected, compared, and scrutinized, according to the rules of natural interpretation delivered in the second book of the *Novum Organum*, or such others as he designed to add to them; and, if experiments are admissible, these are to be conducted according to the same rules. Experience and observation are the guides through the Baconian philosophy, which is the handmaid and interpreter of nature. When Lord Bacon seems to decry experience, which in certain passages he might be thought to do, it is the particular and empirical observation of individuals, from which many rash generalizations had been drawn, as opposed to that founded on an accurate natural history. Such hasty inferences he reckoned still more pernicious to true knowledge

this was, I find nowhere more neatly delivered than in an Arabic treatise on logic, published, with a translation, in the eighth volume of the *Asiatic Researches*.

"Induction is the process of collecting particulars for the purpose of establishing a general rule respecting the nature of the whole class. Induction is of two kinds: viz., perfect and imperfect. It is perfect induction when the general rule is obtained from an examination of all the parts. For example, all animals are either endowed with speech, or not endowed with speech. But those endowed and those not endowed are both sentient: therefore all animals are sentient. This is an example

of perfect induction, which produces certainty.

"It is imperfect induction when, a number of individuals of a class being overlooked or excluded, a general rule is thus established respecting the whole. For instance, if it should be assumed that all animals move the under-jaw in eating, because this is the case with man, horses, goats, and sheep, this would be an example of imperfect induction, which does not afford certainty, because it is possible that some animals may not move the under-jaw in eating, as it is reported of the crocodile." — p. 127. — 1847.]

than the sophistical methods of the current philosophy; and in a remarkable passage, after censuring this precipitancy of empirical conclusions in the chemists, and in Gilbert's *Treatise on the Magnet*, utters a prediction, that if ever mankind, excited by his counsels, should seriously betake themselves to seek the guidance of experience, instead of relying on the dogmatic schools of the sophists, the proneness of the human mind to snatch at general axioms would expose them to much risk of error from the theories of this superficial class of philosophers.¹

44. The indignation, however, of Lord Bacon is more frequently directed against the predominant philosophy of his age, that of Aristotle and the schoolmen. His dislike of Aristotle. Though he does justice to the great abilities of the former, and acknowledges the exact attention to facts displayed in his *History of Animals*, he deems him one of the most eminent adversaries to the only method that can guide us to the real laws of nature. The old Greek philosophers, Empedocles, Leucippus, Anaxagoras, and others of their age, who had been in the right track of investigation, stood much higher in the esteem of Bacon than their successors, Plato, Zeno, Aristotle, by whose lustre they had been so much superseded, that both their works have perished, and their tenets are with difficulty collected. These more distinguished leaders of the Grecian schools were in his eyes little else than disputatious professors (it must be remembered that he had in general only physical science in his view), who seemed to have it in common with children, "ut ad garriendum prompti sint, generare non possint;" so wordy and barren was their miscalled wisdom.

45. Those who object to the importance of Lord Bacon's precepts in philosophy, that mankind have practised His method much required. many of them immemorially, are rather confirming their utility than taking off much from their originality, in any fair sense of that term. Every logical method is built on the common faculties of human nature, which have been exercised since the creation in discerning, better or worse, truth from falsehood, and inferring the unknown from the known. That men might have done this more correctly is manifest from the quantity of error into which, from want

¹ *Nov. Organ.*, lib. i. 64. It may be doubted whether Bacon did full justice to Gilbert.

of reasoning well on what came before them, they have habitually fallen. In experimental philosophy, to which the more special rules of Lord Bacon are generally referred, there was a notorious want of that very process of reasoning which he has supplied. It is more than probable, indeed, that the great physical philosophers of the seventeenth century would have been led to employ some of his rules, had he never promulgated them; but I believe they had been little regarded in the earlier period of science.¹ It is also a very defective view of the Baconian method to look only at the experimental rules given in the *Novum Organum*. The preparatory steps of completely exhausting the natural history of the subject of inquiry by a patient and sagacious consideration of it in every light are at least of equal importance, and equally prominent in the inductive philosophy.

46. The first object of Lord Bacon's philosophical writings is to prove their own necessity, by giving an unfavorable impression as to the actual state of most ^{its objects} sciences, in consequence of the prejudices of the human mind, and of the mistaken methods pursued in their cultivation. The second was to point out a better prospect for the future. One of these occupies the treatise *De Augmentis*, and the first book of the *Novum Organum*. The other, besides many anticipations in these, is partially detailed in the second book, and would have been more thoroughly developed in those remaining portions which the author did not complete. We shall now give a very short sketch of these two famous works, which comprise the greater part of the Baconian philosophy.

47. The *Advancement of Learning* is divided into two books only; the treatise *De Augmentis*, into nine. The first of these, in the latter, is introductory, and designed to remove prejudices against the search after truth, by indicating the causes which had hitherto obstructed it. In the second book, he lays down his celebrated partition of human learning into history, poetry, and philosophy, according to the faculties of the mind ^{Sketch of the treatise De Augmentis.} respectively concerned in them,—the memory, imagination, and reason. History is natural or civil, under the latter of which ecclesiastical and literary histories are com- ^{History}

¹ It has been remarked, that the famous experiment of Pascal on the barometer, by carrying it to a considerable elevation, was "a crucial instance, one of the first, if not the very first, on record in physics."—Herschel, p. 220.

upon comparison, that more than two-thirds of this treatise are a version, with slight interpolation or omission, from the Advancement of Learning; the remainder being new matter.

35. The *Instauratio Magna* had been already published in 1620, while Lord Bacon was still chancellor.

Instauratio Magna. Fifteen years had elapsed since he gave to the world his Advancement of Learning,—the first-fruits of such astonishing vigor of philosophical genius, that, inconceivable as the completion of the scheme he had even then laid down in prospect for his new philosophy by any single effort must appear, we may be disappointed at the great deficiencies which this latter work exhibits, and which he was not destined to fill up. But he had passed the interval in active life, and in dangerous paths; deserting, as in truth he had all along been prone enough to do, the “shady spaces of philosophy,” as Milton calls them, for the court of a sovereign, who, with some real learning, was totally incapable of sounding the depths of Lord Bacon’s mind, or even of estimating his genius.

36. The *Instauratio Magna*, dedicated to James, is divided, according to the magnificent groundplot of its author, into six parts. The first of these he entitles *Partitiones Scientiarum*, comprehending a general summary of that knowledge which mankind already possess; yet not merely treating this affirmatively, but taking special notice of whatever should seem deficient or imperfect; sometimes even supplying, by illustration or precept, these vacant spaces of science. This first part he declares to be wanting in the *Instauratio*. It has been chiefly supplied by the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; yet perhaps even that does not fully come up to the amplitude of his design.

37. The second part of the *Instauratio* was to be, as he expresses it, “the science of a better and more perfect use of reason in the investigation of things, and of the true aids of the understanding;” the new logic, or inductive method, in which what is eminently styled the Baconian philosophy consists. This, as far as he completed it, is known to all by the name of the *Novum Organum*. But he seems to have designed a fuller treatise in place of this; the aphorisms into which he has digested it being rather the heads or theses of chapters, at least in many

First part:
Partitiones
Scientiarum.

Second part:
Novum Or-
ganum.

places, that would have been farther expanded.¹ And it is still more important to observe, that he did not achieve the whole of his summary that he had promised; but, out of nine divisions of his method, we only possess the first, which he denominates *prærogativa instantiarum*. Eight others, of exceeding importance to his logic, he has not touched at all, except to describe them by name, and to promise more. "We will speak," he says, "in the first place, of prerogative instances; secondly, of the aids of induction; thirdly, of the rectification of induction; fourthly, of varying the investigation according to the nature of the subject; fifthly, of prerogative natures (or objects), as to investigation, or the choice of what shall be first inquired into; sixthly, of the boundaries of inquiry, or the synoptical view of all natures in the world; seventhly, on the application of inquiry to practice, and what relates to man; eighthly, on the preparations (*parasceve*) for inquiry; lastly, on the ascending and descending scale of axioms."² All these, after the first, are wanting, with the exception of a few slightly handled in separate parts of Bacon's writings; and the deficiency, which is so important, seems to have been sometimes overlooked by those who have written about the *Novum Organum*.

38. The third part of the *Instauratio Magna* was to comprise an entire natural history, diligently and scrupulously collected from experience of every kind; including under that name of natural history every thing wherein the art of man has been employed on natural substances, either for practice or experiment; no method of reasoning being sufficient to guide us to truth as to natural things, if they are not themselves clearly and exactly apprehended. It is unnecessary to observe, that very little of this immense chart of nature could be traced by the hand of Bacon, or in his time. His *Centuries of Natural History*, containing about one thousand observed facts and experiments, are a very slender contribution towards such a

¹ It is entitled by himself, *Partis secundæ Summa, digesta in Aphorismos*.

² "Dicemus itaque primo loco de prærogativa instantiarum; secundo, de auxiliis inductionis; tertio, de rectificatione inductionis; quarto, de variatione inquisitionis pro natura subjecti; quinto, de prærogativa naturarum quatenus ad inquisitionem, sive de eo quod inquiran-

dum est prius et posterius; sexto, de terminis inquisitionis, sive de synopsi omnium naturarum in universo; septimo, de deductione ad praxin, sive de eo quod est in ordine ad hominem; octavo, de parascevis ad inquisitionem; postremo autem, de scala ascensoria et descensoria axiomatum."—*Ib.* li. 22.

description of universal nature as he contemplated: these form no part of the *Instauratio Magna*, and had been compiled before. But he enumerates one hundred and thirty particular histories which ought to be drawn up for his great work. A few of these he has given in a sort of skeleton, as samples rather of the method of collecting facts, than of the facts themselves; namely, the History of Winds, of Life and Death, of Density and Rarity, of Sound and Hearing.

39. The fourth part, called *Scala Intellectus*, is also wanting, with the exception of a very few introductory pages. "By these tables," says Bacon, "we mean, not such examples as we subjoin to the several rules of our method, but types and models, which place before our eyes the entire process of the mind in the discovery of truth, selecting various and remarkable instances."¹ These he compares to the diagrams of geometry, by attending to which the steps of the demonstration become perspicuous. Though the great brevity of his language in this place renders it rather difficult to see clearly what he understood by these models, some light appears to be thrown on this passage by one in the treatise *De Augmentis*, where he enumerates among the desiderata of logic what he calls *traditio lampadis*, or a delivery of any science or particular truth according to the order wherein it was discovered.² "The methods of geometers," he there says, "have some resemblance to this art;" which is not, however, the case as to the synthetical geometry with which we are generally conversant. It is the history of analytical investigation; and many beautiful illustrations of it have been given since the days of Bacon in all subjects to which that method of inquiry has been applied.

¹ "Neque de his exemplis loquimur, quæ singulis præceptis ac regulis illustrandi gratia adjiuntur, hoc enim in secunda operis parte abunde præstitimus, sed plane typos intelligimus ac plasmata, quæ universum mentis processum atque inveniendi continuatam fabricam et ordinem in certis subjectis, hisque variis et insignibus tanquam sub oculos ponant. Etenim nobis venit in mentem in mathematicis, astante machina, sequi demonstrationem facilem et perspicuam; contra abque hac commoditate omnia videri involuta et quam revera sunt subtiliora."
² Lib. vi. c. 2. "Scientia quæ aliis tanquam tela pertexendo traditur, eadem methodo, si fieri possit, animo alterius est insinuanda, quæ primitus inventa est.

Atque hoc ipsum fieri sane potest in scientiis per inductionem acquisitis: sed in anticipata ista et præmatura scientia, quæ utimur, non facile dicat quis quo itinere ad eam quam nactus est scientiam pervenerit. Attamen sane secundum majus et minus possit quis scientiam propriam revisere, et vestigia suæ cognitionis simul et consensûs rememari; atque hoc factis scientiis sic transplantare in animum alienum, sicut crevit in suo. . . . Cujus quidem generis traditionis, methodus mathematicorum in eo subjecto similitudinem quandam habet." I do not well understand the words, *in eo subjecto*: he may possibly have referred to analytical processes.

40. In a fifth part of the *Instauratio Magna*, Bacon had designed to give a specimen of the new philosophy which he hoped to raise, after a due use of his natural history and inductive method, by way of anticipation or sample of the whole. He calls it *Prodromi, sive Anticipationes Philosophiæ Secundæ*. And some fragments of this part are published by the names *Cogitata et Visa*, *Cogitationes de Natura Rerum*, *Filum Labyrinthi*, and a few more; being as much, in all probability, as he had reduced to writing. In his own metaphor, it was to be like the payment of interest till the principal could be raised; “*tanquam fœnus reddatur, donec sors haberi possit*.” For he despaired of ever completing a work by a sixth and last portion, which was to display a perfect system of philosophy, deduced and confirmed by a legitimate, sober, and exact inquiry according to the method which he had invented and laid down. “To perfect this last part is above our powers and beyond our hopes. We may, as we trust, make no despicable beginnings: the destinies of the human race must complete it; in such a manner, perhaps, as men, looking only at the present, would not readily conceive. For upon this will depend not only a speculative good, but all the fortunes of mankind, and all their power.” And, with an eloquent prayer that his exertions may be rendered effectual to the attainment of truth and happiness, this introductory chapter of the *Instauratio*, which announces the distribution of its portions, concludes. Such was the temple, of which Bacon saw in vision before him the stately front and decorated pediments, in all their breadth of light, and harmony of proportion; while long vistas of receding columns, and glimpses of internal splendor, revealed a glory that it was not permitted him to comprehend. In the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, and in the *Novum Organum*, we have less, no doubt, than Lord Bacon, under different conditions of life, might have achieved: he might have been more emphatically the high-priest of nature, if he had not been the chancellor of James I.; but no one man could have filled up the vast outline which he alone, in that stage of the world, could have so boldly sketched.

41. The best order of studying the Baconian philosophy would be to read attentively the *Advancement of Learning*; next, to take the treatise *De Augmentis*, comparing it all along

Fifth part:
Anticipationes
Philosophiæ.

Sixth part:
Philosophiæ
Secundæ.

with the former; and afterwards to proceed to the *Novum Organum*. A less degree of regard has usually been paid to the *Centuries of Natural History*, which are the least important of his writings, or even to the other philosophical fragments, some of which contain very excellent passages; yet such, in great measure, as will be found substantially in other parts of his works. The most remarkable are the *Cogitata et Visa*. It must be said, that one who thoroughly venerates Lord Bacon will not disdain his repetitions, which sometimes, by variations of phrase, throw light upon each other. It is generally supposed that the Latin works were translated from the original English by several assistants, among whom George Herbert and Hobbes have been named, under the author's superintendence.¹ The Latin style of these writings is singularly concise, energetic, and impressive, but frequently crabbed, uncouth, and obscure; so that we read with more admiration of the sense, than delight in the manner of delivering it. But Rawley, in his *Life of Bacon*, informs us that he had seen about twelve autographs of the *Novum Organum*, wrought up and improved year by year, till it reached the shape in which it was published; and he does not intimate that these were in English, unless the praise he immediately afterwards bestows on his English style may be thought to warrant that supposition.² I do not know that we have positive evidence as to any of the Latin works being translations from English, except the treatise *De Augmentis*.

42. The leading principles of the Baconian philosophy are contained in the *Advancement of Learning*. These are amplified, corrected, illustrated, and developed in the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; from the fifth book of which, with some help from other parts, is taken the first book of the *Novum Organum*, and even a part of the second. I use this

¹ The translation was made, as Archbishop Tenison informs us, "by Mr. Herbert and some others who were esteemed masters in the Roman eloquence."

² "Ipse reperi in archivis dominationis sue, autographa plus minus duodecim Organi Novi de anno in annum elaborati, et ad incudem revocati, et singulis annis, ulteriore lima subinde politi et castigati, donec in illud tandem corpus adoleverat, quo in lucem editum fuit; sicut multa ex animalibus fetus lambere consuecunt usque quo ad membrorum firmitudinem

ecce perveniunt. In libris suis componendis verborum vigorem et perspicuitatem præcipue sectabatur, non elegantiam aut concinnitatem sermonis, et inter scribendum aut dictandum sæpe interrogavit, num sensus ejus clare admodum et perspicue redditus esset? Quippe qui acutus equum esse ut verba famularentur rebus, non res verbis. Et si in stylium forsitan polidorem incidisset, siquidem apud prætrates eloquii Anglicani artifex habitus est, id evenit, quia evitare arduum ei erat."

language, because, though earlier in publication, I conceive that the *Novum Organum* was later in composition. All that very important part of this fifth book which relates to *Experientia Litterata*, or *Venatio Panis*, as he calls it, and contains excellent rules for conducting experiments in natural philosophy, is new, and does not appear in the *Advancement of Learning*, except by way of promise of what should be done in it. Nor is this, at least so fully and clearly, to be found in the *Novum Organum*. The second book of this latter treatise he professes not to anticipate. "*De Novo Organo silemus*," he says, "*neque de eo quicquam prælibamus*." This can only apply to the second book, which he considered as the real exposition of his method, after clearing away the fallacies which form the chief subject of the first. Yet what is said of *Topica particularis*, in this fifth book *De Augmentis* (illustrated by "articles of inquiry concerning gravity and levity"), goes entirely on the principles of the second book of the *Novum Organum*.

43. Let us now see what Lord Bacon's method really was. He has given it the name of induction, but carefully distinguishes it from what bore that name in the old logic; that is, an inference from a perfect enumeration of particulars to a general law of the whole. For such an enumeration, though of course conclusive, is rarely practicable in nature, where the particulars exceed our powers of numbering.¹ Nor, again, is the Baconian method

Nature of the Baconian Induction.

¹ "*Inductio quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem, res puerilis est, et proinde concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantiâ contradictoria, et perimque secundum pauciora quam par est, et ex his tantummodo quæ præsto sunt promissat. At inductio quæ ad inventionem et demonstrationem scientiarum et artium erit utilis, naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ac deinde post negativas tot quot sufficiunt, super affirmativas concludere; quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentatum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone, qui ad excusandas definitiones et ideas, hac certe forma inductionis aliquatenus utitur.*" — *Nov. Org.*, l. 106. In this passage, Bacon seems to imply that the enumeration of particulars in any induction is or may be imperfect. This is certainly the case in the plurality of physical inductions; but it does not appear that the logical writers looked upon this as the primary and legitimate cause. Induction was distinguished

into the complete and incomplete. "The word," says a very modern writer, "is perhaps unhappy, as indeed it is taken in several vague senses; but to abolish it is impossible. It is the Latin translation of *ἐπαγωγή*, which word is used by Aristotle as a counterpart to *συλλογισμὸς*. He seems to consider it in a perfect or dialectic, and in an imperfect or rhetorical sense. Thus, if a genus (G.) contained four species (A. B. C. D.), syllogism would argue, that what is true of G. is true of any one of the four; but perfect induction would reason, that what we can prove true of A. B. C. D. separately, we may properly state as true of G., the whole genus. This is evidently a formal argument, as demonstrative as syllogism. But the imperfect or rhetorical induction will perhaps enumerate three only of the species, and then draw the conclusion concerning G., which virtually includes the fourth; or, what is the same thing, will argue, that

to be confounded with the less complete form of the inductive process, namely, inferences from partial experience in similar

what is true of the three is to be believed true likewise of the fourth."—Newman's Lectures on Logic, p. 73. (1837.) The same distinction between perfect and imperfect induction is made in the Encyclopédie Française, art. "Induction," and apparently on the authority of the ancients.

It may be observed, that this imperfect induction may be put in a regular logical form, and is only vicious in syllogistic reasoning when the conclusion asserts a higher probability than the premises. If, for example, we reason thus: Some serpents are venomous. — This unknown animal is a serpent. — Therefore this is venomous: we are guilty of an obvious paralogism. If we infer only. This may be venomous, our reasoning is perfectly valid in itself, at least in the common apprehension of all mankind, except dialecticians, but not regular in form. The only means that I perceive of making it so, is to put it in some such phrase as the following: All unknown serpents are affected by a certain probability of being venomous: This animal, &c. It is not necessary, of course, that the probability should be capable of being estimated, provided we mentally conceive it to be no other in the conclusion than in the major term. In the best treatises on the strict or syllogistic method, as far as I have seen, there seems a deficiency in respect to *probable* conclusions, which may have arisen from the practice of taking instances from universal or necessary, rather than contingent truths, as well as from the contracted views of reasoning which the Aristotelian school have always inculcated. No sophisms are so frequent in practice as the concluding generally from a partial induction, or assuming (most commonly tacitly) by what Archbishop Whately calls "a kind of logical fiction," that a few individuals are "adequate samples or representations of the class they belong to." These sophisms cannot, in the present state of things, be practised largely in physical science or natural history; but, in reasonings on matter of fact, they are of incessant occurrence. The "logical fiction" may indeed frequently be employed, even on subjects unconnected with the physical laws of nature; but to know when this may be, and to what extent, is just that which, far more than any other skill, distinguishes what is called a good reasoner from a bad one.

[I permit this note to remain as in former editions; but it might have been more fully and more correctly expressed. The proper nature of induction has been treat-

ed within a few years by Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh Review, vol. lvi.); by Archbishop Whately in his Elements of Logic; by the author of the article "Organon" in the Penny Cyclopædia; by M. de Rémusat, *Essai de Philosophie*, vol. ii. p. 408; by Dr. Whewell in the History, and again in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences; and by Mr. Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. i. p. 352. The apparently various opinions of these writers, though in some degree resolving themselves into differences of definition, deserve attention from the philosophical reader; but it would be rather too extraneous from the character of the present work to examine them. I will only observe, that what has been called perfect induction, or a complete enumeration of particulars, is as barren of new truth as the syllogism itself, to which indeed, though with some variety in the formal rules, it properly belongs. For if we have already enumerated all species of fish, and asserted them to be cold-blooded, we advance not a step by saying this again of a herring or a haddock. Mr. Mill, therefore, has well remarked, that "Induction is a process of inference: it proceeds from the known to the unknown; and any operation involving no inference, any process in which what seems the conclusion is no wider than the premises from which it is drawn, does not fall within the meaning of the term."—*System of Logic*, vol. i. p. 352. But this inference is only rendered logically conclusive, or satisfactory to the reason, as any thing more than a probable argument, by means of a generalization which assumes, on some extra-logical ground, such as the uniformity of physical laws, that the partial induction might have been rendered universal. If the conclusion contains more than the premises *imply*, it is manifestly fallacious. But that the inductive syllogism, *ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς* (*Analyt. Prin.*, i. ii. c. 23), can only lead, in *form*, to probable conclusions, even though the enumeration should be complete, appears from its being in the third figure; though after a general principle is once established by induction, when we come to apply it in new cases, the process will be in the first. Archbishop Whately and Sir W. Hamilton only differ in appearance as to this, since they look to different periods of reasoning: one, in which experience is generalized by the assumption of something unproved; another, in which a particular case is shown to fall within the generalization. But the second is not the induction of Aristotle. What

circumstances; though this may be a very sufficient ground for practical, which is probable, knowledge. His own method rests on the same general principle, namely, the uniformity of the laws of nature, so that, in certain conditions of phenomena, the same effects or the same causes may be assumed; but it endeavors to establish these laws on a more exact and finer process of reasoning than partial experience can effect. For the recurrence of antecedents and consequents does not prove a necessary connection between them, unless we can exclude the presence of all other conditions which may determine the event. Long and continued experience of such a recurrence, indeed, raises a high probability of a necessary connection: but the aim of Bacon was to supersede experience in this sense, and to find a shorter road to the result; and for this his methods of exclusion are devised. As complete and accurate a collection of facts, connected with the subject of inquiry, as possible, is to be made out by means of that copious natural history which he contemplated, or from any other good sources. These are to be selected, compared, and scrutinized, according to the rules of natural interpretation delivered in the second book of the *Novum Organum*, or such others as he designed to add to them; and, if experiments are admissible, these are to be conducted according to the same rules. Experience and observation are the guides through the Baconian philosophy, which is the handmaid and interpreter of nature. When Lord Bacon seems to decry experience, which in certain passages he might be thought to do, it is the particular and empirical observation of individuals, from which many rash generalizations had been drawn, as opposed to that founded on an accurate natural history. Such hasty inferences he reckoned still more pernicious to true knowledge

this was, I find nowhere more neatly delivered than in an Arabic treatise on logic, published, with a translation, in the eighth volume of the *Asiatic Researches*.

"Induction is the process of collecting particulars for the purpose of establishing a general rule respecting the nature of the whole class. Induction is of two kinds; viz., perfect and imperfect. It is perfect induction when the general rule is obtained from an examination of all the parts. For example, all animals are either endowed with speech, or not endowed with speech. But those endowed and those not endowed are both sentient; therefore all animals are sentient. This is an example

of perfect induction, which produces certainty.

"It is imperfect induction when, a number of individuals of a class being overlooked or excluded, a general rule is thus established respecting the whole. For instance, if it should be assumed that all animals move the under-jaw in eating, because this is the case with man, horses, goats, and sheep, this would be an example of imperfect induction, which does not afford certainty, because it is possible that some animals may not move the under-jaw in eating, as it is reported of the crocodile." — p. 127. — 1847.]

than the sophistical methods of the current philosophy; and in a remarkable passage, after censuring this precipitancy of empirical conclusions in the chemists, and in Gilbert's Treatise on the Magnet, utters a prediction, that if ever mankind, excited by his counsels, should seriously betake themselves to seek the guidance of experience, instead of relying on the dogmatic schools of the sophists, the proneness of the human mind to snatch at general axioms would expose them to much risk of error from the theories of this superficial class of philosophers.¹

44. The indignation, however, of Lord Bacon is more frequently directed against the predominant philosophy of his age, that of Aristotle and the schoolmen. His dislike of Aristotle. Though he does justice to the great abilities of the former, and acknowledges the exact attention to facts displayed in his History of Animals, he deems him one of the most eminent adversaries to the only method that can guide us to the real laws of nature. The old Greek philosophers, Empedocles, Leucippus, Anaxagoras, and others of their age, who had been in the right track of investigation, stood much higher in the esteem of Bacon than their successors, Plato, Zeno, Aristotle, by whose lustre they had been so much superseded, that both their works have perished, and their tenets are with difficulty collected. These more distinguished leaders of the Grecian schools were in his eyes little else than disputatious professors (it must be remembered that he had in general only physical science in his view), who seemed to have it in common with children, "ut ad garriendum prompti sint, generare non possint;" so wordy and barren was their miscalled wisdom.

45. Those who object to the importance of Lord Bacon's precepts in philosophy, that mankind have practised His method much required. many of them immemorially, are rather confirming their utility than taking off much from their originality, in any fair sense of that term. Every logical method is built on the common faculties of human nature, which have been exercised since the creation in discerning, better or worse, truth from falsehood, and inferring the unknown from the known. That men might have done this more correctly is manifest from the quantity of error into which, from want

¹ Nov. Organ., lib. i. 64. It may be doubted whether Bacon did full justice to Gilbert.

of reasoning well on what came before them, they have habitually fallen. In experimental philosophy, to which the more special rules of Lord Bacon are generally referred, there was a notorious want of that very process of reasoning which he has supplied. It is more than probable, indeed, that the great physical philosophers of the seventeenth century would have been led to employ some of his rules, had he never promulgated them; but I believe they had been little regarded in the earlier period of science.¹ It is also a very defective view of the Baconian method to look only at the experimental rules given in the *Novum Organum*. The preparatory steps of completely exhausting the natural history of the subject of inquiry by a patient and sagacious consideration of it in every light are at least of equal importance, and equally prominent in the inductive philosophy.

46. The first object of Lord Bacon's philosophical writings is to prove their own necessity, by giving an unfavorable impression as to the actual state of most ^{Its objects} sciences, in consequence of the prejudices of the human mind, and of the mistaken methods pursued in their cultivation. The second was to point out a better prospect for the future. One of these occupies the treatise *De Augmentis*, and the first book of the *Novum Organum*. The other, besides many anticipations in these, is partially detailed in the second book, and would have been more thoroughly developed in those remaining portions which the author did not complete. We shall now give a very short sketch of these two famous works, which comprise the greater part of the Baconian philosophy.

47. The *Advancement of Learning* is divided into two books only; the treatise *De Augmentis*, into nine. The first of these, in the latter, is introductory, and designed to remove prejudices against the search ^{Sketch of the treatise De Augmentis.} after truth, by indicating the causes which had hitherto obstructed it. In the second book, he lays down his celebrated partition of human learning into history, poetry, and philosophy, according to the faculties of the mind ^{History} respectively concerned in them,—the memory, imagination, and reason. History is natural or civil, under the latter of which ecclesiastical and literary histories are com-

¹ It has been remarked, that the famous experiment of Pascal on the barometer, by carrying it to a considerable elevation, was "a crucial instance, one of the first, if not the very first, on record in physics."—Herschel, p. 229.

prised. These again fall into regular subdivisions; all of which he treats in a summary manner, and points out the deficiencies which ought to be supplied in many departments of history. Poetry succeeds in the last chapter of the same book; but by confining the name to fictitious narrative, except as to ornaments of style, which he refers to a different part of his subject, he much limited his views of that literature; even if it were true, as it certainly is not, that the imagination alone, in any ordinary use of the word, is the medium of poetical emotion. The word "emotion," indeed, is sufficient to show that Bacon should either have excluded poetry altogether from his enumeration of sciences and learning, or taken into consideration other faculties of the soul than those which are merely intellectual.

48. Stewart has praised with justice a short but beautiful paragraph concerning poetry (under which title may be comprehended all the various creations of the faculty of the imagination, at least as they are manifested by words), wherein Bacon "has exhausted every thing that philosophy and good sense have yet had to offer on the subject of what has since been called the *beau idéal*." The same eminent writer and ardent admirer of Bacon observes, that D'Alembert improved on the Baconian arrangement by classing the fine arts together with poetry. Injustice had been done to painting and music, especially the former, when, in the fourth book *De Augmentis*, they were counted as mere *artes voluptariæ*, subordinate to a sort of Epicurean gratification of the senses, and only somewhat more liberal than cookery or cosmetics.

49. In the third book, science having been divided into theological and philosophical, and the former, or what regards revealed religion, being postponed for the present, he lays it down that all philosophy relates to God, to nature, or to man. Under natural theology, as a sort of appendix, he reckons the science or theory of angels and superhuman spirits; a more favorite theme, especially as treated independently of revelation, in the ages that preceded Lord Bacon, than it has been since. Natural philosophy is speculative or practical; the former divided into physics, in a particular sense, and metaphysics: "one of which inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; the other handleth the formal and final causes."

Fine passage on poetry.

Natural theology and metaphysics.

Hence physics, dealing with particular instances, and regarding only the effects produced, is precarious in its conclusions, and does not reach the stable principles of causation.

"Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit
Uno eodemque igni."

Metaphysics, to which word he gave a sense as remote from that which it bore in the Aristotelian schools as from that in which it is commonly employed at present, had for its proper object the investigation of forms. It was "a generally received and inveterate opinion, that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or true differences." "Formæ inventio," he says in another place, "habetur pro desperata." The word *form* itself, being borrowed from the old philosophy, is not immediately intelligible to every reader. "In the Baconian sense," says Playfair, "form differs ^{Form of} only from cause in being permanent, whereas we ^{bodies} apply cause to that which exists in order of time." Form (*natura naturans*, as it was barbarously called) is the general law, or condition of existence, in any substance or quality (*natura naturata*), which is wherever its form is.¹ The conditions of a mathematical figure, prescribed in its definition, might in this sense be called its form, if it did not seem to be Lord Bacon's intention to confine the word to the laws of particular sensible existences. In modern philosophy, it might be defined to be that particular combination of forces which impresses a certain modification upon matter subjected to their influence.

50. To a knowledge of such forms, or laws of essence and existence, at least in a certain degree, it might be possible, in Bacon's sanguine estimation of his own ^{Might some-}logic, for man to attain. Not that we could hope to ^{times be in-}understand the forms of complex beings, which are almost ^{quired into} infinite in variety, but the simple and primary natures, which are combined in them. "To inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold, nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colors, of gravity and levity, of density and tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which, like

¹ "Licet enim in natura nihil vere existat præter corpora individua, eorumque actiones per se individuas ex lege, in doctrinis tamen illa ipsa lex, ejusque inquisitio, et inventio atque explicatio pro fundamento est tam ad sciendum quam operandum. Nam autem legem ejusque paragraphos Formarum nomine intelligimus; præsertim cum hoc vocabulum invaluerit et familiariter occurrat." - Nov. Org., li. 2.

an alphabet, are not many, and of which the essences, upheld by matter, of all creatures do consist, — to inquire, I say, the true forms of these is that part of metaphysics which we now define of.”¹ Thus, in the words he soon afterwards uses, “of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. As for the vertical point, ‘Opus quod operatur Deus a principio usque ad finem,’ the summary law of nature, we know not whether man’s inquiry can attain unto it.”²

51. The second object of metaphysics, according to Lord Bacon’s notion of the world, was the investigation of final causes too much slighted. It is well known that he has spoken of this in physics, with unguarded disparagement.³ “Like a virgin consecrated to God, it bears nothing;” one of those witty conceits that sparkle over his writings, but will not bear a severe examination. It has been well remarked, that, almost at the moment he published this, one of the most important discoveries of his age, the circulation of the blood,

¹ In the *Novum Organum* he seems to have gone a little beyond this, and to have hoped that the form itself of concrete things might be known. “*Datæ autem nature formam, sive differentiam veram, sive naturam naturantem, sive fontem emanationis (ista enim vocabula habemus, quæ ad indicationem rei proxime accedunt), invenire opus et intentio est Humane Scientiæ.*” — Lib. ii. 1.

² *Advancement of Learning*, book ii. This sentence he has scarcely altered in the Latin.

³ “*Causa finalis tantum abest ut prosit, ut etiam scientias corrumpat, nisi in hominis actionibus.*” — *Nov. Org.*, ii. 2. It must be remembered that Bacon had good reason to deprecate the admixture of theological dogmas with philosophy, which had been, and has often since been, the absolute perversion of all legitimate reasoning in science. See what Stewart has said upon Lord Bacon’s objection to reasoning from final causes in *physics*. *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers*, book iii. chap. ii. sect. 4.

[It ought to be more remembered than sometimes it has been, that Bacon solely objects to the confusion of *final* with *efficient* causes, or, as some would say, with antecedent conditions. These alone he considered to fall within the province of physics. But, as a part of metaphysical theology, he gives the former here a place. Stewart has quoted at length the passage, which entirely vindicates Bacon from the charge of depreciating the argu-

ment in favor of theism from the structure of the world; a charge not uncommonly insinuated against him in the seventeenth century, but repeated lately with the most dogmatic violence by a powerful writer, (Count de Malstre, *Examen de la Philos. de Bacon*, c. 13, *et alibi*. Bruxelles, 1838. This work, little known perhaps in England, is, from beginning to end, a violent attack upon the Baconian philosophy and its author, by a man of extraordinary vigor as a polemical writer, quick to discover any weak point, and powerful to throw upon it the light of a remarkably masculine and perspicuous style; second only perhaps in these respects to Boesuet, or rather only falling short of him in elegance of language; but, like him, a mere sworn soldier of one party, utterly destitute of an eclectic spirit in his own philosophy, or even of the power of appreciating with ordinary candor the diversities of opinion in others; repulsive, therefore, not only to all who have looked with reverence upon those whom he labors to degrade, but to all who abhor party-spirit in the research of truth; yet not unworthy to be read even by them, since he has many just criticisms, and many acute observations; such, however, as ought always to be tried by comparison with the text of Bacon, whom he may not designedly have misrepresented, but, having set out with the conviction that he was a charlatan and an atheist, he naturally is led to exhibit in no other light. — 1847.]

had rewarded the acuteness of Harvey in reasoning on the final cause of the valves in the veins.

52. Nature, or physical philosophy, according to Lord Bacon's partition, did not comprehend the human species. Whether this be not more consonant to popular language, adopted by preceding systems of philosophy, than to a strict and perspicuous arrangement, may by some be doubted; though a very respectable authority, that of Dugald Stewart, is opposed to including man in the province of physics. For it is surely strange to separate the physiology of the human body, as quite a science of another class, from that of inferior animals; and, if we place this part of our being under the department of physical philosophy, we shall soon be embarrassed by what Bacon has called the *doctrina de fœdere*, the science of the connection between the soul of man and his bodily frame,—a vast and interesting field, even yet very imperfectly explored.

Man not
included
by him in
physics.

53. It has pleased, however, the author to follow his own arrangement. The fourth book relates to the constitution, bodily and mental, of mankind. In this book he has introduced several subdivisions, which, considered merely as such, do not always appear the most philosophical; but the pregnancy and acuteness of his observations under each head silence all criticism of this kind. This book has nearly doubled the extent of the corresponding pages in the *Advancement of Learning*. The doctrine as to the substance of the thinking principle having been very slightly touched, or rather passed over, with two curious disquisitions on divination and fascination, he advances, in four ensuing books, to the intellectual and moral faculties, and those sciences which immediately depend upon them. Logic and ethics are the grand divisions, correlative to the reason and the will of man. Logic, according to Lord Bacon, comprises the sciences of inventing, judging, retaining, and delivering the conceptions of the mind. We invent, that is, discover, new arts, or new arguments; we judge by induction or by syllogism; the memory is capable of being aided by artificial methods. All these processes of the mind are the subjects of several sciences, which it was the peculiar aim of Bacon, by his own logic, to place on solid foundations.

Man in
body and
mind.

Logic:

54. It is here to be remarked, that the sciences of logic and ethics, according to the partitions of Lord Bacon, are far more extensive than we are accustomed to consider them. Whatever concerned the human intellect came under the first; whatever related to the will, and affections of the mind, fell under the head of ethics. "*Logica de intellectu et ratione, ethica de voluntate appetitu et affectibus disserit; altera decreta, altera actiones progignit.*" But it has been usual to confine logic to the methods of guiding the understanding in the search for truth; and some, though, as it seems to me, in a manner not warranted by the best usage of philosophers,¹ have endeavored to exclude every thing but the syllogistic mode of reasoning from the logical province. Whether, again, the nature and operations of the human mind, in general, ought to be reckoned a part of physics, has already been mentioned as a disputable question.

55. The science of delivering our own thoughts to others, branching into grammar and rhetoric, and including poetry, so far as its proper vehicles — metre and diction — are concerned, occupies the sixth book. In all this he finds more desiderata, than, from the great attention paid to these subjects by the ancients, could have been expected. Thus his ingenious collection of antitheta, or commonplaces in rhetoric, though mentioned by Cicero as to the judicial species of eloquence, is first extended by Bacon himself, as he supposes, to deliberative or political orations. I do not, however, think it probable that this branch of topics could have been neglected by antiquity, though the writings relating to it may not have descended to us; nor can we by any means say there is nothing of the kind in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Whether the utility of these commonplaces, when collected in books, be very great, is another question. And a similar doubt might be suggested with respect to the elenchs, or refutations, of rhetorical sophisms, *colores boni et mali*, which he reports as equally deficient, though a commencement had been made by Aristotle.

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(neither of which, as he justly observes, find a place in the Ethics of Aristotle, though they are sometimes treated, not so appositely, in his Rhetoric); lastly, the methods of altering and affecting the will and appetite, such as custom, education, imitation, or society. "The main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind: the one describing the nature of good; the other presenting rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto." This latter he also calls "the Georgics of the mind." He seems to place "the platform or essence of good" in seeking the good of the whole, rather than that of the individual, applying this to refute the ancient theories as to the *summum bonum*. But perhaps Bacon had not thoroughly disentangled this question, and confounds, as is not unusual, the *summum bonum*, or personal felicity, with the object of moral action, or *commune bonum*. He is right, however, in preferring, morally speaking, the active to the contemplative life against Aristotle and other philosophers. This part is translated in *De Augmentis*, with little variation, from the *Advancement of Learning*; as is also what follows on the Georgics, or culture, of the mind. The philosophy of civil life, as it relates both to the conduct of men in their mutual intercourse, which is peculiarly termed prudence, and to that higher prudence which is concerned with the administration of communities, fills up the chart of the Baconian ethics. In the eighth book, admirable reflections on the former of these subjects occur at almost every sentence. Many, perhaps most, of these will be found in the *Advancement of Learning*. But, in this, he had been, for a reason sufficiently obvious and almost avowed, cautiously silent upon the art of government, — the craft of his king. The motives for silence were still so powerful, that Politics. he treats, in the *De Augmentis*, only of two heads in political science: the methods of enlarging the boundaries of a state, which James I. could hardly resent as an interference with his own monopoly; and one of far more importance to the well-being of mankind, the principles of universal jurisprudence, or rather of universal legislation, according to which standard all laws ought to be framed. These he has sketched in ninety-seven aphorisms, or short rules, which, from the great experience of Bacon in the laws, as well as his

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*Novum
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61. In the second book of the *Novum Organum*, we come at length to the new logic, the interpretation of nature, as he calls it, or the rules for conducting inquiries in natural philosophy according to his inductive method. It is, as we have said, a fragment of his entire system, and is chiefly confined to the "prerogative instances,"¹ or phenomena which are to be selected, for various reasons, as most likely to aid our investigations of nature. Fifteen of these are used to guide the intellect, five to assist the senses, seven to correct the practice. This second book is written with more than usual want of perspicuity; and, though it is intrinsically the Baconian philosophy in a pre-eminent sense, I much doubt whether it is very extensively read, though far more so than it was fifty years since. Playfair, however, has given an excellent abstract of it in his Preliminary Dissertation to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, with abundant and judicious illustrations from modern science. Sir John Herschel, in his admirable *Discourse on Natural Philosophy*, has added a greater number from still more recent discoveries, and has also furnished such a luminous development of the difficulties of the *Novum Organum*, as had been vainly hoped in former times. The commentator of Bacon should be himself of an original genius in philosophy. These novel illustrations are the more useful, because Bacon himself, from defective knowledge of natural phenomena, and from what, though contrary to his precepts, his ardent fancy could not avoid, — a premature hastening to explain the essences of things instead of their proximate causes, — has frequently given erroneous examples. It is to be observed, on the other hand, that he often anticipates with marvellous sagacity the discoveries of posterity, and that his patient and acute analysis of the phenomena of heat has been deemed a model of his own inductive reasoning. "No one," observes Playfair, "has done so much in such circumstances." He was even ignorant of some things that he might have known; he wanted every branch of mathematics; and placed in this remote corner of Europe, without many kindred minds to animate his zeal for physical science, seems hardly to have believed the discoveries of Galileo.

¹ The allusion to *prærogative instances* is not to the English word *prærogative*, as Sir John Herschel seems to suppose (*Discourse on Natural Philosophy*, p. 142), but to the *prærogative centuria* in the Roman comitia, which being first called, though by lot, was generally found, by some prejudice or superstition, to influence the rest, which seldom voted otherwise. It is rather a forced analogy, which is not uncommon with Bacon.

62. It has happened to Lord Bacon, as it has to many other writers, that he has been extolled for qualities by no means characteristic of his mind. The first aphorism of the *Novum Organum*, so frequently quoted, "Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, performs and understands so much as he has collected concerning the order of nature by observation or reason, nor do his power or his knowledge extend farther," has seemed to bespeak an extreme sobriety of imagination, a willingness to acquiesce in registering the phenomena of nature without seeking a revelation of her secrets. And nothing is more true than that such was the cautious and patient course of inquiry prescribed by him to all the genuine disciples of his inductive method. But he was far from being one of those humble philosophers who would limit human science to the enumeration of particular facts. He had, on the contrary, vast hopes of the human intellect under the guidance of his new logic. The *latens schematismus*, or intrinsic configuration of bodies, the *latens processus ad formam*, or transitional operation through which they pass from one form, or condition of nature, to another, would one day, as he hoped, be brought to light; and this not, of course, by simple observation of the senses, nor even by assistance of instruments, concerning the utility of which he was rather sceptical, but by a rigorous application of exclusive and affirmative propositions to the actual phenomena by the inductive method. "It appears," says Playfair, "that Bacon placed the ultimate object of philosophy too high, and too much out of the reach of man, even when his exertions are most skilfully conducted. He seems to have thought, that by giving a proper direction to our researches, and carrying them on according to the inductive method, we should arrive at the knowledge of the essences of the powers and qualities residing in bodies; that we should, for instance, become acquainted with the essence of heat, of cold, of color, of transparency. The fact however is, that, in as far as science has yet advanced, no one essence has been discovered, either as to matter in general, or as to any of its more extensive modifications. We are yet in doubt whether heat is a peculiar motion of the minute parts of bodies, as Bacon himself conceived it to be, or something emitted or radiated from their surfaces, or, lastly, the vibrations of an elastic medium by which they are penetrated and surrounded."

63. It requires a very extensive survey of the actual dominion of science, and a great sagacity, to judge, even in the loosest manner, what is beyond the possible limits of human knowledge. Certainly, since the time when this passage was written by Playfair, more steps have been made towards realizing the sanguine anticipations of Bacon than in the two centuries that had elapsed since the publication of the *Novum Organum*. We do not yet know the real nature of heat; but few would pronounce it impossible or even unlikely that we may know it, in the same degree that we know other physical realities not immediately perceptible, before many years shall have expired. The atomic theory of Dalton, the laws of crystalline substances discovered by Häuy, the development of others still subtler by Mitscherlich, instead of exhibiting, as the older philosophy had done, the *idola rerum*, the sensible appearances of concrete substance, radiations from the internal glory, admit us, as it were, to stand within the vestibule of nature's temple, and to gaze on the very curtain of the shrine. If, indeed, we could know the internal structure of one primary atom, and could tell, not of course by immediate testimony of sense, but by legitimate inference from it, through what constant laws its component though indiscernible molecules, the atoms of atoms, attract, retain, and repel each other, we should have before our mental vision not only the *latens schematismus*, the real configuration of the substance, but its *form*, or efficient nature, and could give as perfect a definition of any such substance, of gold, for example, as we can of a cone or a parallelogram. The recent discoveries of animal and vegetable development, and especially the happy application of the microscope to observing chemical and organic changes in their actual course, are equally remarkable advances towards a knowledge of the *latens processus ad formam*, the corpuscular motions by which all change must be accomplished, and are in fact a great deal more than Bacon himself would have deemed possible.¹

64. These astonishing revelations of natural mysteries, fresh tidings of which crowd in upon us every day, may be

¹ By the *latens processus*, he meant has taken place, a *latent progress* from one only what is the natural operation by which one form or condition of being is induced upon another. Thus, when the surface of iron becomes rusty, or when water is converted into steam, some change form to another. This, in numberless cases, we can now answer, at least to a very great extent, by the science of chemistry.

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¹ Discourse on Nat. Philos., p. 191.

even this has been sceptically accepted by our cautious school of philosophy. If we are ever to go farther into the molecular analysis of substances, it must be through the means and upon the authority of new discoveries exhibited to our senses in experiment. But the existing powers of exhibiting or compelling nature by instruments, vast as they appear to us, and wonderful as has been their efficacy in many respects, have done little for many years past in diminishing the number of substances reputed to be simple; and with strong reasons to suspect that some of these, at least, yield to the crucible of nature, our electric batteries have, up to this hour, played innocuously round their heads.

66. Bacon has thrown out, once or twice, a hint at a single principle, a summary law of nature, as if all subordinate causes resolved themselves into one great process, according to which God works his will in the universe: "Opus quod operatur Deus a principio usque ad finem." The natural tendency towards simplification, and what we consider as harmony, in our philosophical systems, which Lord Bacon himself reckons among the *idola tribus*, the fallacies incident to the species, has led some to favor this unity of physical law. Impact and gravity have each had their supporters. But we are as yet at a great distance from establishing such a generalization, nor does it appear by any means probable that it will ever assume any simple form.

67. The close connection of the inductive process recommended by Bacon with natural philosophy in the common sense of that word, and the general selection of his examples for illustration from that science, have given rise to a question, whether he comprehended metaphysical and moral philosophy within the scope of his inquiry.¹ That they formed a part of the Instauration of Sciences, and therefore of the Baconian philosophy in the fullest sense of the word, is obvious from the fact that a large proportion of the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum* is dedicated to those subjects; and it is not less so that the *idola* of the *Novum Organum* are at least as apt to deceive us in moral as in physical argument. The question, there-

Inductive
logic:
whether
confined to
physics.

¹ This question was discussed some years since by the late editor of the *Edinburgh Review*, on one side, and by Dugald Stewart on the other. See *Edinburgh Review*, vol. iii. p. 278; and the Preliminary Dissertation to Stewart's *Philosophical Essays*.

fore, can only be raised as to the peculiar method of conducting investigations, which is considered as his own. This would, however, appear to have been decided by himself in very positive language: "It may be doubted, rather than objected, by some, whether we look to the perfection, by means of our method, of natural philosophy alone, or of the other sciences also, of logic, of ethics, of politics. But we certainly mean what has here been said to be understood as to them all; and as the ordinary logic, which proceeds by syllogism, does not relate to physical only, but to every other science, so ours, which proceeds by induction, comprises them all. For we as much collect a history and form tables concerning anger, fear, shame, and the like, and also concerning examples from civil life, and as much concerning the intellectual operations of memory, combination, and partition, judgment and the others, as concerning heat and cold, or light, or vegetation, or such things."¹ But he proceeds to intimate, as far as I understand the next sentence, that although his method or logic, strictly speaking, is applicable to other subjects, it is his immediate object to inquire into the properties of natural things, or what is generally meant by physics. To this, indeed, the second book of the *Novum Organum* and the portions that he completed of the remaining parts of the *Instauratio Magna* bear witness.

68. It by no means follows, because the leading principles of the inductive philosophy are applicable to other topics of inquiry than what is usually comprehended under the name of physics, that we can employ all the *prærogative instantiarum*, and still less the peculiar rules for conducting experiments which Bacon has given us, in moral or even psychological disquisi-

Baconian
philosophy
built on ob-
servation
and experi-
ment.

¹ "Etiam dubitabit quispiam potius quam obijciat, utrum nos de naturali tantum philosophia, an etiam de scientiis reliquis, logicis, ethicis, politicis, secundum viam nostram perficiendis loquamur. At nos certè de universis hæc, quæ dicta sunt, intelligimus; atque quemadmodum vulgaris logica, quæ regit res per syllogismum, non tantum ad naturales, sed ad omnes scientias pertinet, ita et nostra, quæ procedit per inductionem, omnia complectitur. Tam enim Historiam et Tabulas Inveniendi conficimus de ira, metu et verecundia et similibus, ac etiam de exemplis rerum civilium; nec minùs de modibus mentalibus memoriæ, compo-

sitionis et divisionis, iudicii et reliquorum, quam de calido et frigido, aut luce, aut vegetatione aut similibus. Sed tamen cum nostra ratio interpretandi, post historiam præparatam et ordinatam, non mentis tantum motus et discursus, ut logica vulgaris, sed et rerum naturarum intuesatur, ita mentem regimus ut ad rerum naturarum se aptis per omnia modis applicare possit. Atque propterea multa et diversa in doctrina interpretationis præcipimus, quæ ad subjecti, de quo inquirimus, qualitatem et conditionem modum inveniendi nonnulla ex parte applicent." — *Nov. Org.* i. 127.

tions. Many of them are plainly referable to particular manipulations, or at most to limited subjects of chemical theory. And the frequent occurrence of passages which show Lord Bacon's fondness for experimental processes, seems to have led some to consider his peculiar methods as more exclusively related to such modes of inquiry than they really are. But when the Baconian philosophy is said to be experimental, we are to remember that experiment is only better than what we may call passive observation, because it enlarges our capacity of observing with exactness and expedition. The reasoning is grounded on observation in both cases. In astronomy, where nature remarkably presents the objects of our observation without liability to error or uncertain delay, we may reason on the inductive principle as well as in sciences that require tentative operations. The inferences drawn from the difference of time in the occultation of the satellites of Jupiter at different seasons, in favor of the Copernican theory and against the instantaneous motion of light, are inductions of the same kind with any that could be derived from an *experimentum crucis*. They are exclusions of those hypotheses which might solve many phenomena, but fail to explain those immediately observed.

69. But astronomy, from the comparative solitariness, if we may so say, of all its phenomena, and the simplicity of their laws, has an advantage that is rarely found in the sciences of mere observation. ^{Advantages of the latter.} Bacon justly gave to experiment, or the interrogation of nature, compelling her to give up her secrets, a decided preference whenever it can be employed; and it is unquestionably true that the inductive method is tedious, if not uncertain, when it cannot resort to so compendious a process. One of the subjects selected by Bacon in the third part of the *Instauration* as specimens of the method by which an inquiry into nature should be conducted—the History of Winds—does not greatly admit of experiments; and the very slow progress of meteorology, which has yet hardly deserved the name of a science, when compared with that of chemistry or optics, will illustrate the difficulties of employing the inductive method without their aid. It is not, therefore, that Lord Bacon's method of philosophizing is properly experimental, but that by experiment it is most successfully displayed.

70. It will follow from hence, that in proportion as, in any

matter of inquiry, we can separate, in what we examine, the determining conditions, or law of form, from every thing extraneous, we shall be more able to use the Baconian method with advantage. In metaphysics, or what Stewart would have called the philosophy of the human mind, there seems much in its own nature capable of being subjected to the inductive reasoning. Such are those facts which, by their intimate connection with physiology, or the laws of the bodily frame, fall properly within the province of the physician. In these, though exact observation is chiefly required, it is often practicable to shorten its process by experiment. And another important illustration may be given from the education of children, considered as a science of rules deduced from observation; wherein also we are frequently more able to substitute experiment for mere experience, than with mankind in general, whom we may observe at a distance, but cannot control. In politics, as well as in moral prudence, we can seldom do more than this. It seems, however, practicable to apply the close attention enforced by Bacon, and the careful arrangement and comparison of phenomena, which are the basis of his induction, to these subjects. Thus, if the circumstances of all popular seditions recorded in history were to be carefully collected with great regard to the probability of evidence, and to any peculiarity that may have affected the results, it might be easy to perceive such a connection of antecedent and subsequent events in the great plurality of instances, as would reasonably lead us to form probable inferences as to similar tumults when they should occur. This has sometimes been done, with less universality, and with much less accuracy than the Baconian method requires, by such theoretical writers on politics as Machiavel and Bodin. But it has been apt to degenerate into pedantry, and to dis-appoint the practical statesman, who commonly rejects it with scorn; partly because civil history is itself defective, seldom giving a just view of events, and still less frequently of the motives of those concerned in them; partly because the history of mankind is far less copious than that of nature, and, in much that relates to politics, has not yet had time to furnish the ground-work of a sufficient induction; but partly also from some distinctive circumstances which affect our reasonings in moral far more than in physical science, and

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71. The Baconian logic, as has been already said, deduces universal principles from select observation; that is, ^{Induction} from particular, and, in some cases of experiment, ^{less conclu-} from singular instances. It may easily appear to one ^{sive in} conversant with the syllogistic method less legitimate ^{these sub-} ^{jects.} than the old induction, which proceeded by an exhaustive enumeration of particulars,¹ and at most warranting but a probable conclusion. The answer to this objection can only be found in the acknowledged uniformity of the laws of nature, so that whatever has once occurred will, under absolutely similar circumstances, always occur again. This may be called the suppressed premise of every Baconian enthymeme, every inference from observation of phenomena, which extends beyond the particular case. When it is once ascertained that water is composed of one proportion of oxygen to one of hydrogen, we never doubt but that such are its invariable constituents. We may repeat the experiment to secure ourselves against the risk of error in the operation, or of some unperceived condition that may have affected the result; but, when a sufficient number of trials has secured us against this, an invariable law of nature is inferred from the particular instance: nobody conceives that one pint of pure water *can* be of a different composition from another. All men, even the most rude, reason upon this primary maxim; but they reason inconclusively, from misapprehending the true relations of cause and effect in the phenomena to which they direct their attention. It is by the sagacity and ingenuity with which Bacon has excluded the various sources of error, and discouraged the true cause, that his method is distinguished from that which the vulgar practise.

72. It is required, however, for the validity of this method, first, that there should be a strict uniformity in the general laws of nature, from which we can infer that ^{Reasons for} what has been will, in the same conditions, be again; ^{this differ-} and, secondly, that we shall be able to perceive and estimate ^{ence.} all the conditions with an entire and exclusive knowledge. The first is granted in all physical phenomena; but in those

¹ [This is not quite an accurate account of the old induction, which seldom proceeded to an exhaustive enumeration, but ^{assumed a general truth from a particular one. — 1847.}]

ficed."¹ Thus also Dr. Thomas Brown: "In the inmost sanctuaries of the mind were all the idols which he overthrew;" and a later author on the *Novum Organum* fancies that Bacon "strikingly, though in his usual quaint style, calls the prejudices that check the progress of the mind by the name of idols, because mankind are apt to pay homage to these, instead of regarding truth."² Thus, too, in the translation of the *Novum Organum*, published in Mr. Basil Montagu's edition, we find *idola* rendered by idols, without explanation. We may, in fact, say that this meaning has been almost universally given by later writers. By whom it was introduced I cannot determine. Cudworth, in a passage where he glances at Bacon, has said, "It is no *idol of the den*, to use that affected language." But, in the pedantic style of the seventeenth century, it is not impossible that idol may here have been put as a mere translation of the Greek *εἰδωλον*, and in the same general sense of an idea or intellectual image.³ Although the popular sense would not be inapposite to the general purpose of Bacon in the first part of the *Novum Organum*, it cannot be reckoned so exact and philosophical an illustration of the sources of human error as the unfaithful image, the shadow of reality, seen through a refracting surface, or reflected from an unequal mirror, as in the Platonic hypothesis of the cave, wherein we are placed with our backs to the light, to which he seems to allude in his *idola specūs*.⁴ And as this is also plainly the true meaning, as a comparison with the parallel passages in the *Advancement of Learning* demonstrates, there can be no pretence for continuing to employ a word which has served to mislead such men as Brown and Playfair.

¹ Prelim. Dissertation to *Encyclopedia*.

² Introduction to the *Novum Organum*, published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. Even Stewart seems to have fallen into the same error. "While these idols of the den maintain their authority, the cultivation of the philosophical spirit is impossible; or rather it is in a renunciation of this idolatry that the philosophical spirit essentially consists."—Dissertation, &c. The observation is equally true, whatever sense we may give to *idol*.

³ In Todd's edition of Johnson's Dictionary this sense is not mentioned. But in that of the *Encyclopedia Metropolitana* we have these words: "An *idol* or image is also opposed to a reality; thus Lord Bacon (see the quotation from him)

speaks of idols or false appearances." The quotation is from the translation of one of his short Latin tracts, which was not made by himself. It is, however, a proof that the word *idol* was once used in this sense.

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¹ Discourse on Nat. Philos., p. 191.

even this has been sceptically accepted by our cautious school of philosophy. If we are ever to go farther into the molecular analysis of substances, it must be through the means and upon the authority of new discoveries exhibited to our senses in experiment. But the existing powers of exhibiting or compelling nature by instruments, vast as they appear to us, and wonderful as has been their efficacy in many respects, have done little for many years past in diminishing the number of substances reputed to be simple; and with strong reasons to suspect that some of these, at least, yield to the crucible of nature, our electric batteries have, up to this hour, played innocuously round their heads.

66. Bacon has thrown out, once or twice, a hint at a single principle, a summary law of nature, as if all subordinate causes resolved themselves into one great process, according to which God works his will in the universe: "*Opus quod operatur Deus a principio usque ad finem.*" The natural tendency towards simplification, and what we consider as harmony, in our philosophical systems, which Lord Bacon himself reckons among the *idola tribus*, the fallacies incident to the species, has led some to favor this unity of physical law. Impact and gravity have each had their supporters. But we are as yet at a great distance from establishing such a generalization, nor does it appear by any means probable that it will ever assume any simple form.

67. The close connection of the inductive process recommended by Bacon with natural philosophy in the common sense of that word, and the general selection of his examples for illustration from that science, have given rise to a question, whether he comprehended metaphysical and moral philosophy within the scope of his inquiry.¹ That they formed a part of the Instauration of Sciences, and therefore of the Baconian philosophy in the fullest sense of the word, is obvious from the fact that a large proportion of the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum* is dedicated to those subjects; and it is not less so that the *idola* of the *Novum Organum* are at least as apt to deceive us in moral as in physical argument. The question, there-

Inductive
logic:
whether
confined to
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¹ This question was discussed some years since by the late editor of the *Edinburgh Review*, on one side, and by Dugald Stewart on the other. See *Edinburgh Review*, vol. iii. p. 273; and the *Preliminary Dissertation to Stewart's Philosophical Essays*.

fore, can only be raised as to the peculiar method of conducting investigations, which is considered as his own. This would, however, appear to have been decided by himself in very positive language: "It may be doubted, rather than objected, by some, whether we look to the perfection, by means of our method, of natural philosophy alone, or of the other sciences also, of logic, of ethics, of politics. But we certainly mean what has here been said to be understood as to them all; and as the ordinary logic, which proceeds by syllogism, does not relate to physical only, but to every other science, so ours, which proceeds by induction, comprises them all. For we as much collect a history and form tables concerning anger, fear, shame, and the like, and also concerning examples from civil life, and as much concerning the intellectual operations of memory, combination, and partition, judgment and the others, as concerning heat and cold, or light, or vegetation, or such things."¹ But he proceeds to intimate, as far as I understand the next sentence, that although his method or logic, strictly speaking, is applicable to other subjects, it is his immediate object to inquire into the properties of natural things, or what is generally meant by physics. To this, indeed, the second book of the *Novum Organum* and the portions that he completed of the remaining parts of the *Instauratio Magna* bear witness.

68. It by no means follows, because the leading principles of the inductive philosophy are applicable to other topics of inquiry than what is usually comprehended under the name of physics, that we can employ all the *prærogative instantiarum*, and still less the peculiar rules for conducting experiments which Bacon has given us, in moral or even psychological disquisi-

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tions. Many of them are plainly referable to particular manipulations, or at most to limited subjects of chemical theory. And the frequent occurrence of passages which show Lord Bacon's fondness for experimental processes, seems to have led some to consider his peculiar methods as more exclusively related to such modes of inquiry than they really are. But when the Baconian philosophy is said to be experimental, we are to remember that experiment is only better than what we may call passive observation, because it enlarges our capacity of observing with exactness and expedition. The reasoning is grounded on observation in both cases. In astronomy, where nature remarkably presents the objects of our observation without liability to error or uncertain delay, we may reason on the inductive principle as well as in sciences that require tentative operations. The inferences drawn from the difference of time in the occultation of the satellites of Jupiter at different seasons, in favor of the Copernican theory and against the instantaneous motion of light, are inductions of the same kind with any that could be derived from an *experimentum crucis*. They are exclusions of those hypotheses which might solve many phenomena, but fail to explain those immediately observed.

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70. It will follow from hence, that in proportion as, in any

matter of inquiry, we can separate, in what we examine, the determining conditions, or law of form, from every thing extraneous, we shall be more able to use the Baconian method with advantage. In metaphysics, or what Stewart would have called the philosophy of the human mind, there seems much in its own nature capable of being subjected to the inductive reasoning. Such are those facts which, by their intimate connection with physiology, or the laws of the bodily frame, fall properly within the province of the physician. In these, though exact observation is chiefly required, it is often practicable to shorten its process by experiment. And another important illustration may be given from the education of children, considered as a science of rules deduced from observation; wherein also we are frequently more able to substitute experiment for mere experience, than with mankind in general, whom we may observe at a distance, but cannot control. In politics, as well as in moral prudence, we can seldom do more than this. It seems, however, practicable to apply the close attention enforced by Bacon, and the careful arrangement and comparison of phenomena, which are the basis of his induction, to these subjects. Thus, if the circumstances of all popular seditions recorded in history were to be carefully collected with great regard to the probability of evidence, and to any peculiarity that may have affected the results, it might be easy to perceive such a connection of antecedent and subsequent events in the great plurality of instances, as would reasonably lead us to form probable inferences as to similar tumults when they should occur. This has sometimes been done, with less universality, and with much less accuracy than the Baconian method requires, by such theoretical writers on politics as Machiavel and Bodin. But it has been apt to degenerate into pedantry, and to dis-appoint the practical statesman, who commonly rejects it with scorn; partly because civil history is itself defective, seldom giving a just view of events, and still less frequently of the motives of those concerned in them; partly because the history of mankind is far less copious than that of nature, and, in much that relates to politics, has not yet had time to furnish the ground-work of a sufficient induction; but partly also from some distinctive circumstances which affect our reasonings in moral far more than in physical science, and

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which deserve to be considered, so far at least as to sketch the arguments that might be employed.

71. The Baconian logic, as has been already said, deduces universal principles from select observation; that is, ^{Induction} from particular, and, in some cases of experiment, ^{less conclu-} from singular instances. It may easily appear to one ^{sive in} conversant with the syllogistic method less legitimate ^{these sub-} than the old induction, which proceeded by an exhaustive enumeration of particulars,¹ and at most warranting but a probable conclusion. The answer to this objection can only be found in the acknowledged uniformity of the laws of nature, so that whatever has once occurred will, under absolutely similar circumstances, always occur again. This may be called the suppressed premise of every Baconian enthymeme, every inference from observation of phenomena, which extends beyond the particular case. When it is once ascertained that water is composed of one proportion of oxygen to one of hydrogen, we never doubt but that such are its invariable constituents. We may repeat the experiment to secure ourselves against the risk of error in the operation, or of some unperceived condition that may have affected the result; but, when a sufficient number of trials has secured us against this, an invariable law of nature is inferred from the particular instance: nobody conceives that one pint of pure water *can* be of a different composition from another. All men, even the most rude, reason upon this primary maxim; but they reason inconclusively, from misapprehending the true relations of cause and effect in the phenomena to which they direct their attention. It is by the sagacity and ingenuity with which Bacon has excluded the various sources of error, and disengaged the true cause, that his method is distinguished from that which the vulgar practise.

72. It is required, however, for the validity of this method, first, that there should be a strict uniformity in the ^{Reasons for} general laws of nature, from which we can infer that ^{this differ-} what has been will, in the same conditions, be again; and, secondly, that we shall be able to perceive and estimate all the conditions with an entire and exclusive knowledge. The first is granted in all physical phenomena; but in those

¹ [This is not quite an accurate account of the old induction, which seldom proceeded to an exhaustive enumeration, but ^{assumed a general truth from a particular one. — 1847.]}

which we cannot submit to experiment, or investigate by some such method as Bacon has pointed out, we often find our philosophy at fault for want of the second. Such is at present the case with respect to many parts of chemistry; for example, that of organic substances, which we can analyze, but as yet can in very few instances recompose. We do not know, and, if we did know, could not probably command, the entire conditions of organic bodies (even structurally, not as living), — the *form*, as Bacon calls it, of blood or milk or oak-galls. But, in attempting to subject the actions of men to this inductive philosophy, we are arrested by the want of both the necessary requisitions. Matter can only be diverted from its obedience to unvarying laws by the control of mind; but we have to inquire whether mind is equally the passive instrument of any law. We have to open the great problem of human liberty, and must deny even a disturbing force to the will, before we can assume that all actions of mankind must, under given conditions, preserve the same necessary train of sequences as a molecule of matter. But, if this be answered affirmatively, we are still almost as far removed from a conclusive result as before. We cannot, without contradicting every-day experience, maintain that all men are determined alike by the same *outward* circumstances: we must have recourse to the differences of temperament, of physical constitution, of casual or habitual association. The former alone, however, are, at the best, subject to our observation, either at the time, or, as is most common, through testimony; of the latter, no being, which does not watch the movements of the soul itself, can reach more than a probable conjecture. Sylla resigned the dictatorship; therefore all men in the circumstances of Sylla will do the same, — is an argument false in one sense of the word “circumstances,” and useless at least in any other. It is doubted by many, whether meteorology will ever be well understood, on account of the complexity of the forces concerned, and their remoteness from the apprehension of the senses. Do not the same difficulties apply to human affairs? And while we reflect on these difficulties, to which we must add those which spring from the scantiness of our means of observation, the defectiveness and falsehood of testimony, especially what is called historical, and a thousand other errors to which the various “idola of the world and the cave” expose us, we shall rather be astonished that so many

probable rules of civil prudence have been treasured up and confirmed by experience, than disposed to give them a higher place in philosophy than they can claim.

73. It might be alleged in reply to these considerations, that, admitting the absence of a strictly scientific certainty in moral reasoning, we have yet, as seems acknowledged on the other side, a great body of probable inferences, in the extensive knowledge and sagacious application of which most of human wisdom consists. And all that is required of us, in dealing either with moral evidence or with the conclusions we draw from it, is to estimate the probability of neither too high; an error from which the severe and patient discipline of the inductive philosophy is most likely to secure us. It would be added by some, that the theory of probabilities deduces a wonderful degree of certainty from things very uncertain, when a sufficient number of experiments can be made; and thus, that events depending upon the will of mankind, even under circumstances the most anomalous and apparently irreducible to principles, may be calculated with a precision inexplicable to any one who has paid little attention to the subject. This, perhaps, may appear rather a curious application of mathematical science, than one from which our moral reasonings are likely to derive much benefit, especially as the conditions under which a very high probability can mathematically be obtained involve a greater number of trials than experience will generally furnish. It is, nevertheless, a field that deserves to be more fully explored: the success of those who have attempted to apply analytical processes to moral probabilities has not hitherto been very encouraging, inasmuch as they have often come to results falsified by experience; but a more scrupulous regard to all the conditions of each problem may perhaps obviate many sources of error.¹

Considerations on the other side.

74. It seems, upon the whole, that we should neither con-

¹ A calculation was published not long since, said to be on the authority of an eminent living philosopher, according to which, granting a moderate probability that each of twelve jurors would decide rightly, the chances in favor of the rectitude of their unanimous verdict were made something extravagantly high; I think, about 8,000 to 1. It is more easy to perceive the fallacies of this pretended demonstration, than to explain how a man of great acuteness should have over-

looked them. One among many is, that it assumes the giving an unanimous verdict at all to be voluntary; whereas, in practice, the jury must decide one way or the other. We must deduct, therefore, a fraction expressing the probability that some of the twelve have wrongly conceded their opinions to the rest. One danger of this rather favorite application of mathematical principles to moral probabilities, as indeed it is of statistical tables (a remark of far wider extent), is, that, by

ceive the inductive method to be useless in regard to any subject but physical science, nor deny the peculiar advantages it possesses in those inquiries rather than others. What must in all studies be important, is the habit of turning round the subject of our investigation in every light, the observation of every thing that is peculiar, the exclusion of all that we find on reflection to be extraneous. In historical and antiquarian researches, in all critical examination which turns upon facts, in the scrutiny of judicial evidence, a great part of Lord Bacon's method—not, of course, all the experimental rules of the *Novum Organum*—has, as I conceive, a legitimate application.¹ I would refer any one

considering mankind merely as units, it practically habituates the mind to a moral and social levelling, as inconsistent with a just estimate of men as it is characteristic of the present age.

¹ The principle of Bacon's prerogative instances, and perhaps in some cases a very analogous application of them, appear to hold in our inquiries into historical evidence. The fact sought to be ascertained in the one subject corresponds to the physical law in the other. The testimonies, as we, though rather laxly, call them, or passages in books from which we infer the fact, correspond to the observations or experiments from which we deduce the law. The necessity of a sufficient induction by searching for all proof that may bear on the question, is as manifest in one case as in the other. The exclusion of precarious and inconclusive evidence is alike indispensable in both. The selection of prerogative instances, or such as carry with them satisfactory conviction, requires the same sort of inventive and reasoning powers. It is easy to illustrate this by examples. Thus, in the controversy concerning the Icon Basilike, the admission of Gauden's claim by Lord Clarendon is in the nature of a prerogative instance: it renders the supposition of the falsehood of that claim highly improbable. But the many second-hand and hearsay testimonies, which may be alleged on the other side to prove that the book was written by King Charles, are not prerogative instances, because their falsehood will be found to involve very little improbability. So, in a different controversy, the silence of some of the fathers, as to the text, commonly called, of the three heavenly witnesses, even while expounding the context of the passage, may be reckoned a prerogative instance: a decisive proof that they did not know it, or did not believe it genuine; because,

if they did, no motive can be conceived for the omission. But the silence of Laurentius Valla as to its absence from the manuscripts on which he commented is no prerogative instance to prove that it was contained in them, because it is easy to perceive that he might have motives for saying nothing; and though the negative argument, as it is called, or inference that a fact is not true because such and such persons have not mentioned it, is, taken generally, weaker than positive testimony, it will frequently supply prerogative instances where the latter does not. Lennoy, in a little treatise, *De Auctoritate Negantis Argumenti*, which displays more plain sense than ingenuity or philosophy, lays it down that a fact of a public nature, which is not mentioned by any writer within two hundred years of the time, supposing, of course, that there is extant a competent number of writers who would naturally have mentioned it, is not to be believed. The period seems rather arbitrary, and was possibly so considered by himself; but the general principle is of the highest importance in historical criticism. Thus, in the once-celebrated question of Pope Joan, the silence of all writers near the time, as to so wonderful a fact, was justly deemed a kind of prerogative argument, when set in opposition to the many repetitions of the story in later ages. But the silence of Gildas and Bede as to the victories of Arthur is no such argument against their reality, because they were not under an historical obligation, or any strong motive which would prevent their silence. Generally speaking, the more anomalous and interesting an event is, the stronger is the argument against its truth from the silence of contemporaries, on account of the propensity of mankind to believe and recount the marvellous; and the weaker is the argument from the testimony of

who may doubt this to his History of Winds, as one sample of what we mean by the Baconian method, and ask whether a kind of investigation, analogous to what is therein pursued for the sake of eliciting physical truths, might not be employed in any analytical process where general or even particular facts are sought to be known. Or, if an example is required of such an investigation, let us look at the copious induction from the past and actual history of mankind, upon which Malthus established his general theory of the causes which have retarded the natural progress of population. Upon all these subjects before mentioned, there has been an astonishing improvement in the reasoning of the learned, and perhaps of the world at large, since the time of Bacon, though much remains very defective. In what degree it may be owing to the prevalence of a physical philosophy founded upon his inductive logic, it might not be uninteresting to inquire.¹

75. It is probable that Lord Bacon never much followed up in his own mind that application of his method to psychological, and still less to moral and political subjects, which he has declared himself to intend. The distribution of the *Instauratio Magna*, which he has prefixed to it, relates wholly to physical science. He has in no one instance given an example, in the *Novum Organum*, from moral philosophy, and one only, that of artificial mem-

Bacon's
aptitude for
moral sub-
jects.

later times for the same reason. A similar analogy holds also in jurisprudence. The principle of our law, rejecting hearsay and secondary evidence, is founded on the Baconian rule. Fifty persons may depose that they have heard of a fact or of its circumstances; but the eye-witness is the prerogative instance. It would carry us too far to develop this at length, even if I were fully prepared to do so: but this much may lead us to think, that whoever shall fill up that lamentable *desideratum*, the logic of evidence, ought to have familiarised himself with the *Novum Organum*.

¹ "The effects which Bacon's writings have hitherto produced have indeed been far more conspicuous in physics than in the science of mind. Even here, however, they have been great and most important, as well as in some collateral branches of knowledge, such as natural jurisprudence, political economy, criticism, and morals, which spring up from the same root, or rather which are branches of that tree of which the science of mind is the trunk."

— Stewart's Philosophical Essays, Prelim. Dissertation. The principal advantage, perhaps, of those habits of reasoning which the Baconian methods, whether learned directly or through the many disciples of that school, have a tendency to generate, is, that they render men cautious and pains-taking in the pursuit of truth, and therefore restrain them from deciding too soon. "Nemo reperitur qui in rebus ipsis et experientia moram fecerit legitimam." These words are more frequently true of moral and political reasoners than of any others. Men apply historical or personal experience; but they apply it hastily, and without giving themselves time for either a copious or an exact induction; the great majority being too much influenced by passion, party-spirit, or vanity, or perhaps by affections morally right, but not the less dangerous in reasoning to maintain the patient and dispassionate suspense of judgment which ought to be the condition of our inquiries.

ory, from what he would have called logic.¹ But we must constantly remember that the philosophy of Bacon was left exceedingly incomplete. Many lives would not have sufficed for what he had planned, and he gave only the leisure hours of his own. It is evident that he had turned his thoughts to physical philosophy rather for an exercise of his reasoning faculties, and out of his insatiable thirst for knowledge, than from any peculiar aptitude for their subjects, much less any advantage of opportunity for their cultivation. He was more eminently the philosopher of human than of general nature. Hence he is exact as well as profound in all his reflections on civil life and mankind; while his conjectures in natural philosophy, though often very acute, are apt to wander far from the truth in consequence of his defective acquaintance with the phenomena of nature. His *Centuries of Natural History* give abundant proof of this. He is, in all these inquiries, like one doubtfully, and by degrees, making out a distant prospect, but often deceived by the haze. But if we compare what may be found in the sixth, seventh, and eighth books *De Augmentis*, in the *Essays*, the *History of Henry VII.*, and the various short treatises contained in his works on moral and political wisdom and on human nature, from experience of which all such wisdom is drawn, with the *Rhetoric*, *Ethics*, and *Politics* of Aristotle, or with the historians most celebrated for their deep insight into civil society and human character, — with Thucydides, Tacitus, Philip de Comines, Machiavel, Davila, Hume, — we shall, I think, find that one man may almost be compared with all of these together. When Galileo is named as equal to Bacon, it is to be remembered that Galileo was no moral or political philosopher; and, in this department, Leibnitz certainly falls very short of Bacon. Burke, perhaps, comes, of all modern writers, the nearest to him; but, though Bacon may not be more profound than Burke, he is more copious and comprehensive.

76. The comparison of Bacon and Galileo is naturally built upon the influence which, in the same age, they exerted in overthrowing the philosophy of the schools, and in founding that new discipline of real science which has rendered the last centuries glorious. Hume

Comparison
of Bacon
and Galileo.

¹ *Nov. Organ.*, li. 26. It may, however, be observed, that we find a few passages in the ethical part of *De Aug-* *mentis*, lib. vii. cap. 2, which show that he had some notions of moral induction germinating in his mind.

has given the preference to the latter, who made accessions to the domain of human knowledge so splendid, so inaccessible to cavil, so unequivocal in their results, that the majority of mankind would perhaps be carried along with this decision. There seems, however, to be no doubt that the mind of Bacon was more comprehensive and profound. But these comparisons are apt to involve *incommensurable* relations. In their own intellectual characters, they bore no great resemblance to each other. Bacon had scarce any knowledge of geometry, and so far ranks much below not only Galileo, but Descartes, Newton, and Leibnitz, — all signalized by wonderful discoveries in the science of quantity, or in that part of physics which employs it. He has, in one of the profound aphorisms of the *Novum Organum*, distinguished the two species of philosophical genius; one more apt to perceive the differences of things, the other their analogies. In a mind of the highest order, neither of these powers will be really deficient; and his own inductive method is at once the best exercise of both, and the best safeguard against the excess of either. But, upon the whole, it may certainly be said, that the genius of Lord Bacon was naturally more inclined to collect the resemblances of nature than to note her differences. This is the case with men like him of sanguine temper, warm fancy, and brilliant wit; but it is not the frame of mind which is best suited to strict reasoning.

77. It is no proof of a solid acquaintance with Lord Bacon's philosophy, to deify his name as the ancient schools did those of their founders, or even to exaggerate the powers of his genius. Powers they were surprisingly great, yet limited in their range, and not in all respects equal; nor could they overcome every impediment of circumstance. Even of Bacon it may be said, that he attempted more than he has achieved, and perhaps more than he clearly apprehended. His objects appear sometimes indistinct, and I am not sure that they are always consistent. In the *Advancement of Learning*, he aspired to fill up, or at least to indicate, the deficiencies in every department of knowledge: he gradually confined himself to philosophy, and at length to physics. But few of his works can be deemed complete, not even the treatise *De Augmentis*, which comes nearer to this than most of the rest. Hence the study of Lord Bacon is difficult, and not, as I conceive, very well adapted to those who have made no progress whatever

fore, can only be raised as to the peculiar method of conducting investigations, which is considered as his own. This would, however, appear to have been decided by himself in very positive language: "It may be doubted, rather than objected, by some, whether we look to the perfection, by means of our method, of natural philosophy alone, or of the other sciences also, of logic, of ethics, of politics. But we certainly mean what has here been said to be understood as to them all; and as the ordinary logic, which proceeds by syllogism, does not relate to physical only, but to every other science, so ours, which proceeds by induction, comprises them all. For we as much collect a history and form tables concerning anger, fear, shame, and the like, and also concerning examples from civil life, and as much concerning the intellectual operations of memory, combination, and partition, judgment and the others, as concerning heat and cold, or light, or vegetation, or such things."¹ But he proceeds to intimate, as far as I understand the next sentence, that although his method or logic, strictly speaking, is applicable to other subjects, it is his immediate object to inquire into the properties of natural things, or what is generally meant by physics. To this, indeed, the second book of the *Novum Organum* and the portions that he completed of the remaining parts of the *Instauratio Magna* bear witness.

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69. But astronomy, from the comparative solitariness, if we may so say, of all its phenomena, and the simplicity of their laws, has an advantage that is rarely found in sciences of mere observation. ^{Advantages of the latter.} Bacon justly gave to experiment, or the interrogation of nature, compelling her to give up her secrets, a decided preference whenever it can be employed; and it is unquestionably true that the inductive method is tedious, if not uncertain, when it cannot resort to so compendious a process. One of the subjects selected by Bacon in the third part of the *Instauration* as specimens of the method by which an inquiry into nature should be conducted—the History of Winds—does not greatly admit of experiments; and the very slow progress of meteorology, which has yet hardly deserved the name of a science, when compared with that of chemistry or optics, will illustrate the difficulties of employing the inductive method without their aid. It is not, therefore, that Lord Bacon's method of philosophizing is properly experimental, but that by experiment it is most successfully displayed.

70. It will follow from hence, that in proportion as, in any

matter of inquiry, we can separate, in what we examine, the determining conditions, or law of form, from every thing extraneous, we shall be more able to use the Baconian method with advantage. In metaphysics, or what Stewart would have called the philosophy of the human mind, there seems much in its own nature capable of being subjected to the inductive reasoning. Such are those facts which, by their intimate connection with physiology, or the laws of the bodily frame, fall properly within the province of the physician. In these, though exact observation is chiefly required, it is often practicable to shorten its process by experiment. And another important illustration may be given from the education of children, considered as a science of rules deduced from observation; wherein also we are frequently more able to substitute experiment for mere experience, than with mankind in general, whom we may observe at a distance, but cannot control. In politics, as well as in moral prudence, we can seldom do more than this. It seems, however, practicable to apply the close attention enforced by Bacon, and the careful arrangement and comparison of phenomena, which are the basis of his induction, to these subjects. Thus, if the circumstances of all popular seditions recorded in history were to be carefully collected with great regard to the probability of evidence, and to any peculiarity that may have affected the results, it might be easy to perceive such a connection of antecedent and subsequent events in the great plurality of instances, as would reasonably lead us to form probable inferences as to similar tumults when they should occur. This has sometimes been done, with less universality, and with much less accuracy than the Baconian method requires, by such theoretical writers on politics as Machiavel and Bodin. But it has been apt to degenerate into pedantry, and to dis-appoint the practical statesman, who commonly rejects it with scorn; partly because civil history is itself defective, seldom giving a just view of events, and still less frequently of the motives of those concerned in them; partly because the history of mankind is far less copious than that of nature, and, in much that relates to politics, has not yet had time to furnish the ground-work of a sufficient induction; but partly also from some distinctive circumstances which affect our reasonings in moral far more than in physical science, and

Sometimes applicable to philosophy of human mind.

Less so to politics and morals.

which deserve to be considered, so far at least as to sketch the arguments that might be employed.

71. The Baconian logic, as has been already said, deduces universal principles from select observation; that is, from particular, and, in some cases of experiment, from singular instances. It may easily appear to one ^{Induction less conclusive in these subjects.} conversant with the syllogistic method less legitimate than the old induction, which proceeded by an exhaustive enumeration of particulars,¹ and at most warranting but a probable conclusion. The answer to this objection can only be found in the acknowledged uniformity of the laws of nature, so that whatever has once occurred will, under absolutely similar circumstances, always occur again. This may be called the suppressed premise of every Baconian enthymeme, every inference from observation of phenomena, which extends beyond the particular case. When it is once ascertained that water is composed of one proportion of oxygen to one of hydrogen, we never doubt but that such are its invariable constituents. We may repeat the experiment to secure ourselves against the risk of error in the operation, or of some unperceived condition that may have affected the result; but, when a sufficient number of trials has secured us against this, an invariable law of nature is inferred from the particular instance: nobody conceives that one pint of pure water *can* be of a different composition from another. All men, even the most rude, reason upon this primary maxim; but they reason inconclusively, from misapprehending the true relations of cause and effect in the phenomena to which they direct their attention. It is by the sagacity and ingenuity with which Bacon has excluded the various sources of error, and disengaged the true cause, that his method is distinguished from that which the vulgar practise.

72. It is required, however, for the validity of this method, first, that there should be a strict uniformity in the general laws of nature, from which we can infer that ^{Reasons for this difference.} what has been will, in the same conditions, be again; and, secondly, that we shall be able to perceive and estimate all the conditions with an entire and exclusive knowledge. The first is granted in all physical phenomena; but in those

¹ [This is not quite an accurate account of the old induction, which seldom proceeded to an exhaustive enumeration, but *assumed* a general truth from a particular one. — 1847.]

which we cannot submit to experiment, or investigate by some such method as Bacon has pointed out, we often find our philosophy at fault for want of the second. Such is at present the case with respect to many parts of chemistry; for example, that of organic substances, which we can analyze, but as yet can in very few instances recompose. We do not know, and, if we did know, could not probably command, the entire conditions of organic bodies (even structurally, not as living),—the *form*, as Bacon calls it, of blood or milk or oak-galls. But, in attempting to subject the actions of men to this inductive philosophy, we are arrested by the want of both the necessary requisitions. Matter can only be diverted from its obedience to unvarying laws by the control of mind; but we have to inquire whether mind is equally the passive instrument of any law. We have to open the great problem of human liberty, and must deny even a disturbing force to the will, before we can assume that all actions of mankind must, under given conditions, preserve the same necessary train of sequences as a molecule of matter. But, if this be answered affirmatively, we are still almost as far removed from a conclusive result as before. We cannot, without contradicting every-day experience, maintain that all men are determined alike by the same *outward* circumstances: we must have recourse to the differences of temperament, of physical constitution, of casual or habitual association. The former alone, however, are, at the best, subject to our observation, either at the time, or, as is most common, through testimony; of the latter, no being, which does not watch the movements of the soul itself, can reach more than a probable conjecture. Sylla resigned the dictatorship; therefore all men in the circumstances of Sylla will do the same,—is an argument false in one sense of the word “circumstances,” and useless at least in any other. It is doubted by many, whether meteorology will ever be well understood, on account of the complexity of the forces concerned, and their remoteness from the apprehension of the senses. Do not the same difficulties apply to human affairs? And while we reflect on these difficulties, to which we must add those which spring from the scantiness of our means of observation, the defectiveness and falsehood of testimony, especially what is called historical, and a thousand other errors to which the various “idola of the world and the cave” expose us, we shall rather be astonished that so many

probable rules of civil prudence have been treasured up and confirmed by experience, than disposed to give them a higher place in philosophy than they can claim.

73. It might be alleged in reply to these considerations, that, admitting the absence of a strictly scientific certainty in moral reasoning, we have yet, as seems Considerations on the other side. acknowledged on the other side, a great body of probable inferences, in the extensive knowledge and sagacious application of which most of human wisdom consists. And all that is required of us, in dealing either with moral evidence or with the conclusions we draw from it, is to estimate the probability of neither too high; an error from which the severe and patient discipline of the inductive philosophy is most likely to secure us. It would be added by some, that the theory of probabilities deduces a wonderful degree of certainty from things very uncertain, when a sufficient number of experiments can be made; and thus, that events depending upon the will of mankind, even under circumstances the most anomalous and apparently irreducible to principles, may be calculated with a precision inexplicable to any one who has paid little attention to the subject. This, perhaps, may appear rather a curious application of mathematical science, than one from which our moral reasonings are likely to derive much benefit, especially as the conditions under which a very high probability can mathematically be obtained involve a greater number of trials than experience will generally furnish. It is, nevertheless, a field that deserves to be more fully explored: the success of those who have attempted to apply analytical processes to moral probabilities has not hitherto been very encouraging, inasmuch as they have often come to results falsified by experience; but a more scrupulous regard to all the conditions of each problem may perhaps obviate many sources of error.¹

74. It seems, upon the whole, that we should neither con-

¹ A calculation was published not long since, said to be on the authority of an eminent living philosopher, according to which, granting a moderate probability that each of twelve jurors would decide rightly, the chances in favor of the rectitude of their unanimous verdict were made something extravagantly high; I think, about 8,000 to 1. It is more easy to perceive the fallacies of this pretended demonstration, than to explain how a man of great acuteness should have over-

looked them. One among many is, that it assumes the giving an unanimous verdict at all to be voluntary; whereas, in practice, the jury must decide one way or the other. We must deduct, therefore, a fraction expressing the probability that some of the twelve have wrongly conceded their opinions to the rest. One danger of this rather favorite application of mathematical principles to moral probabilities, as indeed it is of statistical tables (a remark of far wider extent), is, that, by

ceive the inductive method to be useless in regard to any subject but physical science, nor deny the peculiar advantages it possesses in those inquiries rather than others. What must in all studies be important, is the habit of turning round the subject of our investigation in every light, the observation of every thing that is peculiar, the exclusion of all that we find on reflection to be extraneous. In historical and antiquarian researches, in all critical examination which turns upon facts, in the scrutiny of judicial evidence, a great part of Lord Bacon's method—not, of course, all the experimental rules of the *Novum Organum*—has, as I conceive, a legitimate application.¹ I would refer any one

considering mankind merely as units, it practically habituates the mind to a moral and social levelling, as inconsistent with a just estimate of men as it is characteristic of the present age.

¹ The principle of Bacon's prerogative instances, and perhaps in some cases a very analogous application of them, appear to hold in our inquiries into historical evidence. The fact sought to be ascertained in the one subject corresponds to the physical law in the other. The testimonies, as we, though rather laxly, call them, or passages in books from which we infer the fact, correspond to the observations or experiments from which we deduce the law. The necessity of a sufficient induction by searching for all proof that may bear on the question, is as manifest in one case as in the other. The exclusion of precarious and inconclusive evidence is alike indispensable in both. The selection of prerogative instances, or such as carry with them satisfactory conviction, requires the same sort of inventive and reasoning powers. It is easy to illustrate this by examples. Thus, in the controversy concerning the Icon Basilike, the admission of Gauden's claim by Lord Clarendon is in the nature of a prerogative instance: it renders the supposition of the falsehood of that claim highly improbable. But the many second-hand and hearsay testimonies, which may be alleged on the other side to prove that the book was written by King Charles, are not prerogative instances, because their falsehood will be found to involve very little improbability. So, in a different controversy, the silence of some of the fathers, as to the text, commonly called, of the three heavenly witnesses, even while expounding the context of the passage, may be reckoned a prerogative instance: a decisive proof that they did not know it, or did not believe it genuine; because,

if they did, no motive can be conceived for the omission. But the silence of Laurentius Valla as to its absence from the manuscripts on which he commented is no prerogative instance to prove that it was contained in them, because it is easy to perceive that he might have motives for saying nothing; and though the negative argument, as it is called, or inference that a fact is not true because such and such persons have not mentioned it, is, taken generally, weaker than positive testimony, it will frequently supply prerogative instances where the latter does not. Lennoy, in a little treatise, *De Auctoritate Negantis Argumenti*, which displays more plain sense than ingenuity or philosophy, lays it down that a fact of a public nature, which is not mentioned by any writer within two hundred years of the time, supposing, of course, that there is extant a competent number of writers who would naturally have mentioned it, is not to be believed. The period seems rather arbitrary, and was possibly so considered by himself; but the general principle is of the highest importance in historical criticism. Thus, in the once-celebrated question of Pope Joan, the silence of all writers near the time, as to so wonderful a fact, was justly deemed a kind of prerogative argument, when set in opposition to the many repetitions of the story in later ages. But the silence of Gildas and Bede as to the victories of Arthur is no such argument against their reality, because they were not under an historical obligation, or any strong motive which would prevent their silence. Generally speaking, the more anomalous and interesting an event is, the stronger is the argument against its truth from the silence of contemporaries, on account of the propensity of mankind to believe and recount the marvellous; and the weaker is the argument from the testimony of

who may doubt this to his History of Winds, as one sample of what we mean by the Baconian method, and ask whether a kind of investigation, analogous to what is therein pursued for the sake of eliciting physical truths, might not be employed in any analytical process where general or even particular facts are sought to be known. Or, if an example is required of such an investigation, let us look at the copious induction from the past and actual history of mankind, upon which Malthus established his general theory of the causes which have retarded the natural progress of population. Upon all these subjects before mentioned, there has been an astonishing improvement in the reasoning of the learned, and perhaps of the world at large, since the time of Bacon, though much remains very defective. In what degree it may be owing to the prevalence of a physical philosophy founded upon his inductive logic, it might not be uninteresting to inquire.¹

75. It is probable that Lord Bacon never much followed up in his own mind that application of his method to psychological, and still less to moral and political subjects, which he has declared himself to intend. The distribution of the *Instauratio Magna*, which he has prefixed to it, relates wholly to physical science. He has in no one instance given an example, in the *Novum Organum*, from moral philosophy, and one only, that of artificial mem-

Bacon's
aptitude for
moral sub-
jects.

later times for the same reason. A similar analogy holds also in jurisprudence. The principle of our law, rejecting hearsay and secondary evidence, is founded on the Baconian rule. Fifty persons may depose that they have heard of a fact or of its circumstances; but the eye-witness is the prerogative instance. It would carry us too far to develop this at length, even if I were fully prepared to do so: but this much may lead us to think, that whoever shall fill up that lamentable *desideratum*, the logic of evidence, ought to have familiarized himself with the *Novum Organum*.

¹ "The effects which Bacon's writings have hitherto produced have indeed been far more conspicuous in physics than in the science of mind. Even here, however, they have been great and most important, as well as in some collateral branches of knowledge, such as natural jurisprudence, political economy, criticism, and morals, which spring up from the same root, or rather which are branches of that tree of which the science of mind is the trunk."

— Stewart's Philosophical Essays, Prelim. Dissertation. The principal advantage, perhaps, of those habits of reasoning which the Baconian methods, whether learned directly or through the many disciples of that school, have a tendency to generate, is, that they render men cautious and pains-taking in the pursuit of truth, and therefore restrain them from deciding too soon. "Nemo reperitur qui in rebus ipsis et experientia moram fecerit legitimam." These words are more frequently true of moral and political reasoners than of any others. Men apply historical or personal experience; but they apply it hastily, and without giving themselves time for either a copious or an exact induction; the great majority being too much influenced by passion, party-spirit, or vanity, or perhaps by affections morally right, but not the less dangerous in reasoning to maintain the patient and dispassionate suspense of judgment which ought to be the condition of our inquiries.

ory, from what he would have called logic.¹ But we must constantly remember that the philosophy of Bacon was left exceedingly incomplete. Many lives would not have sufficed for what he had planned, and he gave only the leisure hours of his own. It is evident that he had turned his thoughts to physical philosophy rather for an exercise of his reasoning faculties, and out of his insatiable thirst for knowledge, than from any peculiar aptitude for their subjects, much less any advantage of opportunity for their cultivation. He was more eminently the philosopher of human than of general nature. Hence he is exact as well as profound in all his reflections on civil life and mankind; while his conjectures in natural philosophy, though often very acute, are apt to wander far from the truth in consequence of his defective acquaintance with the phenomena of nature. His *Centuries of Natural History* give abundant proof of this. He is, in all these inquiries, like one doubtfully, and by degrees, making out a distant prospect, but often deceived by the haze. But if we compare what may be found in the sixth, seventh, and eighth books *De Augmentis*, in the *Essays*, the *History of Henry VII.*, and the various short treatises contained in his works on moral and political wisdom and on human nature, from experience of which all such wisdom is drawn, with the *Rhetoric*, *Ethics*, and *Politics* of Aristotle, or with the historians most celebrated for their deep insight into civil society and human character, — with Thucydides, Tacitus, Philip de Comines, Machiavel, Davila, Hume, — we shall, I think, find that one man may almost be compared with all of these together. When Galileo is named as equal to Bacon, it is to be remembered that Galileo was no moral or political philosopher; and, in this department, Leibnitz certainly falls very short of Bacon. Burke, perhaps, comes, of all modern writers, the nearest to him; but, though Bacon may not be more profound than Burke, he is more copious and comprehensive.

76. The comparison of Bacon and Galileo is naturally built upon the influence which, in the same age, they exerted in overthrowing the philosophy of the schools, and in founding that new discipline of real science which has rendered the last centuries glorious. Hume

Comparison
of Bacon
and Galileo.

¹ *Nov. Organ.*, ii. 26. It may, however, be observed, that we find a few passages in the ethical part of *De Aug-* *mentis*, lib. vii. cap. 8, which show that he had some notions of moral induction germinating in his mind.

has given the preference to the latter, who made accessions to the domain of human knowledge so splendid, so inaccessible to cavil, so unequivocal in their results, that the majority of mankind would perhaps be carried along with this decision. There seems, however, to be no doubt that the mind of Bacon was more comprehensive and profound. But these comparisons are apt to involve *incommensurable* relations. In their own intellectual characters, they bore no great resemblance to each other. Bacon had scarce any knowledge of geometry, and so far ranks much below not only Galileo, but Descartes, Newton, and Leibnitz,—all signalized by wonderful discoveries in the science of quantity, or in that part of physics which employs it. He has, in one of the profound aphorisms of the *Novum Organum*, distinguished the two species of philosophical genius; one more apt to perceive the differences of things, the other their analogies. In a mind of the highest order, neither of these powers will be really deficient; and his own inductive method is at once the best exercise of both, and the best safeguard against the excess of either. But, upon the whole, it may certainly be said, that the genius of Lord Bacon was naturally more inclined to collect the resemblances of nature than to note her differences. This is the case with men like him of sanguine temper, warm fancy, and brilliant wit; but it is not the frame of mind which is best suited to strict reasoning.

77. It is no proof of a solid acquaintance with Lord Bacon's philosophy, to deify his name as the ancient schools did those of their founders, or even to exaggerate the powers of his genius. Powers they were surprisingly great, yet limited in their range, and not in all respects equal; nor could they overcome every impediment of circumstance. Even of Bacon it may be said, that he attempted more than he has achieved, and perhaps more than he clearly apprehended. His objects appear sometimes indistinct, and I am not sure that they are always consistent. In the *Advancement of Learning*, he aspired to fill up, or at least to indicate, the deficiencies in every department of knowledge: he gradually confined himself to philosophy, and at length to physics. But few of his works can be deemed complete, not even the treatise *De Augmentis*, which comes nearer to this than most of the rest. Hence the study of Lord Bacon is difficult, and not, as I conceive, very well adapted to those who have made no progress whatever

in the exact sciences, nor accustomed themselves to independent thinking. They have never been made a text-book in our universities; though, after a judicious course of preparatory studies, by which I mean a good foundation in geometry and the philosophical principles of grammar, the first book of the *Novum Organum* might be very advantageously combined with the instruction of an enlightened lecturer.¹

¹ It by no means is to be inferred, that because the actual text of Bacon is not always such as can be well understood by very young men, I object to their being led to the real principles of inductive philosophy, which alone will teach them to think, firmly but not presumptuously, for themselves. Few defects, on the contrary, in our system of education, are more visible than the want of an adequate course of logic; and this is not likely to be rectified so long as the Aristotelian methods challenge that denomination exclusively of all other aids to the reasoning faculties. The position that nothing else is to be called logic, were it even agreeable to the derivation of the word, which it is not, or to the usage of the ancients, which is by no means uniformly the case, or to that of modern philosophy and correct language, which is certainly not at all the case, is no answer to the question, whether what we call logic does not deserve to be taught at all.

A living writer of high reputation, who has at least fully understood his own subject, and illustrated it better than his predecessors, from a more enlarged reading and thinking, wherein his own acuteness has been improved by the writers of the Baconian school, has been unfortunately instrumental, by the very merits of his treatise on Logic, in keeping up the prejudices on this subject, which have generally been deemed characteristic of the university to which he belonged. All the reflection I have been able to give to the subject has convinced me of the inefficacy of the syllogistic art in enabling us to think rightly for ourselves, or, which is part of thinking rightly, to detect those fallacies of others which might impose on our understanding before we have acquired that art. It has been often alleged, and, as far as I can judge, with perfect truth, that no man, who can be worth answering, ever commits, except through mere inadvertence, any paralogisms which the common logic serves to point out. It is easy enough to construct syllogisms which sin against its rules; but the question is, by whom they were employed. For though it is not uncommon, as I am aware, to

represent an adversary as reasoning illogically, this is generally effected by putting his argument into our own words. The great fault of all, over induction, or the assertion of a general premise upon an insufficient examination of particulars, cannot be discovered or cured by any logical skill; and this is the error into which men really fall, not that of omitting to distribute the middle term, though it comes in effect, and often in appearance, to the same thing. I do not contend that the rules of syllogism, which are very short and simple, ought not to be learned; or that there may not be some advantage in occasionally stating our own argument, or calling on another to state his, in a regular form (an advantage, however, rather dialectical, which is, in other words, rhetorical, than one which affects the reasoning faculties themselves); nor do I deny that it is philosophically worth while to know that all *general reasoning by words* may be reduced into syllogism, as it is to know that most of plane geometry may be resolved into the superposition of equal triangles; but to represent this portion of logical science as the whole, appears to me almost like teaching the scholar Euclid's axioms, and the axiomatic theorem to which I have alluded, and calling this the science of geometry. The following passage from the Port-Royal logic is very judicious and candid, giving as much to the Aristotelian system as it deserves: "Cette partie, que nous avons maintenant à traiter, qui comprend les règles du raisonnement, est estimée la plus importante de la logique, et c'est presque l'unique qu'on y traite avec quelque soin; mais il y a sujet de douter si elle est aussi utile qu'on se l'imagine. La plupart des erreurs des hommes, comme nous avons déjà dit ailleurs, viennent bien plus de ce qu'ils raisonnent sur de faux principes, que non pas de ce qu'ils raisonnent mal suivant leurs principes. Il arrive rarement qu'on se laisse tromper par des raisonnemens qui ne soient faux que parceque la conséquence en est mal tirée; et ceux qui ne seroient pas capables d'en reconnoître la fausseté par la seule lumière de la raison, ne le seroient pas ordinairement d'entendre les règles que l'on en donne, et encore

78. The ignorance of Bacon in mathematics, and, what was much worse, his inadequate notions of their utility, must be reckoned among the chief defects in his philosophical writings. In a remarkable passage of the *Advancement of Learning*, he held mathematics to be a part of metaphysics; but the place of this is altered in the *Latin*, and they are treated as merely auxiliary or instrumental to physical inquiry. He had some prejudice against pure mathematics, and thought they had been unduly elevated in comparison with the realities of nature. "I know not," he says, "how it has arisen that mathematics and logic, which ought to be the serving-maids of physical philosophy,

His prejudice against mathematics.

ne savaient les appliquer. Néanmoins, quand on ne considéreroit ces règles que comme des vérités spéculatives, elles serviroient toujours à exercer l'esprit; et de plus, on ne peut nier qu'elles n'aient quelque usage en quelques rencontres, et à l'égard de quelques personnes, qui, étant d'un naturel vif et pénétrant, ne se laissent quelquefois tromper par des fausses conséquences, que faute d'attention, à quoi la réflexion qu'ils feroient sur ces règles seroit capable de remédier." — *Art de Penser*, part. III. How different is this sensible passage from one quoted from some anonymous writer in *Whately's Logic*, p. 24:—"A fallacy consists of an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood so entangled, so intimately blended, that the fallacy is, in the chemical phrase, held in solution: *one drop of sound logic* is that test which immediately dissolves them, makes the foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom." One fallacy, it might be answered, as common as any, is the *false analogy*, the misleading the mind by a comparison where there is no real proportion or resemblance. The chemist's test is the necessary means of detecting the foreign substance; if the "*drop of sound logic*" be such, it is strange that lawyers, mathematicians, and mankind in general, should so sparingly employ it; the fact being notorious, that those most eminent for strong reasoning powers are rarely conversant with the syllogistic method. It is also well known, that these "intimately blended mixtures of truth and falsehood" perplex no man of plain sense, except when they are what is called *extraneous*: cases wherein the art of syllogism is of no use.

[The syllogistic logic appears to have been more received into favor of late among philosophers, both here and on the Continent, than it was in the two preceding centuries. The main question, it is to be kept in mind, does not relate to its

principles as a science, but to the practical usefulness of its rules as an art. An able writer has lately observed, that "he must be fortunate in the clearness of his mind, who, knowing the logical mode, is never obliged to have recourse to it to destroy ambiguity or heighten evidence, and particularly so in his opponents, who, in verbal or written controversy, never finds it necessary to employ it in trying their arguments." *Penny Cyclopædia*, art. "Syllogism." Every one must judge of this by his own experience: the profound thinker whose hand seems discernible in this article, has a strong claim to authority in favor of the utility of the syllogistic method; yet we cannot help remembering that it is very rarely employed even in controversy, where I really believe it to be a valuable weapon against an antagonist, and capable of producing no small effect on the indifferent reader or hearer, especially if he is not of a very sharp apprehension; and moreover that, as I at least believe, the proportion of mathematical, political, or theological reasoners, who have acquired or retained any tolerable expertness in the *technical* part of logic, is far from high, nor am I aware that they fall into fallacies for want of knowledge of it; but I mean strictly such fallacies as the syllogistic method alone seems to correct. What comes nearest to syllogistic reasoning in practice is that of geometry: as thus, $A=B$; but $C=A$; ergo, $C=B$, is essentially a syllogism, but not according to form. If, however, equality of magnitude may be considered as identity, according to the dictum of Aristotle, ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἡ λογικὴ ἐνότης, the foregoing is regular in logical form; and if we take A, B, and C for *ratios*, which are properly identical, not equal, this may justly be called a syllogism. But those who contend most for the formal logic seldom much regard its use in geometrical science. — 1847.]

yet affecting to vaunt the certainty that belongs to them, presume to exercise a dominion over her." It is, in my opinion, erroneous to speak of geometry, which relates to the realities of space, and to natural objects so far as extended, as a mere handmaid of physical philosophy, and not rather a part of it. Playfair has made some good remarks on the advantages derived to experimental philosophy itself from the mere application of geometry and algebra. And one of the reflections which this ought to excite is, that we are not to conceive, as some hastily do, that there can be no real utility to mankind, even of that kind of utility which consists in multiplying the conveniences and luxuries of life, springing from theoretical and speculative inquiry. The history of algebra, so barren in the days of Tartaglia and Vieta, so productive of *wealth*, when applied to dynamical calculations in our own, may be a sufficient answer.

79. One of the petty blemishes, which, though lost in the Bacon's excess of wit. splendor of Lord Bacon's excellences, it is not unfair to mention, is connected with the peculiar characteristics of his mind: he is sometimes too metaphorical and witty. His remarkable talent for discovering analogies seems to have inspired him with too much regard to them as arguments, even when they must appear to any common reader fanciful and far-fetched. His terminology, chiefly for the same reason, is often a little affected, and, in Latin, rather barbarous. The divisions of his prerogative instances in the *Novum Organum* are not always founded upon intelligible distinctions. And the general obscurity of the style, neither himself nor his assistants being good masters of the Latin language, which at the best is never flexible or copious enough for our philosophy, renders the perusal of both his great works too laborious for the impatient reader. Brucker has well observed, that the *Novum Organum* has been neglected by the generality, and proved of far less service than it would otherwise have been in philosophy, in consequence of these very defects, as well as the real depth of the author's mind.¹

80. What has been the fame of Bacon, "the wisest, greatest of mankind," it is needless to say. What has been his

¹ "Legende ipsa nobilissima tractatio ab illis est, qui in rerum naturalium inquisitione feliciter progredi cupiunt. Quae si paulo plus luminis et perspicuitatis haberet, et novorum terminorum et partitio-

num artificio lectorum non remoreretur, longe plura, quam factum est, contulisset ad philosophiae emendationem. His enim obstantibus a plerisque hoc organum neglectum est." — *Hist. Philos.*, v. 99.

real influence over mankind, how much of our enlarged and exact knowledge may be attributed to his inductive method, what of this again has been due to a thorough study of his writings, and what to an indirect and secondary acquaintance with them, are questions of another kind, and less easily solved. Stewart, the philosopher who has dwelt most on the praises of Bacon, while he conceives him to have exercised a considerable influence over the English men of science in the seventeenth century, supposes, on the authority of Montucla, that he did not "command the general admiration of Europe," till the publication of the preliminary discourse to the French Encyclopædia by Diderot and D'Alembert. This, however, is by much too precipitate a conclusion. He became almost immediately known on the Continent. Gassendi was one of his most ardent admirers. Descartes mentions him, I believe, once only, in a letter to Mersenne in 1632;¹ but he was of all men the most unwilling to praise a contemporary. It may be said that these were philosophers, and that their testimony does not imply the admiration of mankind. But writers of a very different character mention him in a familiar manner. Richelieu is said to have highly esteemed Lord Bacon.² And it may in some measure be due to this, that in the *Sentimens de l'Académie Française sur le Cid*, he is alluded to simply by the name Bacon, as one well known.³ Voiture, in a letter to Costar, about the same time, bestows high eulogy on some passages of Bacon which his correspondent had sent to him, and observes that Horace would have been astonished to hear a barbarian Briton discourse in such a style.⁴ The treatise *De Augmentis* was republished in France in 1624, the year after its appearance in England. It was translated into French as early as 1632; no great proofs of neglect. Editions came

¹ Vol. vi. p. 210, edit. Cousin.

² The only authority that I can now quote for this is not very good, that of Aubrey's Manuscripts, which I find in Feward's *Anecdotes*, iv. 323. But it seems not improbable. The same book quotes Balzac as saying, "Croyons donc, pour l'amour du Chancelier Bacon, que toutes les folies des anciens sont sages; et tous leurs songes mystères, et de celles-là qui sont estimées pures fables, il n'y en a pas une, quelque bizarre et extravagante qu'elle soit, qui n'ait son fondement dans l'histoire, si l'on en veut croire Bacon, et

qui n'ait été déguisé de la sorte par les sages du vieux temps pour la rendre plus utile aux peuples."

³ P. 44 (1688).

⁴ "J'ai trouvé parfaitement beau tout ce que vous me mandez de Bacon. Mais ne vous semble-t'il pas qu'Horace, qui disoit, *Viam Britannos hospitibus feros*, seroit bien étonné d'entendre un barbare discourir comme cela?" Costar is said by Bayle to have borrowed much from Bacon. La Mothe le Vayer mentions him in his *Dialogues*: in fact, instances are numerous.

out in Holland, 1645, 1652, and 1662. Even the *Novum Organum*, which, as has been said, never became so popular as his other writings, was thrice printed in Holland, in 1645, 1650, and 1660.¹ Leibnitz and Puffendorf are loud in their expressions of admiration, the former ascribing to him the revival of true philosophy as fully as we can at present.² I should be more inclined to doubt whether he were adequately valued by his countrymen in his own time, or in the immediately subsequent period. Under the first Stuarts, there was little taste among studious men but for theology, and chiefly for a theology which, proceeding with an extreme deference to authority, could not but generate a disposition of mind, even upon other subjects, alien to the progressive and inquisitive spirit of the inductive philosophy.³ The institution of the Royal Society, or rather the love of physical science out of which that institution arose, in the second part of the seventeenth century, made England resound with the name of her illustrious chancellor. Few now spoke of him without

¹ Montagu's *Life of Bacon*, p. 407. He has not mentioned an edition at Strasburg, 1636, which is in the British Museum.

There is also an edition, without time or place, in the catalogue of the British Museum.

² Brucker, v. 95. Stewart says that "Bayle does not give above twelve lines to Bacon;" but he calls him one of the greatest men of his age, and the length of an article in Bayle was never designed to be a measure of the merit of its subject.

—[The reception of Bacon's philosophical writings on the Continent has been elaborately proved against Stewart, in a dissertation by Mr. Macvey Napier, published in the eighth volume of the *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*.—1842.]

³ It is not uncommon to meet with persons, especially who are or have been engaged in teaching others dogmatically what they have themselves received in the like manner, to whom the inductive philosophy appears a mere school of scepticism, or at best wholly inapplicable to any subjects which require entire conviction. A certain deduction from certain premises is the only reasoning they acknowledge. Lord Bacon has a remarkable passage on this in the 9th book *De Argumentis*. "Postquam articuli et principia religionis jam in sedibus suis fuerint locata, ita ut a rationali examine penitus eximantur, tum demum conceditur ab illis illusiones derivare ac deducere secundum analogiam ipsorum. In rebus quidem

naturalibus hoc non tenet. Nam et ipsa principia examini subiciuntur; per inductionem, inquam, licet minime per syllogismum. Atque eadem illa nullam habent cum ratione repugnantiam, ut ab eodem fonte cum primis propositiones, tum medii, deducantur. Aliter fit in religione: ubi et primæ propositiones anthropystatæ sunt atque per se substantiæ; et rursus non reguntur ab illa ratione quæ propositiones consequentes deducit. Neque tamen hoc fit in religione sola, sed etiam in aliis scientiis, tam gravioribus, quam levioribus, ubi scilicet propositiones humane placita sunt, non posita; siquidem et in illis rationis usus absolutus esse non potest. Videmus enim in ludis, puta schæcorum, aut similibus, priores ludi normas et leges merè positivas esse, et ad placitum; quæ recipi, non in disputationem vocari, prorsus oportet; ut vero vincas, et peritè lusum instituas, ad artificiosum est et rationale. Eodem modo fit et in legibus humane; in quibus hæc paucæ sunt maxime, ut loquantur, hoc est, placita mera jura, quæ auctoritate magis quam ratione nitantur, neque in disputationem veniunt. Quid vero sit justissimum, non absolute, sed relative, hoc est ex analogiâ illarum maximarum, id demum rationale est, et latum disputationi campum præbet." This passage, well weighed, may show us where, why, and by whom, the synthetic and syllogistic methods have been preferred to the inductive and analytical.

a kind of homage that only the greatest men receive. Yet still it was by natural philosophers alone that the writings of Bacon were much studied. The editions of his works, except the *Essays*, were few: the *Novum Organum* never came separately from the English press.¹ They were not even frequently quoted; for I believe it will be found that the fashion of referring to the brilliant passages of the *De Augmentis* and the *Novum Organum*, at least in books designed for the general reader, is not much older than the close of the last century. Scotland has the merit of having led the way: Reid, Stewart, Robison, and Playfair turned that which had been a blind veneration into a rational worship; and I should suspect that more have read Lord Bacon within these thirty years than in the two preceding centuries. It may be an usual consequence of the enthusiastic panegyrics lately poured upon his name, that a more positive efficacy has sometimes been attributed to his philosophical writings than they really possessed; and it might be asked whether Italy, where he was probably not much known, were not the true school of experimental philosophy in Europe, whether his methods of investigation were not chiefly such as men of sagacity and lovers of truth might simultaneously have devised. But, whatever may have been the case with respect to actual discoveries in science, we must give to written wisdom its proper meed: no books prior to those of Lord Bacon carried mankind so far on the road to truth; none have obtained so thorough a triumph over arrogant usurpation without seeking to substitute another; and he may be compared to those liberators of nations who have given them laws by which they might govern themselves, and retained no homage but their gratitude.²

¹ The *De Augmentis* was only once published after the first edition, in 1683. An indifferent translation, by Gilbert Watts, came out in 1640. No edition of Bacon's Works was published in England before 1730; another appeared in 1740, and there have been several since. But they had been printed at Frankfort in 1665. It is unnecessary to observe, that many copies of the foreign editions were brought to this country. This is mostly taken from Mr. Montagu's account.

² I have met, since this passage was written, with one in Stewart's *Life of Reid*, which seems to state the *effects* of Bacon's philosophy in a just and temperate spirit, and which I rather quote because this writer has, by his eulogies on that philo-

sophy, led some to an exaggerated notion. "The influence of Bacon's genius on the subsequent progress of physical discovery has been seldom duly appreciated; by some writers almost entirely overlooked, and by others considered as the sole cause of the reformation in science which has since taken place. Of these two extremes, the latter certainly is the least wide of the truth; for, in the whole history of letters, no other individual can be mentioned whose exertions have had so indisputable an effect in forwarding the intellectual progress of mankind. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged, that, before the era when Bacon appeared, various philosophers in different parts of Europe had struck into the right path; and it may

ceive the inductive method to be useless in regard to any subject but physical science, nor deny the peculiar advantages it possesses in those inquiries rather than others. What must in all studies be important, is the habit of turning round the subject of our investigation in every light, the observation of every thing that is peculiar, the exclusion of all that we find on reflection to be extraneous. In historical and antiquarian researches, in all critical examination which turns upon facts, in the scrutiny of judicial evidence, a great part of Lord Bacon's method—not, of course, all the experimental rules of the *Novum Organum*—has, as I conceive, a legitimate application.¹ I would refer any one

considering mankind merely as units, it practically habituates the mind to a moral and social levelling, as inconsistent with a just estimate of men as it is characteristic of the present age.

¹ The principle of Bacon's prerogative instances, and perhaps in some cases a very analogous application of them, appear to hold in our inquiries into historical evidence. The fact sought to be ascertained in the one subject corresponds to the physical law in the other. The testimonies, as we, though rather laxly, call them, or passages in books from which we infer the fact, correspond to the observations or experiments from which we deduce the law. The necessity of a sufficient induction by searching for all proof that may bear on the question, is as manifest in one case as in the other. The exclusion of precarious and inconclusive evidence is alike indispensable in both. The selection of prerogative instances, or such as carry with them satisfactory conviction, requires the same sort of inventive and reasoning powers. It is easy to illustrate this by examples. Thus, in the controversy concerning the Icon Basilike, the admission of Gauden's claim by Lord Clarendon is in the nature of a *prerogative instance*: it renders the supposition of the falsehood of that claim highly improbable. But the many second-hand and hearsay testimonies, which may be alleged on the other side to prove that the book was written by King Charles, are not prerogative instances, because their falsehood will be found to involve very little improbability. So, in a different controversy, the silence of some of the fathers, as to the text, commonly called, of the three heavenly witnesses, even while expounding the context of the passage, may be reckoned a *prerogative instance*: a decisive proof that they did not know it, or did not believe it genuine; because,

if they did, no motive can be conceived for the omission. But the silence of Laurentius Valla as to its absence from the manuscripts on which he commented is no prerogative instance to prove that it was contained in them, because it is easy to perceive that he might have motives for saying nothing; and though the negative argument, as it is called, or inference that a fact is not true because such and such persons have not mentioned it, is, taken generally, weaker than positive testimony, it will frequently supply prerogative instances where the latter does not. Launoy, in a little treatise, *De Auctoritate Negantis Argumenti*, which displays more plain sense than ingenuity or philosophy, lays it down that a fact of a public nature, which is not mentioned by any writer within two hundred years of the time, supposing, of course, that there is extant a competent number of writers who would naturally have mentioned it, is not to be believed. The period seems rather arbitrary, and was possibly so considered by himself; but the general principle is of the highest importance in historical criticism. Thus, in the once-celebrated question of Pope Joan, the silence of all writers near the time, as to so wonderful a fact, was justly deemed a kind of *prerogative argument*, when set in opposition to the many repetitions of the story in later ages. But the silence of Gildas and Bede as to the victories of Arthur is no such argument against their reality, because they were not under an historical obligation, or any strong motive which would prevent their silence. Generally speaking, the more anomalous and interesting an event is, the stronger is the argument against its truth from the silence of contemporaries, on account of the propensity of mankind to believe and recount the marvellous; and the weaker is the argument from the testimony of

who may doubt this to his History of Winds, as one sample of what we mean by the Baconian method, and ask whether a kind of investigation, analogous to what is therein pursued for the sake of eliciting physical truths, might not be employed in any analytical process where general or even particular facts are sought to be known. Or, if an example is required of such an investigation, let us look at the copious induction from the past and actual history of mankind, upon which Malthus established his general theory of the causes which have retarded the natural progress of population. Upon all these subjects before mentioned, there has been an astonishing improvement in the reasoning of the learned, and perhaps of the world at large, since the time of Bacon, though much remains very defective. In what degree it may be owing to the prevalence of a physical philosophy founded upon his inductive logic, it might not be uninteresting to inquire.¹

75. It is probable that Lord Bacon never much followed up in his own mind that application of his method to psychological, and still less to moral and political subjects, which he has declared himself to intend. The distribution of the *Instauratio Magna*, which he has prefixed to it, relates wholly to physical science. He has in no one instance given an example, in the *Novum Organum*, from moral philosophy, and one only, that of artificial mem-

Bacon's
aptitude for
moral sub-
jects.

later times for the same reason. A similar analogy holds also in jurisprudence. The principle of our law, rejecting hearsay and secondary evidence, is founded on the Baconian rule. Fifty persons may depose that they have heard of a fact or of its circumstances; but the eye-witness is the prerogative instance. It would carry us too far to develop this at length, even if I were fully prepared to do so; but this much may lead us to think, that whoever shall fill up that lamentable *desideratum*, the logic of evidence, ought to have familiarised himself with the *Novum Organum*.

¹ "The effects which Bacon's writings have hitherto produced have indeed been far more conspicuous in physics than in the science of mind. Even here, however, they have been great and most important, as well as in some collateral branches of knowledge, such as natural jurisprudence, political economy, criticism, and morals, which spring up from the same root, or rather which are branches of that tree of which the science of mind is the trunk."

— Stewart's *Philosophical Essays*, Prelim. Dissertation. The principal advantage, perhaps, of those habits of reasoning which the Baconian methods, whether learned directly or through the many disciples of that school, have a tendency to generate, is, that they render men cautious and pains-taking in the pursuit of truth, and therefore restrain them from deciding too soon. "*Nemo reperitur qui in rebus ipse et experientia moram fecerit legitimam.*" These words are more frequently true of moral and political reasoners than of any others. Men apply historical or personal experience; but they apply it hastily, and without giving themselves time for either a copious or an exact induction; the great majority being too much influenced by passion, party-spirit, or vanity, or perhaps by affections morally right, but not the less dangerous in reasoning to maintain the patient and dispassionate suspense of judgment which ought to be the condition of our inquiries.

ory, from what he would have called logic.¹ But we must constantly remember that the philosophy of Bacon was left exceedingly incomplete. Many lives would not have sufficed for what he had planned, and he gave only the leisure hours of his own. It is evident that he had turned his thoughts to physical philosophy rather for an exercise of his reasoning faculties, and out of his insatiable thirst for knowledge, than from any peculiar aptitude for their subjects, much less any advantage of opportunity for their cultivation. He was more eminently the philosopher of human than of general nature. Hence he is exact as well as profound in all his reflections on civil life and mankind; while his conjectures in natural philosophy, though often very acute, are apt to wander far from the truth in consequence of his defective acquaintance with the phenomena of nature. His *Centuries of Natural History* give abundant proof of this. He is, in all these inquiries, like one doubtfully, and by degrees, making out a distant prospect, but often deceived by the haze. But if we compare what may be found in the sixth, seventh, and eighth books *De Augmentis*, in the *Essays*, the *History of Henry VII.*, and the various short treatises contained in his works on moral and political wisdom and on human nature, from experience of which all such wisdom is drawn, with the *Rhetoric*, *Ethics*, and *Politics* of Aristotle, or with the historians most celebrated for their deep insight into civil society and human character, — with Thucydides, Tacitus, Philip de Comines, Machiavel, Davila, Hume, — we shall, I think, find that one man may almost be compared with all of these together. When Galileo is named as equal to Bacon, it is to be remembered that Galileo was no moral or political philosopher; and, in this department, Leibnitz certainly falls very short of Bacon. Burke, perhaps, comes, of all modern writers, the nearest to him; but, though Bacon may not be more profound than Burke, he is more copious and comprehensive.

76. The comparison of Bacon and Galileo is naturally built upon the influence which, in the same age, they exerted in overthrowing the philosophy of the schools, and in founding that new discipline of real science which has rendered the last centuries glorious. Hume

Comparison
of Bacon
and Galileo.

¹ *Nov. Organ.*, ii. 26. It may, however, be observed, that we find a few passages in the ethical part of *De Aug-* *mentis*, lib. vii. cap. 8, which show that he had some notions of moral induction germinating in his mind.

has given the preference to the latter, who made accessions to the domain of human knowledge so splendid, so inaccessible to cavil, so unequivocal in their results, that the majority of mankind would perhaps be carried along with this decision. There seems, however, to be no doubt that the mind of Bacon was more comprehensive and profound. But these comparisons are apt to involve *incommensurable* relations. In their own intellectual characters, they bore no great resemblance to each other. Bacon had scarce any knowledge of geometry, and so far ranks much below not only Galileo, but Descartes, Newton, and Leibnitz,—all signalized by wonderful discoveries in the science of quantity, or in that part of physics which employs it. He has, in one of the profound aphorisms of the *Novum Organum*, distinguished the two species of philosophical genius; one more apt to perceive the differences of things, the other their analogies. In a mind of the highest order, neither of these powers will be really deficient; and his own inductive method is at once the best exercise of both, and the best safeguard against the excess of either. But, upon the whole, it may certainly be said, that the genius of Lord Bacon was naturally more inclined to collect the resemblances of nature than to note her differences. This is the case with men like him of sanguine temper, warm fancy, and brilliant wit; but it is not the frame of mind which is best suited to strict reasoning.

77. It is no proof of a solid acquaintance with Lord Bacon's philosophy, to deify his name as the ancient schools did those of their founders, or even to exaggerate the powers of his genius. Powers they were surprisingly great, yet limited in their range, and not in all respects equal; nor could they overcome every impediment of circumstance. Even of Bacon it may be said, that he attempted more than he has achieved, and perhaps more than he clearly apprehended. His objects appear sometimes indistinct, and I am not sure that they are always consistent. In the *Advancement of Learning*, he aspired to fill up, or at least to indicate, the deficiencies in every department of knowledge: he gradually confined himself to philosophy, and at length to physics. But few of his works can be deemed complete, not even the treatise *De Augmentis*, which comes nearer to this than most of the rest. Hence the study of Lord Bacon is difficult, and not, as I conceive, very well adapted to those who have made no progress whatever

in the exact sciences, nor accustomed themselves to independent thinking. They have never been made a text-book in our universities; though, after a judicious course of preparatory studies, by which I mean a good foundation in geometry and the philosophical principles of grammar, the first book of the *Novum Organum* might be very advantageously combined with the instruction of an enlightened lecturer.¹

¹ It by no means is to be inferred, that because the actual text of Bacon is not always such as can be well understood by very young men, I object to their being led to the real principles of inductive philosophy, which alone will teach them to think, firmly but not presumptuously, for themselves. Few defects, on the contrary, in our system of education, are more visible than the want of an adequate course of logic; and this is not likely to be rectified so long as the Aristotelian methods challenge that denomination exclusively of all other aids to the reasoning faculties. The position that nothing else is to be called logic, were it even agreeable to the derivation of the word, which it is not, or to the usage of the ancients, which is by no means uniformly the case, or to that of modern philosophy and correct language, which is certainly not at all the case, is no answer to the question, whether what we call logic does not deserve to be taught at all.

A living writer of high reputation, who has at least fully understood his own subject, and illustrated it better than his predecessors, from a more enlarged reading and thinking, wherein his own acuteness has been improved by the writers of the Baconian school, has been unfortunately instrumental, by the very merits of his treatise on Logic, in keeping up the prejudices on this subject, which have generally been deemed characteristic of the university to which he belonged. All the reflection I have been able to give to the subject has convinced me of the inefficacy of the syllogistic art in enabling us to think rightly for ourselves, or, which is part of thinking rightly, to detect those fallacies of others which might impose on our understanding before we have acquired that art. It has been often alleged, and, as far as I can judge, with perfect truth, that no man, who can be worth answering, ever commits, except through mere inadvertence, any paralogisms which the common logic serves to point out. It is easy enough to construct syllogisms which sin against its rules; but the question is, by whom they were employed. For though it is not uncommon, as I am aware, to

represent an adversary as reasoning illogically, this is generally effected by putting his argument into our own words. The great fault of all, over induction, or the assertion of a general premise upon an insufficient examination of particulars, cannot be discovered or cured by any logical skill; and this is the error into which men really fall, not that of omitting to distribute the middle term, though it comes in effect, and often in appearance, to the same thing. I do not contend that the rules of syllogism, which are very short and simple, ought not to be learned; or that there may not be some advantage in occasionally stating our own argument, or calling on another to state his, in a regular form (an advantage, however, rather dialectical, which is, in other words, rhetorical, than one which affects the reasoning faculties themselves); nor do I deny that it is philosophically worth while to know that all *general reasoning by words* may be reduced into syllogism, as it is to know that most of plane geometry may be resolved into the superposition of equal triangles; but to represent this portion of logical science as the whole, appears to me almost like teaching the scholar Euclid's axioms, and the axiomatic theorem to which I have alluded, and calling this the science of geometry. The following passage from the Port-Royal logic is very judicious and candid, giving as much to the Aristotelian system as it deserves: "Cette partie, que nous avons maintenant à traiter, qui comprend les règles du raisonnement, est estimée la plus importante de la logique, et c'est presque l'unique qu'on y traite avec quelque soin; mais il y a sujet de douter si elle est aussi utile qu'on se l'imagine. La plupart des erreurs des hommes, comme nous avons déjà dit ailleurs, viennent bien plus de ce qu'ils raisonnent sur de faux principes, que non pas de ce qu'ils raisonnent mal suivant leurs principes. Il arrive rarement qu'on se laisse tromper par des raisonnemens qui ne soient faux que parce que la conséquence en est mal tirée; et ceux qui ne seroient pas capables d'en reconnaître la fausseté par la seule lumière de la raison, ne le seroient pas ordinairement d'entendre les règles que l'on en donne, et encore

78. The ignorance of Bacon in mathematics, and, what was much worse, his inadequate notions of their utility, must be reckoned among the chief defects in his philosophical writings. In a remarkable passage of the *Advancement of Learning*, he held mathematics to be a part of metaphysics; but the place of this is altered in the *Latin*, and they are treated as merely auxiliary or instrumental to physical inquiry. He had some prejudice against pure mathematics, and thought they had been unduly elevated in comparison with the realities of nature. "I know not," he says, "how it has arisen that mathematics and logic, which ought to be the serving-maids of physical philosophy,

His prejudice against mathematics.

moins de les appliquer. Néanmoins, quand on ne considère ces règles que comme des vérités spéculatives, elles serviroient toujours à exacerber l'esprit; et de plus, on ne peut nier qu'elles n'aient quelque usage en quelques rencontres, et à l'égard de quelques personnes, qui, étant d'un naturel vil et pénétrant, ne se laissent quelquefois tromper par des fausses conséquences, que faute d'attention. À quoi la réflexion qu'ils feroient sur ces règles seroit capable de remédier." — *Art de Penser*, part iii. How different is this sensible passage from one quoted from some anonymous writer in *Whately's Logic*, p. 24! — "A fallacy consists of an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood so entangled, so intimately blended, that the fallacy is, in the chemical phrase, held in solution: one drop of sound logic is that test which immediately dissolves them, makes the foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom." One fallacy, it might be answered, as common as any, is the false analogy, the misleading the mind by a comparison where there is no real proportion or resemblance. The chemist's test is the necessary means of detecting the foreign substance; if the "drop of sound logic" be such, it is strange that lawyers, mathematicians, and mankind in general, should so sparingly employ it; the fact being notorious, that those most eminent for strong reasoning powers are rarely conversant with the syllogistic method. It is also well known, that these "intimately blended mixtures of truth and falsehood" perplex no man of plain sense, except when they are what is called extralogical: cases wherein the art of syllogism is of no use.

[The syllogistic logic appears to have been more received into favor of late among philosophers, both here and on the Continent, than it was in the two preceding centuries. The main question, it is so kept in mind, does not relate to its

principles as a science, but to the practical usefulness of its rules as an art. An able writer has lately observed, that "he must be fortunate in the clearness of his mind, who, knowing the logical mode, is never obliged to have recourse to it to destroy ambiguity or heighten evidence, and particularly so in his opponents, who, in verbal or written controversy, never finds it necessary to employ it in trying their arguments." *Penny Cyclopædia*, art. "Syllogism." Every one must judge of this by his own experience: the profound thinker whose hand seems discernible in this article, has a strong claim to authority in favor of the utility of the syllogistic method; yet we cannot help remembering that it is very rarely employed even in controversy, where I really believe it to be a valuable weapon against an antagonist, and capable of producing no small effect on the indifferent reader or hearer, especially if he is not of a very sharp apprehension; and moreover that, as I at least believe, the proportion of mathematical, political, or theological reasoners, who have acquired or retained any tolerable expertise in the technical part of logic, is far from high, nor am I aware that they fall into fallacies for want of knowledge of it; but I mean strictly such fallacies as the syllogistic method alone seems to correct. What comes nearest to syllogistic reasoning in practice is that of geometry: as thus, $A = B$; but $C = A$; ergo, $C = B$, is essentially a syllogism, but not according to form. If, however, equality of magnitude may be considered as identity, according to the dictum of Aristotle, *ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἡ λογικὴ ἐστὶν*, the foregoing is regular in logical form; and if we take A , B , and C for ratios, which are properly identical, not equal, this may justly be called a syllogism. But those who contend most for the formal logic seldom much regard its use in geometrical science. — 1847.]

yet affecting to vaunt the certainty that belongs to them, presume to exercise a dominion over her." It is, in my opinion, erroneous to speak of geometry, which relates to the realities of space, and to natural objects so far as extended, as a mere handmaid of physical philosophy, and not rather a part of it. Playfair has made some good remarks on the advantages derived to experimental philosophy itself from the mere application of geometry and algebra. And one of the reflections which this ought to excite is, that we are not to conceive, as some hastily do, that there can be no real utility to mankind, even of that kind of utility which consists in multiplying the conveniences and luxuries of life, springing from theoretical and speculative inquiry. The history of algebra, so barren in the days of Tartaglia and Vieta, so productive of *wealth*, when applied to dynamical calculations in our own, may be a sufficient answer.

79. One of the petty blemishes, which, though lost in the splendor of Lord Bacon's excellences, it is not unfair to mention, is connected with the peculiar characteristics of his mind: he is sometimes too metaphorical and witty. His remarkable talent for discovering analogies seems to have inspired him with too much regard to them as arguments, even when they must appear to any common reader fanciful and far-fetched. His terminology, chiefly for the same reason, is often a little affected, and, in Latin, rather barbarous. The divisions of his prerogative instances in the *Novum Organum* are not always founded upon intelligible distinctions. And the general obscurity of the style, neither himself nor his assistants being good masters of the Latin language, which at the best is never flexible or copious enough for our philosophy, renders the perusal of both his great works too laborious for the impatient reader. Brucker has well observed, that the *Novum Organum* has been neglected by the generality, and proved of far less service than it would otherwise have been in philosophy, in consequence of these very defects, as well as the real depth of the author's mind.¹

80. What has been the fame of Bacon, "the wisest, greatest of mankind," it is needless to say. What has been his

¹ "Legenda ipsa nobilissima tractatio ab illis est, qui in rerum naturalium inquisitione feliciter progredi cupiunt. Quam si paulo plus luminis et perspicuitatis haberet, et novorum terminorum et partitio-

num artificio lectorem non remoraretur, longe plura, quam factum est, contulisset ad philosophiam emendationem. His enim obstantibus a plerisque hoc organum neglectum est." — *Hist. Philos.*, v. 99.

real influence over mankind, how much of our enlarged and exact knowledge may be attributed to his inductive method, what of this again has been due to a thorough study of his writings, and what to an indirect and secondary acquaintance with them, are questions of another kind, and less easily solved. Stewart, the philosopher who has dwelt most on the praises of Bacon, while he conceives him to have exercised a considerable influence over the English men of science in the seventeenth century, supposes, on the authority of Montucla, that he did not "command the general admiration of Europe," till the publication of the preliminary discourse to the French Encyclopædia by Diderot and D'Alembert. This, however, is by much too precipitate a conclusion. He became almost immediately known on the Continent. Gassendi was one of his most ardent admirers. Descartes mentions him, I believe, once only, in a letter to Mersenne in 1632;¹ but he was of all men the most unwilling to praise a contemporary. It may be said that these were philosophers, and that their testimony does not imply the admiration of mankind. But writers of a very different character mention him in a familiar manner. Richelieu is said to have highly esteemed Lord Bacon.² And it may in some measure be due to this, that in the *Sentimens de l'Académie Française sur le Cid*, he is alluded to simply by the name Bacon, as one well known.³ Voiture, in a letter to Costar, about the same time, bestows high eulogy on some passages of Bacon which his correspondent had sent to him, and observes that Horace would have been astonished to hear a barbarian Briton discourse in such a style.⁴ The treatise *De Augmentis* was republished in France in 1624, the year after its appearance in England. It was translated into French as early as 1632; no great proofs of neglect. Editions came

¹ Vol. vi. p. 210, edit. Cousin.

² The only authority that I can now quote for this is not very good, that of Aubrey's Manuscripts, which I find in Fervard's *Anecdotes*, iv. 323. But it seems not improbable. The same book quotes Balzac as saying, "Croyons donc, pour l'amour du Chancelier Bacon, que toutes les fables des anciens sont sages; et tous leurs songes mystères, et de celles-là qui sont estimées pures fables, il n'y en a pas une, quelque bizarre et extravagante qu'elle soit, qui n'ait son fondement dans l'histoire, si l'on en veut croire Bacon, et

qui n'ait été déguisé de la sorte par les sages du vieux temps pour la rendre plus utile aux peuples."

³ P. 44 (1633).

⁴ "J'ai trouvé parfaitement beau tout ce que vous me mandes de Bacon. Mais ne vous semble t'il pas qu'Horace, qui disoit, *Vitam Britannos hospitibus feros*, seroit bien étonné d'entendre un barbare discourir comme cela?" Costar is said by Bayle to have borrowed much from Bacon. La Mothe le Vayer mentions him in his *Dialogues*: in fact, instances are numerous.

out in Holland, 1645, 1652, and 1662. Even the *Novum Organum*, which, as has been said, never became so popular as his other writings, was thrice printed in Holland, in 1645, 1650, and 1660.¹ Leibnitz and Puffendorf are loud in their expressions of admiration, the former ascribing to him the revival of true philosophy as fully as we can at present.² I should be more inclined to doubt whether he were adequately valued by his countrymen in his own time, or in the immediately subsequent period. Under the first Stuarts, there was little taste among studious men but for theology, and chiefly for a theology which, proceeding with an extreme deference to authority, could not but generate a disposition of mind, even upon other subjects, alien to the progressive and inquisitive spirit of the inductive philosophy.³ The institution of the Royal Society, or rather the love of physical science out of which that institution arose, in the second part of the seventeenth century, made England resound with the name of her illustrious chancellor. Few now spoke of him without

¹ Montagu's *Life of Bacon*, p. 407. He has not mentioned an edition at Strasburg, 1686, which is in the British Museum.

There is also an edition, without time or place, in the catalogue of the British Museum.

² Brucker, v. 96. Stewart says that "Bayle does not give above twelve lines to Bacon;" but he calls him one of the greatest men of his age, and the length of an article in Bayle was never designed to be a measure of the merit of its subject. — [The reception of Bacon's philosophical writings on the Continent has been elaborately proved against Stewart, in a dissertation by Mr. Macvey Napier, published in the eighth volume of the *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*. — 1842.]

³ It is not uncommon to meet with persons, especially who are or have been engaged in teaching others dogmatically what they have themselves received in the like manner, to whom the inductive philosophy appears a mere school of scepticism, or at best wholly inapplicable to any subjects which require entire conviction. A certain deduction from certain premises is the only reasoning they acknowledge. Lord Bacon has a remarkable passage on this in the 9th book *De Augmentis*. "Postquam articuli et principia religionis jam in sedibus suis fuerint locata, ita ut a rationis examine penitus eximantur, tum demum conceditur ab illis illusiones derivare ac deducere secundum analogiam ipsorum. In rebus quidem

naturalibus hoc non tenet. Nam et ipsa principia examini subiciuntur; per inductionem, inquam, hoc minime per syllogismum. Atque eadem illa nullam habent cum ratione repugnantiam, ut ab eodem fonte cum primis propositiones, tum mediae, deducantur. Aliter fit in religione: ubi et primae propositiones auctoritatem sunt atque per se subsistentes; et rursus non reguntur ab illa ratione quas propositiones consequentes deducit. Neque tamen hoc fit in religione sola, sed etiam in aliis scientiis, tam gravioribus, quam levioribus, ubi scilicet propositiones humanae placita sunt, non posita; aliquidem et in illis rationis usus absolutus esse non potest. Videmus enim in ludis, puta schaccorum, aut similibus, priores ludi normas et leges merè positivas esse, et ad placitum; quas recipi, non in disputationem vocari, prorsus oportet; ut vero vincas, et perit lusum instituas, ad artificiosum est et rationale. Eodem modo fit et in legibus humanis; in quibus haud paucos sunt maxime, ut loquantur, hoc est, placita mera juris, quas auctoritate magis quam ratione nituntur, neque in disceptationem veniunt. Quid vero sit iustissimum, non absolutè, sed relativè, hoc est ex analogia illarum maximarum, id demum rationale est, et latum disputationi campum praebeat." This passage, well weighed, may show us where, why, and by whom, the synthetic and syllogistic methods have been preferred to the inductive and analytical.

a kind of homage that only the greatest men receive. Yet still it was by natural philosophers alone that the writings of Bacon were much studied. The editions of his works, except the *Essays*, were few: the *Novum Organum* never came separately from the English press.¹ They were not even frequently quoted; for I believe it will be found that the fashion of referring to the brilliant passages of the *De Augmentis* and the *Novum Organum*, at least in books designed for the general reader, is not much older than the close of the last century. Scotland has the merit of having led the way: Reid, Stewart, Robison, and Playfair turned that which had been a blind veneration into a rational worship; and I should suspect that more have read Lord Bacon within these thirty years than in the two preceding centuries. It may be an usual consequence of the enthusiastic panegyrics lately poured upon his name, that a more positive efficacy has sometimes been attributed to his philosophical writings than they really possessed; and it might be asked whether Italy, where he was probably not much known, were not the true school of experimental philosophy in Europe, whether his methods of investigation were not chiefly such as men of sagacity and lovers of truth might simultaneously have devised. But, whatever may have been the case with respect to actual discoveries in science, we must give to written wisdom its proper meed: no books prior to those of Lord Bacon carried mankind so far on the road to truth; none have obtained so thorough a triumph over arrogant usurpation without seeking to substitute another; and he may be compared to those liberators of nations who have given them laws by which they might govern themselves, and retained no homage but their gratitude.²

¹ The *De Augmentis* was only once published after the first edition, in 1683. An indifferent translation, by Gilbert Watts, came out in 1640. No edition of Bacon's Works was published in England before 1730; another appeared in 1740, and there have been several since. But they had been printed at Frankfort in 1656. It is unnecessary to observe, that many copies of the foreign editions were brought to this country. This is mostly taken from Mr. Montagu's account.

² I have met, since this passage was written, with one in Stewart's *Life of Reid*, which seems to state the effects of Bacon's philosophy in a just and temperate spirit, and which I rather quote because this writer has, by his eulogies on that philo-

sophy, led some to an exaggerated notion. "The influence of Bacon's genius on the subsequent progress of physical discovery has been seldom duly appreciated; by some writers almost entirely overlooked, and by others considered as the sole cause of the reformation in science which has since taken place. Of these two extremes, the latter certainly is the least wide of the truth; for, in the whole history of letters, no other individual can be mentioned whose exertions have had so indisputable an effect in forwarding the intellectual progress of mankind. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged, that, before the era when Bacon appeared, various philosophers in different parts of Europe had struck into the right path; and it may

SECTION III.

On the Metaphysical Philosophy of Descartes.

81. RENÉ DESCARTES was born in 1596, of an ancient family in Touraine. An inquisitive curiosity into the nature and causes of all he saw is said to have distinguished his childhood, and this was certainly accompanied by an uncommon facility and clearness of apprehension. At a very early age, he entered the college of the Jesuits at La Flèche, and passed through their entire course of literature and philosophy. It was now, at the age of sixteen, as he tells us, that he began to reflect, with little satisfaction, on his studies; finding his mind beset with error, and obliged to confess that he had learned nothing but the conviction of his ignorance. Yet he knew that he had been educated in a famous school, and that he was not deemed behind his contemporaries. The ethics, the logic, even the geometry, of the ancients, did not fill his mind with that clear stream of truth for which he was ever thirsting. On leaving La Flèche, the young Descartes mingled for some years in the world, and served as a volunteer both under Prince Maurice, and in the Imperial Army. Yet during this period there were intervals when he withdrew himself wholly from society, and devoted his leisure to mathematical science. Some germs also of his peculiar philosophy were already ripening in his mind.

perhaps be doubted, whether any one important rule with respect to the true method of investigation be contained in his works, of which no hint can be traced in those of his predecessors. His great merit lay in concentrating their feeble and scattered lights; fixing the attention of philosophers on the distinguishing characteristics of true and of false science, by a felicity of illustration peculiar to himself, seconded by the commanding powers of a bold and figurative eloquence. The method of investigation which he recommended had been previously followed in every instance in which any solid discovery had been made with respect to the laws of nature: but it had been followed accidentally and without any regular pre-

conceived design; and it was reserved for him to reduce to rule and method what others had effected, either fortuitously, or from some momentary glimpse of the truth. These remarks are not intended to detract from the just glory of Bacon; for they apply to all those, without exception, who have systematized the principles of any of the arts. Indeed they apply less forcibly to him than to any other philosopher whose studies have been directed to objects analogous to his; inasmuch as we know of no art of which the rules have been reduced successfully into a didactic form, when the art itself was as much in infancy as experimental philosophy was when Bacon wrote." — *Account of Life and Writings of Reid*, sect. 2.

82. Descartes was twenty-three years old, when, passing a solitary winter in his quarters at Neuburg, on the Danube, he began to revolve in his mind the futility of all existing systems of philosophy, and the discrepancy of opinions among the generality of mankind, which rendered it probable that no one had yet found out the road to real science. He determined, therefore, to set about the investigation of truth for himself, erasing from his mind all preconceived judgments, as having been hastily and precariously taken up. He laid down for his guidance a few fundamental rules of logic, such as to admit nothing as true which he did not clearly perceive, and to proceed from the simpler notions to the more complex; taking the method of geometers, by which they had gone so much farther than others, for the true art of reasoning. Commencing, therefore, with the mathematical sciences, and observing, that, however different in their subjects, they treat properly of nothing but the relations of quantity, he fell, almost accidentally, as his words seem to import, on the great discovery that geometrical curves may be expressed algebraically.¹ This gave him more hope of success in applying his method to other parts of philosophy.

83. Nine years more elapsed, during which Descartes, though he quitted military service, continued to observe mankind in various parts of Europe, still keeping his heart fixed on the great aim he had proposed to himself, but, as he confesses, without having framed the scheme of any philosophy beyond those of his contemporaries. He deemed his time of life immature for so stupendous a task. But at the age of thirty-three, with little notice to his friends, he quitted Paris, convinced that absolute retirement was indispensable for that rigorous investigation of first principles which he now determined to institute, and retired into Holland. In this country he remained eight years so completely aloof from the distractions of the world, that he concealed his very place of residence, though preserving an intercourse of letters with many friends in France.

84. In 1637, he broke upon the world with a volume containing the Discourse upon Method, the Dioptrics, the Meteors, and the Geometry. It is only with the first that we are for

¹ Œuvres de Descartes, par Cousin, Paris, 1824, vol. i. p. 148.

the present concerned.¹ In this discourse, the most interesting, perhaps, of Descartes' writings, on account of the picture of his life and of the progress of his studies that it furnishes, we find the Cartesian metaphysics, which do not consist of many articles, almost as fully detailed as in any of his later works. In the *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, published in 1641, these fundamental principles are laid down again more at length. He invited the criticism of philosophers on these famous *Meditations*. They did not refuse the challenge; and seven sets of objections from as many different quarters, with seven replies from Descartes himself, are subjoined to the later editions of the *Meditations*. The *Principles of Philosophy*, published in Latin in 1644, contains what may be reckoned the final statement, which occupies most of the first book, written with uncommon conciseness and precision. The beauty of philosophical style which distinguishes Descartes is never more seen than in this first book of the *Principia*, the translation of which was revised by Clerselier, an eminent friend of the author. It is a contrast at once to the elliptical brevity of Aristotle, who hints, or has been supposed to hint, the most important positions in a short clause, and to the verbose, figurative declamation of many modern metaphysicians. In this admirable perspicuity, Descartes was imitated by his disciples Arnauld and Malebranche, especially the former. His unfinished posthumous treatise, the *Inquiry after Truth by Natural Reason*, is not carried farther than a partial development of the same leading principles of Cartesianism. There is, consequently, a great deal of apparent repetition in the works of Descartes, but such as on attentive consideration will show, not perhaps much real variance, but some new lights that had occurred to the author in the course of his reflections.²

85. In pursuing the examination of the first principles of knowledge, Descartes perceived not only that he had cause to doubt of the various opinions which he had found current among men, from that very circumstance of their variety, but

¹ *Œuvres de Descartes*, par Cousin, Paris, 1824, vol. i. pp. 121-212.

² A work has lately been published, *Essais Philosophiques, suivis de la Métaphysique de Descartes, assemblée et mise en ordre par L. A. Gruyer*, 4 vols., Bruxelles, 1832. In the fourth volume, we find the metaphysical passages in the wri-

tings of Descartes, including his correspondence, arranged methodically in his own words, but with the omission of a large part of the objections to the *Meditations* and of his replies. I did not, however, see this work in time to make use of it.

that the sources of all which he had received for truth themselves, namely, the senses, had afforded him no indisputable certainty. He began to recollect how often He begins by doubting all. he had been misled by appearances, which had at first sight given no intimation of their fallacy, and asked himself in vain by what infallible test he could discern the reality of external objects, or at least their conformity to his idea of them. The strong impressions made in sleep led him to inquire whether all he saw and felt might not be in a dream. It was true that there seemed to be some notions more elementary than the rest, such as extension, figure, duration, which could not be reckoned fallacious; nor could he avoid owning, that, if there were not an existing triangle in the world, the angles of one conceived by the mind, though it were in sleep, must appear equal to two right angles. But, even in this certitude of demonstration, he soon found something deficient: to err in geometrical reasoning is not impossible; why might he not err in this? especially in a train of consequences, the particular terms of which are not at the same instant present to the mind. But, above all, there might be a superior being, powerful enough and willing to deceive him. It was no kind of answer to treat this as improbable, or as an arbitrary hypothesis. He had laid down as a maxim that nothing could be received as truth which was not demonstrable; and in one place, rather hyperbolically, and indeed extravagantly in appearance, says that he made little difference between merely probable and false suppositions; meaning this, however, as we may presume, in the sense of geometers, who would say the same thing.

86. But, divesting himself thus of all belief in what the world deemed most unquestionable, plunged in an abyss, as it seemed for a time, he soon found his feet His first step in knowledge. on a rock, from which he sprang upwards to an unclouded sun. Doubting all things, abandoning all things, he came to the question, What is it that doubts and denies? Something it must be: he might be deceived by a superior power; but it was he that was deceived. He felt his own existence: the proof of it was that he did feel it; that he had affirmed, that he now doubted, in a word, that he was a thinking substance. *Cogito; Ergo sum*—this famous enthymeme of the Cartesian philosophy veiled in rather formal language that which was to him, and must be to us all, the

eternal basis of conviction, which no argument can strengthen, which no sophistry can impair,—the consciousness of a self within, a percipient indivisible Ego.¹ The only proof of this is, that it admits of no proof, that no man can pretend to doubt of his own existence with sincerity, or to express a doubt without absurd and inconsistent language.

87. The scepticism of Descartes, it appears, which is merely provisional, is not at all similar to that of the Pyrrhonists, though some of his arguments may have been shafts from their quiver. Nor did he make use, which is somewhat remarkable, of the reasonings afterwards employed by Berkeley against the material world, though no one more frequently distinguished than Descartes between the objective reality, as it was then supposed to be, of ideas in the mind, and the external or sensible reality of things. Scepticism, in fact, was so far from being characteristic of his disposition, that his errors sprang chiefly from the opposite source, little as he was aware of it, from an undue positiveness in theories which he could not demonstrate, or even render highly probable.²

88. The certainty of an existing Ego easily led him to that of the operations of the mind, called afterwards by Locke ideas of reflection, the believing, doubting, willing, loving, fearing, which he knew by consciousness, and indeed by means

¹ This word, introduced by the Germans, or originally perhaps by the old Cartesians, is rather awkward, but far less so than the English pronoun *I*, which is also equivocal in sound. Stewart has adopted it as the lesser evil; and it seems reasonable not to scruple the use of a word so convenient, if not necessary, to express the unity of the conscious principle. If it had been employed earlier, I am apt to think that some great metaphysical extravagances would have been avoided, and some fundamental truths more clearly apprehended. Fichte is well known to have made the grand division of *Ich* and *Nicht Ich*, *Ego* and *Non Ego*, the basis of his philosophy; in other words, the difference of subjective and objective reality.

² One of the rules Descartes lays down in his posthumous art of logic, is that we ought never to busy ourselves except about objects concerning which our understanding appears capable of acquiring an unquestionable and certain knowledge, vol. xi. p. 204. This is at least too unlimited a proposition, and would exclude, not indeed all probability, but all in-

quiries which must by necessity end in nothing more than probability. Accordingly we find in the next pages, that he made little account of any sciences but arithmetic and geometry, or such others as equal them in certainty. "From all this," he concludes, "we may infer, not that arithmetic and geometry are the only sciences which we must learn, but that he who seeks the road to truth should not trouble himself with any object of which he cannot have as certain a knowledge as of arithmetical and geometrical demonstrations." It is unnecessary to observe what havoc this would make with investigations, even in physics, of the highest importance to mankind.

Beattie, in the *Essay on Truth*, part ii. chap. 2. has made some unfounded criticisms on the scepticism of Descartes, and endeavors to turn into ridicule his "*Cogito; Ergo sum.*" Yet if any one should deny his own, or our existence, I do not see how we could refute him, were he worthy of refutation, but by some such language; and, in fact, it is what Beattie himself says, more paraphrastically, in answering Hume.

of which alone he knew that the Ego existed. He now proceeded a step farther; and, reflecting on the simplest truths of arithmetic and geometry, saw that it was ^{He arrives at more} as impossible to doubt of them as of the acts of ^{certainty.} his mind. But as he had before tried to doubt even of these, on the hypothesis that he might be deceived by a superior intelligent power, he resolved to inquire whether such a power existed, and, if it did, whether it could be a deceiver. The affirmative of the former and the negative of the latter question Descartes established by that extremely subtle reasoning so much celebrated in the seventeenth century, but which has less frequently been deemed conclusive in later times. It is at least that which no man, not fitted by long practice for metaphysical researches, will pretend to embrace.

89. The substance of his argument was this. He found within himself the idea of a perfect Intelligence, ^{His proof} eternal, infinite, necessary. This could not come ^{of a Deity.} from himself, nor from external things, because both were imperfect, and there could be no more in the effect than there is in the cause. And, this idea requiring a cause, it could have none but an actual being, not a possible being, which is undistinguishable from mere nonentity. If, however, this should be denied, he inquires whether he, with this idea of God, could have existed by any other cause, if there were no God. Not, he argues, by himself; for, if he were the author of his own being, he would have given himself every perfection, in a word, would have been God. Not by his parents; for the same might be said of them, and so forth, if we remount to a series of productive beings. Besides this, as much power is required to preserve as to create; and the continuance of existence in the effect implies the continued operation of the cause.

90. With this argument, in itself sufficiently refined, Descartes blended another still more distant from common apprehension. Necessary existence is involved ^{Another} proof of it. in the idea of God. All other beings are conceivable in their essence, as things possible; in God alone, his essence and existence are inseparable. Existence is necessary to perfection; hence a perfect being, or God, cannot be conceived without necessary existence. Though I do not know that I have misrepresented Descartes in this result of his very subtle argument, it is difficult not to treat it as a sophism. And it

[illegible][illegible]

91. From the idea of a perfect being, Descartes immediately deduced the truth of his belief in an external world, and in the inferences of his reason. For to deceive his creatures would be an imperfection in God; but God is perfect. Whatever, therefore, is clearly and distinctly apprehended by our reason must be true. We have only to be on our guard against our own precipitancy and prejudice, or surrender of our reason to the authority of others. It is not by our understanding, such as God gave it to us, that we are deceived; but the exercise of our free-will, a high prerogative of our nature, is often so incautious as to make us not discern truth from falsehood, and affirm or deny, by a voluntary act, that which we do not distinctly apprehend. The properties of quantity, founded on our ideas of extension and number, are distinctly perceived by our minds; and hence the sciences of arithmetic and geometry are certainly true. But, when he turns his thoughts to the phenomena of external sensation, Descartes cannot wholly extricate himself from his original concession, the basis of his doubt, that the senses do sometimes deceive us. He endeavors to reconcile this with his own theory, which had built the certainty of all that we clearly hold certain on the perfect veracity of God.

92. It is in this inquiry that he reaches that important distinction between the primary and secondary properties of matter (the latter being modifications of the former, relative only to our apprehension, but not inherent in things), which, without being wholly new, contradicted the Aristotelian theories of the schools;¹ and he

His deductions from this.

Primary and secondary qualities.

It bespeaks the clear and acute understanding of this celebrated philosopher, and appears to me an entire refutation of the scholastic argument of Descartes; one more fit for the Anselms and such dealers in words, from whom it came, than for himself.

¹ See Stewart's First Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy. This writer has justly observed, that many persons conceive *color* to be inherent in the object, so that the censure of Reid on Descartes and his followers, as having pretended to discover what no one doubted, is at least unreasonable in this respect. A late writer has gone so far as to say, "Nothing at first can seem a more rational, obvious, and incontrovertible conclusion, than that the color of a body is an inherent quality, like its weight, hardness, &c.; and that to see the object, and to see it of its own

color, when nothing intervenes between our eyes and it, are one and the same thing. Yet this is only a prejudice," &c. — Herschel's Discourse on Nat. Philos., p. 82. I almost even suspect that the notion of sounds and smells, being secondary or merely sensible qualities, is not distinct in all men's minds. But, after we are become familiar with correct ideas, it is not easy to revive prejudices in our imagination. In the same page of Stewart's Dissertation, he has been led by dislike of the University of Oxford to misconceive, in an extraordinary manner, a passage of Addison in the Guardian, which is evidently a sportive ridicule of the Cartesian theory, and is absolutely inapplicable to the Aristotelian.

(The most remarkable circumstance in Reid's animadversion on Descartes, as having announced nothing but what was

was always objected by his adversaries, that he inferred the necessity of the thing from the necessity of the idea, which was the very point in question. It seems impossible to vindicate many of his expressions, from which he never receded in the controversy to which his *Meditations* gave rise. But the long habit of repeating in his mind the same series of reasonings, gave Descartes, as it will always do, an inward assurance of their certainty, which could not be weakened by any objection. The former argument for the being of God, whether satisfactory or not, is to be distinguished from the present.¹

¹ "From what is said already of the ignorance we are in of the essence of mind, it is evident that we are not able to know whether any mind be necessarily existent by a necessity *a priori* founded in its essence, as we have showed time and space to be. Some philosophers think that such a necessity may be demonstrated of God from the nature of perfection. For God being infinitely, that is, absolutely perfect, they say he must needs be necessarily existent; because, say they, necessary existence is one of the greatest of perfections. But I take this to be one of those false and imaginary arguments that are founded in the abuse of certain terms; and, of all others, this word 'perfection' seems to have suffered most this way. I wish I could clearly understand what these philosophers mean by the word 'perfection,' when they thus say that necessity of existence is perfection. Does perfection here signify the same thing that it does when we say that God is infinitely good, omnipotent, omniscient? Surely perfections are properly asserted of the several powers that attend the essences of things and not of any thing else, but in a very unnatural and improper sense. Perfection is a term of relation; and its sense implies a fitness or agreement to some certain end, and most properly to some power in the thing that is denominated perfect. The term, as the etymology of it shows, is taken from the operation of artists. When an artist proposes to himself to make any thing that shall be serviceable to a certain effect, his work is called more or less perfect, according as it agrees more or less with the design of the artist. From arts, by a similitude of sense, this word has been introduced into morality, and signifies that quality of an agent by which it is able to act agreeable to the end its actions tend to. The metaphysicians who reduce every thing to transcendental considerations have also translated this term into their science, and use it to signify the

agreement that any thing has with that idea which it is required that thing should answer to. This perfection, therefore, belongs to those attributes that constitute the essence of a thing; and that being is properly called the most perfect which has all, the best, and each the completest in its kind, of those attributes which can be united in one essence. Perfection, therefore, belongs to the essence of things, and not properly to their existence; which is not a perfection of any thing, no attribute of it, but only the mere constitution of it in *verum natura*. Necessary existence, therefore, which is a mode of existence, is not a perfection; it being no attribute of the thing no more than existence is, which it is a mode of. But it may be said, that though necessary existence is not a perfection in itself, yet it is so in its cause, upon account of that attribute of the entity from whence it flows; that that attribute must of all others be the most perfect and most excellent, which necessary existence flows from, it being such as cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing. But what excellency, what perfection, is there in all this? Space is necessarily existent on account of extension, which cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing. But what perfection is there in space upon this account, which can in no manner act on any thing, which is entirely devoid of all power, wherein I have showed all perfections to consist? Therefore necessary existence, abstractedly considered, is no perfection; and therefore the idea of infinite perfection does not include, and consequently not prove, God to be necessarily existent. If he be so, it is on account of those attributes of his essence which we have no knowledge of."

I have made this extract from a very short tract, called *Contemplatio Philosophica*, by Brook Taylor, which I found in an unpublished memoir of his life printed by the late Sir William Young in 1798.

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It bespeaks the clear and acute understanding of this celebrated philosopher, and appears to me an entire refutation of the scholastic argument of Descartes; one more fit for the Anselms and such dealers in words, from whom it came, than for himself.

¹ See Stewart's First Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy. This writer has justly observed, that many persons conceive *color* to be inherent in the object, so that the censure of Reid on Descartes and his followers, as having pretended to discover what no one doubted, is at least unreasonable in this respect. A late writer has gone so far as to say, "Nothing at first can seem a more rational, obvious, and incontrovertible conclusion, than that the color of a body is an inherent quality, like its weight, hardness, &c.; and that to see the object, and to see it of its own

color, when nothing intervenes between our eyes and it, are one and the same thing. Yet this is only a prejudice," &c. — Herschel's Discourse on Nat. Philos., p. 82. I almost even suspect that the notion of sounds and smells, being secondary or merely sensible qualities, is not distinct in all men's minds. But, after we are become familiar with correct ideas, it is not easy to revive prejudices in our imagination. In the same page of Stewart's Dissertation, he has been led by dislike of the University of Oxford to misconceive, in an extraordinary manner, a passage of Addison in the Guardian, which is evidently a sportive ridicule of the Cartesian theory, and is absolutely inapplicable to the Aristotelian.

[The most remarkable circumstance in Reid's animadversion on Descartes, as having announced nothing but what was

out in Holland, 1645, 1652, and 1662. Even the *Novum Organum*, which, as has been said, never became so popular as his other writings, was thrice printed in Holland, in 1645, 1650, and 1660.¹ Leibnitz and Puffendorf are loud in their expressions of admiration, the former ascribing to him the revival of true philosophy as fully as we can at present.² I should be more inclined to doubt whether he were adequately valued by his countrymen in his own time, or in the immediately subsequent period. Under the first Stuarts, there was little taste among studious men but for theology, and chiefly for a theology which, proceeding with an extreme deference to authority, could not but generate a disposition of mind, even upon other subjects, alien to the progressive and inquisitive spirit of the inductive philosophy.³ The institution of the Royal Society, or rather the love of physical science out of which that institution arose, in the second part of the seventeenth century, made England resound with the name of her illustrious chancellor. Few now spoke of him without

¹ Montagu's *Life of Bacon*, p. 407. He has not mentioned an edition at Strasburg, 1636, which is in the British Museum.

There is also an edition, without time or place, in the catalogue of the British Museum.

² Brucker, v. 95. Stewart says that "Bayle does not give above twelve lines to Bacon;" but he calls him one of the greatest men of his age, and the length of an article in Bayle was never designed to be a measure of the merit of its subject. — [The reception of Bacon's philosophical writings on the Continent has been elaborately proved against Stewart, in a dissertation by Mr. Macvey Napier, published in the eighth volume of the *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*. — 1842.]

³ It is not uncommon to meet with persons, especially who are or have been engaged in teaching others dogmatically what they have themselves received in the like manner, to whom the inductive philosophy appears a mere school of scepticism, or at best wholly inapplicable to any subjects which require entire conviction. A certain deduction from certain promises is the only reasoning they acknowledge. Lord Bacon has a remarkable passage on this in the 9th book *De Augmentis*. "Postquam articuli et principia religionis jam in sedibus suis fuerint locata, ita ut a rationis examine penitus eximantur, tum demum conceditur ab illis illusiones derivare ac deducere secundum analogiam ipsorum. In rebus quidem

naturalibus hoc non tenet. Nam et ipsa principia examini subducuntur; per inductionem, inquam, licet minime per syllogismum. Atque eadem illa nullam habent cum ratione repugnantiam, ut ab eodem fonte cum primis propositiones, tum medice, deducantur. Aliter fit in religione: ubi et primæ propositiones anthropostatæ sunt atque per se subsistentes; et rursum non reguntur ab illa ratione quas propositiones consequentes deducit. Neque tamen hoc fit in religione sola, sed etiam in aliis scientiis, tam gravioribus, quam levioribus, ubi scilicet propositiones humane placita sunt, non posita; siquidem et in illis rationis usus absolutus esse non potest. Videmus enim in ludis, puta schæcorum, aut similibus, priores ludi normas et leges merè positivas esse, et ad placitum; quas recipi, non in disputationem vocari, prorsus oportet; ut vero vincas, et perit lusum instituas, ad artificiosum est et rationale. Eodem modo fit et in legibus humanis; in quibus hæc panes sunt maxime, ut loquantur, hoc est, placita mera juris, quas auctoritate magis quam ratione nituntur, neque in disputationem veniunt. Quid vero sit iustissimum, non absolutè, sed relativè, hoc est ex analogiâ illarum maximarum, id demum rationale est, et lætum disputationi campum præbet." This passage, well weighed, may show us where, why, and by whom, the synthetic and syllogistic methods have been preferred to the inductive and analytical.

a kind of homage that only the greatest men receive. Yet still it was by natural philosophers alone that the writings of Bacon were much studied. The editions of his works, except the *Essays*, were few: the *Novum Organum* never came separately from the English press.¹ They were not even frequently quoted; for I believe it will be found that the fashion of referring to the brilliant passages of the *De Augmentis* and the *Novum Organum*, at least in books designed for the general reader, is not much older than the close of the last century. Scotland has the merit of having led the way: Reid, Stewart, Robison, and Playfair turned that which had been a blind veneration into a rational worship; and I should suspect that more have read Lord Bacon within these thirty years than in the two preceding centuries. It may be an usual consequence of the enthusiastic panegyrics lately poured upon his name, that a more positive efficacy has sometimes been attributed to his philosophical writings than they really possessed; and it might be asked whether Italy, where he was probably not much known, were not the true school of experimental philosophy in Europe, whether his methods of investigation were not chiefly such as men of sagacity and lovers of truth might simultaneously have devised. But, whatever may have been the case with respect to actual discoveries in science, we must give to written wisdom its proper meed: no books prior to those of Lord Bacon carried mankind so far on the road to truth; none have obtained so thorough a triumph over arrogant usurpation without seeking to substitute another; and he may be compared to those liberators of nations who have given them laws by which they might govern themselves, and retained no homage but their gratitude.²

¹ The *De Augmentis* was only once published after the first edition, in 1688. An indifferent translation, by Gilbert Watts, came out in 1640. No edition of Bacon's Works was published in England before 1730; another appeared in 1740, and there have been several since. But they had been printed at Frankfort in 1635. It is unnecessary to observe, that many copies of the foreign editions were brought to this country. This is mostly taken from Mr. Montagu's account.

² I have met, since this passage was written, with one in Stewart's *Life of Reid*, which seems to state the effects of Bacon's philosophy in a just and temperate spirit, and which I rather quote because this writer has, by his eulogies on that philo-

sophy, led some to an exaggerated notion. "The influence of Bacon's genius on the subsequent progress of physical discovery has been seldom duly appreciated; by some writers almost entirely overlooked, and by others considered as the sole cause of the reformation in science which has since taken place. Of these two extremes, the latter certainly is the least wide of the truth; for, in the whole history of letters, no other individual can be mentioned whose exertions have had so indisputable an effect in forwarding the intellectual progress of mankind. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged, that, before the era when Bacon appeared, various philosophers in different parts of Europe had struck into the right path; and it may

SECTION III.

On the Metaphysical Philosophy of Descartes.

81. RENÉ DESCARTES was born in 1596, of an ancient family in Touraine. An inquisitive curiosity into the nature and causes of all he saw is said to have distinguished his childhood, and this was certainly accompanied by an uncommon facility and clearness of apprehension. At a very early age, he entered the college of the Jesuits at La Flèche, and passed through their entire course of literature and philosophy. It was now, at the age of sixteen, as he tells us, that he began to reflect, with little satisfaction, on his studies; finding his mind beset with error, and obliged to confess that he had learned nothing but the conviction of his ignorance. Yet he knew that he had been educated in a famous school, and that he was not deemed behind his contemporaries. The ethics, the logic, even the geometry, of the ancients, did not fill his mind with that clear stream of truth for which he was ever thirsting. On leaving La Flèche, the young Descartes mingled for some years in the world, and served as a volunteer both under Prince Maurice, and in the Imperial Army. Yet during this period there were intervals when he withdrew himself wholly from society, and devoted his leisure to mathematical science. Some germs also of his peculiar philosophy were already ripening in his mind.

perhaps be doubted, whether any one important rule with respect to the true method of investigation be contained in his works, of which no hint can be traced in those of his predecessors. His great merit lay in concentrating their feeble and scattered lights; fixing the attention of philosophers on the distinguishing characteristics of true and of false science, by a felicity of illustration peculiar to himself, seconded by the commanding powers of a bold and figurative eloquence. The method of investigation which he recommended had been previously followed in every instance in which any solid discovery had been made with respect to the laws of nature: but it had been followed accidentally and without any regular pre-

conceived design; and it was reserved for him to reduce to rule and method what others had effected, either fortuitously, or from some momentary glimpse of the truth. These remarks are not intended to detract from the just glory of Bacon; for they apply to all those, without exception, who have systematized the principles of any of the arts. Indeed they apply less forcibly to him than to any other philosopher whose studies have been directed to objects analogous to his; inasmuch as we know of no art of which the rules have been reduced successfully into a didactic form, when the art itself was as much in infancy as experimental philosophy was when Bacon wrote."—*Account of Life and Writings of Reid*, sect. 2.

82. Descartes was twenty-three years old, when, passing a solitary winter in his quarters at Neuburg, on the Danube, he began to revolve in his mind the futility of all existing systems of philosophy, and the discrepancy of opinions among the generality of mankind, which rendered it probable that no one had yet found out the road to real science. He determined, therefore, to set about the investigation of truth for himself, erasing from his mind all preconceived judgments, as having been hastily and precariously taken up. He laid down for his guidance a few fundamental rules of logic, such as to admit nothing as true which he did not clearly perceive, and to proceed from the simpler notions to the more complex; taking the method of geometers, by which they had gone so much farther than others, for the true art of reasoning. Commencing, therefore, with the mathematical sciences, and observing, that, however different in their subjects, they treat properly of nothing but the relations of quantity, he fell, almost accidentally, as his words seem to import, on the great discovery that geometrical curves may be expressed algebraically.¹ This gave him more hope of success in applying his method to other parts of philosophy.

83. Nine years more elapsed, during which Descartes, though he quitted military service, continued to observe mankind in various parts of Europe, still keeping his heart fixed on the great aim he had proposed to himself, but, as he confesses, without having framed the scheme of any philosophy beyond those of his contemporaries. He deemed his time of life immature for so stupendous a task. But at the age of thirty-three, with little notice to his friends, he quitted Paris, convinced that absolute retirement was indispensable for that rigorous investigation of first principles which he now determined to institute, and retired into Holland. In this country he remained eight years so completely aloof from the distractions of the world, that he concealed his very place of residence, though preserving an intercourse of letters with many friends in France.

84. In 1637, he broke upon the world with a volume containing the Discourse upon Method, the Dioptrics, the Meteors, and the Geometry. It is only with the first that we are for

¹ Œuvres de Descartes, par Cousin, Paris, 1824, vol. i. p. 148.

the present concerned.¹ In this discourse, the most interesting, perhaps, of Descartes' writings, on account of the picture of his life and of the progress of his studies that it furnishes, we find the Cartesian metaphysics, which do not consist of many articles, almost as fully detailed as in any of his later works. In the *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, published in 1641, these fundamental principles are laid down again more at length. He invited the criticism of philosophers on these famous *Meditations*. They did not refuse the challenge; and seven sets of objections from as many different quarters, with seven replies from Descartes himself, are subjoined to the later editions of the *Meditations*. The *Principles of Philosophy*, published in Latin in 1644, contains what may be reckoned the final statement, which occupies most of the first book, written with uncommon conciseness and precision. The beauty of philosophical style which distinguishes Descartes is never more seen than in this first book of the *Principia*, the translation of which was revised by Clerselier, an eminent friend of the author. It is a contrast at once to the elliptical brevity of Aristotle, who hints, or has been supposed to hint, the most important positions in a short clause, and to the verbose, figurative declamation of many modern metaphysicians. In this admirable perspicuity, Descartes was imitated by his disciples Arnauld and Malebranche, especially the former. His unfinished posthumous treatise, the *Inquiry after Truth by Natural Reason*, is not carried farther than a partial development of the same leading principles of Cartesianism. There is, consequently, a great deal of apparent repetition in the works of Descartes, but such as on attentive consideration will show, not perhaps much real variance, but some new lights that had occurred to the author in the course of his reflections.²

85. In pursuing the examination of the first principles of knowledge, Descartes perceived not only that he had cause to doubt of the various opinions which he had found current among men, from that very circumstance of their variety, but

¹ *Œuvres de Descartes*, par Cousin, Paris, 1824, vol. i. pp. 121-212.

² A work has lately been published, *Essai Philosophique, suivis de la Métaphysique de Descartes, assemblée et mise en ordre par L. A. Gruyer*, 4 vols., Bruxelles, 1832. In the fourth volume, we find the metaphysical passages in the writ-

tings of Descartes, including his correspondence, arranged methodically in his own words, but with the omission of a large part of the objections to the *Meditations* and of his replies. I did not, however, see this work in time to make use of it.

that the sources of all which he had received for truth themselves, namely, the senses, had afforded him no indisputable certainty. He began to recollect how often ^{He begins by doubting all.} he had been misled by appearances, which had at first sight given no intimation of their fallacy, and asked himself in vain by what infallible test he could discern the reality of external objects, or at least their conformity to his idea of them. The strong impressions made in sleep led him to inquire whether all he saw and felt might not be in a dream. It was true that there seemed to be some notions more elementary than the rest, such as extension, figure, duration, which could not be reckoned fallacious; nor could he avoid owning, that, if there were not an existing triangle in the world, the angles of one conceived by the mind, though it were in sleep, must appear equal to two right angles. But, even in this certitude of demonstration, he soon found something deficient: to err in geometrical reasoning is not impossible; why might he not err in this? especially in a train of consequences, the particular terms of which are not at the same instant present to the mind. But, above all, there might be a superior being, powerful enough and willing to deceive him. It was no kind of answer to treat this as improbable, or as an arbitrary hypothesis. He had laid down as a maxim that nothing could be received as truth which was not demonstrable; and in one place, rather hyperbolically, and indeed extravagantly in appearance, says that he made little difference between merely probable and false suppositions; meaning this, however, as we may presume, in the sense of geometers, who would say the same thing.

86. But, divesting himself thus of all belief in what the world deemed most unquestionable, plunged in an ^{His first step in knowledge.} abyss, as it seemed for a time, he soon found his feet on a rock, from which he sprang upwards to an unclouded sun. Doubting all things, abandoning all things, he came to the question, What is it that doubts and denies? Something it must be: he might be deceived by a superior power; but it was he that was deceived. He felt his own existence: the proof of it was that he did feel it; that he had affirmed, that he now doubted, in a word, that he was a thinking substance. *Cogito; Ergo sum*—this famous enthymeme of the Cartesian philosophy veiled in rather formal language that which was to him, and must be to us all, the

eternal basis of conviction, which no argument can strengthen, which no sophistry can impair,—the consciousness of a self within, a percipient indivisible Ego.¹ The only proof of this is, that it admits of no proof, that no man can pretend to doubt of his own existence with sincerity, or to express a doubt without absurd and inconsistent language.

87. The scepticism of Descartes, it appears, which is merely provisional, is not at all similar to that of the Pyrrhonists, though some of his arguments may have been shafts from their quiver. Nor did he make use, which is somewhat remarkable, of the reasonings afterwards employed by Berkeley against the material world, though no one more frequently distinguished than Descartes between the objective reality, as it was then supposed to be, of ideas in the mind, and the external or sensible reality of things. Scepticism, in fact, was so far from being characteristic of his disposition, that his errors sprang chiefly from the opposite source, little as he was aware of it, from an undue positiveness in theories which he could not demonstrate, or even render highly probable.²

88. The certainty of an existing Ego easily led him to that of the operations of the mind, called afterwards by Locke ideas of reflection, the believing, doubting, willing, loving, fearing, which he knew by consciousness, and indeed by means

¹ This word, introduced by the Germans, or originally perhaps by the old Cartesians, is rather awkward, but far less so than the English pronoun *I*, which is also equivocal in sound. Stewart has adopted it as the lesser evil; and it seems reasonable not to scruple the use of a word so convenient, if not necessary, to express the unity of the conscious principle. If it had been employed earlier, I am apt to think that some great metaphysical extravagances would have been avoided, and some fundamental truths more clearly apprehended. Fichte is well known to have made the grand division of *Ich* and *Nicht Ich*, *Ego* and *Non Ego*, the basis of his philosophy; in other words, the difference of subjective and objective reality.

² One of the rules Descartes lays down in his posthumous art of logic, is that we ought never to busy ourselves except about objects concerning which our understanding appears capable of acquiring an unquestionable and certain knowledge, vol. xi. p. 204. This is at least too unlimited a proposition, and would exclude, not indeed all probability, but all in-

quiries which must by necessity end in nothing more than probability. Accordingly we find in the next pages, that he made little account of any sciences but arithmetic and geometry, or such others as equal them in certainty. "From all this," he concludes, "we may infer, not that arithmetic and geometry are the only sciences which we must learn, but that he who seeks the road to truth should not trouble himself with any object of which he cannot have as certain a knowledge as of arithmetical and geometrical demonstrations." It is unnecessary to observe what havoc this would make with investigations, even in physics, of the highest importance to mankind.

Beattie, in the *Essay on Truth*, part ii. chap. 2, has made some unfounded criticisms on the scepticism of Descartes, and endeavors to turn into ridicule his "*Cogito; Ergo sum.*" Yet if any one should deny his own, or our existence, I do not see how we could refute him, were he worthy of refutation, but by some such language; and, in fact, it is what Beattie himself says, more paraphrastically, in answering Hume.

of which alone he knew that the Ego existed. He now proceeded a step farther; and, reflecting on the simplest truths of arithmetic and geometry, saw that it was ^{He arrives at more certainty.} as impossible to doubt of them as of the acts of his mind. But as he had before tried to doubt even of these, on the hypothesis that he might be deceived by a superior intelligent power, he resolved to inquire whether such a power existed, and, if it did, whether it could be a deceiver. The affirmative of the former and the negative of the latter question Descartes established by that extremely subtle reasoning so much celebrated in the seventeenth century, but which has less frequently been deemed conclusive in later times. It is at least that which no man, not fitted by long practice for metaphysical researches, will pretend to embrace.

89. The substance of his argument was this. He found within himself the idea of a perfect Intelligence, ^{His proof of a Deity.} eternal, infinite, necessary. This could not come from himself, nor from external things, because both were imperfect, and there could be no more in the effect than there is in the cause. And, this idea requiring a cause, it could have none but an actual being, not a possible being, which is undistinguishable from mere nonentity. If, however, this should be denied, he inquires whether he, with this idea of God, could have existed by any other cause, if there were no God. Not, he argues, by himself; for, if he were the author of his own being, he would have given himself every perfection, in a word, would have been God. Not by his parents; for the same might be said of them, and so forth, if we remount to a series of productive beings. Besides this, as much power is required to preserve as to create; and the continuance of existence in the effect implies the continued operation of the cause.

90. With this argument, in itself sufficiently refined, Descartes blended another still more distant from common apprehension. Necessary existence is involved ^{Another proof of it.} in the idea of God. All other beings are conceivable in their essence, as things possible; in God alone, his essence and existence are inseparable. Existence is necessary to perfection; hence a perfect being, or God, cannot be conceived without necessary existence. Though I do not know that I have misrepresented Descartes in this result of his very subtle argument, it is difficult not to treat it as a sophism. And it

was always objected by his adversaries, that he inferred the necessity of the thing from the necessity of the idea, which was the very point in question. It seems impossible to vindicate many of his expressions, from which he never receded in the controversy to which his *Meditations* gave rise. But the long habit of repeating in his mind the same series of reasonings, gave Descartes, as it will always do, an inward assurance of their certainty, which could not be weakened by any objection. The former argument for the being of God, whether satisfactory or not, is to be distinguished from the present.¹

¹ "From what is said already of the ignorance we are in of the essence of mind, it is evident that we are not able to know whether any mind be necessarily existent by a necessity *d priori* founded in its essence, as we have showed time and space to be. Some philosophers think that such a necessity may be demonstrated of God from the nature of perfection. For God being infinitely, that is, absolutely perfect, they say he must needs be necessarily existent; because, say they, necessary existence is one of the greatest of perfections. But I take this to be one of those false and imaginary arguments that are founded in the abuse of certain terms; and, of all others, this word 'perfection' seems to have suffered most this way. I wish I could clearly understand what these philosophers mean by the word 'perfection,' when they thus say that necessity of existence is perfection. Does perfection here signify the same thing that it does when we say that God is infinitely good, omnipotent, omniscient? Surely perfections are properly asserted of the several powers that attend the essences of things and not of any thing else, but in a very unnatural and improper sense. Perfection is a term of relation; and its sense implies a fitness or agreement to some certain end, and most properly to some power in the thing that is denominated perfect. The term, as the etymology of it shows, is taken from the operation of artists. When an artist proposes to himself to make any thing that shall be serviceable to a certain effect, his work is called more or less perfect, according as it agrees more or less with the design of the artist. From arts, by a similitude of sense, this word has been introduced into morality, and signifies that quality of an agent by which it is able to act agreeable to the end its actions tend to. The metaphysicians who reduce every thing to transcendental considerations have also translated this term into their science, and use it to signify the

agreement that any thing has with that idea which it is required that thing should answer to. This perfection, therefore, belongs to those attributes that constitute the essence of a thing; and that being is properly called the most perfect which has all, the best, and each the completest in its kind, of those attributes which can be united in one essence. Perfection, therefore, belongs to the essence of things, and not properly to their existence; which is not a perfection of any thing, no attribute of it, but only the mere constitution of it in *rerum naturam*. Necessary existence, therefore, which is a mode of existence, is not a perfection; it being no attribute of the thing no more than existence is, which it is a mode of. But it may be said, that though necessary existence is not a perfection in itself, yet it is so in its cause, upon account of that attribute of the entity from whence it flows; that that attribute must of all others be the most perfect and most excellent, which necessary existence flows from, it being such as cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing. But what excellency, what perfection, is there in all this? Space is necessarily existent on account of extension, which cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing. But what perfection is there in space upon this account, which can in no manner act on any thing, which is entirely devoid of all power, wherein I have showed all perfections to consist? Therefore necessary existence, abstractedly considered, is no perfection; and therefore the idea of infinite perfection does not include, and consequently not prove, God to be necessarily existent. If he be so, it is on account of those attributes of his essence which we have no knowledge of."

I have made this extract from a very short tract, called *Contemplatio Philosophica*, by Brook Taylor, which I found in an unpublished memoir of his life printed by the late Sir William Young in 1798.

91. From the idea of a perfect being, Descartes immediately deduced the truth of his belief in an external world, and in the inferences of his reason. For to deceive his creatures would be an imperfection in God; but God is perfect. Whatever, therefore, is clearly and distinctly apprehended by our reason must be true. We have only to be on our guard against our own precipitancy and prejudice, or surrender of our reason to the authority of others. It is not by our understanding, such as God gave it to us, that we are deceived; but the exercise of our free-will, a high prerogative of our nature, is often so incautious as to make us not discern truth from falsehood, and affirm or deny, by a voluntary act, that which we do not distinctly apprehend. The properties of quantity, founded on our ideas of extension and number, are distinctly perceived by our minds; and hence the sciences of arithmetic and geometry are certainly true. But, when he turns his thoughts to the phenomena of external sensation, Descartes cannot wholly extricate himself from his original concession, the basis of his doubt, that the senses do sometimes deceive us. He endeavors to reconcile this with his own theory, which had built the certainty of all that we clearly hold certain on the perfect veracity of God.

92. It is in this inquiry that he reaches that important distinction between the primary and secondary properties of matter (the latter being modifications of the former, relative only to our apprehension, but not inherent in things), which, without being wholly new, contradicted the Aristotelian theories of the schools;¹ and he

His deductions from this.

Primary and secondary qualities.

It bespeaks the clear and acute understanding of this celebrated philosopher, and appears to me an entire refutation of the scholastic argument of Descartes; one more fit for the Anaximans and such dealers in words, from whom it came, than for himself.

¹ See Stewart's First Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy. This writer has justly observed, that many persons conceive *color* to be inherent in the object, so that the censure of Reid on Descartes and his followers, as having pretended to discover what no one doubted, is at least unreasonable in this respect. A late writer has gone so far as to say, "Nothing at first can seem a more rational, obvious, and incontrovertible conclusion, than that the color of a body is an inherent quality, like its weight, hardness, &c; and that to see the object, and to see it of its own

color, when nothing intervenes between our eyes and it, are one and the same thing. Yet this is only a prejudice," &c. — Herschel's Discourse on Nat. Philos., p. 82. I almost even suspect that the notion of sounds and smells, being secondary or merely sensible qualities, is not distinct in all men's minds. But, after we are become familiar with correct ideas, it is not easy to revive prejudices in our imagination. In the same page of Stewart's Dissertation, he has been led by dislike of the University of Oxford to misconceive, in an extraordinary manner, a passage of Addison in the Guardian, which is evidently a sportive ridicule of the Cartesian theory, and is absolutely inapplicable to the Aristotelian.

(The most remarkable circumstance in Reid's animadversion on Descartes, as having announced nothing but what was

remarked, that we are never, strictly speaking, deceived by our senses, but by the inferences which we draw from them.

93. Such is nearly the substance, exclusive of a great variety of more or less episodal theories, of the three metaphysical works of Descartes, the history of the soul's progress from opinion to doubt, and from doubt to certainty. Few would dispute, at the present day, that he has destroyed too much of his foundations to render his superstructure stable; and, to readers averse from metaphysical reflection, he must seem little else than an idle theorist, weaving cobwebs for pastime, which common sense sweeps away. It is fair, however, to observe that no one was more careful than Descartes to guard against any practical scepticism in the affairs of life. He even goes so far as to maintain, that a man, having adopted any practical opinion on such grounds as seem probable, should pursue it with as much steadiness as if it were founded on demonstration; observing, however, as a general rule, to choose the most moderate opinions among those which he should find current in his own country.¹

94. The objections adduced against the *Meditations* are in a series of seven. The first are by a theologian named Caterus, the second by Mersenne, the third by Hobbes, the fourth by Arnauld, the fifth by Gassendi, the sixth by some anonymous writers, the seventh by a Jesuit of the name of Bourdin. To all of these, Descartes replied with spirit and acuteness. By far the most important controversy was with Gassendi, whose objections were stated

Objections
made to his
Meditations.

generally known, is that he had himself, in his *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, contended very dogmatically in favor of the vulgar notion that secondary qualities exist in bodies, independently of sensation. "This scarlet rose, which is before me, is still a scarlet rose when I shut my eyes, and was so at midnight when no eye saw it. The color remains when the appearance ceases; it remains the same when the appearance changes."—Chap. vi. § 4. He even uses similar language as to perfumes, which, indeed, stand on the same ground, though we feel less of the prejudice in favor of their reality than of that of colors. Nothing can be more obvious than the reply: the color remains only on the tacit hypothesis that some one is looking at the object; at midnight we can hardly say that the rose is red, except by an additional hypothesis, that the day should break. "We never," he proceeds, "as far

as I can judge, give the name of color to the sensation, but to the quality only." How then do we talk of bright, dull, glaring, gay, dampling colors? Do not these words refer to a sensation, rather than to a configuration of parts in the colored body, by which it reflects or refracts light? But this first production of Reid, though abounding with acute and original remarks, is too much disfigured by a tendency to halloo on the multitude against speculative philosophy. The appeal to common sense, that is, the crude notions of men who had never reflected, even enough to use language with precision, would have been fatal to psychology. Reid afterwards laid aside the popular tone in writing on philosophy, though perhaps he was always too much inclined to cut knots when he could not untie them.—1847.]

¹ Vol. i. p. 147; vol. iii. p. 64.

more briefly, and, I think, with less skill, by Hobbes. It was the first trumpet in the new philosophy of an ancient war between the sensual and ideal schools of psychology. Descartes had revived, and placed in a clearer light, the doctrine of mind, as not absolutely dependent upon the senses, nor of the same nature as their objects. Stewart does not acknowledge him as the first teacher of the soul's immateriality. "That many of the schoolmen, and that the wisest of the ancient philosophers, when they described the mind as a spirit, or as a spark of celestial fire, employed these expressions, not with any intention to materialize its essence, but merely from want of more unexceptionable language, might be shown with demonstrative evidence, if this were the proper place for entering into the discussion."¹ But, though it cannot be said that Descartes was absolutely the first who maintained the strict immateriality of the soul, it is manifest to any one who has read his correspondence, that the tenet, instead of being general, as we are apt to presume, was by no means in accordance with the common opinion of his age. The fathers, with the exception, perhaps the single one, of Augustin, had taught the corporeity of the thinking substance. Arnauld seems to consider the doctrine of Descartes as almost a novelty in modern times. "What you have written concerning the distinction between the soul and body appears to me very clear, very evident, and quite divine; and, as nothing is older than truth, I have had singular pleasure to see that almost the same things have formerly been very perspicuously and agreeably handled by St. Augustin in all his tenth book on the Trinity, but chiefly in the tenth chapter."² But Arnauld himself, in his objections to the *Meditations*, had put it as at least questionable, whether that which thinks is not something extended, which, besides the usual properties of extended substances, such as mobility and figure, has also this particular virtue and power of thinking.³ The reply of Descartes removed the difficulties of the illustrious Jansenist, who became an ardent and almost complete disciple of the new philosophy. In a placard against the Cartesian philosophy, printed in 1647, which seems to have come from Revius, professor of theology at Leyden, it is said, "As far as regards the nature of things, nothing seems to hinder but that the soul may be either a substance,

¹ *Dissertation*, *ubi suprad.*² Descartes, II. 14.³ Descartes, x. 128.

or a mode of corporeal substance."¹ And More, who had carried on a metaphysical correspondence with Descartes, whom he professed to admire, at least at that time, above all philosophers that had ever existed, without exception of his favorite Plato, extols him after his death in a letter to Clerse-lier, as having best established the foundations of religion. "For the peripatetica," he says, "pretend that there are certain substantial forms emanating from matter, and so united to it that they cannot subsist without it, to which class these philosophers refer the souls of almost all living beings, even those to which they allow sensation and thought; while the Epicureans, on the other hand, who laugh at substantial forms, ascribe thought to matter itself, so that it is M. Descartes alone, of all philosophers, who has at once banished from philosophy all these substantial forms or souls derived from matter, and absolutely divested matter itself of the faculty of feeling and thinking."²

95. It must be owned, that the firm belief of Descartes in the immateriality of the Ego, or thinking principle, was accompanied with what in later times would have been deemed rather too great concessions to the materialists. He held the imagination and the memory to be portions of the brain, wherein the images of our sensations are bodily preserved; and even assigned such a motive force to the imagination, as to produce those involuntary actions which we often perform, and all the movements of brutes. "This explains how all the motions of all animals arise, though we grant them no knowledge of things, but only an imagination entirely corporeal, and how all those operations which do not require the concurrence of reason are produced in us." But the whole of his notions as to the con-

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only that the soul, when separated from the gross body, is invested with a substantial clothing, or that there is what we may call an interior body, a supposed monad, to which the thinking principle is indissolubly united. This is what all materialists mean, who have any clear notions whatever: it is a possible, perhaps a plausible, perhaps even a highly probable, hypothesis, but one which will not prove their theory. The former seems almost an indispensable supposition, if we admit sensibility to phenomena at all in the soul after death; but it is rather, perhaps, a theological than a metaphysical speculation.

nexion of the soul and body, and indeed all his physiological theories of which he was most enamoured, do little credit to the Cartesian philosophy. They are among those portions of his creed which have lain most open to ridicule, and which it would be useless for us to detail. He seems to have expected more advantage to psychology from anatomical researches than in that state of the science, or even probably in any future state of it, anatomy could afford. When asked once where was his library, he replied, showing a calf he was dissecting, "This is my library."¹ His treatise on the passions, a subject so important in the philosophy of the human mind, is made up of crude hypotheses, or, at best, irrelevant observations, on their physical causes and concomitants.

96. It may be considered as a part of this syncretism, as we may call it, of the material and immaterial hypotheses, that Descartes fixed the seat of the soul ^{Seat of soul in pineal gland.} in the conarion, or pineal gland, which he selected as the only part of the brain which is not double. By some means of communication which he did not profess to explain, though later metaphysicians have attempted to do so, the unextended intelligence, thus confined to a certain spot, receives the sensations which are immediately produced through impressions on the substance of the brain. If he did not solve the problem, be it remembered that the problem has never since been solved. It was objected by a nameless correspondent, who signs himself Hyperaspistes, that the soul, being incorporeal, could not leave by its operations a trace on the brain, which his theory seemed to imply. Descartes answered, in rather a remarkable passage, that, as to things purely intellectual, we do not, properly speaking, remember them at all, as they are equally original thoughts every time they present themselves to the mind, except that they are habitually joined as it were, and associated with certain names, which, being bodily, make us remember them.²

¹ Descartes was very fond of dissection: "C'est un exercice où je me suis souvent occupé depuis onze ans, et je crois qu'il n'y a guère de médecins qui y aient regardé de si près que moi." — Vol. viii. p. 100, also pp. 174 and 180.

² This passage I must give in French, finding it obscure, and having translated more according to what I guess than literally. "Mais pour ce qui est des choses

purement intellectuelles à proprement parler on n'en a aucun souvenir; et la première fois qu'elles se présentent à l'esprit, on les pense aussi-bien que la seconde, si ce n'est peut-être qu'elles ont coutume d'être jointes et comme attachées à certains noms qui, étant corporels, font que nous nous souvenons aussi d'elles." — Vol. viii. p. 271.

the present concerned.¹ In this discourse, the most interesting, perhaps, of Descartes' writings, on account of the picture of his life and of the progress of his studies that it furnishes, we find the Cartesian metaphysics, which do not consist of many articles, almost as fully detailed as in any of his later works. In the *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, published in 1641, these fundamental principles are laid down again more at length. He invited the criticism of philosophers on these famous *Meditations*. They did not refuse the challenge; and seven sets of objections from as many different quarters, with seven replies from Descartes himself, are subjoined to the later editions of the *Meditations*. The *Principles of Philosophy*, published in Latin in 1644, contains what may be reckoned the final statement, which occupies most of the first book, written with uncommon conciseness and precision. The beauty of philosophical style which distinguishes Descartes is never more seen than in this first book of the *Principia*, the translation of which was revised by Clerselier, an eminent friend of the author. It is a contrast at once to the elliptical brevity of Aristotle, who hints, or has been supposed to hint, the most important positions in a short clause, and to the verbose, figurative declamation of many modern metaphysicians. In this admirable perspicuity, Descartes was imitated by his disciples Arnauld and Malebranche, especially the former. His unfinished posthumous treatise, the *Inquiry after Truth by Natural Reason*, is not carried farther than a partial development of the same leading principles of Cartesianism. There is, consequently, a great deal of apparent repetition in the works of Descartes, but such as on attentive consideration will show, not perhaps much real variance, but some new lights that had occurred to the author in the course of his reflections.²

85. In pursuing the examination of the first principles of knowledge, Descartes perceived not only that he had cause to doubt of the various opinions which he had found current among men, from that very circumstance of their variety, but

¹ *Œuvres de Descartes*, par Cousin, Paris, 1824, vol. i. pp. 121-212.

² A work has lately been published, *Essai Philosophique, suivi de la Métaphysique de Descartes, assemblée et mise en ordre par L. A. Gruyer*, 4 vols., Bruxelles, 1832. In the fourth volume, we find the metaphysical passages in the writ-

tings of Descartes, including his correspondence, arranged methodically in his own words, but with the omission of a large part of the objections to the *Meditations* and of his replies. I did not, however, see this work in time to make use of it.

that the sources of all which he had received for truth themselves, namely, the senses, had afforded him no indisputable certainty. He began to recollect how often ^{He begins by doubting all.} he had been misled by appearances, which had at first sight given no intimation of their fallacy, and asked himself in vain by what infallible test he could discern the reality of external objects, or at least their conformity to his idea of them. The strong impressions made in sleep led him to inquire whether all he saw and felt might not be in a dream. It was true that there seemed to be some notions more elementary than the rest, such as extension, figure, duration, which could not be reckoned fallacious; nor could he avoid owning, that, if there were not an existing triangle in the world, the angles of one conceived by the mind, though it were in sleep, must appear equal to two right angles. But, even in this certitude of demonstration, he soon found something deficient: to err in geometrical reasoning is not impossible; why might he not err in this? especially in a train of consequences, the particular terms of which are not at the same instant present to the mind. But, above all, there might be a superior being, powerful enough and willing to deceive him. It was no kind of answer to treat this as improbable, or as an arbitrary hypothesis. He had laid down as a maxim that nothing could be received as truth which was not demonstrable; and in one place, rather hyperbolically, and indeed extravagantly in appearance, says that he made little difference between merely probable and false suppositions; meaning this, however, as we may presume, in the sense of geometers, who would say the same thing.

86. But, divesting himself thus of all belief in what the world deemed most unquestionable, plunged in an ^{His first step in knowledge.} abyss, as it seemed for a time, he soon found his feet on a rock, from which he sprang upwards to an unclouded sun. Doubting all things, abandoning all things, he came to the question, What is it that doubts and denies? Something it must be: he might be deceived by a superior power; but it was he that was deceived. He felt his own existence: the proof of it was that he did feel it; that he had affirmed, that he now doubted, in a word, that he was a thinking substance. *Cogito; Ergo sum*—this famous enthymeme of the Cartesian philosophy veiled in rather formal language that which was to him, and must be to us all, the

eternal basis of conviction, which no argument can strengthen, which no sophistry can impair, — the consciousness of a self within, a percipient indivisible Ego.¹ The only proof of this is, that it admits of no proof, that no man can pretend to doubt of his own existence with sincerity, or to express a doubt without absurd and inconsistent language.

87. The scepticism of Descartes, it appears, which is merely provisional, is not at all similar to that of the Pyrrhonists, though some of his arguments may have been shafts from their quiver. Nor did he make use, which is somewhat remarkable, of the reasonings afterwards employed by Berkeley against the material world, though no one more frequently distinguished than Descartes between the objective reality, as it was then supposed to be, of ideas in the mind, and the external or sensible reality of things. Scepticism, in fact, was so far from being characteristic of his disposition, that his errors sprang chiefly from the opposite source, little as he was aware of it, from an undue positiveness in theories which he could not demonstrate, or even render highly probable.²

88. The certainty of an existing Ego easily led him to that of the operations of the mind, called afterwards by Locke ideas of reflection, the believing, doubting, willing, loving, fearing, which he knew by consciousness, and indeed by means

¹ This word, introduced by the Germans, or originally perhaps by the old Cartesians, is rather awkward, but far less so than the English pronoun *I*, which is also equivocal in sound. Stewart has adopted it as the lesser evil; and it seems reasonable not to scruple the use of a word so convenient, if not necessary, to express the unity of the conscious principle. If it had been employed earlier, I am apt to think that some great metaphysical extravagances would have been avoided, and some fundamental truths more clearly apprehended. Fichte is well known to have made the grand division of *Ich* and *Nicht Ich*, *Ego* and *Non Ego*, the basis of his philosophy; in other words, the difference of subjective and objective reality.

² One of the rules Descartes lays down in his posthumous art of logic, is that we ought never to busy ourselves except about objects concerning which our understanding appears capable of acquiring an unquestionable and certain knowledge, vol. xi. p. 204. This is at least too unlimited a proposition, and would exclude, not indeed all probability, but all in-

quiries which must by necessity end in nothing more than probability. Accordingly we find in the next pages, that he made little account of any sciences but arithmetic and geometry, or such others as equal them in certainty. "From all this," he concludes, "we may infer, not that arithmetic and geometry are the only sciences which we must learn, but that he who seeks the road to truth should not trouble himself with any object of which he cannot have as certain a knowledge as of arithmetical and geometrical demonstrations." It is unnecessary to observe what havoc this would make with investigations, even in physics, of the highest importance to mankind.

Beattie, in the Essay on Truth, part II. chap. 2. has made some unfounded criticisms on the scepticism of Descartes, and endeavors to turn into ridicule his "*Cogito; Ergo sum.*" Yet if any one should deny his own, or our existence, I do not see how we could refute him, were he worthy of refutation, but by some such language; and, in fact, it is what Beattie himself says, more paraphrastically, in answering Hume.

of which alone he knew that the Ego existed. He now proceeded a step farther; and, reflecting on the simplest truths of arithmetic and geometry, saw that it was as impossible to doubt of them as of the acts of his mind. But as he had before tried to doubt even of these, on the hypothesis that he might be deceived by a superior intelligent power, he resolved to inquire whether such a power existed, and, if it did, whether it could be a deceiver. The affirmative of the former and the negative of the latter question Descartes established by that extremely subtle reasoning so much celebrated in the seventeenth century, but which has less frequently been deemed conclusive in later times. It is at least that which no man, not fitted by long practice for metaphysical researches, will pretend to embrace.

89. The substance of his argument was this. He found within himself the idea of a perfect Intelligence, eternal, infinite, necessary. This could not come from himself, nor from external things, because both were imperfect, and there could be no more in the effect than there is in the cause. And, this idea requiring a cause, it could have none but an actual being, not a possible being, which is undistinguishable from mere nonentity. If, however, this should be denied, he inquires whether he, with this idea of God, could have existed by any other cause, if there were no God. Not, he argues, by himself; for, if he were the author of his own being, he would have given himself every perfection, in a word, would have been God. Not by his parents; for the same might be said of them, and so forth, if we remount to a series of productive beings. Besides this, as much power is required to preserve as to create; and the continuance of existence in the effect implies the continued operation of the cause.

90. With this argument, in itself sufficiently refined, Descartes blended another still more distant from common apprehension. Necessary existence is involved in the idea of God. All other beings are conceivable in their essence, as things possible; in God alone, his essence and existence are inseparable. Existence is necessary to perfection; hence a perfect being, or God, cannot be conceived without necessary existence. Though I do not know that I have misrepresented Descartes in this result of his very subtle argument, it is difficult not to treat it as a sophism. And it

was always objected by his adversaries, that he inferred the necessity of the thing from the necessity of the idea, which was the very point in question. It seems impossible to vindicate many of his expressions, from which he never receded in the controversy to which his *Meditations* gave rise. But the long habit of repeating in his mind the same series of reasonings, gave Descartes, as it will always do, an inward assurance of their certainty, which could not be weakened by any objection. The former argument for the being of God, whether satisfactory or not, is to be distinguished from the present.¹

¹ "From what is said already of the ignorance we are in of the essence of mind, it is evident that we are not able to know whether any mind be necessarily existent by a necessity *d priori* founded in its essence, as we have showed time and space to be. Some philosophers think that such a necessity may be demonstrated of God from the nature of perfection. For God being infinitely, that is, absolutely perfect, they say he must needs be necessarily existent; because, say they, necessary existence is one of the greatest of perfections. But I take this to be one of those false and imaginary arguments that are founded in the abuse of certain terms; and, of all others, this word 'perfection' seems to have suffered most this way. I wish I could clearly understand what these philosophers mean by the word 'perfection,' when they thus say that necessity of existence is perfection. Does perfection here signify the same thing that it does when we say that God is infinitely good, omnipotent, omniscient? Surely perfections are properly asserted of the several powers that attend the essences of things and not of any thing else, but in a very unnatural and improper sense. Perfection is a term of relation; and its sense implies a fitness or agreement to some certain end, and most properly to some power in the thing that is denominated perfect. The term, as the etymology of it shows, is taken from the operation of artists. When an artist proposes to himself to make any thing that shall be serviceable to a certain effect, his work is called more or less perfect, according as it agrees more or less with the design of the artist. From arts, by a similitude of sense, this word has been introduced into morality, and signifies that quality of an agent by which it is able to act agreeable to the end its actions tend to. The metaphysicians who reduce every thing to transcendental considerations have also translated this term into their science, and use it to signify the

agreement that any thing has with that idea which it is required that thing should answer to. This perfection, therefore, belongs to those attributes that constitute the essence of a thing; and that being is properly called the most perfect which has all, the best, and each the completest in its kind, of those attributes which can be united in one essence. Perfection, therefore, belongs to the essence of things, and not properly to their existence; which is not a perfection of any thing, no attribute of it, but only the mere constitution of it in *rerum natura*. Necessary existence, therefore, which is a mode of existence, is not a perfection; it being no attribute of the thing no more than existence is, which it is a mode of. But it may be said, that though necessary existence is not a perfection in itself, yet it is so in its cause, upon account of that attribute of the entity from whence it flows; that that attribute must of all others be the most perfect and most excellent, which necessary existence flows from, it being such as cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing. But what excellency, what perfection, is there in all this? Space is necessarily existent on account of extension, which cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing. But what perfection is there in space upon this account, which can in no manner act on any thing, which is entirely devoid of all power, wherein I have showed all perfections to consist? Therefore necessary existence, abstractedly considered, is no perfection; and therefore the idea of infinite perfection does not include, and consequently not prove, God to be necessarily existent. If he be so, it is on account of those attributes of his essence which we have no knowledge of."

I have made this extract from a very short tract, called *Contemplatio Philosophica*, by Brook Taylor, which I found in an unpublished memoir of his life printed by the late Sir William Young in 1798.

91. From the idea of a perfect being, Descartes immediately deduced the truth of his belief in an external world, and in the inferences of his reason. For to deceive his creatures would be an imperfection in God; but God is perfect. Whatever, therefore, is clearly and distinctly apprehended by our reason must be true. We have only to be on our guard against our own precipitancy and prejudice, or surrender of our reason to the authority of others. It is not by our understanding, such as God gave it to us, that we are deceived; but the exercise of our free-will, a high prerogative of our nature, is often so incautious as to make us not discern truth from falsehood, and affirm or deny, by a voluntary act, that which we do not distinctly apprehend. The properties of quantity, founded on our ideas of extension and number, are distinctly perceived by our minds; and hence the sciences of arithmetic and geometry are certainly true. But, when he turns his thoughts to the phenomena of external sensation, Descartes cannot wholly extricate himself from his original concession, the basis of his doubt, that the senses do sometimes deceive us. He endeavors to reconcile this with his own theory, which had built the certainty of all that we clearly hold certain on the perfect veracity of God.

His deductions from this.

92. It is in this inquiry that he reaches that important distinction between the primary and secondary properties of matter (the latter being modifications of the former, relative only to our apprehension, but not inherent in things), which, without being wholly new, contradicted the Aristotelian theories of the schools;¹ and he

Primary and secondary qualities.

It bespeaks the clear and acute understanding of this celebrated philosopher, and appears to me an entire refutation of the scholastic argument of Descartes; one more fit for the Anselms and such dealers in words, from whom it came, than for himself.

¹ See Stewart's First Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy. This writer has justly observed, that many persons conceive *color* to be inherent in the object, so that the censure of Reid on Descartes and his followers, as having pretended to discover what no one doubted, is at least unreasonable in this respect. A late writer has gone so far as to say, "Nothing at first can seem a more rational, obvious, and incontrovertible conclusion, than that the color of a body is an inherent quality, like its weight, hardness, &c.; and that to see the object, and to see it of its own

color, when nothing intervenes between our eyes and it, are one and the same thing. Yet this is only a prejudice," &c. — Herschel's Discourse on Nat. Philos., p. 82. I almost even suspect that the notion of sounds and smells, being secondary or merely sensible qualities, is not distinct in all men's minds. But, after we are become familiar with correct ideas, it is not easy to revive prejudices in our imagination. In the same page of Stewart's Dissertation, he has been led by dislike of the University of Oxford to misconceive, in an extraordinary manner, a passage of Addison in the Guardian, which is evidently a sportive ridicule of the Cartesian theory, and is absolutely inapplicable to the Aristotelian.

[The most remarkable circumstance in Reid's animadversion on Descartes, as having announced nothing but what was

remarked, that we are never, strictly speaking, deceived by our senses, but by the inferences which we draw from them.

93. Such is nearly the substance, exclusive of a great variety of more or less episodic theories, of the three metaphysical works of Descartes, the history of the soul's progress from opinion to doubt, and from doubt to certainty. Few would dispute, at the present day, that he has destroyed too much of his foundations to render his superstructure stable; and, to readers averse from metaphysical reflection, he must seem little else than an idle theorist, weaving cobwebs for pastime, which common sense sweeps away. It is fair, however, to observe that no one was more careful than Descartes to guard against any practical scepticism in the affairs of life. He even goes so far as to maintain, that a man, having adopted any practical opinion on such grounds as seem probable, should pursue it with as much steadiness as if it were founded on demonstration; observing, however, as a general rule, to choose the most moderate opinions among those which he should find current in his own country.¹

94. The objections adduced against the *Meditations* are in a series of seven. The first are by a theologian named Caterus, the second by Mersenne, the third by Hobbes, the fourth by Arnauld, the fifth by Gassendi, the sixth by some anonymous writers, the seventh by a Jesuit of the name of Bourdin. To all of these, Descartes replied with spirit and acuteness. By far the most important controversy was with Gassendi, whose objections were stated

generally known, is that he had himself, in his *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, contended very dogmatically in favor of the vulgar notion that secondary qualities exist in bodies, independently of sensation. "This scarlet rose, which is before me, is still a scarlet rose when I shut my eyes, and was so at midnight when no eye saw it. The color remains when the appearance ceases; it remains the same when the appearance changes."—Chap. vi. § 4. He even uses similar language as to perfumes, which, indeed, stand on the same ground, though we feel less of the prejudice in favor of their reality than of that of colors. Nothing can be more obvious than the reply: the color remains only on the tacit hypothesis that some one is looking at the object; at midnight we can hardly say that the rose is red, except by an additional hypothesis, that the day should break. "We never," he proceeds, "as far

as I can judge, give the name of color to the sensation, but to the quality only." How then do we talk of bright, dull, glaring, gay, dampling colors? Do not these words refer to a sensation, rather than to a configuration of parts in the colored body, by which it reflects or refracts light? But this first production of Reid, though abounding with acute and original remarks, is too much disfigured by a tendency to halloo on the multitude against speculative philosophy. The appeal to common sense, that is, the crude notions of men who had never reflected, even enough to use language with precision, would have been fatal to psychology. Reid afterwards laid aside the popular tone in writing on philosophy, though perhaps he was always too much inclined to cut knots when he could not untie them.—1847.]

¹ Vol. I. p. 147; vol. III. p. 64.

more briefly, and, I think, with less skill, by Hobbes. It was the first trumpet in the new philosophy of an ancient war between the sensual and ideal schools of psychology. Descartes had revived, and placed in a clearer light, the doctrine of mind, as not absolutely dependent upon the senses, nor of the same nature as their objects. Stewart does not acknowledge him as the first teacher of the soul's immateriality. "That many of the schoolmen, and that the wisest of the ancient philosophers, when they described the mind as a spirit, or as a spark of celestial fire, employed these expressions, not with any intention to materialize its essence, but merely from want of more unexceptionable language, might be shown with demonstrative evidence, if this were the proper place for entering into the discussion."¹ But, though it cannot be said that Descartes was absolutely the first who maintained the strict immateriality of the soul, it is manifest to any one who has read his correspondence, that the *tenet*, instead of being general, as we are apt to presume, was by no means in accordance with the common opinion of his age. The fathers, with the exception, perhaps the single one, of Augustin, had taught the corporeity of the thinking substance. Arnauld seems to consider the doctrine of Descartes as almost a novelty in modern times. "What you have written concerning the distinction between the soul and body appears to me very clear, very evident, and quite divine; and, as nothing is older than truth, I have had singular pleasure to see that almost the same things have formerly been very perspicuously and agreeably handled by St. Augustin in all his tenth book on the Trinity, but chiefly in the tenth chapter."² But Arnauld himself, in his objections to the *Meditations*, had put it as at least questionable, whether that which thinks is not something extended, which, besides the usual properties of extended substances, such as mobility and figure, has also this particular virtue and power of thinking.³ The reply of Descartes removed the difficulties of the illustrious Jansenist, who became an ardent and almost complete disciple of the new philosophy. In a placard against the Cartesian philosophy, printed in 1647, which seems to have come from Revius, professor of theology at Leyden, it is said, "As far as regards the nature of things, nothing seems to hinder but that the soul may be either a substance,

¹ *Dissertation*, *ubi* *supra*.² Descartes, x. 128.³ Descartes, ii. 14.

or a mode of corporeal substance."¹ And More, who had carried on a metaphysical correspondence with Descartes, whom he professed to admire, at least at that time, above all philosophers that had ever existed, without exception of his favorite Plato, extols him after his death in a letter to Clerse-lier, as having best established the foundations of religion. "For the peripatetics," he says, "pretend that there are certain substantial forms emanating from matter, and so united to it that they cannot subsist without it, to which class these philosophers refer the souls of almost all living beings, even those to which they allow sensation and thought; while the Epicureans, on the other hand, who laugh at substantial forms, ascribe thought to matter itself, so that it is M. Descartes alone, of all philosophers, who has at once banished from philosophy all these substantial forms or souls derived from matter, and absolutely divested matter itself of the faculty of feeling and thinking."²

95. It must be owned, that the firm belief of Descartes in the immateriality of the Ego, or thinking principle, was accompanied with what in later times would have been deemed rather too great concessions to the materialists. He held the imagination and the memory to be portions of the brain, wherein the images of our sensations are bodily preserved; and even assigned such a motive force to the imagination, as to produce those involuntary actions which we often perform, and all the movements of brutes. "This explains how all the motions of all animals arise, though we grant them no knowledge of things, but only an imagination entirely corporeal, and how all those operations which do not require the concurrence of reason are produced in us." But the whole of his notions as to the con-

¹ Descartes, x. 73.

² Descartes, x. 336. Even More seems to have been perplexed at one time by the difficulty of accounting for the knowledge and sentiment of disembodied souls, and almost inclined to admit their corporeity. "J'aimerois mieux dire avec les Platoniciens, les anciens péres, et presque tous les philosophes, que les âmes humaines, tous les génies tant bons que mauvais, sont corporels, et que par conséquent ils ont un sentiment réel, c'est à dire, qui leur vient du corps dont ils sont revêtus." This is in a letter to Descartes in 1649, which I have not read in Latin (vol. x. p. 249). I do not quite understand whether he meant

only that the soul, when separated from the gross body, is invested with a substantial clothing, or that there is what we may call an interior body, a supposed monad, to which the thinking principle is indissolubly united. This is what all materialists mean, who have any clear notions whatever: it is a possible, perhaps a plausible, perhaps even a highly probable, hypothesis, but one which will not prove their theory. The former seems almost an indispensable supposition, if we admit sensibility to phenomena at all in the soul after death; but it is rather, perhaps, a theological than a metaphysical speculation.

nection of the soul and body, and indeed all his physiological theories of which he was most enamoured, do little credit to the Cartesian philosophy. They are among those portions of his creed which have lain most open to ridicule, and which it would be useless for us to detail. He seems to have expected more advantage to psychology from anatomical researches than in that state of the science, or even probably in any future state of it, anatomy could afford. When asked once where was his library, he replied, showing a calf he was dissecting, "This is my library."¹ His treatise on the passions, a subject so important in the philosophy of the human mind, is made up of crude hypotheses, or, at best, irrelevant observations, on their physical causes and concomitants.

96. It may be considered as a part of this syncretism, as we may call it, of the material and immaterial hypotheses, that Descartes fixed the seat of the soul ^{Seat of soul in pineal gland.} in the conarion, or pineal gland, which he selected as the only part of the brain which is not double. By some means of communication which he did not profess to explain, though later metaphysicians have attempted to do so, the unextended intelligence, thus confined to a certain spot, receives the sensations which are immediately produced through impressions on the substance of the brain. If he did not solve the problem, be it remembered that the problem has never since been solved. It was objected by a nameless correspondent, who signs himself Hyperaspistes, that the soul, being incorporeal, could not leave by its operations a trace on the brain, which his theory seemed to imply. Descartes answered, in rather a remarkable passage, that, as to things purely intellectual, we do not, properly speaking, remember them at all, as they are equally original thoughts every time they present themselves to the mind, except that they are habitually joined as it were, and associated with certain names, which, being bodily, make us remember them.²

¹ Descartes was very fond of dissection: "C'est un exercice où je me suis souvent occupé depuis onze ans, et je crois qu'il n'y a guère de médecin qui y ait regardé de si près que moi." — Vol. viii. p. 100, also pp. 174 and 180.

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or a mode of corporeal substance."¹ And More, who had carried on a metaphysical correspondence with Descartes, whom he professed to admire, at least at that time, above all philosophers that had ever existed, without exception of his favorite Plato, extols him after his death in a letter to Clerse-lier, as having best established the foundations of religion. "For the peripatetics," he says, "pretend that there are certain substantial forms emanating from matter, and so united to it that they cannot subsist without it, to which class these philosophers refer the souls of almost all living beings, even those to which they allow sensation and thought; while the Epicureans, on the other hand, who laugh at substantial forms, ascribe thought to matter itself, so that it is M. Descartes alone, of all philosophers, who has at once banished from philosophy all these substantial forms or souls derived from matter, and absolutely divested matter itself of the faculty of feeling and thinking."²

95. It must be owned, that the firm belief of Descartes in the immateriality of the Ego, or thinking principle, was accompanied with what in later times would have been deemed rather too great concessions to the materialists. He held the imagination and the memory to be portions of the brain, wherein the images of our sensations are bodily preserved; and even assigned such a motive force to the imagination, as to produce those involuntary actions which we often perform, and all the movements of brutes. "This explains how all the motions of all animals arise, though we grant them no knowledge of things, but only an imagination entirely corporeal, and how all those operations which do not require the concurrence of reason are produced in us." But the whole of his notions as to the con-

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97. If the orthodox of the age were not yet prepared for a doctrine which seemed so favorable at least to natural religion as the immateriality of the soul, it may be readily supposed, that Gassendi, like Hobbes, had imbibed too much of the Epicurean theory to acquiesce in the spiritualizing principles of his adversary. In a sportive style he addresses him, *O anima!* and Descartes, replying more angrily, retorts upon him the name *O caro!* which he frequently repeats. Though we may lament such unhappy efforts at wit in these great men, the names do not ill represent the spiritual and carnal philosophies; the school that produced Leibnitz, Kant, and Stewart, contrasted with that of Hobbes, Condillac, and Cabanis.

98. It was a matter of course that the vulnerable passages of the six Meditations would not escape the spear of so skilful an antagonist as Gassendi. But many of his objections appear to be little more than cavils; and, upon the whole, Descartes leaves me with the impression of his great superiority in metaphysical acuteness. It was indeed impossible that men should agree who persisted in using a different definition of the important word *idea*; and the same source of interminable controversy has flowed ever since for their disciples. Gassendi, adopting the scholastic maxim, "Nothing is in the understanding, which has not been in the sense," carried it so much farther than those from whom it came, that he denied any thing to be an idea but what was imagined by the mind. Descartes repeatedly desired both him and Hobbes, whose philosophy was built on the same notion, to remark that he meant by "*idea*" whatever can be conceived by the understanding, though not capable of being represented by the imagination.¹ Thus we imagine

¹ "Par le nom d'idée, il veut seulement qu'on entende ici les images des choses matérielles dépeintes en la fantaisie corporelle; et cela étant supposé, il lui est aisé de montrer qu'on ne peut avoir propre et véritable idée de Dieu ni d'un ange; mais j'ai souvent averti, et principalement en celui là même, que je prenda le nom d'idée pour tout ce qui est conçu immédiatement par l'esprit; en sorte que, lorsque je veux et que je crains, parceque je conçois en même temps, que je veux et que je crains, ce vouloir et cette crainte sont mis par moi en nombre des idées; et je me suis servi de ce mot, parcequ'il étoit déjà communé-

ment reçu par les philosophes pour signifier les formes des conceptions de l'entendement divin, encore que nous ne reconnoissons en Dieu aucune fantaisie ou imagination corporelle, et je n'en savois point de plus propre. Et je pense avoir assez expliqué l'idée de Dieu pour ceux qui veulent concevoir les sens que je donne à mes paroles; mais pour ceux qui s'attachent à les entendre autrement que je ne fais, je ne le pourrais jamais assez." — Vol. I. p. 404. This is in answer to Hobbes: the objections of Hobbes, and Descartes' replies, turn very much on this primary difference between ideas as images, which alone our

a triangle, but we can only conceive a figure of a thousand sides: we know its existence, and can reason about its properties; but we have no image whatever in the mind, by which we can distinguish such a polygon from one of a smaller or greater number of sides. Hobbes, in answer to this, threw out a paradox which he has not, perhaps at least in so unlimited a manner, repeated, — that by reason, that is, by the process of reasoning, we can infer nothing as to the nature of things, but only as to their names.¹ It is singular that a man, conversant at least with the elements of geometry, should have fallen into this error. For it does not appear that he meant to speak only of natural substances, as to which his language might seem to be a bad expression of what was afterwards clearly shown by Locke. That the understanding can conceive and reason upon that which the imagination cannot delineate, is evident, not only from Descartes' instance of a polygon, but more strikingly by the whole theory of infinities, which are certainly somewhat more than bare words, whatever assistance words may give us in explaining them to others or to ourselves.²

99. Dugald Stewart has justly dwelt on the signal service rendered by Descartes to psychological philosophy, by turning the mental vision inward upon itself, and accustoming us to watch the operations of our intellect, which, though employed upon ideas obtained through the

Stewart's
remarks on
Descartes.

countryman could understand, and ideas as intellections, conceptions, *νοήματα*, incapable of being imagined, but not less certainly known and reasoned upon. The French is a translation, but made by Clerelier under the eye of Descartes, so that it may be quoted as an original.

¹ "Que dirons-nous maintenant si peut-être le raisonnement n'est rien autre chose qu'un assemblage et un enchaînement de noms par ce mot *est*? D'où il s'ensuivroit que par la raison nous ne concluons rien de tout touchant la nature des choses, mais seulement touchant leurs appellations, c'est à dire que par elle nous voyons simplement si nous assemblons bien ou mal les noms des choses, selon les conventions que nous avons faites à notre fantaisie touchant leurs significations." — p. 476. Descartes merely answered: "L'assemblage qui se fait dans le raisonnement n'est pas celui des noms, mais bien celui des choses, signifiées par les noms; et je m'étonne que le contraire puisse venir en l'esprit de personne." Descartes treated Hobbes, whom he did not esteem, with less attention than

his other correspondents. Hobbes could not understand what have been called ideas of reflection, such as fear; and thought it was nothing more than the idea of the object feared. "For what else is the fear of a lion," he says, "than the idea of this lion, and the effect which it produces in the heart, which leads us to run away? But this running is not a thought; so that nothing of thought exists in fear but the idea of the object." Descartes only replied, "It is self-evident that it is not the same thing to see a lion and fear him, that it is to see him only." — p. 488.

² I suspect, from what I have since read, that Hobbes had a different, and what seems to me a very erroneous, view of infinite or infinitesimal quantities in geometry. For he answers the old sophism of Zeno, "Quicquid dividi potest in partes infinitas est infinitum," in a manner which does not meet the real truth of the case: "Dividi potest in partes infinitas nihil aliud est quam dividi potest in partes quocunque quis velit." — *Logica sive Computatio*, c. 5, p. 38 (edit. 1657).

senses, are, as distinguishable from them as the workman from his work. He has given, indeed, to Descartes a very proud title, Father of the experimental philosophy of the human mind, as if he were to man what Bacon was to nature.¹ By patient observation of what passed within him, by holding his soul, as it were, like an object in a microscope, which is the only process of a good metaphysician, he became habituated to throw away those integuments of sense which hide us from ourselves. Stewart has censured him for the paradox, as he calls it, that the *essence* of mind consists in thinking, and that of matter in extension. That the act of thinking is as inseparable from the mind as extension is from matter, cannot indeed, be proved; since, as our thoughts are successive, it is not inconceivable that there may be intervals of duration between them; but it can hardly be reckoned a paradox. But whoever should be led by the word "essence" to suppose that Descartes confounded the percipient thinking substance, the Ego, upon whose bosom, like that of the ocean, the waves of perception are raised by every breeze of sense, with the perception itself, or even, what is scarcely more tenable, with the reflective action, or thought; that he anticipated this strange paradox of Hume in his earliest work, from which he silently withdrew in his Essays, — would not only do great injustice to one of the acutest understandings that ever came to the subject, but overlook several clear assertions of the distinction, especially in his answer to Hobbes. "The thought,"

¹ Dissertation on Progress of Philosophy. The word "experiment" must be taken in the sense of observation. Stewart very early took up his admiration for Descartes. "He was the first philosopher who stated in a clear and satisfactory manner the distinction between mind and matter, and who pointed out the proper plan for studying the intellectual philosophy. It is chiefly in consequence of his precise ideas with respect to this distinction, that we may remark in all his metaphysical writings a perspicuity which is not observable in those of any of his predecessors." — *Elem. of Philos. of Human Mind*, vol. i. (published in 1792), note A. "When Descartes," he says in the dissertation before quoted, "established it as a general principle that *nothing conceivable by the power of imagination could throw any light on the operations of thought*, a principle which I consider as exclusively his own, he laid the foundations of the experimental philosophy of the human mind. That the same

truth had been previously perceived more or less distinctly by Bacon and others, appears probable from the general complexion of their speculations; but which of them has expressed it with equal precision, or laid it down as a fundamental maxim in their logic?" The words which I have put in Italics seem too vaguely and not very clearly expressed, nor am I aware that they are borne out in their literal sense by any position of Descartes; nor do I apprehend the allusion to Bacon. But it is certain that Descartes, and still more his disciples Arnauld and Malebranche, take better care to distinguish what can be imagined from what can be conceived or understood, than any of the school of Gassendi in this or other countries. One of the great merits of Descartes as a metaphysical writer, not unconnected with this, is that he is generally careful to avoid figurative language in speaking of mental operations; wherein he has much the advantage over Locke.

he says, "differs from that which thinks, as the mode from the substance."¹ And Stewart has in his earliest work justly corrected Reid in this point as to the Cartesian doctrine.²

100. Several singular positions, which have led to an undue depreciation of Descartes in general as a philosopher, occur in his metaphysical writings. Such was his denial of thought, and, as is commonly said, sensation, to brutes, which he seems to have founded on the mechanism of the bodily organs,—a cause sufficient, in his opinion, to explain all the phenomena of the motions of animals, and to obviate the difficulty of assigning to them immaterial souls;³ his rejection of final causes in the explanation

Paradoxes
of Des-
cartes.

¹ Vol. i. p. 470. Arnauld objected, in a letter to Descartes, "Comment se peut-il faire que la pensée constitue l'essence de l'esprit, puisque l'esprit est une substance, et que la pensée semble n'être qu'un mode?" Descartes replied that thought in general, *la pensée, ou la nature qui pense*, in which he placed the essence of the soul, was very different from such or such particular acts of thinking. Vol. vi. pp. 153, 150.

² Philosophy of Human Mind, vol. i. note A. See the Principles, § 63.

³ It is a common opinion that Descartes denied all life and sensibility to brutes; but this seems not so clear. "Il faut remarquer," he says in a letter to More, where he has been arguing against the existence in brutes of any thinking principle, "que je parle de la pensée, non de la vie ou du sentiment; car je n'ôte la vie à aucun animal, ne la faisant consister que dans la seule chaleur du cœur. Je ne leur refuse pas même le sentiment autant qu'il dépend des organes du corps."—Vol. x. p. 206. In a longer passage, if he does not express himself very clearly, he admits passions in brutes; and it seems impossible that he could have ascribed passions to what has no sensation. Much of what he here says is very good. "Bien que Montaigne et Charron aient dit, qu'il y a plus de différence d'homme à homme que d'homme à bête, il n'est toutefois jamais trouvé aucune bête si parfaite, qu'elle ait usé de quelque signe pour faire entendre à d'autres animaux quelque chose qui n'eût point de rapport à ses passions; et il n'y a point d'homme si imparfait qu'il n'en use; en sorte que ceux qui sont sourds et muets inventent des signes particuliers par lesquels ils expriment leurs pensées; ce qui me semble un très-fort argument pour prouver que ce qui fait que les bêtes ne parlent point comme nous, est qu'elles n'ont aucune pensée, et non point que les

organes leur manquent. Et on ne peut dire qu'elles parlent entre elles, mais que nous ne les entendons pas; car comme les chiens et quelques autres animaux nous expriment leurs passions, ils nous exprimeroient aussi-bien leurs pensées s'ils en avoient. Je sais bien que les bêtes font beaucoup de choses mieux que nous, mais je ne m'en étonne pas; car cela même sert à prouver qu'elles agissent naturellement, et par ressorts, ainsi qu'un horloge; laquelle montre bien mieux l'heure qu'il est, que notre jugement nous l'enseigne. . . . On peut seulement dire que, bien que les bêtes ne fassent aucune action qui nous assure qu'elles pensent, toutefois, à cause que les organes de leurs corps ne sont pas si différents des nôtres, on peut conjecturer qu'il y a quelque pensée jointe à ces organes, ainsi que nous expérimentons en nous, bien que la leur soit beaucoup moins parfaite; à quoi je n'ai rien à répondre, si non que si elles pensoient aussi que nous, elles auroient une âme immortelle aussi bien que nous; ce qui n'est pas vraisemblable, à cause qu'il n'y a point de raison pour le croire de quelques animaux, sans le croire de tous, et qu'il y en a plusieurs trop imparfaits pour pouvoir croire cela d'eux, comme sont les huîtres, les éponges," &c.—Vol. ix. p. 426. I do not see the meaning of *une âme immortelle* in the last sentence: if the words had been *une âme immatérielle*, it would be to the purpose. More, in a letter to which this is a reply, had argued as if Descartes took brutes for insensible machines, and combats the paradox with the arguments which common sense furnishes. He would even have preferred ascribing immortality to them, as many ancient philosophers did. But surely Descartes, who did not acknowledge any proofs of the immortality of the human soul to be valid, except those founded on revelation, needed not to trouble himself much about this difficulty.

of nature as far above our comprehension, and unnecessary to those who had the internal proof of God's existence; his still more paradoxical tenet, that the truth of geometrical theorems, and every other axiom of intuitive certainty, depended upon the will of God; a notion that seems to be a relic of his original scepticism, but which he pertinaciously defends throughout his letters.¹ From remarkable errors, men of original and independent genius are rarely exempt: Descartes had pulled down an edifice constructed by the labors of near two thousand years, with great reason in many respects, yet perhaps with too unlimited a disregard of his predecessors; it was his destiny, as it had been theirs, to be sometimes refuted and depreciated in his turn. But the single fact of his having first established, both in philosophical and popular belief, the proper immateriality of the soul, were we even to forget the other great accessions which he made to psychology, would declare the influence he has had on human opinion. From this immateriality, however, he did not derive the tenet of its immortality. He was justly contented to say, that, from the intrinsic difference between mind and body, the dissolution of the one could not necessarily take away the existence of the other, but that it was for God to determine whether it should continue to exist; and this determination, as he thought, could only be learned from his revealed will. The more powerful arguments, according to general apprehension, which reason affords for the sentient being of the soul after death, did not belong to the metaphysical philosophy of Descartes, and would never have been very satisfactory to his mind. He says, in one of his letters, that, "laying aside what faith assures us of, he owns that it is more easy to make conjectures for our own advantage, and entertain promising hopes, than to feel any confidence in their accomplishment."²

101. Descartes was perhaps the first who saw that definitions of words, already as clear as they can be made, are nugatory or impracticable. This alone would distinguish his philosophy from that of the Aristotelians, who had wearied and confused themselves for twenty

¹ His just notion of definitions.
 "C'est en effet parler de Dieu comme d'un Jupiter ou d'un Saturne, et l'assujettir au Sêux et aux destinées, que de dire que ces vérités sont indépendantes de lui. Ne craignez point, je vous prie, d'assurer et de publier partout que c'est Dieu qui a

établi ces lois en la nature; ainsi qu'un roi établit les lois en son royaume." — Vol. vi. p. 169. He argues as strenuously the same point in p. 182 and p. 307.

² Vol. ix. p. 368.

centuries with unintelligible endeavors to grasp by definition what refuses to be defined. "Mr. Locke," says Stewart, "claims this improvement as entirely his own; but the merit of it unquestionably belongs to Descartes, although it must be owned that he has not always sufficiently attended to it in his researches."¹ A still more decisive passage to this effect than that referred to by Stewart in the *Principia* will be found in the posthumous dialogue on the Search after Truth. It is objected by one of the interlocutors, as it had actually been by Gassendi, that, to prove his existence by the act of thinking, he should first know what existence and what thought is. "I agree with you," the representative of Descartes replies, "that it is necessary to know what doubt is, and what thought is, before we can be fully persuaded of this reasoning — I doubt, therefore I am — or, what is the same — I think, therefore I am. But do not imagine that for this purpose you must torture your mind to find out the next genus, or the essential differences, as the logicians talk, and so compose a regular definition. Leave this to such as teach or dispute in the schools. But whoever will examine things by himself, and judge of them according to his understanding, cannot be so senseless as not to see clearly, when he pays attention, what doubting, thinking, being, are, or to have any need to learn their distinctions. Besides, there are things which we render more obscure in attempting to define them, because, as they are very simple and very clear, we cannot know and comprehend them better than by themselves. And it should be reckoned among the chief errors that can be committed in science for men to fancy that they can define that

¹ Dissertation, *ubi supra*. Stewart, in his Philosophical Essays, note A, had censured Reid for assigning this remark to Descartes and Locke, but without giving any better reason than that it is found in a work written by Lord Stair; earlier, certainly, than Locke, but not before Descartes. It may be doubtful, as we shall see hereafter, whether Locke has not gone beyond Descartes, or at least distinguished undefinable words more strictly.

[Mr William Hamilton remarks on this passage, where Reid assigns the observation to Descartes and Locke: "This is incorrect. Descartes has little, and Locke no praise for this observation. It had been made by Aristotle, and after him by many others; while, subsequently to Des-

cartes, and previous to Locke, Pascal and the Port-Royal logicians, to say nothing of a paper of Leibnitz in 1684, had reduced it to a matter of commonplace. In this instance, Locke can indeed be proved a borrower." — Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 220. But this very learned writer quotes no passage from Aristotle to this effect; and certainly the practice of that philosopher and his followers was to attempt definitions of every thing. Nor could Aristotle, or even Descartes, have distinguished undefinable words by their expressing simple ideas of sense or reflection, as Locke has done, when they have not made that classification of ideas into simple and complex, which forms so remarkable a part of his philosophy — 1847.]

more briefly, and, I think, with less skill, by Hobbes. It was the first trumpet in the new philosophy of an ancient war between the sensual and ideal schools of psychology. Descartes had revived, and placed in a clearer light, the doctrine of mind, as not absolutely dependent upon the senses, nor of the same nature as their objects. Stewart does not acknowledge him as the first teacher of the soul's immateriality. "That many of the schoolmen, and that the wisest of the ancient philosophers, when they described the mind as a spirit, or as a spark of celestial fire, employed these expressions, not with any intention to materialize its essence, but merely from want of more unexceptionable language, might be shown with demonstrative evidence, if this were the proper place for entering into the discussion."¹ But, though it cannot be said that Descartes was absolutely the first who maintained the strict immateriality of the soul, it is manifest to any one who has read his correspondence, that the tenet, instead of being general, as we are apt to presume, was by no means in accordance with the common opinion of his age. The fathers, with the exception, perhaps the single one, of Augustin, had taught the corporeity of the thinking substance. Arnauld seems to consider the doctrine of Descartes as almost a novelty in modern times. "What you have written concerning the distinction between the soul and body appears to me very clear, very evident, and quite divine; and, as nothing is older than truth, I have had singular pleasure to see that almost the same things have formerly been very perspicuously and agreeably handled by St. Augustin in all his tenth book on the Trinity, but chiefly in the tenth chapter."² But Arnauld himself, in his objections to the *Meditations*, had put it as at least questionable, whether that which thinks is not something extended, which, besides the usual properties of extended substances, such as mobility and figure, has also this particular virtue and power of thinking.³ The reply of Descartes removed the difficulties of the illustrious Jansenist, who became an ardent and almost complete disciple of the new philosophy. In a placard against the Cartesian philosophy, printed in 1647, which seems to have come from Revius, professor of theology at Leyden, it is said, "As far as regards the nature of things, nothing seems to hinder but that the soul may be either a substance,

¹ *Dissertation, ubi suprad.*

² Descartes, li. 14.

³ Descartes, x. 188.

remarked, that we are never, strictly speaking, deceived by our senses, but by the inferences which we draw from them.

93. Such is nearly the substance, exclusive of a great variety of more or less episodic theories, of the three metaphysical works of Descartes, the history of the soul's progress from opinion to doubt, and from doubt to certainty. Few would dispute, at the present day, that he has destroyed too much of his foundations to render his superstructure stable; and, to readers averse from metaphysical reflection, he must seem little else than an idle theorist, weaving cobwebs for pastime, which common sense sweeps away. It is fair, however, to observe that no one was more careful than Descartes to guard against any practical scepticism in the affairs of life. He even goes so far as to maintain, that a man, having adopted any practical opinion on such grounds as seem probable, should pursue it with as much steadiness as if it were founded on demonstration; observing, however, as a general rule, to choose the most moderate opinions among those which he should find current in his own country.¹

94. The objections adduced against the *Meditations* are in a series of seven. The first are by a theologian named Caterus, the second by Mersenne, the third by Hobbes, the fourth by Arnauld, the fifth by Gassendi, the sixth by some anonymous writers, the seventh by a Jesuit of the name of Bourdin. To all of these, Descartes replied with spirit and acuteness. By far the most important controversy was with Gassendi, whose objections were stated

generally known, is that he had himself, in his inquiry into the Human Mind, contended very dogmatically in favor of the vulgar notion that secondary qualities exist in bodies, independently of sensation. "This scarlet rose, which is before me, is still a scarlet rose when I shut my eyes, and was so at midnight when no eye saw it. The color remains when the appearance ceases; it remains the same when the appearance changes."—Chap. vi. § 4. He even uses similar language as to perfumes, which, indeed, stand on the same ground, though we feel less of the prejudice in favor of their reality than of that of colors. Nothing can be more obvious than the reply: the color remains only on the tacit hypothesis that some one is looking at the object; at midnight we can hardly say that the rose is red, except by an additional hypothesis, that the day should break. "We never," he proceeds, "as far

as I can judge, give the name of color to the sensation, but to the quality only." How then do we talk of bright, dull, glaring, gay, dampling colors? Do not these words refer to a sensation, rather than to a configuration of parts in the colored body, by which it reflects or refracts light? But this first production of Reid, though abounding with acute and original remarks, is too much disfigured by a tendency to halloo on the multitude against speculative philosophy. The appeal to common sense, that is, the crude notions of men who had never reflected, even enough to use language with precision, would have been fatal to psychology. Reid afterwards laid aside the popular tone in writing on philosophy, though perhaps he was always too much inclined to cut knots when he could not untie them.—1847.]

¹ Vol. i. p. 147; vol. iii. p. 64.

more briefly, and, I think, with less skill, by Hobbes. It was the first trumpet in the new philosophy of an ancient war between the sensual and ideal schools of psychology. Descartes had revived, and placed in a clearer light, the doctrine of mind, as not absolutely dependent upon the senses, nor of the same nature as their objects. Stewart does not acknowledge him as the first teacher of the soul's immateriality. "That many of the schoolmen, and that the wisest of the ancient philosophers, when they described the mind as a spirit, or as a spark of celestial fire, employed these expressions, not with any intention to materialize its essence, but merely from want of more unexceptionable language, might be shown with demonstrative evidence, if this were the proper place for entering into the discussion."¹ But, though it cannot be said that Descartes was absolutely the first who maintained the strict immateriality of the soul, it is manifest to any one who has read his correspondence, that the *tenet*, instead of being general, as we are apt to presume, was by no means in accordance with the common opinion of his age. The fathers, with the exception, perhaps the single one, of Augustin, had taught the corporeity of the thinking substance. Arnauld seems to consider the doctrine of Descartes as almost a novelty in modern times. "What you have written concerning the distinction between the soul and body appears to me very clear, very evident, and quite divine; and, as nothing is older than truth, I have had singular pleasure to see that almost the same things have formerly been very perspicuously and agreeably handled by St. Augustin in all his tenth book on the Trinity, but chiefly in the tenth chapter."² But Arnauld himself, in his objections to the *Meditations*, had put it as at least questionable, whether that which thinks is not something extended, which, besides the usual properties of extended substances, such as mobility and figure, has also this particular virtue and power of thinking.³ The reply of Descartes removed the difficulties of the illustrious Jansenist, who became an ardent and almost complete disciple of the new philosophy. In a placard against the Cartesian philosophy, printed in 1647, which seems to have come from Revius, professor of theology at Leyden, it is said, "As far as regards the nature of things, nothing seems to hinder but that the soul may be either a substance,

¹ *Dissertation, ubi supra.*² Descartes, H. 14.³ Descartes, x. 128.

or a mode of corporeal substance."¹ And More, who had carried on a metaphysical correspondence with Descartes, whom he professed to admire, at least at that time, above all philosophers that had ever existed, without exception of his favorite Plato, extols him after his death in a letter to Clerse-lier, as having best established the foundations of religion. "For the peripatetics," he says, "pretend that there are certain substantial forms emanating from matter, and so united to it that they cannot subsist without it, to which class these philosophers refer the souls of almost all living beings, even those to which they allow sensation and thought; while the Epicureans, on the other hand, who laugh at substantial forms, ascribe thought to matter itself, so that it is M. Descartes alone, of all philosophers, who has at once banished from philosophy all these substantial forms or souls derived from matter, and absolutely divested matter itself of the faculty of feeling and thinking."²

95. It must be owned, that the firm belief of Descartes in the immateriality of the Ego, or thinking principle, was accompanied with what in later times would have been deemed rather too great concessions to the materialists. He held the imagination and the memory to be portions of the brain, wherein the images of our sensations are bodily preserved; and even assigned such a motive force to the imagination, as to produce those involuntary actions which we often perform, and all the movements of brutes. "This explains how all the motions of all animals arise, though we grant them no knowledge of things, but only an imagination entirely corporeal, and how all those operations which do not require the concurrence of reason are produced in us." But the whole of his notions as to the con-

¹ Descartes, x. 73.

² Descartes, x. 386. Even More seems to have been perplexed at one time by the difficulty of accounting for the knowledge and sentiment of disembodied souls, and almost inclined to admit their corporeity. "J'aimerois mieux dire avec les Platoniciens, les anciens pères, et presque tous les philosophes, que les âmes humaines, tous les génies tant bons que mauvais, sont corporels, et que par conséquent ils ont un sentiment réel, c'est à dire, qui leur vient du corps dont ils sont revêtus." This is in a letter to Descartes in 1649, which I have not read in Latin (vol. x. p. 249). I do not quite understand whether he meant

only that the soul, when separated from the gross body, is invested with a substantial clothing, or that there is what we may call an interior body, a supposed monad, to which the thinking principle is indissolubly united. This is what all materialists mean, who have any clear notions whatever: It is a possible, perhaps a plausible, perhaps even a highly probable, hypothesis, but one which will not prove their theory. The former seems almost an indispensable supposition, if we admit sensibility to phenomena at all in the soul after death; but it is rather, perhaps, a theological than a metaphysical speculation.

nection of the soul and body, and indeed all his physiological theories of which he was most enamoured, do little credit to the Cartesian philosophy. They are among those portions of his creed which have lain most open to ridicule, and which it would be useless for us to detail. He seems to have expected more advantage to psychology from anatomical researches than in that state of the science, or even probably in any future state of it, anatomy could afford. When asked once where was his library, he replied, showing a calf he was dissecting, "This is my library."¹ His treatise on the passions, a subject so important in the philosophy of the human mind, is made up of crude hypotheses, or, at best, irrelevant observations, on their physical causes and concomitants.

96. It may be considered as a part of this syncretism, as we may call it, of the material and immaterial hypotheses, that Descartes fixed the seat of the soul ^{Seat of soul in pineal gland.} in the conarion, or pineal gland, which he selected as the only part of the brain which is not double. By some means of communication which he did not profess to explain, though later metaphysicians have attempted to do so, the unextended intelligence, thus confined to a certain spot, receives the sensations which are immediately produced through impressions on the substance of the brain. If he did not solve the problem, be it remembered that the problem has never since been solved. It was objected by a nameless correspondent, who signs himself Hyperaspistes, that the soul, being incorporeal, could not leave by its operations a trace on the brain, which his theory seemed to imply. Descartes answered, in rather a remarkable passage, that, as to things purely intellectual, we do not, properly speaking, remember them at all, as they are equally original thoughts every time they present themselves to the mind, except that they are habitually joined as it were, and associated with certain names, which, being bodily, make us remember them.²

¹ Descartes was very fond of dissection: "C'est un exercice où je me suis souvent occupé depuis onze ans, et je crois qu'il n'y a guère de médecins qui y aient regardé de si près que moi." — Vol. viii. p. 100, also pp. 174 and 180.

² This passage I must give in French, finding it obscure, and having translated mere according to what I guess than literally. "Mais pour ce qui est des choses

purement intellectuelles à proprement parler on n'en a aucun souvenir; et la première fois qu'elles se présentent à l'esprit, on les pense aussi-bien que la seconde, si ce n'est peut-être qu'elles ont coutume d'être jointes et comme attachées à certains noms qui, étant corporels, font que nous nous souvenons aussi d'elles." — Vol. viii. p. 271.

97. If the orthodox of the age were not yet prepared for a doctrine which seemed so favorable at least to natural religion as the immateriality of the soul, it may be readily supposed, that Gassendi, like Hobbes, had imbibed too much of the Epicurean theory to acquiesce in the spiritualizing principles of his adversary. In a sportive style he addresses him, *O anima!* and Descartes, replying more angrily, retorts upon him the name *O caro!* which he frequently repeats. Though we may lament such unhappy efforts at wit in these great men, the names do not ill represent the spiritual and carnal philosophies; the school that produced Leibnitz, Kant, and Stewart, contrasted with that of Hobbes, Condillac, and Cabanis.

98. It was a matter of course that the vulnerable passages of the six Meditations would not escape the spear of so skilful an antagonist as Gassendi. But many of his objections appear to be little more than cavils; and, upon the whole, Descartes leaves me with the impression of his great superiority in metaphysical acuteness. It was indeed impossible that men should agree who persisted in using a different definition of the important word *idea*; and the same source of interminable controversy has flowed ever since for their disciples. Gassendi, adopting the scholastic maxim, "Nothing is in the understanding, which has not been in the sense," carried it so much farther than those from whom it came, that he denied any thing to be an idea but what was imagined by the mind. Descartes repeatedly desired both him and Hobbes, whose philosophy was built on the same notion, to remark that he meant by "*idea*" whatever can be conceived by the understanding, though not capable of being represented by the imagination.¹ Thus we imagine

¹ "Par le nom d'idée, il veut seulement qu'on entende ici les images des choses matérielles dépeintes en la fantaisie corporelle; et cela étant supposé, il lui est aisé de montrer qu'on ne peut avoir propre et véritable idée de Dieu ni d'un ange; mais j'ai souvent averti, et principalement en celui là même, que je prenda le nom d'idée pour tout ce qui est conçu immédiatement par l'esprit; en sorte que, lorsque je veux et que je crains, parceque je conçois en même temps, que je veux et que je crains, ce vouloir et cette crainte sont mis par moi en nombre des idées; et je me suis servi de ce mot, parcequ'il étoit déjà communé-

ment reçu par les philosophes pour signifier les formes des conceptions de l'entendement divin, encore que nous ne reconnoissions en Dieu aucune fantaisie ou imagination corporelle, et je n'en avois point de plus propre. Et je pense avoir assez expliqué l'idée de Dieu pour ceux qui veulent concevoir les sens que je donne à mes paroles; mais pour ceux qui s'attachent à les entendre autrement que je ne fais, je ne le pourrais jamais assez." — Vol. I. p. 404. This is in answer to Hobbes: the objections of Hobbes, and Descartes' replies, turn very much on this primary difference between ideas as images, which alone our

a triangle, but we can only conceive a figure of a thousand sides: we know its existence, and can reason about its properties; but we have no image whatever in the mind, by which we can distinguish such a polygon from one of a smaller or greater number of sides. Hobbes, in answer to this, threw out a paradox which he has not, perhaps at least in so unlimited a manner, repeated, — that by reason, that is, by the process of reasoning, we can infer nothing as to the nature of things, but only as to their names.¹ It is singular that a man, conversant at least with the elements of geometry, should have fallen into this error. For it does not appear that he meant to speak only of natural substances, as to which his language might seem to be a bad expression of what was afterwards clearly shown by Locke. That the understanding can conceive and reason upon that which the imagination cannot delineate, is evident, not only from Descartes' instance of a polygon, but more strikingly by the whole theory of infinities, which are certainly somewhat more than bare words, whatever assistance words may give us in explaining them to others or to ourselves.²

99. Dugald Stewart has justly dwelt on the signal service rendered by Descartes to psychological philosophy, by turning the mental vision inward upon itself, and Stewart's remarks on Descartes. accustoming us to watch the operations of our intellect, which, though employed upon ideas obtained through the

countryman could understand, and ideas as intellections, conceptions, *νοήματα*, incapable of being imagined, but not less certainly known and reasoned upon. The French is a translation, but made by Clerseiller under the eye of Descartes, so that it may be quoted as an original.

¹ "Que dirons-nous maintenant si peut-être le raisonnement n'est rien autre chose qu'un assemblage et un enchaînement de noms par ce mot *est*? D'où il s'ensuivroit que par la raison nous ne concluons rien de tout touchant la nature des choses, mais seulement touchant leurs appellations, c'est à dire que par elle nous voyons simplement si nous assemblons bien ou mal les noms des choses, selon les conventions que nous avons faites à notre fantaisie touchant leurs significations." — p. 476. Descartes merely answered: "L'assemblage qui se fait dans le raisonnement n'est pas celui des noms, mais bien celui des choses, signifiées par les noms; et je m'étonne que le contraire puisse venir en l'esprit de personne." Descartes treated Hobbes, whom he did not esteem, with less attention than

his other correspondents. Hobbes could not understand what have been called ideas of reflection, such as fear; and thought it was nothing more than the idea of the object feared. "For what else is the fear of a lion," he says, "than the idea of this lion, and the effect which it produces in the heart, which leads us to run away? But this running is not a thought; so that nothing of thought exists in fear but the idea of the object." Descartes only replied, "It is self-evident that it is not the same thing to see a lion and fear him, that it is to see him only." — p. 483.

² I suspect, from what I have since read, that Hobbes had a different, and what seems to me a very erroneous, view of infinite or infinitesimal quantities in geometry. For he answers the old sophism of Zeno, "Quicquid dividi potest in partes infinitas est infinitum," in a manner which does not meet the real truth of the case: "Dividi potest in partes infinitas nihil aliud est quam dividi potest in partes quocunque quis velit." — *Logica sive Computatio*, c. 6, p. 38 (edit. 1667).

senses, are as distinguishable from them as the workman from his work. He has given, indeed, to Descartes a very proud title, Father of the experimental philosophy of the human mind, as if he were to man what Bacon was to nature.¹ By patient observation of what passed within him, by holding his soul, as it were, like an object in a microscope, which is the only process of a good metaphysician, he became habituated to throw away those integuments of sense which hide us from ourselves. Stewart has censured him for the paradox, as he calls it, that the *essence* of mind consists in thinking, and that of matter in extension. That the act of thinking is as inseparable from the mind as extension is from matter, cannot indeed, be proved; since, as our thoughts are successive, it is not inconceivable that there may be intervals of duration between them; but it can hardly be reckoned a paradox. But whoever should be led by the word "*essence*" to suppose that Descartes confounded the percipient thinking substance, the Ego, upon whose bosom, like that of the ocean, the waves of perception are raised by every breeze of sense, with the perception itself, or even, what is scarcely more tenable, with the reflective action, or thought; that he anticipated this strange paradox of Hume in his earliest work, from which he silently withdrew in his Essays,—would not only do great injustice to one of the acutest understandings that ever came to the subject, but overlook several clear assertions of the distinction, especially in his answer to Hobbes. "The thought,"

¹ Dissertation on Progress of Philosophy. The word "experiment" must be taken in the sense of observation. Stewart very early took up his admiration for Descartes. "He was the first philosopher who stated in a clear and satisfactory manner the distinction between mind and matter, and who pointed out the proper plan for studying the intellectual philosophy. It is chiefly in consequence of his precise ideas with respect to this distinction, that we may remark in all his metaphysical writings a perspicuity which is not observable in those of any of his predecessors."—Elem. of Philos. of Human Mind, vol. i. (published in 1792), note A. "When Descartes," he says in the dissertation before quoted, "established it as a general principle that *nothing conceivable by the power of imagination could throw any light on the operations of thought*, a principle which I consider as exclusively his own, he laid the foundations of the experimental philosophy of the human mind. That the same

truth had been previously perceived more or less distinctly by Bacon and others, appears probable from the general complexion of their speculations; but which of them has expressed it with equal precision, or laid it down as a fundamental maxim in their logic?" The words which I have put in Italics seem too vaguely and not very clearly expressed, nor am I aware that they are borne out in their literal sense by any position of Descartes; nor do I apprehend the allusion to Bacon. But it is certain that Descartes, and still more his disciples Arnauld and Malebranche, take better care to distinguish what can be imagined from what can be conceived or understood, than any of the school of Gassendi in this or other countries. One of the great merits of Descartes as a metaphysical writer, not unconnected with this, is that he is generally careful to avoid figurative language in speaking of mental operations; wherein he has much the advantage over Locke.

he says, "differs from that which thinks, as the mode from the substance."¹ And Stewart has in his earliest work justly corrected Reid in this point as to the Cartesian doctrine.²

100. Several singular positions, which have led to an undue depreciation of Descartes in general as a philosopher, occur in his metaphysical writings. Such was his ^{Paradoxes of Descartes.} denial of thought, and, as is commonly said, sensation, to brutes, which he seems to have founded on the mechanism of the bodily organs,—a cause sufficient, in his opinion, to explain all the phenomena of the motions of animals, and to obviate the difficulty of assigning to them immaterial souls;³ his rejection of final causes in the explanation

¹ Vol. i. p. 470. Arnauld objected, in a letter to Descartes. "Comment se peut-il faire que la pensée constitue l'essence de l'esprit, puisque l'esprit est une substance, et que la pensée semble n'en être qu'un mode?" Descartes replied that thought in general, *la pensée, ou la nature qui pense*, in which he placed the essence of the soul, was very different from such or such particular acts of thinking. Vol. vi. pp. 163. 160.

² Philosophy of Human Mind, vol. i. note A. See the Principia, § 63.

³ It is a common opinion that Descartes denied all life and sensibility to brutes; but this seems not so clear. "Il faut remarquer," he says in a letter to More, where he has been arguing against the existence in brutes of any thinking principle, "que je parle de la pensée, non de la vie ou du sentiment; car je n'ôte la vie à aucun animal, ne la faisant consister que dans la seule chaleur du cœur. Je ne leur refuse pas même le sentiment autant qu'il dépend des organes du corps."—Vol. x. p. 208. In a longer passage, if he does not express himself very clearly, he admits passions in brutes; and it seems impossible that he could have ascribed passions to what has no sensation. Much of what he here says is very good. "Bien que Montaigne et Charron aient dit, qu'il y a plus de différence d'homme à homme que d'homme à bête, il n'est toutefois jamais trouvé aucune bête si parfaite, qu'elle ait usé de quelque signe pour faire entendre à d'autres animaux quelque chose qui n'eût point de rapport à ses passions; et il n'y a point d'homme si imparfait qu'il n'en use; en sorte que ceux qui sont sourds et muets inventent des signes particuliers par lesquels ils expriment leurs pensées; ce qui me semble un très-fort argument pour prouver que ce qui fait que les bêtes ne parlent point comme nous, est qu'elles n'ont aucune pensée, et non point que les

organes leur manquent. Et on ne peut dire qu'elles parlent entre elles, mais que nous ne les entendons pas; car comme les chiens et quelques autres animaux nous expriment leurs passions, ils nous exprimeroient aussi-bien leurs pensées s'ils en avoient. Je sais bien que les bêtes font beaucoup de choses mieux que nous, mais je ne m'en étonne pas; car cela même sert à prouver qu'elles agissent naturellement, et par ressorts, ainsi qu'un horloge; laquelle montre bien mieux l'heure qu'il est, que notre jugement nous l'enseigne. . . . On peut seulement dire que, bienque les bêtes ne fassent aucune action qui nous assure qu'elles pensent, toutefois, à cause que les organes de leurs corps ne sont pas fort différens des nôtres, on peut conjecturer qu'il y a quelque pensée jointe à ces organes, ainsi que nous expérimentons en nous, bienque la leur soit beaucoup moins parfaite; à quoi je n'ai rien à répondre, si non que si elles pensoient aussi que nous, elles auroient une âme immortelle aussi bien que nous; ce qui n'est pas vraisemblable, à cause qu'il n'y a point de raison pour le croire de quelques animaux, sans le croire de tous, et qu'il y en a plusieurs trop imparfaits pour pouvoir croire cela d'eux, comme sont les huîtres, les éponges," &c.—Vol. ix. p. 426. I do not see the meaning of *une âme immortelle* in the last sentence: if the words had been *une âme immatérielle*, it would be to the purpose. More, in a letter to which this is a reply, had argued as if Descartes took brutes for insensible machines, and combats the paradox with the arguments which common sense furnishes. He would even have preferred ascribing immortality to them, as many ancient philosophers did. But surely Descartes, who did not acknowledge any proofs of the immortality of the human soul to be valid, except those founded on revelation, needed not to trouble himself much about this difficulty.

of nature as far above our comprehension, and unnecessary to those who had the internal proof of God's existence; his still more paradoxical tenet, that the truth of geometrical theorems, and every other axiom of intuitive certainty, depended upon the will of God; a notion that seems to be a relic of his original scepticism, but which he pertinaciously defends throughout his letters.¹ From remarkable errors, men of original and independent genius are rarely exempt: Descartes had pulled down an edifice constructed by the labors of near two thousand years, with great reason in many respects, yet perhaps with too unlimited a disregard of his predecessors; it was his destiny, as it had been theirs, to be sometimes refuted and depreciated in his turn. But the single fact of his having first established, both in philosophical and popular belief, the proper immateriality of the soul, were we even to forget the other great accessions which he made to psychology, would declare the influence he has had on human opinion. From this immateriality, however, he did not derive the tenet of its immortality. He was justly contented to say, that, from the intrinsic difference between mind and body, the dissolution of the one could not necessarily take away the existence of the other, but that it was for God to determine whether it should continue to exist; and this determination, as he thought, could only be learned from his revealed will. The more powerful arguments, according to general apprehension, which reason affords for the sentient being of the soul after death, did not belong to the metaphysical philosophy of Descartes, and would never have been very satisfactory to his mind. He says, in one of his letters, that, "laying aside what faith assures us of, he owns that it is more easy to make conjectures for our own advantage, and entertain promising hopes, than to feel any confidence in their accomplishment."²

101. Descartes was perhaps the first who saw that definitions of words, already as clear as they can be made, are nugatory or impracticable. This alone would distinguish his philosophy from that of the Aristotelians, who had wearied and confused themselves for twenty

His just
notion of
definitions.

¹ "C'est en effet parler de Dieu comme d'un Jupiter ou d'un Saturne, et l'assujettir au Sux et aux destinées, que de dire que ces vérités sont indépendantes de lui. Ne craignes point, je vous prie, d'assurer et de publier partout que c'est Dieu qui a

établi ces lois en la nature; ainsi qu'un roi établit les lois en son royaume." — Vol. vi. p. 109. He argues as strenuously the same point in p. 132 and p. 307.

² Vol. ix. p. 369.

centuries with unintelligible endeavors to grasp by definition what refuses to be defined. "Mr. Locke," says Stewart, "claims this improvement as entirely his own; but the merit of it unquestionably belongs to Descartes, although it must be owned that he has not always sufficiently attended to it in his researches."¹ A still more decisive passage to this effect than that referred to by Stewart in the *Principia* will be found in the posthumous dialogue on the Search after Truth. It is objected by one of the interlocutors, as it had actually been by Gassendi, that, to prove his existence by the act of thinking, he should first know what existence and what thought is. "I agree with you," the representative of Descartes replies, "that it is necessary to know what doubt is, and what thought is, before we can be fully persuaded of this reasoning—I doubt, therefore I am—or, what is the same—I think, therefore I am. But do not imagine that for this purpose you must torture your mind to find out the next genus, or the essential differences, as the logicians talk, and so compose a regular definition. Leave this to such as teach or dispute in the schools. But whoever will examine things by himself, and judge of them according to his understanding, cannot be so senseless as not to see clearly, when he pays attention, what doubting, thinking, being, are, or to have any need to learn their distinctions. Besides, there are things which we render more obscure in attempting to define them, because, as they are very simple and very clear, we cannot know and comprehend them better than by themselves. And it should be reckoned among the chief errors that can be committed in science for men to fancy that they can define that

¹ Dissertation, *ubi supra*. Stewart, in his *Philosophical Essays*, note A, had censured Reid for assigning this remark to Descartes and Locke, but without giving any better reason than that it is found in a work written by Lord Stair; earlier, certainly, than Locke, but not before Descartes. It may be doubtful, as we shall see hereafter, whether Locke has not gone beyond Descartes, or at least distinguished undefinable words more strictly.

[Sir William Hamilton remarks on this passage, where Reid assigns the observation to Descartes and Locke: "This is incorrect. Descartes has little, and Locke no praise for this observation. It had been made by Aristotle, and after him by many others; while, subsequently to Des-

cartes, and previous to Locke, Pascal and the Port-Royal logicians, to say nothing of a paper of Leibnitz in 1684, had reduced it to a matter of commonplace. In this instance, Locke can indeed be proved a borrower."—Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 220. But this very learned writer quotes no passage from Aristotle to this effect; and certainly the practice of that philosopher and his followers was to attempt definitions of every thing. Nor could Aristotle, or even Descartes, have distinguished undefinable words by their expressing simple ideas of sense or reflection, as Locke has done, when they have not made that classification of ideas into simple and complex, which forms so remarkable a part of his philosophy—1847.]

which they can only conceive, and distinguish what is clear in it from what is obscure, while they do not see the difference between that which must be defined before it is understood, and that which can be fully known by itself. Now, among things which can thus be clearly known by themselves, we must put doubting, thinking, being. For I do not believe any one ever existed so stupid as to need to know what being is before he could affirm that he is; and it is the same of thought and doubt. Nor can he learn these things except by himself, nor be convinced of them but by his own experience, and by that consciousness and inward witness which every man finds in himself when he examines the subject. And as we should define whiteness in vain to a man who can see nothing, while one who can open his eyes and see a white object requires no more, so to know what doubting is, and what thinking is, it is only necessary to doubt and to think.¹ Nothing could more tend to cut short the verbal cavils of the schoolmen, than this limitation of their favorite exercise, — definition. It is due, therefore, to Descartes, so often accused of appropriating the discoveries of others, that we should establish his right to one of the most important that the new logic has to boast.

102. He seems, at one moment, to have been on the point of taking another step very far in advance of his ^{His notion of} substances age. "Let us take," he says, "a piece of wax from the honeycomb; it retains some taste and smell; it is hard; it is cold; it has a very marked color, form, and size. Approach it to the fire; it becomes liquid, warm, inodorous, tasteless; its form and color are changed, its size is increased. Does the same wax remain after these changes? It must be allowed that it does: no one doubts it, no one thinks otherwise. What was it, then, that we so distinctly knew to exist in this piece of wax? Nothing certainly that we observed by the senses, since all that the taste, the smell, the sight, the touch, reported to us has disappeared, and still the same wax remains." This something which endures under every change of sensible qualities cannot be imagined; for the imagination must represent some of these qualities, and none of them are essential to the thing: it can only be conceived by the understanding.²

103. It may seem almost surprising to us, after the writings

¹ Vol. xi. p. 369.

² *Méditation Seconde*, l. 266.

of Locke and his followers on the one hand, and the chemist with his crucible on the other, have chased these abstract substances of material objects from their sanctuaries, that a man of such prodigious acuteness and intense reflection as Descartes should not have remarked that the identity of wax after its liquefaction is merely nominal, and depending on arbitrary language, which in many cases gives new appellations to the same aggregation of particles after a change of their sensible qualities; and that all we call substances are but aggregates of resisting movable corpuscles, which, by the laws of nature, are capable of affecting our senses differently, according to the combinations they may enter into, and the changes they may successively undergo. But if he had distinctly seen this, which I do not apprehend that he did, it is not likely that he would have divulged the discovery. He had already given alarm to the jealous spirit of orthodoxy by what now appears to many so self-evident, that they have treated the supposed paradox as a trifling with words,—the doctrine that color, heat, smell, and other secondary qualities, or accidents of bodies, do not exist in them, but in our own minds, and are the effects of their intrinsic or primary qualities. It was the tenet of the schools, that these were sensible realities, inherent in bodies; and the church held as an article of faith, that, the substance of bread being withdrawn from the consecrated wafer, the accidents of that substance remained as before, but independent, and not inherent in any other. Arnauld raised this objection, which Descartes endeavored to repel by a new theory of transubstantiation; but it always left a shade of suspicion, in the Catholic Church of Rome, on the orthodoxy of Cartesianism.

104. "The paramount and indisputable authority, which, in all our reasonings concerning the human mind, he ascribes to the evidence of consciousness," is reckoned by Stewart among the great merits of Descartes. It is certain that there are truths which we know, as it is called, intuitively; that is, by the mind's immediate inward glance. And reasoning would be interminable, if it did not find its ultimate limit in truths which it cannot prove. Gassendi imputed to Descartes, that, in his fundamental enthymeme, "Cogito, ergo sum," he supposed a knowledge of the major premise, "Quod cogitat, est." But Descartes replied that it was a great error to believe that our

Not quite correct.

His notions of intuitive truth.

knowledge of particular propositions must always be deduced from universals, according to the rules of logic; whereas, on the contrary, it is by means of our knowledge of particulars that we ascend to generals, though it is true that we descend again from them to infer other particular propositions.¹ It is probable that Gassendi did not make this objection very seriously.

105. Thus the logic of Descartes, using that word for principles that guide our reasoning, was an instrument of defence both against the captiousness of ordinary scepticism, that of the Pyrrhonic school, and against the disputatious dogmatism of those who professed to serve under the banner of Aristotle. He who reposes on his own consciousness, or who recurs to first principles of intuitive knowledge, though he cannot be said to silence his adversary, should have the good sense to be silent himself; which puts equally an end to debate. But, so far as we are concerned with the investigation of truth, the Cartesian appeal to our own consciousness, of which Stewart was very fond, just as it is in principle, *may* end in an assumption of our own prejudices as the standard of belief. Nothing can be truly self-evident but that which a clear, an honest, and an experienced understanding in another man acknowledges to be so.

106. Descartes has left a treatise highly valuable, but not very much known, on the art of logic, or rules for the conduct of the understanding.² Once only, in a letter, he has

¹ Vol. II. p. 306. See, too, the passage, quoted above, in his posthumous dialogue. [Perhaps the best answer might have been, that "*Cogito, ergo sum*," though thrown into the form of an enthymeme, was not meant so much for a logical inference, as an assertion of consciousness. It has been observed, that *cogito* is equivalent to *sum cogitans*, and involves the conclusion. It is impossible to employ rules of logic upon operations of the mind which are anterior to all reasoning.—1847.]

² M. Cousin has translated and republished two works of Descartes, which had only appeared in *Opera Posthuma Cartesii*, Amsterdam, 1701. Their authenticity, from external and intrinsic proofs, is out of question. One of these is that mentioned in the text, entitled *Rules for the Direction of the Understanding*; which, though logical in its subject, takes most of its illustrations from mathematics. The other is a dialogue, left imperfect, in which

he sustains the metaphysical principles of his philosophy. Of these two little tracts their editor has said, "that they equal in vigor and perhaps surpass in arrangement the *Meditations*, and *Discourse on Method*. We see in these more unequivocally the main object of Descartes, and the spirit of the revolution which has created modern philosophy, and placed in the understanding itself the principle of all certainty, the point of departure for all legitimate inquiry. They might seem written but yesterday, and for the present age."—Vol. xi., preface, p. i. I may add to this, that I consider the *Rules for the Direction of the Understanding* as one of the best works on logic (in the enlarged sense) which I have ever read; more practically useful, perhaps, to young students, than the *Novum Organum*; and though, as I have said, his illustrations are chiefly mathematical, most of his rules are applicable to the general discipline of the reasoning powers. It occupies little more

alluded to the name of Bacon.¹ There are, perhaps, a few passages in this short tract that remind us of the *Treatise on Novum Organum*. But I do not know that the coincidence is such as to warrant a suspicion that he was indebted to it: we may reckon it rather a parallel than a derivative logic; written in the same spirit of cautious, inductive procedure, less brilliant and original in its inventions, but of more general application, than the *Novum Organum*, which is with some difficulty extended beyond the province of natural philosophy. Descartes is as averse as Bacon to syllogistic forms. "Truth," he says, "often escapes from these fetters, in which those who employ them remain entangled. This is less frequently the case with those who make no use of logic; experience showing that the most subtle of sophisms cheat none but sophists themselves, not those who trust to their natural reason. And, to convince ourselves how little this syllogistic art serves towards the discovery of truth, we may remark that the logicians can form no syllogism with a true conclusion, unless they are already acquainted with the truth that the syllogism develops. Hence it follows that the vulgar logic is wholly useless to him who would discover truth for himself, though it may assist in explaining to others the truth he already knows, and that it would be better to transfer it as a science from philosophy to rhetoric."²

107. It would occupy too much space to point out the many profound and striking thoughts which this *Merits of treatise on the conduct of the understanding, and his writings*. indeed most of the writings of Descartes, contain. "The greater part of the questions on which the learned dispute are but questions of words. These occur so frequently, that, if philosophers would agree on the signification of their words, scarce any of their controversies would remain." This has been continually said since; but it is a proof of some progress in wisdom, when the original thought of one age becomes the truism of the next. No one had been so much on his guard against the equivocation of words, or knew so well their relation to the operations of the mind. And it may be

than one hundred pages; and I think that I am doing a service in recommending it. Many of the rules will, of course, be found in later books; some, possibly, in earlier. This tract, as well as the dialogue which follows it, is incomplete; a portion being probably lost.

¹ "Si quelqu'un de cette humeur vouloit entreprendre d'écrire l'histoire des apparences célestes selon la méthode de Verulamius." — Vol. vi. p. 210.

² Vol. xi. p. 256.

said generally, though not without exception, of the metaphysical writings of Descartes, that we find in them a perspicuity which springs from his unremitting attention to the logical process of inquiry, admitting no doubtful or ambiguous position, and never requiring from his reader a deference to any authority but that of demonstration. It is a great advantage, in reading such writers, that we are able to discern when they are manifestly in the wrong. The sophisms of Plato, of Aristotle, of the schoolmen, and of a great many recent metaphysicians, are disguised by their obscurity; and, while they creep insidiously into the mind of the reader, are always denied and explained away by partial disciples.

108. Stewart has praised Descartes for having recourse to the evidence of consciousness in order to prove the liberty of the will. But he omits to tell us, that the notions entertained by this philosopher were not such as have been generally thought compatible with free agency in the only sense that admits of controversy. It was an essential part of the theory of Descartes, that God is the cause of all human actions. "Before God sent us into the world," he says in a letter, "he knew exactly what all the inclinations of our will would be; it is he that has implanted them in us; it is he also that has disposed all other things, so that such or such objects should present themselves to us at such or such times, by means of which he has known that our free-will would determine us to such or such actions, and he has willed that it should be so; but he has not willed to compel us thereto."¹ "We could not demonstrate," he says at another time, "that God exists, except by considering him as a being absolutely perfect; and he could not be absolutely perfect, if there could happen any thing in the world which did not spring entirely from him. . . . Mere philosophy is enough to make us know that there cannot enter the least thought into the mind of man, but God must will and have willed from all eternity that it should enter there."² This is in a letter to his highly intelligent friend, the Princess Palatine Elizabeth, grand-daughter of James I.; and he proceeds to declare himself strongly in favor of predestination, denying wholly any particular providence, to which she had alluded, as changing the decrees of God, and all efficacy of prayer, except as one link in the chain of his determinations.

¹ Vol. ix. p. 374.

² Id., p. 246.

Descartes, therefore, whatever some of his disciples may have become, was far enough from an Arminian theology. "As to free-will," he says elsewhere, "I own that, thinking only of ourselves, we cannot but reckon it independent; but, when we think of the infinite power of God, we cannot but believe that all things depend on him, and that consequently our free-will must do so too. . . . But, since our knowledge of the existence of God should not hinder us from being assured of our free-will, because we feel, and are conscious of it in ourselves, so that of our free-will should not make us doubt of the existence of God. For the independence which we experience and feel in ourselves, and which is sufficient to make our actions praiseworthy or blamable, is not incompatible with a dependence of another nature, according to which all things are subject to God."¹

109. A system so novel, so attractive to the imagination by its bold and brilliant paradoxes, as that of Descartes, could not but excite the attention of an age already roused to the desire of a new philosophy, and to the scorn of ancient authority. His first treatises appeared in French; and, though he afterwards employed Latin, his works were very soon translated by his disciples, and under his own care. He wrote in Latin with great perspicuity; in French with liveliness and elegance. His mathematical and optical writings gave him a reputation which envy could not take away, and secured his philosophy from that general ridicule which sometimes overwhelms an obscure author. His very enemies, numerous and vehement as they were, served to enhance the celebrity of the Cartesian system, which he seems to have anticipated by publishing their objections to his *Meditations* with his own replies. In the universities, bigoted for the most part to Aristotelian authority, he had no chance of public reception; but the influence of the universities was much diminished in France, and a new theory had perhaps better chances in its favor on account of their opposition. But the Jesuits, a more powerful body, were, in general, adverse to the Cartesian system, and especially some time afterwards, when it was supposed to have the countenance of several leading Jansenists. The

Fame of his system, and attacks upon it.

¹ Vol. ix. p. 268. This had originally been stated in the *Principia* with less confidence; the free-will of man and pre-determination of God being both asserted as true, but their co-existence incomprehensible. Vol. iii. p. 86

Epicurean school, led by Gassendi and Hobbes, presented a formidable phalanx: since it in fact comprehended the wits of the world, the men of influence and sensuality, quick to discern the many weaknesses of Cartesianism, with no capacity for its excitements. It is unnecessary to say how predominant this class was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both in France and England.

11. Descartes was evidently in considerable alarm lest the ~~dominant~~ church should bear with its weight upon his philosophy. He had the censure on Galileo before his eyes, and certainly used some chicanery of words as to the earth's movement upon this account. It was, however, in the Protestant country which he had chosen as his harbor of refuge that he was doomed to encounter the roughest storm. Gisbert Voet, an eminent theologian in the University of Utrecht, and the head of the party in the Church of Holland, which had been victorious in the Synod of Dort, attacked Descartes with all the virulence and bigotry characteristic of his school of divinity. The famous demonstration of the being of God he asserted to be a cover for atheism, and thus excited a flame of controversy; Descartes being not without supporters in the university, especially Regius, professor of medicine. The philosopher was induced by these assaults to change his residence from a town in the province of Utrecht to Leyden. Voet did not cease to pursue him with outrageous calumny, and succeeded in obtaining decrees of the senate and University of Utrecht, which interdicted Regius from teaching that "new and unproved (*præsumpta*) philosophy" to his pupils. The war of libels on the Voetian side did not cease for some years, and Descartes replied with no small acrimony against Voet himself. The latter had recourse to the civil power, and instituted a prosecution against Descartes, which was quashed by the interference of the Prince of Orange. But many in the University of Leyden, under the influence of a notable theologian of that age, named Triglandius, one of the stoutest champions of Dutch orthodoxy, raised a cry against the Cartesian philosophy as

14 "On a tellement assujéti la théologie à Aristote, qu'il est impossible d'expliquer une autre philosophie qu'il ne semble d'abord qu'elle soit contre la foi. Et à propos de ceci, je vous prie de me mander s'il n'y a rien de déterminé en la foi

touchant l'étendue du monde: savoir s'il est fini ou presque infini, et si tout ce qu'on appelle espaces imaginaires soient des corps créés et véritables." — Vol. vi. p. 73.

being favorable to Pelagianism and Popery, the worst names that could be given in Holland; and it was again through the protection of the Prince of Orange that he escaped a public censure. Regius, the most zealous of his original advocates, began to swerve from the fidelity of a sworn disciple, and published a book containing some theories of his own, which Descartes thought himself obliged to disavow. Ultimately he found, like many benefactors of mankind, that he had purchased reputation at the cost of peace; and, after some visits to France, where, probably from the same cause, he never designed to settle, found an honorable asylum and a premature death at the court of Christina. He died in 1651, having worked a more important change in speculative philosophy than any who had preceded him since the revival of learning; for there could be no comparison in that age between the celebrity and effect of his writings and those of Lord Bacon.¹

111. The prejudice against Descartes, especially in his own country, was aggravated by his indiscreet and not very warrantable assumption of perfect originality.² plagiarism. No one, I think, can fairly refuse to own, that the Cartesian metaphysics, taken in their consecutive arrangement, form truly an original system; and it would be equally unjust to deny the splendid discoveries he developed in algebra and optics. But, upon every one subject which Descartes treated, he has not escaped the charge of plagiarism: professing always to be ignorant of what had been done by others, he falls perpetually into their track; more, as his adversaries maintained, than the chances of coincidence could fairly ex-

¹ The life of Descartes was written, very fully and with the warmth of a disciple, by Baillet, in two volumes quarto, 1691, of which he afterwards published an abridgement. In this, we find at length the attacks made on him by the Voetian theologians. Brucker has given a long and valuable account of the Cartesian philosophy, but not favorable, and perhaps not quite fair. Vol. v. pp. 200-334. Bahls is, as usual, much inferior to Brucker. But those who omit the mathematical portion will not find the original works of Descartes very long; and they are well worthy of being read.

² "I confess," he says in his *Logic*, "that I was born with such a temper, that the chief pleasure I find in study is, not from learning the arguments of others, but by

inventing my own. This disposition alone impelled me in youth to the study of science: hence, whenever a new book promised by its title some new discovery, before sitting down to read it, I used to try whether my own natural sagacity could lead me to any thing of the kind; and I took care not to lose this innocent pleasure by too hasty a perusal. This answered so often, that I at length perceived that I arrived at truth, not as other men do, after blind and precarious guesses, by good luck rather than skill; but that long experience had taught me certain fixed rules, which were of surprising utility, and of which I afterwards made use to discover more truths."—Vol. xi. p. 262.

plain. Leibnitz has summed up the claims of earlier writers to the pretended discoveries of Descartes; and certainly it is a pretty long bill to be presented to any author. I shall insert this passage in a note, though much of it has no reference to this portion of the Cartesian philosophy.¹ It may perhaps be thought by candid minds, that we cannot apply the doctrine of chances to coincidence of reasoning in men of acute and inquisitive spirits, as fairly as we may to that of style or imagery; but, if we hold strictly that the old writer may claim the exclusive praise of a philosophical discovery, we must regret to see such a multitude of feathers plucked from the wing of an eagle.

¹ "Dogmata ejus metaphysica, velut circa ideas a sensibus remotas, et animas distinctionem a corpore, et fluxam per se rerum materialium fidem, prorsus Platonica sunt. Argumentum pro existentia Dei, ex eo, quod ens perfectissimum, vel quo majus intelligi non potest, existentiam includit, fuit Anselmi, et in libro 'Contra insipientem' inscripto extat inter ejus opera, passimque a scholasticis examinatur. In doctrina de continuo, pleno et loco Aristotelem noster secutus est, Stoicosque in re morali penitus expressit, floriferis ut apes in multibus omnia libant. In explicatione rerum mechanica Leucippum et Democritum præeuntes habuit qui et vortices ipsos jam docuerant. Jordanus Brunus eandem fere de magnitudine universi ideas habuisse dicitur, quem admodum et notavit V. CC. Stephanus Spielsius, ut de Gilberto nil dicam, cujus magneticæ considerationes tum per se, tum ad systema universi applicatæ. Cartesio plurimum profuerunt. Explicationem gravitatis per materiam solidioris rejectionem in tangente, quod in physica Cartesianæ prope pulcherrimum est, didicit ex Keplero, qui similitudine palearum motu aque in vase gyrantis ad centrum contraxerum rem explicuit primus. Actionem lucis in distans, similitudine baculi præd jam veteres adumbraverunt. Circa Iridem a M. Antonio de Dominis non parum lucis accepit. Keplerum fulsæ primum suum in dioptriciæ magistrum, et in eo argumento omnes ante se mortales longo intervallo antegressum, statetur Cartesius in epistolis familiaribus; nam in scriptis, quæ ipse edidit, longè abest a tali confessione aut laude: tametsi illa ratio, quæ rationum directionem explicat, ex compositione nimirum duplicis conatûs perpendicularis ad superficiem et ad eandem paralleli, disertè apud Keplerum extet, qui eodem, ut Cartesius, modo æqualitatem angulorum incidentiæ et reflexionis hinc deducit.

Idque gratam mentionem ideo merebatur, quod omnis prope Cartesii ratiocinatio huc inniditur principio. Legem refractionis primum invenisse Willebrodum Snellium, Isaacus Vossius patefecit, quamquam non ideo negare ausim, Cartesium in eadem incidere potuisse de suo. Negavit in epistolis Vietam sibi lectum, sed Thomæ Harrioti Angli libros analyticos posthumos anno 1631 editos vidisse multum vix dubitant; usque adeo magnus est eorum consensus cum calculo geometriæ Cartesianæ. Sane jam Harriotus æquationem nihilo æqualem posuit, et hinc derivavit, quomodo oriatur æquatio ex multiplicatione radicum in se invicem, et quomodo radicum auctione, diminutione, multiplicatione aut divisione variari æquatio possit, et quomodo proinde natura, et constitutio æquationum et radicum cognosci possit ex terminorum habitudine. Itaque narrat celeberrimus Wallisius, Robervallum, qui miratus erat, unde Cartesio in mentem venisset palmarium illud æquationem ponere æqualem nihilo ad instar unius quantitatis, ostense sibi a Domino de Cavendish libro Harrioti exclamasse, 'Il l'a vu! Il l'a vu!' vidit, vidit. Reductionem quadrato-quadratæ æquationis ad cubicam superiori jam sæculo invenit Ludovicus Ferrarius, cujus vitam reliquit Cardanus ejus familiaris. Denique fuit Cartesius, ut a viris doctis dudum notatum est, et ex epistolis nimirum apparet, immodicus contemptor aliorum, et famæ cupiditate ab artificis non abstinens, quæ parum generosa videri possunt. Atque hæc profecto non dico animo obtrectandi viro, quem mirificè æstimo, sed eo consilio, ut cuique suum tribuatur, nec unus omnium laudes absorbeat; justissimum enim est, ut inventoribus suis honores constet, nec sublatæ virtutum præmiis præclara faciendi studium refrigescat." — Leibnitz, apud Brucker, v. 255.

112. The name of Descartes as a great metaphysical writer has revived, in some measure, of late years: and this has been chiefly owing, among ourselves, to Dugald Stewart; in France, to the growing disposition of their philosophers to cast away their idols of the eighteenth century. "I am disposed," says our Scottish philosopher, "to date the origin of the true philosophy of mind from the Principia (why not the earlier works?) of Descartes, rather than from the Organum of Bacon, or the Essays of Locke; without, however, meaning to compare the French author with our two countrymen, either as a contributor to our stock of *facts* relating to the intellectual phenomena, or as the author of any important conclusion concerning the general laws to which they may be referred." The excellent edition by M. Cousin, in which alone the entire works of Descartes can be found, is a homage that France has recently offered to his memory, and an important contribution to the studious both of metaphysical and mathematical philosophy. I have made use of no other, though it might be desirable for the inquirer to have the Latin original at his side, especially in those works which had not been seen in French by their author.

Recent increase of his fame.

SECTION IV.

On the Metaphysical Philosophy of Hobbes.

113. THE metaphysical philosophy of Hobbes was promulgated in his treatise on Human Nature, which appeared in 1650. This, with his other works, De Cive and De Corpore Politico, were fused into that great and general system, which he published in 1651, with the title of Leviathan. The first part of the Leviathan, "Of Man," follows the several chapters of the treatise on Human Nature with much regularity; but so numerous are the enlargements or omissions, so many are the variations with which the author has expressed the same positions, that they should much rather be considered as two works, than as two editions of the same. They differ more than Lord Bacon's

Metaphysical treatises of Hobbes.

treatise, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, does from his *Advancement of Learning*. I shall, however, blend the two in a single analysis; and this I shall generally give, as far as is possible, consistently with my own limits, in the very words of Hobbes. His language is so lucid and concise, that it would be almost as improper to put an algebraical process in different terms as some of his metaphysical paragraphs. But, as a certain degree of abridgment cannot be dispensed with, the reader must not take it for granted, even where inverted commas denote a closer attention to the text, that nothing is omitted, although, in such cases, I never hold it permissible to make any change.

114. All single thoughts, it is the primary tenet of Hobbes, are representations or appearances of some quality of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. "There is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original."¹ In the treatise on Human Nature, he dwells long on the immediate causes of sensation; and if no alteration had been made in his manuscript since he wrote his dedication to the Earl of Newcastle, in 1640, he must be owned to have anticipated

Descartes in one of his most celebrated doctrines. "Because the image in vision, consisting in color and shape, is the knowledge we have of the qualities

of the object of that sense, it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion, that the same color and shape are the very qualities themselves; and for the same cause, that sound and noise are the qualities of the bell, or of the air. And this opinion hath been so long received, that the contrary must needs appear a great paradox; and yet the introduction of species visible and intelligible (which is necessary for the maintenance of that opinion), passing to and fro from the object, is worse than any paradox, as being a plain impossibility. I shall, therefore, endeavor to make plain these points: 1. That the subject wherein color and image are inherent is not the object or thing seen. 2. That there is nothing without us (really) which we call an image or color. 3. That the said image or color is but an apposition unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain or spirits, or some external substance of the head.

¹ *Leviathan*, c. 1.

4. That, as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses, the subject of their inherence is not the object, but the sentient."¹ And this he goes on to prove. Nothing of this will be found in the *Discours sur la Méthode*, the only work of Descartes then published; and, even if we believe Hobbes to have interpolated this chapter after he had read the *Meditations*, he has stated the principle so clearly, and illustrated it so copiously, that, so far especially as Locke and the English metaphysicians took it up, we may almost reckon him another original source.

115. The second chapter of the *Leviathan*, "On Imagination," begins with one of those acute and original observations we often find in Hobbes: "That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves; and, because they find themselves subject after motion to pain and lassitude, think every thing else grows weary of motion and seeks repose of its own accord." The physical principle had lately been established; but the reason here given for the contrary prejudice, though not the sole one, is ingenious, and even true. Imagination he defines to be "conception remaining, and by little and little decaying after the act of sense."² This he afterwards expressed less happily, "the gradual decline of the motion in which sense consists;" his phraseology becoming more and more tinctured with the materialism which he affected in all his philosophy. Neither definition seems at all applicable to the imagination which calls up long past perceptions. "This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself (I mean fancy itself), we call imagination; but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.³ It is, however, evident that imagination and memory are distinguished by something more than their names." The second fundamental error of Hobbes in his metaphysics, his extravagant nominalism, if so it should be called, appears in this

¹ *Hum. Nat.*, c. 2.² *Id.*, c. 2.³ *Lev.*, c. 2.

sentence, as the first, his materialism, does in that previously quoted.

116. The phenomena of dreaming and the phantasms of waking men are considered in this chapter with the keen observation and cool reason of Hobbes.¹ I am not sure that he has gone more profoundly into psychological speculations in the *Leviathan* than in the earlier treatise; but it bears witness more frequently to what had probably been the growth of the intervening period,—a proneness to political and religious allusion, to magnify civil and to depreciate ecclesiastical power. “If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and, with it, prognostics from dreams, false prophecies and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty and ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience. And this ought to be the work of the schools; but they rather nourish such doctrine.”²

117. The fourth chapter on Human Nature, and the corresponding third chapter of the *Leviathan*, entitled “On Discourse, or the Consequence and Train of Imagination,” are among the most remarkable in Hobbes, as they contain the elements of that theory of association, which was slightly touched afterwards by Locke, but developed and pushed to a far greater extent by Hartley. “The cause,” he says, “of the coherence or consequence of one conception to another is their first coherence or consequence at that time when they are produced by sense: as for instance, from St. Andrew the mind runneth to St. Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to a stone, from the same cause; from stone to foundation, because we see them together; and, for the same cause, from foundation to church, and from church to people, and from people to tumult; and, according to this example, the mind may run almost from any thing to any thing.”³ This he illustrates in the *Leviathan* by the well-known anecdote of a question suddenly put by one, in conversation about the death of Charles I., “What was the value of a Roman penny?” Of this *discourse*, as he calls it, in a larger sense of the word than is usual with the logicians, he mentions several kinds; and after observing that the remembrance of succession of one thing to another, that is, of what was antecedent and what

Discourse
or train of
imagination.

¹ *Hum Nat.*, c. 2.

² *Id.*

³ *Id.*, c. 4, § 2.

consequent and what concomitant, is called an experiment, adds, that "to have had many experiments is what we call experience, which is nothing else but remembrance of what antecedents have been followed by what consequents."¹

118. "No man can have a conception of the future, for the future is not yet; but of our conceptions of the past we make a future, or rather call past future ^{Experience.} relatively."² And again: "The present only has a being in nature: things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all; the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present, which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though it be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation, yet in its own nature it is but presumption."³ "When we have observed antecedents and consequents frequently associated, we take one for a sign of the other; as clouds foretell rain, and rain is a sign there have been clouds. But signs are but conjectural, and their assurance is never full or evident. For though a man have always seen the day and night to follow one another hitherto, yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally. Experience concludeth nothing universally. But those who have most experience conjecture best, because they have most signs to conjecture by: hence old men, *cæteris paribus*, and men of quick parts, conjecture better than the young or dull."⁴ "But experience is not to be equalled by any advantage of natural and extemporary wit, though perhaps many young men think the contrary." There is a presumption of the past as well as the future founded on experience, as when, from having often seen ashes after fire, we infer from seeing them again that there has been fire. But this is as conjectural as our expectations of the future.⁵

119. In the last paragraph of the chapter in the *Leviathan*, he adds, what is a very leading principle in the philosophy of Hobbes, but seems to have no ^{Unconceivableness of infinity.} particular relation to what has preceded: "Whatsoever we imagine is finite; therefore there is no idea or conception of any thing we call infinite. No man can have

¹ *Hum. Nat.*, c. 4, § 2.

² *Id.*, c. 4, § 7.

³ *Lev.*, c. 3.

⁴ *Hum. Nat.*, c. 4.

⁵ *Lev.*, c. 3.

in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the things named; having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, — for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power are inconceivable, — but that we may honor him. Also because whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man, therefore, can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place, and indeed with some determinate magnitude, and which may be divided into parts, nor that any thing is all in this place and all in another place at the same time, nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once. For none of these things ever have, or can be incident to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived or deceiving schoolmen." This, we have seen in the last section, had been already discussed with Descartes. The paralogism of Hobbes consists in his imposing a limited sense on the word "idea" or "conception," and assuming that what cannot be conceived according to that sense has no signification at all.

120. The next chapter, being the fifth in one treatise, and the fourth in the other, may be reckoned, perhaps, the most valuable as well as original in the writings of Hobbes. It relates to speech and language. "The invention of printing," he begins by observing, "though ingenious, compared with the invention of letters, is no great matter. . . . But the most noble and profitable invention of all others was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connection, whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which there had been amongst men neither commonwealth nor society, nor content nor peace, no more than among lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to

add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion, and to join them in such manner by degrees as to make himself understood; and so, by succession of time, so much language might be gotten as he had found use for, though not so copious as an orator or philosopher has need of."¹

121. This account of the original of language appears in general as probable as it is succinct and clear. But the assumption that there could have been no society or mutual peace among mankind without language, the ordinary instrument of contract, is too much founded upon his own political speculations: nor is it proved by the comparison to lions, bears, and wolves, even if the analogy could be admitted; since the state of warfare which he here intimates to be natural to man, does not commonly subsist in these wild animals of the same species. *Sævis inter se convenit urris*, is an old remark. But, taking mankind with as much propensity to violence towards each other as Hobbes could suggest, is it speech, or reason and the sense of self-interest, which has restrained this within the boundaries imposed on it by civil society? The position appears to be, that man, with every other faculty and attribute of his nature except language, could never have lived in community with his fellows. It is manifest, that the mechanism of such a community would have been very imperfect. But, possessing his rational powers, it is hard to see why he might not have devised signs to make known his special wants, or why he might not have attained the peculiar prerogative of his species and foundation of society,—the exchange of what he liked less for what he liked better.

122. This will appear more evident, and the exaggerated notions of the school of Hobbes as to the absolute necessity of language to the mutual relations of mankind will be checked, by considering what was not so well understood in his age as at present,—the intellectual capacities of those who are born deaf, and the resources which they are able to employ. It can hardly be questioned, but that a number of families thrown together in this unfortunate situation, without other intercourse, could by the exercise of their natural reason, as well as the domestic and social affections, constitute themselves into a sort of common-

His political theory interferes.

Necessity of speech exaggerated.

¹ *Leviathan*, c. 4.

wealth, at least as regular as that of ants and bees. But those whom we have known to want the use of speech have also wanted the sense of hearing, and have thus been shut out from many assistances to the reasoning faculties, which our hypothesis need not exclude. The fair supposition is that of a number of persons merely dumb; and, although they would not have laws or learning, it does not seem impossible that they might maintain at least a patriarchal, if not a political, society for many generations. Upon the lowest supposition, they could not be inferior to the Chimpanzees, who are said to live in communities in the forests of Angola.

123. The succession of conceptions in the mind depending wholly on that which they had one to another when produced by the senses, they cannot be recalled at our choice and the need we have of them, "but as it chanceth us to hear and see such things as shall bring them to our mind. Hence brutes are unable to call what they want to mind, and often, though they hide food, do not know where to find it. But man has the power to set up marks or sensible objects, and remember thereby somewhat past. The most eminent of these are names or articulate sounds, by which we recall some conception of things to which we give those names; as the appellation 'white' bringeth to remembrance the quality of such objects as produce that color or conception in us. It is by names that we are capable of science, as for instance that of number; for beasts cannot number for want of words, and do not miss one or two out of their young; nor could a man, without repeating orally or mentally the words of number, know how many pieces of money may be before him."¹ We have here another assumption, that the numbering faculty is not stronger in man than in brutes, and also that the former could not have found out how to divide a heap of coins into parcels without the use of words of number. The experiment might be tried with a deaf and dumb child.

124. Of names, some are proper, and some common to many or universal, there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular. "One universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality or other accidents; and whereas a proper name

Names universal, not realities.

¹ Hum. Nat., c. 5.

bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many."¹ "The universality of one name to many things hath been the cause that men think the things are themselves universal, and so seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we call man, viz. man in general; deceiving themselves by taking the universal or general appellation for the thing it signifieth."² For if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general, he meaneth no more but that the painter should choose what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be, none of which are universal. But when he would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chooseth. It is plain, therefore, that there is nothing universal but names, which are therefore called indefinite."³

125. "By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of ^{How im-} the consequences of things imagined in the mind into ^{posed.} a reckoning of the consequences of appellations."⁴ Hence he thinks, that, though a man born deaf and dumb might by meditation know that the angles of one triangle are equal

¹ Lev., c. 4.

² "An Universal," he says in his Logic, "is not a name of many things collectively, but of each taken separately (*sigillatim sumptorum*). Man is not the name of the human species in general, but of each single man, Peter, John, and the rest, separately. Therefore this universal name is not the name of any thing existing in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always of some word or name. Thus when an animal, or a stone, or a ghost (*spectrum*), or any thing else, is called universal, we are not to understand that any man or stone or any thing else was, or is, or can be, an universal, but only that these words 'animal,' 'stone,' and the like, are universal names, that is, names common to many things, and the conceptions corresponding to them in the mind are the images and phantasms of single animals or other things. And therefore we do not need, in order to understand what is meant by an universal, any other faculty than that of imagination, by which we remember that such words have excited the conception in our minds sometimes of one particular thing, sometimes of an-

other."—Cap. 2, s. 9. "Imagination" and "memory" are used by Hobbes almost as synonyms.

³ Hum. Nat., c. 6.

⁴ It may deserve to be remarked, that Hobbes himself, nominalist as he was, did not limit reasoning to comparison of propositions, as some later writers have been inclined to do, and as, in his objections to Descartes, he might seem to do himself. This may be inferred from the sentence quoted in the text, and more expressly, though not quite perspicuously, from a passage in the *Computatio*, sive *Logica*, his Latin treatise published after the *Leviathan*. "*Quomodo autem animo sine verbis tacita cogitatione ratiocinando addere et subtrahere solemus uno aut altero exemplo ostendendum est. Si quis ergo e longinquo aliquid obcuré videat, etai nulla sint imposita vocabula, habet tamen ejus rei ideam eandem propter quam impositis nunc vocabulis dicit eam rem esse corpus. Postquam autem propius accesserit, videritque eandem rem certo quodam modo nunc uno, nunc alio in loco esse, habebit ejusdem ideam novam, propter quam nunc talem rem animatam vocat.*" &c.—p. 2

to two right ones, he could not, on seeing another triangle of different shape, infer the same without a similar process. But by the help of words, after having observed the equality is not consequent on any thing peculiar to one triangle, but on the number of sides and angles which is common to all, he registers his discovery in a proposition. This is surely to confound the antecedent process of reasoning with what he calls the registry, which follows it. The instance, however, is not happily chosen; and Hobbes has conceded the whole point in question, by admitting that the truth of the proposition could be *observed*, which cannot require the use of words.¹ He expresses the next sentence with more felicity. "And thus the consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as an universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place; and delivers us from all labor of the mind saving the first, and makes that which was found true here and now to be true in all times and places."²

126. The equivocal use of names makes it often difficult to recover those conceptions for which they were designed "not only in the language of others, wherein we are to consider the drift and occasion and contexture of the speech, as well as the words themselves, but in our own discourse, which, being derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto us not our own conceptions. It is, therefore, a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself from equivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is said; and this is it we call understanding."³ "If speech be peculiar to man, as for aught I know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also; understanding being nothing else but conception caused by

¹ The demonstration of the thirty-second proposition of Euclid could leave no one in doubt whether this property were common to all triangles, after it had been proved in a single instance. It is said, however, to be recorded by an ancient writer, that this discovery was first made as to equilateral, afterwards as to isosceles, and lastly as to other triangles. Stewart's *Philosophy of Human Mind*, vol. ii. chap. iv. sect. 2. The mode of proof must have been different from that of Euclid. And this might possibly lead us to suspect the truth of the tradition. For if the equality of the angles of a triangle to two right

angles admitted of any *elementary* demonstration, such as might occur in the infancy of geometry, without making use of the property of parallel lines, assumed in the twelfth axiom of Euclid, the difficulties consequent on that assumption would readily be evaded. See the Note on Euclid, i. 29, by Playfair, who has given a demonstration of his own, but one which involves the idea of motion rather more than was usual with the Greeks in their elementary propositions.

² *I. v.*

³ *Hum. Nat.*

speech."¹ This definition is arbitrary, and not conformable to the usual sense. "True and false," he observes afterwards, "are attributes of speech, not of things: where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood, though there may be error. Hence, as truth consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeks precise truth hath need to remember what every word he uses stands for, and place it accordingly. In geometry, the only science hitherto known, men begin by definitions. And every man who aspires to true knowledge should examine the definitions of former authors, and either correct them or make them anew. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. . . . In the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science. And in wrong or no definitions lies the first abuse from which proceed all false and senseless tenets, which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it. For, between true science and erroneous doctrine, ignorance is in the middle. Words are wise men's counters,—they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools."²

127. "The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are, in the common discourse of men, of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions, when we conceive the same thoughts differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive be the same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore, in reasoning, a man must take heed of words, which, besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the

¹ *Lev.*² *Id.*

speaker; such as are the names of virtues and vices: for one man calleth wisdom what another calleth fear, and one cruelty what another justice; one prodigality what another magnanimity, and one gravity what another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can metaphors and tropes of speech; but these are less dangerous because they profess their inconstancy, which the other do not."¹ Thus ends this chapter of the *Leviathan*, which, with the corresponding one in the treatise on Human Nature, are, notwithstanding what appear to me some erroneous principles, as full, perhaps, of deep and original thoughts as any other pages of equal length on the art of reasoning, and philosophy of language. Many have borrowed from Hobbes without naming him; and, in fact, he is the founder of the Nominalist school in England. He may probably have conversed with Bacon on these subjects: we see much of that master's style of illustration. But as Bacon was sometimes too excursive to sift particulars, so Hobbes has sometimes wanted a comprehensive view.

128. "There are," to proceed with Hobbes, "two kinds of knowledge: the one, sense, or knowledge original, and remembrance of the same; the other, science, or knowledge of the truth of propositions, derived from understanding. Both are but experience,—one of things from without, the other from the proper use of words in language; and, experience being but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance. Knowledge implies two things, truth and evidence: the latter is the concomitance of a man's conception with the words that signify such conception in the act of ratiocination." If a man does not annex a meaning to his words, his conclusions are not evident to him. "Evidence is to truth as the sap to the tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with the body and branches, keepeth them alive: when it forsaketh them, they die; for this evidence, which is meaning with our words, is the life of truth." "Science is evidence of truth, from some beginning or principle of sense. The first principle of knowledge is, that we have such and such conceptions; the second, that we have thus and thus named the things whereof they are conceptions; the third is, that we have joined those names in such manner as to make true propositions; the fourth and last is, that we have

¹ *Lev.*

joined these propositions in such manner as they be concluding, and the truth of the conclusion said to be known."¹

129. Reasoning is the addition or subtraction of parcels. "In whatever matter there is room for addition and subtraction, there is room for reason; and where these have no place, then reason has nothing at all to do."² This is neither as perspicuously expressed, nor as satisfactorily illustrated, as is usual with Hobbes; but it is true that all syllogistic reasoning is dependent upon quantity alone, and consequently upon that which is capable of addition and subtraction. This seems not to have been clearly perceived by some writers of the old Aristotelian school, or perhaps by some others, who, as far as I can judge, have a notion that the relation of a genus to a species, or a predicate to its subject, considered merely as to syllogism or deductive reasoning, is something different from that of a whole to its parts; which would deprive that logic of its chief boast, its axiomatic evidence. But, as this would appear too dry to some readers, I shall pursue it farther in a note.³

¹ Hum. Nat., c. 6.

² Lev., c. 5.

³ Dugald Stewart (Elements of Philosophy, &c., vol. ii. ch. ii. sect. 2) has treated this theory of Hobbes on reasoning, as well as that of Condillac, which seems much the same, with great scorn, as "too puerile to admit of (i. e., require) refutation." I do not myself think the language of Hobbes, either here, or as quoted by Stewart from his Latin treatise on Logic, so perspicuous as usual. But I cannot help being of opinion, that he is substantially right. For surely, when we assert that A is B, we assert that all things which fall under the class B, taken collectively, comprehend A; or that $B = A + X$; B being here put, it is to be observed, not for the *res predicata* itself, but for the concrete *de quibus predicandum est*. I mention this, because this elliptical use of the word "predicate" seems to have occasioned some confusion in writers on logic. The predicate, strictly taken, being an attribute or quality, cannot be said to include or contain the subject. But to return, when we say $B = A + X$, or $B - X = A$, since we do not compare, in such a proposition as is here supposed, A with X, we only mean that $A = A$, or that a certain part of B is the same as itself. Again, in a particular affirmative, Some A is B, we assert that part of A, or $A - Y$, is contained in B, or that B may be expressed by $A - Y + X$. So also when we say, Some A

is not B, we equally divide the class or genus B into $A - Y$ and X, or assert that $B = A - Y + X$; but, in this case, the subject is no longer $A - Y$, but the remainder, or other part of A, namely, Y; and this is not found in either term of the predicate. Finally, in the universal negative, No A (neither $A - Y$ nor Y) is B, the $A - Y$ of the predicate vanishes or has no value, and B becomes equal to X, which is incapable of measurement with A, and consequently with either $A - Y$ or Y, which make up A. Now, if we combine this with another proposition, in order to form a syllogism, and say that C is A, we find, as before, that $A = C + Z$; and, substituting this value of A in the former proposition, it appears that $B = C + Z + X$. Then, in the conclusion, we have, C is B; that is, C is a part of $C + Z + X$. And the same in the three other cases or moods of the figure. This seems to be, in plainer terms, what Hobbes means by addition or subtraction of parcels, and what Condillac means by rather a lax expression, that equations and propositions are at bottom the same; or, as he phrases it better, "l'évidence de raison consiste uniquement dans l'identité." If we add to this, as he probably intended, non-identity, as the condition of all negative conclusions, it seems to be no more than is necessarily involved in the fundamental principle of syllogism, the *dictum de omni et nullo*: which may be thus reduced to its shortest

130. A man may reckon without the use of words in particular things, as in conjecturing from the sight of any thing what is likely to follow; and, if he reckons

False reasoning.

terms: "Whatever can be divided into parts, includes all those parts, and nothing else." This is not limited to mathematical quantity, but includes every thing which admits of more and less. Hobbes has a good passage in his *Logic* on this: "Non putandum est computationi, id est, rationationi in numeris tantum locum esse, tanquam homo a cæteris animantibus, quod censuisset Pythagoras, sola numerandi facultate distinctus esset; nam et magnitudo magnitudini, corpus corpori, motus motui, tempus tempori, gradus qualitatis gradui, actio actioni, conceptus conceptui, proportio proportioni, oratio orationi, nomen nomini, in quibus omne philosophiæ genus continetur, adjici adinque potest."

But it does not follow by any means, that we should assent to the strange passages quoted by Stewart from Condillac and Diderot, which reduce all *knowledge* to identical propositions. Even in geometry, where the objects are strictly magnitudes, the countless variety in which their relations may be exhibited constitutes the riches of that inexhaustible science; and, in moral or physical propositions, the relation of quantity between the subject and predicate, as concretes, which enables them to be compared, though it is the sole foundation of all *general deductive reasoning*, or syllogism, has nothing to do with the other properties or relations, of which we obtain a knowledge by means of that comparison. In mathematical reasoning, we infer as to quantity through the medium of quantity; in other reasoning, we use the same medium, but our inference is as to truths which do not lie within that category. Thus in the hackneyed instance, All men are mortal,—that is, mortal creatures include men and something more,—it is absurd to assert, that we only know that men are men. It is true that our knowledge of the truth of the proposition comes by the help of this comparison of men in the subject with men as implied in the predicate; but the very nature of the proposition discovers a constant relation between the individuals of the human species and that mortality which is predicated of them along with others; and it is in this, not in an identical equation, as Diderot seems to have thought, that our *knowledge* consists.

The remarks of Stewart's friend, M. Prevost of Geneva, on the principle of identity as the basis of mathematical science, and which the former has can-

didly subjoined to his own volume, appear to me very satisfactory. Stewart comes to admit that the dispute is nearly verbal: but we cannot say that he originally treated it as such; and the principle itself, both as applied to geometry and to logic, is, in my opinion, of some importance to the clearness of our conceptions as to those sciences. It may be added, that Stewart's objection to the principle of identity as the basis of geometrical reasoning is less forcible in its application to syllogism. He is willing to admit that magnitudes capable of coincidence by immediate superposition may be reckoned identical, but scruples to apply such a word to those which are dissimilar in figure, as the rectangles of the means and extremes of four proportional lines. Neither one nor the other are, in fact, identical as real quantities, the former being necessarily conceived to differ from each other by position in space, as much as the latter; so that the expression he quotes from Aristotle, *ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἢ ἰσότης ἢ ὁμοτης*, or any similar one of modern mathematicians, can only refer to the abstract magnitude of their areas, which being divisible into the same number of equal parts, they are called the same. And there seems no real difference in this respect between two circles of equal radii and two such rectangles as are supposed above; the identity of their magnitudes being a distinct truth, independent of any consideration either of their figure or their position. But, however this may be, the identity of the subject with part of the predicate in an affirmative proposition is never fictitious, but real. It means that the persons or things in the one are strictly the same beings with the persons or things to which they are compared in the other, though, through some difference of relations, or other circumstance, they are expressed in different language. It is needless to give examples, as all those who can read this note at all will know how to find them.

I will here take the liberty to remark, though not closely connected with the present subject, that Archbishop Whately is not quite right in saying (*Elements of Logic*, p. 46), that, in affirmative propositions, the predicate is *never* distributed. Besides the numerous instances where this is, in point of fact, the case, all which he justly excludes, there are many in which it is involved in the very form of the proposition. Such are those which

wrong, it is error. But in reasoning on general words, to fall on a false inference is not error, though often so called, but

assert identity or equality, and such are all definitions. Of the first sort are all the theorems in geometry, asserting an equality of magnitudes or ratios, in which the subject and predicate may always change places. It is true, that, in the instance given in the work quoted,—that equilateral triangles are equiangular,—the converse requires a separate proof, and so in many similar cases. But, in these, the predicate is not distributed by the form of the proposition: they assert no equality of magnitude.

The position, that, where such equality is affirmed, the predicate is not *logically* distributed, would lead to the consequence, that it can only be *converted* into a particular affirmation. Thus, after proving that the square of the hypotenuse in all right-angled triangles is equal to those of the sides, we could only infer that the squares of the sides are *sometimes* equal to that of the hypotenuse; which could not be maintained without rendering the rules of logic ridiculous. The most general mode of considering the question, is to say, as we have done above, that, in an universal affirmative, the predicate B (that is, the class of which B is predicated) is composed of A, the subject, and X, an unknown remainder. But if, by the very nature of the proposition, we perceive that X is nothing, or has no value, it is plain that the subject measures the entire predicate: and, *vice versa*, the predicate measures the subject: in other words, each is taken universally, or distributed.

[A critic upon the first edition has observed, that "nothing is clearer than that in these propositions the predicate is not necessarily distributed;" and even hints a doubt whether I understood the terms rightly. *Edinburgh Review*, vol. lxxiii. p. 219. This suspicion of my ignorance as to the meaning of the two commonest words in logic I need not probably repeat: as to the presumptuous assertion of this critic, without any proof beyond his own authority, that, in propositions denoting equality of magnitude, the predicate is not necessarily distributed, if his own reflections do not convince him, I can only refer him to Aristotle's words: *ἐν ταυτοῖς ἡ λόγος ἐνότης*; and I presume he does not doubt, that, in identical propositions of the form, A est A, the distribution of the predicate, or the convertibility of the proposition, which is the same thing, is manifest.—1842.]

[Reid observes, in his *Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic*, that "the doctrine of the

conversion of propositions is not so complete as it appears. How, for instance, shall we convert this proposition, God is omniscient?" Sir W. Hamilton, who, as editor of Reid, undertakes the defence against him of every thing in the established logic, rather curiously answers, in his notes on this passage: "By saying An, or The, omniscient is God." (Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 697.) The rule requires, "An omniscient," a conversion into the particular; but, as this would be shocking, he substitutes, as an alternative, *the*, which is to take generally or distribute the predicate in the first proposition; and to this the nature of the proposition leads us, as it does in innumerable cases. However, as logical writers, especially the recent, commonly exclude all consideration of the subject-matter of propositions, it may be correct to say, with Archbishop Whately, that, as a rule of syllogism, the predicate is not distributed. Aristotle himself, though he lays this down as a formal rule, does not hesitate to say, that, where the predicate is the *proprium* (*ἰδίον*) or characteristic of the subject, and of nothing else, it may be reciprocated (*ἀνταρνησέσθαι*) with the subject; as, If it is the *proprium* of a man to be capable of learning grammar, all men are capable of being grammarians, and all who are such are men. *Topica*, l. 4. And in the well-known passage upon inductive syllogism, *Analyt. Prior.*, l. ii. c. 23, he shows the minor premise to be convertible into an universal affirmative, by which alone such a syllogism differs from the logical form called *Darapti*. But, as Aristotle notoriously considers syllogisms in their matter as well as form, the modern writers, who confine themselves to the latter, are not concluded by his authority. Their theory, which not only reduces all logic to syllogism, but all syllogism to a very few rules of form, so that we may learn every thing that can be learned in this art through the letters A, B, and C, without any examples at all, appears to render it more jejune and unprofitable than ever. The comparison which some have made of this literal logic with algebra is surely not to the purpose; for we cannot move a step in algebra without known as well as unknown quantities. As soon as we substitute real examples, we must perceive that the predicate is sometimes distributed in affirmative propositions by the sense of the propositions themselves, and without any extrinsic proof; which is all that I meant.—1847.]

absurdity.¹ "If a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle, or accidents of bread in cheese, or immaterial substances, or of a free subject, a free will, or any free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd." Some of these propositions, it will occur, are intelligible in a reasonable sense, and not contradictory, except by means of an arbitrary definition which he who employs them does not admit. It may be observed here, as we have done before, that Hobbes does not confine reckoning, or reasoning, to universals, or even to words.

131. Man has the exclusive privilege of forming general theorems. But this privilege is allayed by another, that is, by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of men those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy. . . . For there is not one that begins his ratiocination from the definitions or explications of the names they are to use, which is a method used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable. He then enumerates seven causes of absurd conclusions; the first of which is the want of definitions, the others are erroneous imposition of names. If we can avoid these errors, it is not easy to fall into absurdity (by which he of course only means any wrong conclusion), except perhaps by the length of a reasoning. "For all men," he says, "by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. Hence it appears that reason is not as sense and memory born with us, nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is, but attained by industry, in apt imposing of names, and in getting a good and orderly method of proceeding from the elements to assertions, and so to syllogisms. Children are not endued with reason at all till they have attained the use of speech, but are called reasonable creatures, for the possibility of having the use of reason hereafter. And reasoning serves the generality of mankind very little, though with their natural prudence without science they are in better condition than those who reason ill themselves, or trust those who have done so."² It has been observed by Buhle, that Hobbes had more respect for the Aristotelian forms of logic than his master Bacon. He has in fact written a short treatise, in his *Elementa Philosophiæ*, on the subject; observing,

¹ *Lev.*, c. 5.

² *Id.*

however, therein, that a true logic will be sooner learned by attending to geometrical demonstrations than by drudging over the rules of syllogism, as children learn to walk not by precept but by habit.¹

132. "No discourse whatever," he says truly in the seventh chapter of the *Leviathan*, "can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to come. For, as to the knowledge of fact, it is originally sense; and, ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be, which is to know absolutely; but only that if this is, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be; which is to know conditionally, and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing. And therefore when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connection of the same into general affirmations, and of those again into syllogisms, the end or last sum is called the conclusion, and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge of the consequence of words which is commonly called science. But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or, if definitions, be not rightly joined together in syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again opinion, namely, of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood."²

133. "Belief, which is the admitting of propositions upon trust, in many cases is no less free from doubt than perfect and manifest knowledge; for as there is nothing whereof there is not some cause, so, when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof conceived. Now, there be many things which we receive from the report of others, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause of doubt; for

¹ "Citius multo veram logicam discunt qui mathematicorum demonstrationibus, quam qui logicorum syllogisandi præceptis legendis tempus conterunt, haud aliter quam parvuli pueri gressum formare discunt non præceptis sed sepe gradiendo." — C. iv. p. 80. "Atque hæc sufficiunt" (he says afterwards) "de syllogismo, qui est tanquam gressus philosophiæ; nam et quantum necesse est ad cognoscendum

unde vim suam habeat omnis argumentatio legitima, tantum diximus; et omnia accumulare quæ dici possunt, æque superfluum esset ac si quis ut dixi puerulo ad gradiendum præcepta dare vellet; acquiritur enim ratiocinandi ars non præceptis sed usu et lectione eorum librorum in quibus omnia severis demonstrationibus transiguntur." — C. v. p. 86.

² Lev., c. 7.

wealth, at least as regular as that of ants and bees. But those whom we have known to want the use of speech have also wanted the sense of hearing, and have thus been shut out from many assistances to the reasoning faculties, which our hypothesis need not exclude. The fair supposition is that of a number of persons merely dumb; and, although they would not have laws or learning, it does not seem impossible that they might maintain at least a patriarchal, if not a political, society for many generations. Upon the lowest supposition, they could not be inferior to the Chimpanzees, who are said to live in communities in the forests of Angola.

123. The succession of conceptions in the mind depending wholly on that which they had one to another when produced by the senses, they cannot be recalled at our choice and the need we have of them, "but as it chanceth us to hear and see such things as shall bring them to our mind. Hence brutes are unable to call what they want to mind, and often, though they hide food, do not know where to find it. But man has the power to set up marks or sensible objects, and remember thereby somewhat past. The most eminent of these are names or articulate sounds, by which we recall some conception of things to which we give those names; as the appellation 'white' bringeth to remembrance the quality of such objects as produce that color or conception in us. It is by names that we are capable of science, as for instance that of number; for beasts cannot number for want of words, and do not miss one or two out of their young; nor could a man, without repeating orally or mentally the words of number, know how many pieces of money may be before him."¹ We have here another assumption, that the numbering faculty is not stronger in man than in brutes, and also that the former could not have found out how to divide a heap of coins into parcels without the use of words of number. The experiment might be tried with a deaf and dumb child.

124. Of names, some are proper, and some common to many or universal, there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular. "One universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality or other accidents; and whereas a proper name

Names universal, not realities.

¹ Hum. Nat., c. 5.

bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many."¹ "The universality of one name to many things hath been the cause that men think the things are themselves universal, and so seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we call man, viz. man in general; deceiving themselves by taking the universal or general appellation for the thing it signifieth."² For if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general, he meaneth no more but that the painter should choose what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be, none of which are universal. But when he would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chooseth. It is plain, therefore, that there is nothing universal but names, which are therefore called indefinite."³

125. "By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of ^{How im-} the consequences of things imagined in the mind into posed. a reckoning of the consequences of appellations."⁴ Hence he thinks, that, though a man born deaf and dumb might by meditation know that the angles of one triangle are equal

¹ *Lev.*, c. 4.

² "An Universal," he says in his *Logic*, "is not a name of many things collectively, but of each taken separately (*sigillatim sumptorum*). Man is not the name of the human species in general, but of each single man, Peter, John, and the rest, separately. Therefore this universal name is not the name of any thing existing in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always of some word or name. Thus when an animal, or a stone, or a ghost (*spectrum*), or any thing else, is called universal, we are not to understand that any man or stone or any thing else was, or is, or can be, an universal, but only that these words 'animal,' 'stone,' and the like, are universal names, that is, names common to many things, and the conceptions corresponding to them in the mind are the images and phantasms of single animals or other things. And therefore we do not need, in order to understand what is meant by an universal, any other faculty than that of imagination, by which we remember that such words have excited the conception in our minds sometimes of one particular thing, sometimes of an-

other." — *Cap.* 2, s. 9. "Imagination" and "memory" are used by Hobbes almost as synonyms.

³ *Hum. Nat.*, c. 5.

⁴ It may deserve to be remarked, that Hobbes himself, nominalist as he was, did not limit reasoning to comparison of propositions, as some later writers have been inclined to do, and as, in his objections to Descartes, he might seem to do himself. This may be inferred from the sentence quoted in the text, and more expressly, though not quite perspicuously, from a passage in the *Computatio*, sive *Logica*, his Latin treatise published after the *Leviathan*. "*Quomodo autem animo sine verbis tacita cogitatione ratiocinando addere et subtrahere solemus uno aut altero exemplo ostendendum est. Si quis ergo e longinquo aliquid obscure videat, etsi nulla sint imposita vocabula, habet tamen ejus rei ideam eandem propter quam impositis nunc vocabulis dicit eam rem esse corpus. Postquam autem propius accesserit, videritque eandem rem certo quodam modo nunc uno, nunc alio in loco esse, habebit ejusdem ideam novam, propter quam nunc talem rem animalam vocat.*" &c. — p. 2

to two right ones, he could not, on seeing another triangle of different shape, infer the same without a similar process. But by the help of words, after having observed the equality is not consequent on any thing peculiar to one triangle, but on the number of sides and angles which is common to all, he registers his discovery in a proposition. This is surely to confound the antecedent process of reasoning with what he calls the registry, which follows it. The instance, however, is not happily chosen; and Hobbes has conceded the whole point in question, by admitting that the truth of the proposition could be *observed*, which cannot require the use of words.¹ He expresses the next sentence with more felicity. "And thus the consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as an universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place; and delivers us from all labor of the mind saving the first, and makes that which was found true here and now to be true in all times and places."²

126. The equivocal use of names makes it often difficult to recover those conceptions for which they were designed "not only in the language of others, wherein we are to consider the drift and occasion and contexture of the speech, as well as the words themselves, but in our own discourse, which, being derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto us not our own conceptions. It is, therefore, a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself from equivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is said; and this is it we call understanding."³ "If speech be peculiar to man, as for aught I know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also; understanding being nothing else but conception caused by

¹ The demonstration of the thirty-second proposition of Euclid could leave no one in doubt whether this property were common to all triangles, after it had been proved in a single instance. It is said, however, to be recorded by an ancient writer, that this discovery was first made as to equilateral, afterwards as to isosceles, and lastly as to other triangles. Stewart's *Philosophy of Human Mind*, vol. ii. chap. iv. sect. 2. The mode of proof must have been different from that of Euclid. And this might possibly lead us to suspect the truth of the tradition. For if the equality of the angles of a triangle to two right

angles admitted of any *elementary* demonstration, such as might occur in the infancy of geometry, without making use of the property of parallel lines, assumed in the twelfth axiom of Euclid, the difficulties consequent on that assumption would readily be evaded. See the Note on Euclid, l. 23, by Playfair, who has given a demonstration of his own, but one which involves the idea of motion rather more than was usual with the Greeks in their elementary propositions.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Hum. Nat.*

speech."¹ This definition is arbitrary, and not conformable to the usual sense. "True and false," he observes afterwards, "are attributes of speech, not of things: where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood, though there may be error. Hence, as truth consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeks precise truth hath need to remember what every word he uses stands for, and place it accordingly. In geometry, the only science hitherto known, men begin by definitions. And every man who aspires to true knowledge should examine the definitions of former authors, and either correct them or make them anew. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. . . . In the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science. And in wrong or no definitions lies the first abuse from which proceed all false and senseless tenets, which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it. For, between true science and erroneous doctrine, ignorance is in the middle. Words are wise men's counters,—they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools."²

127. "The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are, in the common discourse of men, of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions, when we conceive the same thoughts differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive be the same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore, in reasoning, a man must take heed of words, which, besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the

Names differently imposed.

¹ *Lev.*

² *Id.*

speaker; such as are the names of virtues and vices: for one man calleth wisdom what another calleth fear, and one cruelty what another justice; one prodigality what another magnanimity, and one gravity what another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can metaphors and tropes of speech; but these are less dangerous because they profess their inconsistency, which the other do not."¹ Thus ends this chapter of the *Leviathan*, which, with the corresponding one in the treatise on Human Nature, are, notwithstanding what appear to me some erroneous principles, as full, perhaps, of deep and original thoughts as any other pages of equal length on the art of reasoning, and philosophy of language. Many have borrowed from Hobbes without naming him; and, in fact, he is the founder of the Nominalist school in England. He may probably have conversed with Bacon on these subjects: we see much of that master's style of illustration. But as Bacon was sometimes too excursive to sift particulars, so Hobbes has sometimes wanted a comprehensive view.

128. "There are," to proceed with Hobbes, "two kinds of knowledge: the one, sense, or knowledge original, and remembrance of the same; the other, science, or knowledge of the truth of propositions, derived from understanding. Both are but experience, — one of things from without, the other from the proper use of words in language; and, experience being but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance. Knowledge implies two things, truth and evidence: the latter is the concomitance of a man's conception with the words that signify such conception in the act of ratiocination." If a man does not annex a meaning to his words, his conclusions are not evident to him. "Evidence is to truth as the sap to the tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with the body and branches, keepeth them alive: when it forsaketh them, they die; for this evidence, which is meaning with our words, is the life of truth." "Science is evidence of truth, from some beginning or principle of sense. The first principle of knowledge is, that we have such and such conceptions; the second, that we have thus and thus named the things whereof they are conceptions; the third is, that we have joined those names in such manner as to make true propositions; the fourth and last is, that we have

¹ *Lev.*

joined these propositions in such manner as they be concluding, and the truth of the conclusion said to be known."¹

129. Reasoning is the addition or subtraction of parcels. "In whatever matter there is room for addition and subtraction, there is room for reason; and where Reasoning. these have no place, then reason has nothing at all to do."² This is neither as perspicuously expressed, nor as satisfactorily illustrated, as is usual with Hobbes; but it is true that all syllogistic reasoning is dependent upon quantity alone, and consequently upon that which is capable of addition and subtraction. This seems not to have been clearly perceived by some writers of the old Aristotelian school, or perhaps by some others, who, as far as I can judge, have a notion that the relation of a genus to a species, or a predicate to its subject, considered merely as to syllogism or deductive reasoning, is something different from that of a whole to its parts; which would deprive that logic of its chief boast, its axiomatic evidence. But, as this would appear too dry to some readers, I shall pursue it farther in a note.³

¹ Hum. Nat., c. 6.

² Lev., c. 5.

³ Dagald Stewart (Elements of Philosophy, &c., vol. II. ch. II. sect. 2) has treated this theory of Hobbes on reasoning, as well as that of Condillac, which seems much the same, with great scorn, as "too puerile to admit of (i.e., require) refutation." I do not myself think the language of Hobbes, either here, or as quoted by Stewart from his Latin treatise on Logic, so perspicuous as usual. But I cannot help being of opinion, that he is substantially right. For surely, when we assert that A is B, we assert that all things which fall under the class B, taken collectively, comprehend A; or that $B = A + X$; B being here put, it is to be observed, not for the *res predicata* itself, but for the concrete *de quibus predicandum est*. I mention this, because this elliptical use of the word "predicate" seems to have occasioned some confusion in writers on logic. The predicate, strictly taken, being an attribute or quality, cannot be said to include or contain the subject. But to return, when we say $B = A + X$, or $B - X = A$, since we do not compare, in such a proposition as is here supposed, A with X, we only mean that $A = A$, or that a certain part of B is the same as itself. Again, in a particular affirmative, Some A is B, we assert that part of A, or $A - Y$, is contained in B, or that B may be expressed by $A - Y + X$. So also when we say, Some A

is not B, we equally divide the class or genus B into $A - Y$ and X, or assert that $B = A - Y + X$; but, in this case, the subject is no longer $A - Y$, but the remainder, or other part of A, namely, Y; and this is not found in either term of the predicate. Finally, in the universal negative, No A (neither $A - Y$ nor Y) is B, the $A - Y$ of the predicate vanishes or has no value, and B becomes equal to X, which is incapable of measurement with A, and consequently with either $A - Y$ or Y, which make up A. Now, if we combine this with another proposition, in order to form a syllogism, and say that C is A, we find, as before, that $A = C + Z$; and, substituting this value of A in the former proposition, it appears that $B = C + Z + X$. Then, in the conclusion, we have, C is B; that is, C is a part of $C + Z + X$. And the same in the three other cases or moods of the figure. This seems to be, in plainer terms, what Hobbes means by addition or subtraction of parcels, and what Condillac means by rather a lax expression, that equations and propositions are at bottom the same; or, as he phrases it better, "l'évidence de raison consiste uniquement dans l'identité." If we add to this, as he probably intended, non-identity, as the condition of all negative conclusions, it seems to be no more than is necessarily involved in the fundamental principle of syllogism, the *dictum de omni et nullo*: which may be thus reduced to its shortest

130. A man may reckon without the use of words in particular things, as in conjecturing from the sight of any thing what is likely to follow; and, if he reckons

terms: "Whatever can be divided into parts, includes all those parts, and nothing else." This is not limited to mathematical quantity, but includes every thing which admits of more and less. Hobbes has a good passage in his *Logic* on this: "Non putandum est computationi, id est, ratiocinationi in numeris tantum locum esse, tanquam homo a cæteris animantibus, quod censuisset narratur Pythagoras, sola numerandi facultate distinctus esset; nam et magnitudo magnitudini, corpus corpori, motus motui, tempus tempori, gradus qualitatis gradui, actio actioni, conceptus conceptui, proportio proportioni, oratio orationi, nomen nomini, in quibus omne philosophiæ genus continetur, adjici adinque potest."

But it does not follow by any means, that we should assent to the strange passages quoted by Stewart from Condillæ and Diderot, which reduce all *knowledge* to identical propositions. Even in geometry, where the objects are strictly magnitudes, the countless variety in which their relations may be exhibited constitutes the riches of that inexhaustible science; and, in moral or physical propositions, the relation of quantity between the subject and predicate, as concretes, which enables them to be compared, though it is the sole foundation of all *general deductive reasoning*, or syllogism, has nothing to do with the other properties or relations, of which we obtain a knowledge by means of that comparison. In mathematical reasoning, we infer as to quantity through the medium of quantity; in other reasoning, we use the same medium, but our inference is as to truths which do not lie within that category. Thus in the hackneyed instance, All men are mortal,—that is, mortal creatures include men and something more,—it is absurd to assert, that we only know that men are men. It is true that our knowledge of the truth of the proposition comes by the help of this comparison of men in the subject with men as implied in the predicate; but the very nature of the proposition discovers a constant relation between the individuals of the human species and that mortality which is predicated of them along with others; and it is in this, not in an identical equation, as Diderot seems to have thought, that our *knowledge* consists.

The remarks of Stewart's friend, M. Prevost of Geneva, on the principle of identity as the basis of mathematical science, and which the former has can-

didly subjoined to his own volume, appear to me very satisfactory. Stewart comes to admit that the dispute is nearly verbal: but we cannot say that he originally treated it as such; and the principle itself, both as applied to geometry and to logic, is, in my opinion, of some importance to the clearness of our conceptions as to those sciences. It may be added, that Stewart's objection to the principle of identity as the basis of geometrical reasoning is less forcible in its application to syllogism. He is willing to admit that magnitudes capable of coincidence by immediate superposition may be reckoned identical, but scruples to apply such a word to those which are dissimilar in figure, as the rectangles of the means and extremes of four proportional lines. Neither one nor the other are, in fact, identical as real quantities, the former being necessarily conceived to differ from each other by position in space, as much as the latter; so that the expression he quotes from Aristotle, *ἐν τοῖς ἡ ἰσότης ἐνότης*, or any similar one of modern mathematicians, can only refer to the abstract magnitude of their areas, which being divisible into the same number of equal parts, they are called the same. And there seems no real difference in this respect between two circles of equal radii and two such rectangles as are supposed above; the identity of their magnitudes being a distinct truth, independent of any consideration either of their figure or their position. But, however this may be, the identity of the subject with part of the predicate in an affirmative proposition is never fictitious, but real. It means that the persons or things in the one are strictly the same beings with the persons or things to which they are compared in the other, though, through some difference of relations, or other circumstance, they are expressed in different language. It is needless to give examples, as all those who can read this note at all will know how to find them.

I will here take the liberty to remark, though not closely connected with the present subject, that Archbishop Whately is not quite right in saying (*Elements of Logic*, p. 46), that, in affirmative propositions, the predicate is *ever* distributed. Besides the numerous instances where this is, in point of fact, the case, all which he justly excludes, there are many in which it is involved in the very form of the proposition. Such are those which

wrong, it is error. But in reasoning on general words, to fall on a false inference is not error, though often so called, but

assert identity or equality, and such are all definitions. Of the first sort are all the theorems in geometry, asserting an equality of magnitudes or ratios, in which the subject and predicate may always change places. It is true, that, in the instance given in the work quoted,—that equilateral triangles are equiangular,—the converse requires a separate proof, and so in many similar cases. But, in these, the predicate is not distributed by the form of the proposition: they assert no equality of magnitude.

The position, that, where such equality is affirmed, the predicate is not *logically* distributed, would lead to the consequence, that it can only be *converted* into a particular affirmation. Thus, after proving that the square of the hypotenuse in all right-angled triangles is equal to those of the sides, we could only infer that the squares of the sides are *sometimes* equal to that of the hypotenuse; which could not be maintained without rendering the rules of logic ridiculous. The most general mode of considering the question, is to say, as we have done above, that, in an universal affirmative, the predicate B (that is, the class of which B is predicated) is composed of A, the subject, and X, an unknown remainder. But if, by the very nature of the proposition, we perceive that X is nothing, or has no value, it is plain that the subject measures the entire predicate; and, *vice versa*, the predicate measures the subject: in other words, each is taken universally, or distributed.

[A critic upon the first edition has observed, that "nothing is clearer than that in these propositions the predicate is not necessarily distributed;" and even hints a doubt whether I understood the terms rightly. *Edinburgh Review*, vol. lxxiii. p. 219. This suspicion of my ignorance as to the meaning of the two commonest words in logic I need not probably repeat: as to the peremptory assertion of this critic, without any proof beyond his own authority, that, in propositions denoting equality of magnitude, the predicate is not necessarily distributed, if his own reflections do not convince him, I can only refer him to Aristotle's words: *ἐν ταῖς ἰσοῦσιν ἐνότης*; and I presume he does not doubt, that, in identical propositions of the form, *A est A*, the distribution of the predicate, or the convertibility of the proposition, which is the same thing, is manifest.—1842.]

[Reid observes, in his *Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic*, that "the doctrine of the

conversion of propositions is not so complete as it appears. How, for instance, shall we convert this proposition, God is omniscient?" Sir W. Hamilton, who, as editor of Reid, undertakes the defence against him of every thing in the established logic, rather curiously answers, in his notes on this passage: "By saying An, or The, omniscient is God." (Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 697.) The rule requires, "An omniscient," a conversion into the particular; but, as this would be shocking, he substitutes, as an alternative, *the*, which is to take generally or distribute the predicate in the first proposition; and to this the nature of the proposition leads us, as it does in innumerable cases. However, as logical writers, especially the recent, commonly exclude all consideration of the subject-matter of propositions, it may be correct to say, with Archbishop Whately, that, as a rule of syllogism, the predicate is not distributed. Aristotle himself, though he lays this down as a formal rule, does not hesitate to say, that, where the predicate is the *proprium* (*ἰδίον*) or characteristic of the subject, and of nothing else, it may be reciprocated (*ἀνταρροποεῖται*) with the subject; as, If it is the *proprium* of a man to be capable of learning grammar, all men are capable of being grammarians, and all who are such are men. *Topics*, l. 4. And in the well-known passage upon inductive syllogism, *Analyt. Prior.*, l. ii. c. 23, he shows the minor premise to be convertible into an universal affirmative, by which alone such a syllogism differs from the logical form called *Darapti*. But, as Aristotle notoriously considers syllogisms in their matter as well as form, the modern writers, who confine themselves to the latter, are not concluded by his authority. Their theory, which not only reduces all logic to syllogism, but all syllogism to a very few rules of form, so that we may learn every thing that can be learned in this art through the letters A, B, and C, without any examples at all, appears to render it more jejune and unprofitable than ever. The comparison which some have made of this literal logic with algebra is surely not to the purpose; for we cannot move a step in algebra without known as well as unknown quantities. As soon as we substitute real examples, we must perceive that the predicate is sometimes distributed in affirmative propositions by the sense of the propositions themselves, and without any extrinsic proof; which is all that I meant.—1847.]

absurdity.¹ "If a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle, or accidents of bread in cheese, or immaterial substances, or of a free subject, a free will, or any free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd." Some of these propositions, it will occur, are intelligible in a reasonable sense, and not contradictory, except by means of an arbitrary definition which he who employs them does not admit. It may be observed here, as we have done before, that Hobbes does not confine reckoning, or reasoning, to universals, or even to words.

131. Man has the exclusive privilege of forming general theorems. But this privilege is allayed by another, *its frequency*. that is, by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of men those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy. . . . For there is not one that begins his ratiocination from the definitions or explications of the names they are to use, which is a method used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable. He then enumerates seven causes of absurd conclusions; the first of which is the want of definitions, the others are erroneous imposition of names. If we can avoid these errors, it is not easy to fall into absurdity (by which he of course only means any wrong conclusion), except perhaps by the length of a reasoning. "For all men," he says, "by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. Hence it appears that reason is not as sense and memory born with us, nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is, but attained by industry, in apt imposing of names, and in getting a good and orderly method of proceeding from the elements to assertions, and so to syllogisms. Children are not endued with reason at all till they have attained the use of speech, but are called reasonable creatures, for the possibility of having the use of reason hereafter. And reasoning serves the generality of mankind very little, though with their natural prudence without science they are in better condition than those who reason ill themselves, or trust those who have done so."² It has been observed by Buhle, that Hobbes had more respect for the Aristotelian forms of logic than his master Bacon. He has in fact written a short treatise, in his *Elementa Philosophiæ*, on the subject; observing,

¹ *Loc.*, c. 6.² *Id.*

however, therein, that a true logic will be sooner learned by attending to geometrical demonstrations than by drudging over the rules of syllogism, as children learn to walk not by precept but by habit.¹

132. "No discourse whatever," he says truly in the seventh chapter of the *Leviathan*, "can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to come. For, as to the knowledge of fact, it is originally sense; and, ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be, which is to know absolutely; but only that if this is, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be; which is to know conditionally, and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing. And therefore when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connection of the same into general affirmations, and of those again into syllogisms, the end or last sum is called the conclusion, and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge of the consequence of words which is commonly called science. But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or, if definitions, be not rightly joined together in syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again opinion, namely, of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood."²

133. "Belief, which is the admitting of propositions upon trust, in many cases is no less free from doubt than perfect and manifest knowledge; for as there is nothing whereof there is not some cause, so, when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof conceived. Now, there be many things which we receive from the report of others, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause of doubt; for

Knowledge
of fact not
derived
from rea-
soning.

Belief.

¹ "Citius multo veram logicam discunt qui mathematicorum demonstrationibus, quam qui logicorum syllogisandi præceptis legendis tempus conterunt, haud aliter quam parvuli pueri gressum formare discunt non præceptis sed sæpe gradiendo." — C. iv. p. 30. "Atque hæc sufficiunt" (he says afterwards) "de syllogismo, qui est tanquam gressus philosophiæ; nam et quantum necesse est ad cognoscendum

unde vim suam habeat omnis argumentatio legitima, tantum diximus; et omnia accumulare quæ dici possunt, æque superfluum esset ac si quis ut dixi puerulo ad gradiendum præcepta dare velit; acquiritur enim ratiocinandi ars non præceptis sed usu et lectione eorum librorum in quibus omnia severis demonstrationibus transiguntur." — C. v. p. 36.

² Lev., c. 7.

what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things they can know and have no cause to report otherwise than they are, such as is great part of our histories, unless a man would say that all the world had conspired to deceive him?"¹ Whatever we believe on the authority of the speaker, he is the object of our faith. Consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the church, whose word we take and acquiesce therein. Hence all we believe on the authority of men, whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.² We have no certain knowledge of the truth of Scripture, but trust the holy men of God's church succeeding one another from the time of those who saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh. And, as we believe the Scriptures to be the word of God on the authority of the church, the interpretation of the Scripture in case of controversy ought to be trusted to the church rather than private opinion.³

134. The ninth chapter of the *Leviathan* contains a synoptical chart of human science, or "knowledge of consequences," also called philosophy. He divides it into natural and civil, the former into consequences from accidents common to all bodies, quantity and motion, and those from qualities otherwise called physics. The first includes astronomy, mechanics, architecture, as well as mathematics. The second he distinguishes into consequences from qualities of bodies transient, or meteorology, and from those of bodies permanent, such as the stars, the atmosphere, or terrestrial bodies. The last are divided again into those without sense, and those with sense; and these, into animals and men. In the consequences from the qualities of animals generally, he reckons optics and music; in those from men, we find ethics, poetry, rhetoric, and logic. These altogether constitute the first great head of natural philosophy. In the second, or civil philosophy, he includes nothing but the rights and duties of sovereigns and their subjects. This chart of human knowledge is one of the worst that has been propounded, and falls much below that of Bacon.⁴

135. This is the substance of the philosophy of Hobbes, so far as it relates to the intellectual faculties, and especially

¹ *Hum. Nat.*, c. 6.
² *Lev.*, c. 7.

³ *Hum. Nat.*, c. 11.
⁴ *Lev.*, c. 9.

to that of reasoning. In the seventh and two following chapters of the treatise on Human Nature, in the ^{Analysis} ninth and tenth of the Leviathan, he proceeds to the ^{of passions.} analysis of the passions. The motion in some internal substance of the head, if it does not stop there, producing mere conceptions, proceeds to the heart, helping or hindering the vital motions, which he distinguishes from the voluntary, exciting in us pleasant or painful affections, called passions. We are solicited by these to draw near to that which pleases us, and the contrary. Hence pleasure, love, appetite, desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing. As all conceptions we have immediately by the sense are delight or pain or appetite or fear, so are all the imaginations after sense. But as they are weaker imaginations, so are they also weaker pleasures or weaker pains.¹ All delight is appetite, and presupposes a further end. There is no utmost end in this world; for, while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposes a further end. We are not, therefore, to wonder that men desire more, the more they possess; for felicity, by which we mean continual delight, consists, not in having prospered, but in prospering.² Each passion, being, as he fancies, a continuation of the motion which gives rise to a peculiar conception, is associated with it. They all, except such as are immediately connected with sense, consist in the conception of a power to produce some effect. To honor a man is to conceive that he has an excess of power over some one with whom he is compared: hence qualities indicative of power, and actions significant of it, are honorable; riches are honored as signs of power, and nobility is honorable as a sign of power in ancestors.³

136. "The constitution of man's body is in perpetual mutation, and hence it is impossible that all the same ^{Good and} things should always cause in him the same appe- ^{evil, rela-} tites and aversions; much less can all men consent ^{tive terms.} in the desire of any one object. But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calls good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; or of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person using them; there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken

¹ Hum. Nat., c. 7.

² Hum. Nat., c. 7; Lev. c. 11.

³ Hum. Nat., c. 8.

what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things they can know and have no cause to report otherwise than they are, such as is great part of our histories, unless a man would say that all the world had conspired to deceive him?"¹ Whatever we believe on the authority of the speaker, he is the object of our faith. Consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the church, whose word we take and acquiesce therein. Hence all we believe on the authority of men, whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.² We have no certain knowledge of the truth of Scripture, but trust the holy men of God's church succeeding one another from the time of those who saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh. And, as we believe the Scriptures to be the word of God on the authority of the church, the interpretation of the Scripture in case of controversy ought to be trusted to the church rather than private opinion.³

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Good and evil, relative terms.

¹ Hum. Nat., c. 7.

² Hum. Nat., c. 7; Lev. c. 11.

³ Hum. Nat., c. 8.

from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth, or, in a commonwealth, from the person that represents us, or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof."¹

137. In prosecuting this analysis, all the passions are resolved into self-love, the pleasure that we take in our own power, the pain that we suffer in wanting it. Some of his explications are very forced. Thus weeping is said to be from a sense of our want of power. And here comes one of his strange paradoxes. "Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, when the revenge is suddenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of their adversary; *and such are the tears of reconciliation.*"² So resolute was he to resort to any thing the most preposterous, rather than admit a moral feeling in human nature. His account of laughter is better known, and perhaps more probable, though not explaining the whole of the case. After justly observing, that, whatsoever it be that moves laughter, it must be new and unexpected, he defines it to be "a sudden glory arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly; for men laugh at the follies of themselves past." It might be objected, that those are most prone to laughter who have least of this glorying in themselves, or undervaluing of their neighbors.

138. "There is a great difference between the desire of a man when indefinite, and the same desire limited to one person; and this is that love which is the great theme of poets. But, notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word 'need;' for it is a conception a man hath of his need of that one person desired."³ There is yet another passion sometimes called love, but more properly good-will or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power than to find himself able, not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs; and this is that conception wherein consists charity. In which first is contained that natural affection of parents towards their children, which the Greeks call *στοργή*, as also that affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on strangers is not to be called charity,

¹ Lev., c. 6.² Hum. Nat., c. 9; Lev., c. 6 and 10.³ Hum. Nat., c. 9.

but either contract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship, or fear, which makes them to purchase peace."¹ This is equally contrary to notorious truth, there being neither fear nor contract in generosity towards strangers. It is, however, not so extravagant as a subsequent position, that in beholding the danger of a ship in a tempest, though there is pity, which is grief, yet "the delight in our own security is so far predominant, that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends."²

139. As knowledge begins from experience, new experience is the beginning of new knowledge. Whatever, therefore, happens new to a man, gives him the hope of knowing somewhat he knew not before. This appetite of knowledge is curiosity. It is peculiar to man; for beasts never regard new things, except to discern how far they may be useful, while man looks for the cause and beginning of all he sees.³ This attribute of curiosity seems rather hastily denied to beasts. And as men, he says, are always seeking new knowledge, so are they always deriving some new gratification. There is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind while we live here, because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire nor without fear, no more than without sense. "What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honor him, a man shall no sooner know than enjoy, being joys that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of schoolmen, 'beatifical vision,' is unintelligible."⁴

140. From the consideration of the passions, Hobbes advances to inquire what are the causes of the difference in the intellectual capacities and dispositions of men.⁵ Their bodily senses are nearly alike, whence he precipitately infers there can be no great difference in the brain. Yet men differ much in their bodily constitution, whence he derives the principal differences in their minds: some, being addicted to sensual pleasures, are less curious as to knowledge, or ambitious as to power. This is called dulness, and proceeds from the appetite of bodily delight. The contrary to this is a quick ranging of mind accompanied with curiosity in comparing things that come into it, either as to unexpected similitude, in which fancy consists, or dissimili-

Curiosity.

Difference of intellectual capacities.

¹ Hum. Nat., c. 9.

² Id., *ibid.* This is an exaggeration of some well-known lines of Lucretius, which are themselves exaggerated.

³ Hum. Nat., c. 9.

⁴ Lev., c. 6 and c. 11.

⁵ Hum. Nat., c. 10.

tude in things appearing the same, which is properly called judgment; "for to judge is nothing else but to distinguish and discern. And both fancy and judgment are commonly comprehended under the name of wit, which seems to be a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that restiness of the spirits supposed in those who are dull."¹

141. We call it levity, when the mind is easily diverted, and the discourse is parenthetical; and this proceeds from curiosity with too much equality and indifference; for, when all things make equal impression and delight, they equally throng to be expressed. A different fault is indocibility, or difficulty of being taught; which must arise from a false opinion that men know already the truth of what is called in question: for certainly they are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as not to discern the difference of what is proved and what is not; and therefore, if the minds of men were all of white paper, they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatever should be in right method, and by right ratiocination delivered to them. But when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentic records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men than to write legibly on a paper already scribbled over. The immediate cause, therefore, of indocibility is prejudice, and of prejudice false opinion of our own knowledge.²

142. Intellectual virtues are such abilities as go by the name of a good wit, which may be natural or acquired. "By natural wit," says Hobbes, "I mean not that which a man hath from his birth; for that is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little from one another, and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned among virtues. But I mean that wit which is gotten by use only and experience, without method, culture, or instruction, and consists chiefly in celerity of imagining and steady direction. And the difference in this quickness is caused by that of men's passions that love and dislike some one thing, some another; and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination." Fancy is not praised without judgment and discretion, which is properly a discerning of times, places, and persons; but judgment and

¹ Hum. Nat.² 14.

discretion is commended for itself without fancy: without steadiness and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness, such as they have who lose themselves in long digressions and parentheses. If the defect of discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a want of wit.¹

143. The causes of the difference of wits are in the passions; and the difference of passions proceeds partly from the different constitution of the body and partly from different education. Those passions are chiefly the desire of power, riches, knowledge, or honor; all which may be reduced to the first: for riches, knowledge, and honor are but several sorts of power. He who has no great passion for any of these, though he may be so far a good man as to be free from giving offence, yet cannot possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. To have weak passions is dulness; to have passions indifferently for every thing, giddiness and distraction; to have stronger passions for any thing than others have is madness. Madness may be the excess of many passions; and the passions themselves, when they lead to evil, are degrees of it. Differences in the passions. He seems to have had some notion of what Butler is reported to have thrown out as to the madness of a whole people. "What argument for madness can there be greater, than to clamor, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamor, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected, and secured from injury. And, if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man."²

144. There is a fault in some men's habit of discoursing, which may be reckoned a sort of madness, which is Unmeaning language. when they speak words with no signification at all. "And this is incident to none but those that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible as the schoolmen, or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore by those other egregious persons counted idiots. But, to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a schoolman into his hands, and see if he

¹ *Lev.*, c. 8.

² 14

can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point, as the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ, transubstantiation, free-will, &c., into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible, or into any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted with that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar." And, after quoting some words from Suarez, he adds, "When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so?"¹

145. The eleventh chapter of the *Leviathan*, "On manners," **Manners.** by which he means those qualities of mankind which concern their living together in peace and unity, is full of Hobbes's caustic remarks on human nature. Often acute, but always severe, he ascribes overmuch to a deliberate and calculating selfishness. Thus the reverence of antiquity is referred to "the contention men have with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other." Thus, also, "to have received, from one to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than we can hope to requite, disposes to counterfeit love, but really to secret hatred, and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that, in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thralldom; and unrequitable obligation perpetual thralldom, which is to one's equal hateful." He owns, however, that to have received benefits from a superior, disposes us to love him; and so it does where we can hope to requite even an equal. If these maxims have a certain basis of truth, they have at least the fault of those of Rochefoucault: they are made too generally characteristic of mankind.

146. Ignorance of the signification of words disposes men to take on trust not only the truth they know not, **Ignorances** but also errors and nonsense. For neither can be **and pre-ju-** detected without a perfect understanding of words. **dice.** "But ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposes a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions, in such manner as to think that unjust which it has been the custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation of which they can produce an example, or, as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent."

¹ *Lev.*

"Men appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them; which is the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed both by the pen and the sword: whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so, because men care not in that subject what is truth, as it is a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet, by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed as far as he whom it concerned was able."¹ This excellent piece of satire has been often quoted, and sometimes copied, and does not exaggerate the pertinacity of mankind in resisting the evidence of truth, when it thwarts the interests and passions of any particular sect or community. In the earlier part of the paragraph, it seems not so easy to reconcile what Hobbes has said with his general notions of right and justice; since if these resolve themselves, as is his theory, into mere force, there can be little appeal to reason, or to any thing else than custom and precedent, which are commonly the exponents of power.

147. In the conclusion of this chapter of the *Leviathan*, as well as in the next, he dwells more on the nature of religion than he had done in the former treatise, and so as to subject himself to the imputation of absolute atheism, or at least of a denial of most attributes which we assign to the Deity. "Curiosity about causes," he says, "led men to search out, one after the other, till they came to this necessary conclusion, that there is some eternal cause which men call God. But they have no more idea of his nature than a blind man has of fire, though he knows that there is something that warms him. So, by the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind. And they that make little inquiry into the natural causes of things are inclined to feign several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations. And this fear of things invisible is the

¹ Lev., c 11

absurdity.¹ "If a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle, or accidents of bread in cheese, or immaterial substances, or of a free subject, a free will, or any free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd." Some of these propositions, it will occur, are intelligible in a reasonable sense, and not contradictory, except by means of an arbitrary definition which he who employs them does not admit. It may be observed here, as we have done before, that Hobbes does not confine reckoning, or reasoning, to universals, or even to words.

131. Man has the exclusive privilege of forming general theorems. But this privilege is allayed by another, *its frequency*. that is, by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of men those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy. . . . For there is not one that begins his ratiocination from the definitions or explications of the names they are to use, which is a method used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable. He then enumerates seven causes of absurd conclusions; the first of which is the want of definitions, the others are erroneous imposition of names. If we can avoid these errors, it is not easy to fall into absurdity (by which he of course only means any wrong conclusion), except perhaps by the length of a reasoning. "For all men," he says, "by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. Hence it appears that reason is not as sense and memory born with us, nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is, but attained by industry, in apt imposing of names, and in getting a good and orderly method of proceeding from the elements to assertions, and so to syllogisms. Children are not endued with reason at all till they have attained the use of speech, but are called reasonable creatures, for the possibility of having the use of reason hereafter. And reasoning serves the generality of mankind very little, though with their natural prudence without science they are in better condition than those who reason ill themselves, or trust those who have done so."² It has been observed by Buhle, that Hobbes had more respect for the Aristotelian forms of logic than his master Bacon. He has in fact written a short treatise, in his *Elementa Philosophiæ*, on the subject; observing,

¹ *Lev.*, c. 5.² *Id.*

however, therein, that a true logic will be sooner learned by attending to geometrical demonstrations than by drudging over the rules of syllogism, as children learn to walk not by precept but by habit.¹

132. "No discourse whatever," he says truly in the seventh chapter of the Leviathan, "can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to come. For, as to the knowledge of fact, it is originally sense; and, ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be, which is to know absolutely; but only that if this is, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be; which is to know conditionally, and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing. And therefore when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connection of the same into general affirmations, and of those again into syllogisms, the end or last sum is called the conclusion, and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge of the consequence of words which is commonly called science. But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or, if definitions, be not rightly joined together in syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again opinion, namely, of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood."²

133. "Belief, which is the admitting of propositions upon trust, in many cases is no less free from doubt than perfect and manifest knowledge; for as there is nothing whereof there is not some cause, so, when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof conceived. Now, there be many things which we receive from the report of others, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause of doubt; for

Knowledge
of fact not
derived
from rea-
soning.

Belief.

¹ "Citius multo veram logicam discunt qui mathematicorum demonstrationibus, quam qui logicorum syllogismi præceptis legendis tempus conterunt, haud aliter quam parvuli pueri gressum formare discunt non præceptis sed sæpe gradiendo." — C. iv. p. 30. "Atque hæc sufficiunt" (he says afterwards) "de syllogismo, qui est tanquam gressus philosophiæ; nam et quantum necesse est ad cognoscendum

unde vim suam habeat omnis argumentatio legitima, tantum diximus; et omnia accumulare quæ dici possunt, æque superfluum esset ac si quis ut dixi puerulo ad gradiendum præcepta dare velit; acquiritur enim ratiocinandi ars non præceptis sed usu et lectione eorum librorum in quibus omnia severis demonstrationibus transiguntur." — C. v. p. 36.

² Lev., c. 7.

what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things they can know and have no cause to report otherwise than they are, such as is great part of our histories, unless a man would say that all the world had conspired to deceive him?"¹ Whatever we believe on the authority of the speaker, he is the object of our faith. Consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the church, whose word we take and acquiesce therein. Hence all we believe on the authority of men, whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.² We have no certain knowledge of the truth of Scripture, but trust the holy men of God's church succeeding one another from the time of those who saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh. And, as we believe the Scriptures to be the word of God on the authority of the church, the interpretation of the Scripture in case of controversy ought to be trusted to the church rather than private opinion.³

134. The ninth chapter of the *Leviathan* contains a synoptical chart of human science, or "knowledge of consequences," also called philosophy. He divides it into natural and civil, the former into consequences from accidents common to all bodies, quantity and motion, and those from qualities otherwise called physics. The first includes astronomy, mechanics, architecture, as well as mathematics. The second he distinguishes into consequences from qualities of bodies transient, or meteorology, and from those of bodies permanent, such as the stars, the atmosphere, or terrestrial bodies. The last are divided again into those without sense, and those with sense; and these, into animals and men. In the consequences from the qualities of animals generally, he reckons optics and music; in those from men, we find ethics, poetry, rhetoric, and logic. These altogether constitute the first great head of natural philosophy. In the second, or civil philosophy, he includes nothing but the rights and duties of sovereigns and their subjects. This chart of human knowledge is one of the worst that has been propounded, and falls much below that of Bacon.⁴

135. This is the substance of the philosophy of Hobbes, so far as it relates to the intellectual faculties, and especially

¹ *Hum. Nat.*, c. 6.
² *Lev.*, c. 7.

³ *Hum. Nat.*, c. 11.
⁴ *Lev.*, c. 9.

to that of reasoning. In the seventh and two following chapters of the treatise on Human Nature, in the *Analysis* ninth and tenth of the *Leviathan*, he proceeds to the *of passions* analysis of the passions. The motion in some internal substance of the head, if it does not stop there, producing mere conceptions, proceeds to the heart, helping or hindering the vital motions, which he distinguishes from the voluntary, exciting in us pleasant or painful affections, called passions. We are solicited by these to draw near to that which pleases us, and the contrary. Hence pleasure, love, appetite, desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing. As all conceptions we have immediately by the sense are delight or pain or appetite or fear, so are all the imaginations after sense. But as they are weaker imaginations, so are they also weaker pleasures or weaker pains.¹ All delight is appetite, and presupposes a further end. There is no utmost end in this world; for, while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposes a further end. We are not, therefore, to wonder that men desire more, the more they possess; for felicity, by which we mean continual delight, consists, not in having prospered, but in prospering.² Each passion, being, as he fancies, a continuation of the motion which gives rise to a peculiar conception, is associated with it. They all, except such as are immediately connected with sense, consist in the conception of a power to produce some effect. To honor a man is to conceive that he has an excess of power over some one with whom he is compared: hence qualities indicative of power, and actions significant of it, are honorable; riches are honored as signs of power, and nobility is honorable as a sign of power in ancestors.³

136. "The constitution of man's body is in perpetual mutation, and hence it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions; much less can all men consent in the desire of any one object. But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calls good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; or of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person using them; there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken

¹ Hum. Nat., c. 7.² Hum. Nat., c. 7; Lev. c. 11.³ Hum. Nat., c. 8.

from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth, or, in a commonwealth, from the person that represents us, or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof."¹

137. In prosecuting this analysis, all the passions are resolved into self-love, the pleasure that we take in our own power, the pain that we suffer in wanting it. Some of his explications are very forced. Thus weeping is said to be from a sense of our want of power. And here comes one of his strange paradoxes. "Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, when the revenge is suddenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of their adversary; and such are the tears of reconciliation."² So resolute was he to resort to any thing the most preposterous, rather than admit a moral feeling in human nature. His account of laughter is better known, and perhaps more probable, though not explaining the whole of the case. After justly observing, that, whatsoever it be that moves laughter, it must be new and unexpected, he defines it to be "a sudden glory arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly; for men laugh at the follies of themselves past." It might be objected, that those are most prone to laughter who have least of this glorying in themselves, or undervaluing of their neighbors.

138. "There is a great difference between the desire of a man when indefinite, and the same desire limited to one person; and this is that love which is the great theme of poets. But, notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word 'need;' for it is a conception a man hath of his need of that one person desired."³ There is yet another passion sometimes called love, but more properly good-will or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power than to find himself able, not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs; and this is that conception wherein consists charity. In which first is contained that natural affection of parents towards their children, which the Greeks call *στοργή*, as also that affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on strangers is not to be called charity,

¹ Lev., c. 6.² Hum. Nat., c. 9; Lev., c. 6 and 10.³ Hum. Nat., c. 2.

but either contract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship, or fear, which makes them to purchase peace."¹ This is equally contrary to notorious truth, there being neither fear nor contract in generosity towards strangers. It is, however, not so extravagant as a subsequent position, that in beholding the danger of a ship in a tempest, though there is pity, which is grief, yet "the delight in our own security is so far predominant, that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends."²

139. As knowledge begins from experience, new experience is the beginning of new knowledge. Whatever, therefore, happens new to a man, gives him the hope of knowing somewhat he knew not before. This appetite of knowledge is curiosity. It is peculiar to man; for beasts never regard new things, except to discern how far they may be useful, while man looks for the cause and beginning of all he sees.³ This attribute of curiosity seems rather hastily denied to beasts. And as men, he says, are always seeking new knowledge, so are they always deriving some new gratification. There is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind while we live here, because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire nor without fear, no more than without sense. "What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honor him, a man shall no sooner know than enjoy, being joys that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of schoolmen, 'beatifical vision,' is unintelligible."⁴

140. From the consideration of the passions, Hobbes advances to inquire what are the causes of the difference in the intellectual capacities and dispositions of men.⁵ Their bodily senses are nearly alike, whence he precipitately infers there can be no great difference in the brain. Yet men differ much in their bodily constitution, whence he derives the principal differences in their minds: some, being addicted to sensual pleasures, are less curious as to knowledge, or ambitious as to power. This is called dulness, and proceeds from the appetite of bodily delight. The contrary to this is a quick ranging of mind accompanied with curiosity in comparing things that come into it, either as to unexpected similitude, in which fancy consists, or dissimili-

Curiosity.

Difference of intellectual capacities.

¹ Hum. Nat., c. 9.

² Id. *Ibid.* This is an exaggeration of some well-known lines of Lucretius, which are themselves exaggerated.

³ Hum. Nat., c. 9.

⁴ Lev., c. 6 and c. 11.

⁵ Hum. Nat., c. 10.

tude in things appearing the same, which is properly called judgment; "for to judge is nothing else but to distinguish and discern. And both fancy and judgment are commonly comprehended under the name of wit, which seems to be a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that restiness of the spirits supposed in those who are dull."¹

141. We call it levity, when the mind is easily diverted, and the discourse is parenthetical; and this proceeds from curiosity with too much equality and indifference; for, when all things make equal impression and delight, they equally throng to be expressed. A different fault is indocibility, or difficulty of being taught; which must arise from a false opinion that men know already the truth of what is called in question: for certainly they are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as not to discern the difference of what is proved and what is not; and therefore, if the minds of men were all of white paper, they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatever should be in right method, and by right ratiocination delivered to them. But when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentic records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men than to write legibly on a paper already scribbled over. The immediate cause, therefore, of indocibility is prejudice, and of prejudice false opinion of our own knowledge.²

142. Intellectual virtues are such abilities as go by the name of a good wit, which may be natural or acquired. "By natural wit," says Hobbes, "I mean not that which a man hath from his birth; for that is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little from one another, and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned among virtues. But I mean that wit which is gotten by use only and experience, without method, culture, or instruction, and consists chiefly in celerity of imagining and steady direction. And the difference in this quickness is caused by that of men's passions that love and dislike some one thing, some another; and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination." Fancy is not praised without judgment and discretion, which is properly a discerning of times, places, and persons; but judgment and

¹ Hum. Nat.

² Id.

discretion is commended for itself without fancy: without steadiness and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness, such as they have who lose themselves in long digressions and parentheses. If the defect of discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a want of wit.¹

143. The causes of the difference of wits are in the passions; and the difference of passions proceeds partly from the different constitution of the body and partly from different education. Those passions are chiefly the desire of power, riches, knowledge, or honor; all which may be reduced to the first: for riches, knowledge, and honor are but several sorts of power. He who has no great passion for any of these, though he may be so far a good man as to be free from giving offence, yet cannot possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. To have weak passions is dulness; to have passions indifferently for every thing, giddiness and distraction; to have stronger passions for any thing than others have is madness. Madness may be the excess of many passions; and the passions themselves, when they lead to evil, are degrees of it. Differences in the passions. He seems to have had some notion of what Butler is reported to have thrown out as to the madness of a whole people. "What argument for madness can there be greater, than to clamor, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamor, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected, and secured from injury. And, if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man."²

144. There is a fault in some men's habit of discoursing, which may be reckoned a sort of madness, which is Unmeaning language. when they speak words with no signification at all. "And this is incident to none but those that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible as the schoolmen, or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore by those other egregious persons counted idiots. But, to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a schoolman into his hands, and see if he

¹ Lev., c. 8.² Id.

can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point, as the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ, transubstantiation, free-will, &c., into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible, or into any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted with that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar." And, after quoting some words from Suarez, he adds, "When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so?"¹

145. The eleventh chapter of the *Leviathan*, "On manners," **Manners.** by which he means those qualities of mankind which concern their living together in peace and unity, is full of Hobbes's caustic remarks on human nature. Often acute, but always severe, he ascribes overmuch to a deliberate and calculating selfishness. Thus the reverence of antiquity is referred to "the contention men have with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other." Thus, also, "to have received, from one to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than we can hope to requite, disposes to counterfeit love, but really to secret hatred, and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that, in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thralldom; and unrequitable obligation perpetual thralldom, which is to one's equal hateful." He owns, however, that to have received benefits from a superior, disposes us to love him; and so it does where we can hope to requite even an equal. If these maxims have a certain basis of truth, they have at least the fault of those of Rochefoucault: they are made too generally characteristic of mankind.

146. Ignorance of the signification of words disposes men to take on trust not only the truth they know not, but also errors and nonsense. For neither can be **Ignorances and prejudices.** detected without a perfect understanding of words. "But ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposes a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions, in such manner as to think that unjust which it has been the custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation of which they can produce an example, or, as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent."

¹ *Lev.*

"Men appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them; which is the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed both by the pen and the sword: whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so, because men care not in that subject what is truth, as it is a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet, by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed as far as he whom it concerned was able."¹ This excellent piece of satire has been often quoted, and sometimes copied, and does not exaggerate the pertinacity of mankind in resisting the evidence of truth, when it thwarts the interests and passions of any particular sect or community. In the earlier part of the paragraph, it seems not so easy to reconcile what Hobbes has said with his general notions of right and justice; since if these resolve themselves, as is his theory, into mere force, there can be little appeal to reason, or to any thing else than custom and precedent, which are commonly the exponents of power.

147. In the conclusion of this chapter of the *Leviathan*, as well as in the next, he dwells more on the nature of religion than he had done in the former treatise, and so as to subject himself to the imputation of absolute atheism, or at least of a denial of most attributes which we assign to the Deity. "Curiosity about causes," he says, "led men to search out, one after the other, till they came to this necessary conclusion, that there is some eternal cause which men call God. But they have no more idea of his nature than a blind man has of fire, though he knows that there is something that warms him. So, by the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind. And they that make little inquiry into the natural causes of things are inclined to feign several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations. And this fear of things invisible is the

¹ *Lev.*, c. 11

natural seed of that which every one in himself calleth religion, and in them that worship or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition."

148. "As God is incomprehensible, it follows that we can have no conception or image of the Deity; and, consequently, all his attributes signify our inability or defect of power to conceive any thing concerning his nature, and not any conception of the same, excepting only this, that there is a God. Men that by their own meditation arrive at the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, choose rather to confess this is incomprehensible and above their understanding, than to define his nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible."¹ For, concerning such spirits, he holds that it is not possible by natural means only to come to the knowledge of so much as that there are such things.²

149. Religion he derives from three sources, — the desire Its supposed sources. of men to search for causes, the reference of every thing that has a beginning to some cause, and the observation of the order and consequence of things. But the two former lead to anxiety; for the knowledge that there have been causes of the effects we see, leads us to anticipate that they will in time be the causes of effects to come; so that every man, especially such as are over-provident, is "like Prometheus, the prudent man, as his name implies, who was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where an eagle feeding on his liver devoured as much by day as was repaired by night; and so he who looks too far before him has his heart all day long gnawed by the fear of death, poverty, or other calamity, and has no repose nor pause but in sleep." This is an allusion made in the style of Lord Bacon. The ignorance of causes makes men fear some invisible agent, like the gods of the Gentiles; but the investigation of them leads us to a God eternal, infinite, and omnipotent. This ignorance, however, of second causes, conspiring with three other prejudices of mankind, — the belief in ghosts, or spirits of subtile bodies, the devotion and reverence generally shown towards what we fear as having power to hurt us, and the taking of things casual for prognostics, — are altogether the natural seed of religion; which, by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men,

¹ Lev., c. 12.

² Hum. Nat., c. 11.

hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another. He illustrates this by a variety of instances from ancient superstitions. But the forms of religion are changed when men suspect the wisdom, sincerity, or love of those who teach it, or its priests.¹ The remaining portion of the *Leviathan*, relating to moral and political philosophy, must be deferred to our next chapter.

150. The *Elementa Philosophiæ* were published by Hobbes in 1655, and dedicated to his constant patron, the Earl of Devonshire. These are divided into three parts; entitled *De Corpore*, *De Homine*, and *De Cive*. And the first part has itself three divisions; *Logic*, the *First Philosophy*, and *Physics*. The second part, *De Homine*, is neither the treatise of *Human Nature*, nor the corresponding part of the *Leviathan*, though it contains many things substantially found there. A long disquisition on optics and the nature of vision, chiefly geometrical, is entirely new. The third part, *De Cive*, is the treatise by that name, reprinted, as far as I am aware, without alteration.

151. The first part of the first treatise, entitled *Computative Logica*, is by no means the least valuable among the philosophical writings of Hobbes. In forty pages the subject is very well and clearly explained; nor do I know that the principles are better laid down, or the rules more sufficiently given, in more prolix treatises. Many of his observations, especially as to words, are such as we find in his English works; and perhaps his nominalism is more clearly expressed than it is in them. Of the syllogistic method, at least for the purpose of demonstration, or teaching others, he seems to have entertained a favorable opinion, or even to have held it necessary for real demonstration, as his definition shows. Hobbes appears to be aware of what I do not remember to have seen put by others, that, in the natural process of reasoning, the minor premise commonly precedes the major.²

¹ *Lev.*, c. 12.

² In *Whately's Logic*, p. 90, it is observed, that "the proper order is to place the major premise first, and the minor second; but this does not constitute the major and minor premises," &c. It may be the proper order in one sense, as exhibiting better the foundation of syllogistic reasoning; but it is not that which we commonly follow, either in thinking, or in proving to others. In the rhetorical use of syllogism, it can admit of no doubt that the opposite order is the most striking and persuasive; such as in Cato, "If there be a God, he must delight in virtue; and that which he delights in must be happy." In Euclid's demonstrations, this will be found the form usually employed; and though the rules of grammar are generally illustrated by examples, which

It is for want of attending to this, that syllogisms, as usually stated, are apt to have so formal and unnatural a construction. The process of the mind in this kind of reasoning is explained, in general, with correctness, and, I believe, with originality, in the following passage, which I shall transcribe from the Latin, rather than give a version of my own; few probably being likely to read the present section, who are unacquainted with that language. The style of Hobbes, though perspicuous, is concise, and the original words will be more satisfactory than any translation.

152. "Syllogismo directo cogitatio in animo respondens est hujusmodi. Primo concipitur phantasma rei nominatæ cum accidente sive affectu ejus propter quem appellatur eo nomine quod est in minore propositione subjectum; deinde animo occurrit phantasma ejusdem rei cum accidente sive affectu propter quem appellatur, quod est in eadem propositione prædicatum. Tertio redit cogitatio rursus ad rem nominatam cum affectu propter quem eo nomine appellatur, quod est in prædicato propositionis majoris. Postremo cum meminerit eos affectus esse omnes unius et ejusdem rei, concludit tria illa nomina ejusdem quoque rei esse nomina; hoc est, conclusionem esse veram. Exempli causa, quando fit syllogismus hic, Homo est Animal, Animal est Corpus, ergo Homo est Corpus, occurrit animo imago hominis loquentis vel differentis [sic, sed lege disserentis], meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari hominem. Deinde occurrit eadem imago ejusdem hominis sese moventis, meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari animal. Tertio recurrit eadem imago hominis locum aliquem sive spatium occupantis, meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari corpus.¹ Postremo cum meminerit rem illam quæ et

is beginning with the major premise, yet the process of reasoning which a boy employs in construing a Latin sentence is the reverse. He observes a nominative case, a verb in the third person, and then applies his general rule, or major, to the particular instance, or minor, so as to infer their agreement. In criminal jurisprudence, the Scots begin with the major premise, or relevancy of the indictment, when there is room for doubt; the English, with the minor, or evidence of the fact, reserving the other for what we call motion in arrest of judgment. Instances of both orders are common; but by far the most frequent are of that which the Archbishop of Dublin reckons the less proper of the two. Those logicians who

fail to direct the student's attention to this, really do not justice to their own favorite science.

¹ This is the questionable part of Hobbes's theory of syllogism. According to the common and obvious understanding the mind, in the major premise, "Animal est Corpus," does not reflect on the subject of the minor, *Homo*, as occupying space, but on the subject of the major, *Animal*, which includes, indeed, the former, but is mentally substituted for it. It may sometimes happen, that, where this predicate of the minor term is manifestly a collective word that comprehends the subject, the latter is not, as it were, absorbed in it, and may be contemplated by the mind distinctly in the major; as if we

extendebatur secundum locum, et loco movebatur, et oratione utebatur, unam et eandem fuisse, concludit etiam nomina illa tria, Homo, Animal, Corpus, ejusdem rei esse nomina, et proinde, Homo est Corpus, esse propositionem veram. Manifestum hinc est conceptum sive cogitationem quæ respondens syllogismo ex propositionibus universalibus in animo existit, nullam esse in iis animalibus quibus deest usus nominum, cum inter syllogizandum oporteat non modo de re sed etiam alternis vicibus de diversis rei nominibus, quæ propter diversas de re cogitationes adhibitæ sunt, cogitare."

153. The metaphysical philosophy of Hobbes, always bold and original, often acute and profound, without producing an immediate school of disciples like that of Descartes, struck, perhaps, a deeper root in the minds of reflecting men, and has influenced more extensively the general tone of speculation. Locke, who had not read much, had certainly read Hobbes, though he does not borrow from him so much as has sometimes been imagined. The French metaphysicians of the next century found him nearer to their own theories than his more celebrated rival in English philosophy. But the writer who has built most upon Hobbes, and may be reckoned, in a certain sense, his commentator, if he who fully explains and develops a system may deserve that name, was Hartley. The theory of association is implied and intimated in many passages of the elder philosopher, though it was first expanded and applied with a diligent, ingenious, and comprehensive research, if sometimes in too forced a manner, by his disciple. I use this word without particular inquiry into the direct acquaintance of Hartley with the writings of Hobbes: the subject had been frequently touched in intermediate publications; and in matters of reasoning, as I have intimated above, little or no presumption of borrowing can be founded on coincidence. Hartley also resembles Hobbes in the extreme to which he has pushed the nominalist theory, in the proneness to materialize all intellectual processes, and either to force all things mysterious to our faculties into something imaginable, or to

say, John is a man; a man feels; we may perhaps have no image in the mind of any man but John. But this is not the case where the predicated quality appertains to many things visibly different from the subject; as in Hobbes's instance, "Animal est Corpus," we may surely consider other animals as being extended and occupying

space besides men. It does not seem that otherwise there could be any ascending scale from particulars to generals, as far as the reasoning faculties, independent of words, are concerned; and, if we begin with the major premise of the syllogism, this will be still more apparent.

reject them as unmeaning, in the want, much connected with this, of a steady perception of the difference between the Ego and its objects, in an excessive love of simplifying and generalizing, and in a readiness to adopt explanations neither conformable to reason nor experience, when they fall in with some single principle, the key that was to unlock every ward of the human soul.

154. In nothing does Hobbes deserve more credit than in having set an example of close observation in the philosophy of the human mind. If he errs, he errs like a man who goes a little out of the right track, not like one who has set out in a wrong one. The eulogy of Stewart on Descartes, that he was the father of this experimental psychology, cannot be strictly wrested from him by Hobbes, inasmuch as the publications of the former are of an earlier date; but we may fairly say, that the latter began as soon, and prosecuted his inquiries farther. It seems natural to presume, that Hobbes, who is said to have been employed by Bacon in translating some of his works into Latin, had at least been led by him to the inductive process which he has more than any other employed. But he has seldom mentioned his predecessor's name; and indeed his mind was of a different stamp, — less excursive, less quick in discovering analogies, and less fond of reasoning from them, but more close, perhaps more patient, and more apt to follow up a predominant idea, which sometimes becomes one of the *idola speciei* that deceive him.

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND OF
JURISPRUDENCE, FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I. — ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Casuists of the Roman Church — Suarez on Moral Law — Selden — Charron — La Mothe le Vayer — Bacon's Essays — Feltham — Browne's Religio Medici — Other Writers.

1. IN traversing so wide a field as moral and political philosophy, we must still endeavor to distribute the subject according to some order of subdivision, so far at least as the contents of the books themselves which come before us will permit. And we give the first place to those which, relating to the moral law both of nature and revelation, connect the proper subject of the present chapter with that of the second and third.

2. We meet here a concourse of volumes occupying no small space in old libraries, — the writings of the ^{Casuistical} casuists, chiefly within the Romish Church. None ^{writers.} perhaps in the whole compass of literature are more neglected by those who do not read with what we may call a professional view; but to the ecclesiastics of that communion they have still a certain value, though far less than when they were first written. The most vital discipline of that church, the secret of the power of its priesthood, the source of most of ^{Importance} the good and evil it can work, is found in the confes- ^{of confes-}sional. It is there that the keys are kept; it is there that the lamp burns, whose rays diverge to every portion of human life. No church that has relinquished this prerogative can ever establish a permanent dominion over mankind; none that retains it in effective use can lose the hope or the prospect of being their ruler.

tude in things appearing the same, which is properly called judgment; "for to judge is nothing else but to distinguish and discern. And both fancy and judgment are commonly comprehended under the name of wit, which seems to be a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that restiness of the spirits supposed in those who are dull."¹

141. We call it levity, when the mind is easily diverted, and the discourse is parenthetical; and this proceeds from curiosity with too much equality and indifference; for, when all things make equal impression and delight, they equally throng to be expressed. A different fault is indocibility, or difficulty of being taught; which must arise from a false opinion that men know already the truth of what is called in question: for certainly they are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as not to discern the difference of what is proved and what is not; and therefore, if the minds of men were all of white paper, they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatever should be in right method, and by right ratiocination delivered to them. But when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentic records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men than to write legibly on a paper already scribbled over. The immediate cause, therefore, of indocibility is prejudice, and of prejudice false opinion of our own knowledge.²

142. Intellectual virtues are such abilities as go by the name of a good wit, which may be natural or ~~ac-~~^{Wit and} ~~fancy.~~^{fancy} quired. "By natural wit," says Hobbes, "I mean not that which a man hath from his birth; for that is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little from one another, and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned among virtues. But I mean that wit which is gotten by use only and experience, without method, culture, or instruction, and consists chiefly in celerity of imagining and steady direction. And the difference in this quickness is caused by that of men's passions that love and dislike some one thing, some another; and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination." Fancy is not praised without judgment and discretion, which is properly a discerning of times, places, and persons; but judgment and

¹ Hum. Nat.² Id.

discretion is commended for itself without fancy: without steadiness and direction to some end, a great fancy is one kind of madness, such as they have who lose themselves in long digressions and parentheses. If the defect of discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a want of wit.¹

143. The causes of the difference of wits are in the passions; and the difference of passions proceeds partly from the different constitution of the body and partly from different education. Those passions are chiefly the desire of power, riches, knowledge, or honor; all which may be reduced to the first: for riches, knowledge, and honor are but several sorts of power. He who has no great passion for any of these, though he may be so far a good man as to be free from giving offence, yet cannot possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. To have weak passions is dulness; to have passions indifferently for every thing, giddiness and distraction; to have stronger passions for any thing than others have is madness. Madness may be the excess of many passions; and the passions themselves, when they lead to evil, are degrees of it. ^{Differences in the passions.} He seems to have had some notion of what Butler is reported to have thrown out as to the madness of a whole people. "What argument for madness can there be greater, than to clamor, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamor, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected, and secured from injury. And, if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man."²

144. There is a fault in some men's habit of discoursing, which may be reckoned a sort of madness, which is ^{Unmeaning language.} when they speak words with no signification at all. "And this is incident to none but those that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible as the schoolmen, or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore by those other egregious persons counted idiots. But, to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a schoolman into his hands, and see if he

¹ *Lev.*, c. 8.² *Id*

can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point, as the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ, transubstantiation, free-will, &c., into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible, or into any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted with that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar." And, after quoting some words from Suarez, he adds, "When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so?"¹

145. The eleventh chapter of the *Leviathan*, "On manners," Manners. by which he means those qualities of mankind which concern their living together in peace and unity, is full of Hobbes's caustic remarks on human nature. Often acute, but always severe, he ascribes overmuch to a deliberate and calculating selfishness. Thus the reverence of antiquity is referred to "the contention men have with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other." Thus, also, "to have received, from one to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than we can hope to requite, disposes to counterfeit love, but really to secret hatred, and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that, in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thralldom; and unrequitable obligation perpetual thralldom, which is to one's equal hateful." He owns, however, that to have received benefits from a superior, disposes us to love him; and so it does where we can hope to requite even an equal. If these maxims have a certain basis of truth, they have at least the fault of those of Rochefoucault: they are made too generally characteristic of mankind.

146. Ignorance of the signification of words disposes men Ignorances and prejudices. to take on trust not only the truth they know not, but also errors and nonsense. For neither can be detected without a perfect understanding of words. "But ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposes a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions, in such manner as to think that unjust which it has been the custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation of which they can produce an example, or, as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent."

¹ Lev.

"Men appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them; which is the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed both by the pen and the sword: whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so, because men care not in that subject what is truth, as it is a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet, by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed as far as he whom it concerned was able."¹ This excellent piece of satire has been often quoted, and sometimes copied, and does not exaggerate the pertinacity of mankind in resisting the evidence of truth, when it thwarts the interests and passions of any particular sect or community. In the earlier part of the paragraph, it seems not so easy to reconcile what Hobbes has said with his general notions of right and justice; since if these resolve themselves, as is his theory, into mere force, there can be little appeal to reason, or to any thing else than custom and precedent, which are commonly the exponents of power.

147. In the conclusion of this chapter of the *Leviathan*, as well as in the next, he dwells more on the nature of religion than he had done in the former treatise, and so as to subject himself to the imputation of absolute atheism, or at least of a denial of most attributes which we assign to the Deity. "Curiosity about causes," he says, "led men to search out, one after the other, till they came to this necessary conclusion, that there is some eternal cause which men call God. But they have no more idea of his nature than a blind man has of fire, though he knows that there is something that warms him. So, by the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind. And they that make little inquiry into the natural causes of things are inclined to feign several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations. And this fear of things invisible is the

¹ *Lev.*, c. 11

natural seed of that which every one in himself calleth religion, and in them that worship or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition."

148. "As God is incomprehensible, it follows that we can have no conception or image of the Deity; and, consequently, all his attributes signify our inability or defect of power to conceive any thing concerning his nature, and not any conception of the same, excepting only this, that there is a God. Men that by their own meditation arrive at the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, choose rather to confess this is incomprehensible and above their understanding, than to define his nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible."¹ For, concerning such spirits, he holds that it is not possible by natural means only to come to the knowledge of so much as that there are such things.²

149. Religion he derives from three sources, — the desire of men to search for causes, the reference of every thing that has a beginning to some cause, and the observation of the order and consequence of things. But the two former lead to anxiety; for the knowledge that there have been causes of the effects we see, leads us to anticipate that they will in time be the causes of effects to come; so that every man, especially such as are over-provident, is "like Prometheus, the prudent man, as his name implies, who was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where an eagle feeding on his liver devoured as much by day as was repaired by night; and so he who looks too far before him has his heart all day long gnawed by the fear of death, poverty, or other calamity, and has no repose nor pause but in sleep." This is an allusion made in the style of Lord Bacon. The ignorance of causes makes men fear some invisible agent, like the gods of the Gentiles; but the investigation of them leads us to a God eternal, infinite, and omnipotent. This ignorance, however, of second causes, conspiring with three other prejudices of mankind, — the belief in ghosts, or spirits of subtile bodies, the devotion and reverence generally shown towards what we fear as having power to hurt us, and the taking of things casual for prognostics, — are altogether the natural seed of religion; which, by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men,

¹ Lev., c. 12.

² Hum. Nat., c. 11.

hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another. He illustrates this by a variety of instances from ancient superstitions. But the forms of religion are changed when men suspect the wisdom, sincerity, or love of those who teach it, or its priests.¹ The remaining portion of the Leviathan, relating to moral and political philosophy, must be deferred to our next chapter.

150. The *Elementa Philosophiæ* were published by Hobbes in 1655, and dedicated to his constant patron, the Earl of Devonshire. These are divided into three parts; entitled *De Corpore*, *De Homine*, and *De Cive*. And the first part has itself three divisions; *Logic*, the *First Philosophy*, and *Physica*. The second part, *De Homine*, is neither the treatise of Human Nature, nor the corresponding part of the *Leviathan*, though it contains many things substantially found there. A long disquisition on optics and the nature of vision, chiefly geometrical, is entirely new. The third part, *De Cive*, is the treatise by that name, reprinted, as far as I am aware, without alteration.

151. The first part of the first treatise, entitled *Computative Logica*, is by no means the least valuable among the philosophical writings of Hobbes. In forty pages the subject is very well and clearly explained; nor do I know that the principles are better laid down, or the rules more sufficiently given, in more prolix treatises. Many of his observations, especially as to words, are such as we find in his English works; and perhaps his nominalism is more clearly expressed than it is in them. Of the syllogistic method, at least for the purpose of demonstration, or teaching others, he seems to have entertained a favorable opinion, or even to have held it necessary for real demonstration, as his definition shows. Hobbes appears to be aware of what I do not remember to have seen put by others, that, in the natural process of reasoning, the minor premise commonly precedes the major.²

¹ *Lev.*, c. 12.

² In Whately's *Logic*, p. 90, it is observed, that "the proper order is to place the major premise first, and the minor second; but this does not constitute the major and minor premises," &c. It may be the proper order in one sense, as exhibiting better the foundation of syllogistic reasoning; but it is not that which we commonly follow, either in thinking,

or in proving to others. In the rhetorical use of syllogism, it can admit of no doubt that the opposite order is the most striking and persuasive; such as in Cato, "If there be a God, he must delight in virtue; and that which he delights in must be happy." In Euclid's demonstrations, this will be found the form usually employed; and though the rules of grammar are generally illustrated by examples, which

It is for want of attending to this, that syllogisms, as usually stated, are apt to have so formal and unnatural a construction. The process of the mind in this kind of reasoning is explained, in general, with correctness, and, I believe, with originality, in the following passage, which I shall transcribe from the Latin, rather than give a version of my own; few probably being likely to read the present section, who are unacquainted with that language. The style of Hobbes, though perspicuous, is concise, and the original words will be more satisfactory than any translation.

152. "Syllogismo directo cogitatio in animo respondens est hujusmodi. Primo concipitur phantasma rei nominatæ cum accidente sive affectu ejus propter quem appellatur eo nomine quod est in minore propositione subjectum; deinde animo occurrit phantasma ejusdem rei cum accidente sive affectu propter quem appellatur, quod est in eadem propositione prædicatum. Tertio redit cogitatio rursus ad rem nominatam cum affectu propter quem eo nomine appellatur, quod est in prædicato propositionis majoris. Postremo cum meminerit eos affectus esse omnes unius et ejusdem rei, concludit tria illa nomina ejusdem quoque rei esse nomina; hoc est, conclusionem esse veram. Exempli causa, quando fit syllogismus hic, Homo est Animal, Animal est Corpus, ergo Homo est Corpus, occurrit animo imago hominis loquentis vel differentis [sic, sed lege disserentis], meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari hominem. Deinde occurrit eadem imago ejusdem hominis sese moventis, meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari animal. Tertio recurrit eadem imago hominis locum aliquem sive spatium occupantis, meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari corpus.¹ Postremo cum meminerit rem illam quæ et

is beginning with the major premise, yet the process of reasoning which a boy employs in construing a Latin sentence is the reverse. He observes a nominative case, a verb in the third person, and then applies his general rule, or major, to the particular instance, or minor, so as to infer their agreement. In criminal jurisprudence, the Scots begin with the major premise, or relevancy of the indictment, when there is room for doubt; the English, with the minor, or evidence of the fact, reserving the other for what we call motion in arrest of judgment. Instances of both orders are common; but by far the most frequent are of that which the Archbishop of Dublin reckons the less proper of the two. Those logicians who

fail to direct the student's attention to this, really do not justice to their own favorite science.

¹ This is the questionable part of Hobbes's theory of syllogism. According to the common and obvious understanding the mind, in the major premise, "Animal est Corpus," does not reflect on the subject of the minor, *Homo*, as occupying space, but on the subject of the major, *Animal*, which includes, indeed, the former, but is mentally substituted for it. It may sometimes happen, that, where this predicate of the minor term is manifestly a collective word that comprehends the subject, the latter is not, as it were, absorbed in it, and may be contemplated by the mind distinctly in the major; as if we

extendebatur secundum locum, et loco movebatur, et oratione utebatur, unam et eandem fuisse, concludit etiam nomina illa tria, Homo, Animal, Corpus, ejusdem rei esse nomina, et proinde, Homo est Corpus, esse propositionem veram. Manifestum hinc est conceptum sive cogitationem quæ respondens syllogismo ex propositionibus universalibus in animo existit, nullam esse in iis animalibus quibus deest usus nominum, cum inter syllogizandum oporteat non modo de re sed etiam alternis vicibus de diversis rei nominibus, quæ propter diversas de re cogitationes adhibitæ sunt, cogitare."

153. The metaphysical philosophy of Hobbes, always bold and original, often acute and profound, without producing an immediate school of disciples like that of Descartes, struck, perhaps, a deeper root in the minds of reflecting men, and has influenced more extensively the general tone of speculation. Locke, who had not read much, had certainly read Hobbes, though he does not borrow from him so much as has sometimes been imagined. The French metaphysicians of the next century found him nearer to their own theories than his more celebrated rival in English philosophy. But the writer who has built most upon Hobbes, and may be reckoned, in a certain sense, his commentator, if he who fully explains and develops a system may deserve that name, was Hartley. The theory of association is implied and intimated in many passages of the elder philosopher, though it was first expanded and applied with a diligent, ingenious, and comprehensive research, if sometimes in too forced a manner, by his disciple. I use this word without particular inquiry into the direct acquaintance of Hartley with the writings of Hobbes: the subject had been frequently touched in intermediate publications; and in matters of reasoning, as I have intimated above, little or no presumption of borrowing can be founded on coincidence. Hartley also resembles Hobbes in the extreme to which he has pushed the nominalist theory, in the proneness to materialize all intellectual processes, and either to force all things mysterious to our faculties into something imaginable, or to

say, John is a man; a man feels; we may perhaps have no image in the mind of any man but John. But this is not the case where the predicated quality appertains to many things visibly different from the subject; as in Hobbes's instance, "Animal est Corpus," we may surely consider other animals as being extended and occupying

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1. IN traversing so wide a field as moral and political philosophy, we must still endeavor to distribute the subject according to some order of subdivision, so far at least as the contents of the books themselves which come before us will permit. And we give the first place to those which, relating to the moral law both of nature and revelation, connect the proper subject of the present chapter with that of the second and third.

2. We meet here a concourse of volumes occupying no small space in old libraries, — the writings of the ^{Casualtical} casuists, chiefly within the Romish Church. None ^{writers.} perhaps in the whole compass of literature are more neglected by those who do not read with what we may call a professional view; but to the ecclesiastics of that communion they have still a certain value, though far less than when they were first written. The most vital discipline of that church, the secret of the power of its priesthood, the source of most of ^{Importance} the good and evil it can work, is found in the confes- ^{of confes-} sional. It is there that the keys are kept; it is there ^{sion.} that the lamp burns, whose rays diverge to every portion of human life. No church that has relinquished this prerogative can ever establish a permanent dominion over mankind; none that retains it in effective use can lose the hope or the prospect of being their ruler.

3. It is manifest, that, in the common course of this rite, no particular difficulty will arise; nor is the confessor likely to weigh in golden scales the scruples or excuses of ordinary penitents. But peculiar circumstances might be brought before him, wherein there would be a necessity for possessing some rule, lest, by sanctioning the guilt of the self-revealing party, he should incur as much of his own. Treatises, therefore, of casuistry were written as guides to the confessor, and became the text-books in every course of ecclesiastical education. These were commonly digested in a systematic order, and, what is the unfailing consequence of system, or rather almost part of its definition, spread into minute ramifications, and aimed at comprehending every possible emergency. Casuistry is itself allied to jurisprudence, especially to that of the canon law; and it was natural to transfer the subtilty of distinction and copiousness of partition usual with the jurists, to a science which its professors were apt to treat upon very similar principles.

4. The older theologians seem, like the Greek and Roman moralists, when writing systematically, to have made general morality their subject, and casuistry but their illustration. Among the monuments of their ethical philosophy, the *Secunda Secundæ* of Aquinas is the most celebrated. Treatises, however, of casuistry, which is the expansion and application of ethics, may be found both before and during the sixteenth century; and, while the confessional was actively converted to so powerful an engine, they could not conveniently be wanting. Casuistry, indeed, is not much required by the church in an ignorant age; but the sixteenth century was not an age of ignorance. Yet it is not till about the end of that period that we find casuistical literature burst out, so to speak, with a profusion of fruit. "Uninterruptedly afterwards," says Eichhorn, "through the whole seventeenth century, the moral and casuistical literature of the Church of Rome was immensely rich; and it caused a lively and extensive movement in a province which had long been at peace. The first impulse came from the Jesuits, to whom the Jansenists opposed themselves. We must distinguish from both the theological moralists, who remained faithful to their ancient teaching."¹

5. We may be blamed, perhaps, for obtruding a pedantic

¹ *Geschichte der Cultur*, vol. vi. part i. p. 300.

terminology, if we make the most essential distinction in morality, and one for want of which, more than any other, its debatable controversies have arisen, that between the subjective and objective rectitude of actions; in clearer language, between the provinces of conscience and of reason, between what is well meant and what is well done. The chief business of the priest is naturally with the former. The walls of the confessional are privy to the whispers of self-accusing guilt. No doubt can ever arise as to the subjective character of actions which the conscience has condemned, and for which the penitent seeks absolution. Were they even objectively lawful, they are sins in him, according to the unanimous determination of casuists. But though what the conscience reclaims against is necessarily wrong, relatively to the agent, it does not follow that what it may fail to disapprove is innocent. Choose whatever theory we may please as to the moral standard of actions, they must have an objective rectitude of their own, independently of their agent, without which there could be no distinction of right and wrong, nor any scope for the dictates of conscience. The science of ethics, as a science, can only be conversant with objective morality. Casuistry is the instrument of applying this science, which, like every other, is built on reasoning, to the moral nature and volition of man. It rests for its validity on the great principle, that it is our duty to know, as far as lies in us, what is right, as well as to do what we know to be such. But its application was beset with obstacles; the extenuations of ignorance and error were so various, the difficulty of representing the moral position of the penitent to the judgment of the confessor by any process of language so insuperable, that the most acute understanding might be foiled in the task of bringing home a conviction of guilt to the self-deceiving sinner. Again, he might aggravate needless scruples, or disturb the tranquil repose of innocence.

6. But, though past actions are the primary subject of auricular confession, it was a necessary consequence that the priest would be frequently called upon to advise as to the future, to bind or loose the will in incomplete or meditated lines of conduct. And, as all without exception must come before his tribunal, the rich, the noble, the counsellors of princes, and princes themselves, were to reveal their designs, to expound their uncertainties, to call,

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judice.** detected without a perfect understanding of words. "But ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposes a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions, in such manner as to think that unjust which it has been the custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation of which they can produce an example, or, as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent."

¹ *Lev.*

"Men appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them; which is the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed both by the pen and the sword: whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so, because men care not in that subject what is truth, as it is a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet, by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed as far as he whom it concerned was able."¹ This excellent piece of satire has been often quoted, and sometimes copied, and does not exaggerate the pertinacity of mankind in resisting the evidence of truth, when it thwarts the interests and passions of any particular sect or community. In the earlier part of the paragraph, it seems not so easy to reconcile what Hobbes has said with his general notions of right and justice; since if these resolve themselves, as is his theory, into mere force, there can be little appeal to reason, or to any thing else than custom and precedent, which are commonly the exponents of power.

147. In the conclusion of this chapter of the *Leviathan*, as well as in the next, he dwells more on the nature of religion than he had done in the former treatise, and so as to subject himself to the imputation of absolute atheism, or at least of a denial of most attributes which we assign to the Deity. "Curiosity about causes," he says, "led men to search out, one after the other, till they came to this necessary conclusion, that there is some eternal cause which men call God. But they have no more idea of his nature than a blind man has of fire, though he knows that there is something that warms him. So, by the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind. And they that make little inquiry into the natural causes of things are inclined to feign several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations. And this fear of things invisible is the

¹ *Lev.*, c. 11

natural seed of that which every one in himself calleth religion, and in them that worship or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition."

148. "As God is incomprehensible, it follows that we can have no conception or image of the Deity; and, consequently, all his attributes signify our inability or defect of power to conceive any thing concerning his nature, and not any conception of the same, excepting only this, that there is a God. Men that by their own meditation arrive at the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, choose rather to confess this is incomprehensible and above their understanding, than to define his nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible."¹ For, concerning such spirits, he holds that it is not possible by natural means only to come to the knowledge of so much as that there are such things.²

149. Religion he derives from three sources, — the desire Its supposed sources. of men to search for causes, the reference of every thing that has a beginning to some cause, and the observation of the order and consequence of things. But the two former lead to anxiety; for the knowledge that there have been causes of the effects we see, leads us to anticipate that they will in time be the causes of effects to come; so that every man, especially such as are over-provident, is "like Prometheus, the prudent man, as his name implies, who was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where an eagle feeding on his liver devoured as much by day as was repaired by night; and so he who looks too far before him has his heart all day long gnawed by the fear of death, poverty, or other calamity, and has no repose nor pause but in sleep." This is an allusion made in the style of Lord Bacon. The ignorance of causes makes men fear some invisible agent, like the gods of the Gentiles; but the investigation of them leads us to a God eternal, infinite, and omnipotent. This ignorance, however, of second causes, conspiring with three other prejudices of mankind, — the belief in ghosts, or spirits of subtile bodies, the devotion and reverence generally shown towards what we fear as having power to hurt us, and the taking of things casual for prognostics, — are altogether the natural seed of religion; which, by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men,

¹ Lev., c. 12.

² Hum. Nat., c. 11.

hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another. He illustrates this by a variety of instances from ancient superstitions. But the forms of religion are changed when men suspect the wisdom, sincerity, or love of those who teach it, or its priests.¹ The remaining portion of the *Leviathan*, relating to moral and political philosophy, must be deferred to our next chapter.

150. The *Elementa Philosophiæ* were published by Hobbes in 1655, and dedicated to his constant patron, the Earl of Devonshire. These are divided into three parts; entitled *De Corpore*, *De Homine*, and *De Cive*. And the first part has itself three divisions; *Logic*, the *First Philosophy*, and *Physics*. The second part, *De Homine*, is neither the treatise of Human Nature, nor the corresponding part of the *Leviathan*, though it contains many things substantially found there. A long disquisition on optics and the nature of vision, chiefly geometrical, is entirely new. The third part, *De Cive*, is the treatise by that name, reprinted, as far as I am aware, without alteration.

151. The first part of the first treatise, entitled *Computative Logica*, is by no means the least valuable among the philosophical writings of Hobbes. In forty pages the subject is very well and clearly explained; nor do I know that the principles are better laid down, or the rules more sufficiently given, in more prolix treatises. Many of his observations, especially as to words, are such as we find in his English works; and perhaps his nominalism is more clearly expressed than it is in them. Of the syllogistic method, at least for the purpose of demonstration, or teaching others, he seems to have entertained a favorable opinion, or even to have held it necessary for real demonstration, as his definition shows. Hobbes appears to be aware of what I do not remember to have seen put by others, that, in the natural process of reasoning, the minor premise commonly precedes the major.²

¹ *Lev.*, c. 12.

² In Whately's *Logic*, p. 90, it is observed, that "the proper order is to place the major premise first, and the minor second; but this does not constitute the major and minor premises," &c. It may be the proper order in one sense, as exhibiting better the foundation of syllogistic reasoning; but it is not that which we commonly follow, either in thinking,

or in proving to others. In the rhetorical use of syllogism, it can admit of no doubt that the opposite order is the most striking and persuasive; such as in Cato, "If there be a God, he must delight in virtue; and that which he delights in must be happy." In Euclid's demonstrations, this will be found the form usually employed; and though the rules of grammar are generally illustrated by examples, which

It is for want of attending to this, that syllogisms, as usually stated, are apt to have so formal and unnatural a construction. The process of the mind in this kind of reasoning is explained, in general, with correctness, and, I believe, with originality, in the following passage, which I shall transcribe from the Latin, rather than give a version of my own; few probably being likely to read the present section, who are unacquainted with that language. The style of Hobbes, though perspicuous, is concise, and the original words will be more satisfactory than any translation.

152. "Syllogismo directo cogitatio in animo respondens est hujusmodi. Primo concipitur phantasma rei nominatæ cum accidente sive affectu ejus propter quem appellatur eo nomine quod est in minore propositione subjectum; deinde animo occurrit phantasma ejusdem rei cum accidente sive affectu propter quem appellatur, quod est in eadem propositione prædicatum. Tertio redit cogitatio rursus ad rem nominatam cum affectu propter quem eo nomine appellatur, quod est in prædicato propositionis majoris. Postremo cum meminerit eos affectus esse omnes unius et ejusdem rei, concludit tria illa nomina ejusdem quoque rei esse nomina; hoc est, conclusionem esse veram. Exempli causa, quando fit syllogismus hic, Homo est Animal, Animal est Corpus, ergo Homo est Corpus, occurrit animo imago hominis loquentis vel differentis [sic, sed lege disserentis], meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari hominem. Deinde occurrit eadem imago ejusdem hominis sese moventis, meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari animal. Tertio recurrit eadem imago hominis locum aliquem sive spatium occupantis, meminitque id quod sic apparet vocari corpus.¹ Postremo cum meminerit rem illam quæ et

is beginning with the major premise, yet fail to direct the student's attention to this, really do not justice to their own favorite science.

¹ This is the questionable part of Hobbes's theory of syllogism. According to the common and obvious understanding, the mind, in the major premise, "Animal est Corpus," does not reflect on the subject of the minor, *Homo*, as occupying space, but on the subject of the major, *Animal*, which includes, indeed, the former, but is mentally substituted for it. It may sometimes happen, that, where this predicate of the minor term is manifestly a collective word that comprehends the subject, the latter is not, as it were, absorbed in it, and may be contemplated by the mind distinctly in the major; as if we

extendebatur secundum locum, et loco movebatur, et oratione utebatur, unam et eandem fuisse, concludit etiam nomina illa tria, Homo, Animal, Corpus, ejusdem rei esse nomina, et proinde, Homo est Corpus, esse propositionem veram. Manifestum hinc est conceptum sive cogitationem quæ respondens syllogismo ex propositionibus universalibus in animo existit, nullam esse in iis animalibus quibus deest usus nominum, cum inter syllogizandum oporteat non modo de re sed etiam alternis vicibus de diversis rei nominibus, quæ propter diversas de re cogitationes adhibitæ sunt, cogitare."

153. The metaphysical philosophy of Hobbes, always bold and original, often acute and profound, without producing an immediate school of disciples like that of Descartes, struck, perhaps, a deeper root in the minds of reflecting men, and has influenced more extensively the general tone of speculation. Locke, who had not read much, had certainly read Hobbes, though he does not borrow from him so much as has sometimes been imagined. The French metaphysicians of the next century found him nearer to their own theories than his more celebrated rival in English philosophy. But the writer who has built most upon Hobbes, and may be reckoned, in a certain sense, his commentator, if he who fully explains and develops a system may deserve that name, was Hartley. The theory of association is implied and intimated in many passages of the elder philosopher, though it was first expanded and applied with a diligent, ingenious, and comprehensive research, if sometimes in too forced a manner, by his disciple. I use this word without particular inquiry into the direct acquaintance of Hartley with the writings of Hobbes: the subject had been frequently touched in intermediate publications; and in matters of reasoning, as I have intimated above, little or no presumption of borrowing can be founded on coincidence. Hartley also resembles Hobbes in the extreme to which he has pushed the nominalist theory, in the proneness to materialize all intellectual processes, and either to force all things mysterious to our faculties into something imaginable, or to

say, John is a man; a man feels; we may perhaps have no image in the mind of any man but John. But this is not the case where the predicated quality appertains to many things visibly different from the subject; as in Hobbes's instance, "Animal est Corpus," we may surely consider other animals as being extended and occupying

space besides men. It does not seem that otherwise there could be any ascending scale from particulars to generals, as far as the reasoning faculties, independent of words, are concerned; and, if we begin with the major premise of the syllogism, this will be still more apparent.

reject them as unmeaning, in the want, much connected with this, of a steady perception of the difference between the Ego and its objects, in an excessive love of simplifying and generalizing, and in a readiness to adopt explanations neither conformable to reason nor experience, when they fall in with some single principle, the key that was to unlock every ward of the human soul.

154. In nothing does Hobbes deserve more credit than in having set an example of close observation in the philosophy of the human mind. If he errs, he errs like a man who goes a little out of the right track, not like one who has set out in a wrong one. The eulogy of Stewart on Descartes, that he was the father of this experimental psychology, cannot be strictly wrested from him by Hobbes, inasmuch as the publications of the former are of an earlier date; but we may fairly say, that the latter began as soon, and prosecuted his inquiries farther. It seems natural to presume, that Hobbes, who is said to have been employed by Bacon in translating some of his works into Latin, had at least been led by him to the inductive process which he has more than any other employed. But he has seldom mentioned his predecessor's name; and indeed his mind was of a different stamp, — less excursive, less quick in discovering analogies, and less fond of reasoning from them, but more close, perhaps more patient, and more apt to follow up a predominant idea, which sometimes becomes one of the *idola specús* that deceive him.

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND OF
JURISPRUDENCE, FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I. — ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Casuits of the Roman Church — Suarez on Moral Law — Selden — Charron — La Mothe le Vayer — Bacon's Essays — Feltham — Browne's Religio Medici — Other Writers.

1. IN traversing so wide a field as moral and political philosophy, we must still endeavor to distribute the subject according to some order of subdivision, so far at least as the contents of the books themselves which come before us will permit. And we give the first place to those which, relating to the moral law both of nature and revelation, connect the proper subject of the present chapter with that of the second and third.

2. We meet here a concourse of volumes occupying no small space in old libraries, — the writings of the ^{Casuistical} casuists, chiefly within the Romish Church. None ^{writers.} perhaps in the whole compass of literature are more neglected by those who do not read with what we may call a professional view; but to the ecclesiastics of that communion they have still a certain value, though far less than when they were first written. The most vital discipline of that church, the secret of the power of its priesthood, the source of most of ^{Importance} the good and evil it can work, is found in the confes- ^{of confes-} sional. It is there that the keys are kept; it is there ^{sion.} that the lamp burns, whose rays diverge to every portion of human life. No church that has relinquished this prerogative can ever establish a permanent dominion over mankind; none that retains it in effective use can lose the hope or the prospect of being their ruler.

3. It is manifest, that, in the common course of this rite, no particular difficulty will arise; nor is the confessor likely to weigh in golden scales the scruples or excuses of ordinary penitents. But peculiar circumstances might be brought before him, wherein there would be a necessity for possessing some rule, lest, by sanctioning the guilt of the self-revealing party, he should incur as much of his own. Treatises, therefore, of casuistry were written as guides to the confessor, and became the text-books in every course of ecclesiastical education. These were commonly digested in a systematic order, and, what is the unfailing consequence of system, or rather almost part of its definition, spread into minute ramifications, and aimed at comprehending every possible emergency. Casuistry is itself allied to jurisprudence, especially to that of the canon law; and it was natural to transfer the subtilty of distinction and copiousness of partition usual with the jurists, to a science which its professors were apt to treat upon very similar principles.

4. The older theologians seem, like the Greek and Roman moralists, when writing systematically, to have made general morality their subject, and casuistry but their illustration. Among the monuments of their ethical philosophy, the *Secunda Secundæ* of Aquinas is the most celebrated. Treatises, however, of casuistry, which is the expansion and application of ethics, may be found both before and during the sixteenth century; and, while the confessional was actively converted to so powerful an engine, they could not conveniently be wanting. Casuistry, indeed, is not much required by the church in an ignorant age; but the sixteenth century was not an age of ignorance. Yet it is not till about the end of that period that we find casuistical literature burst out, so to speak, with a profusion of fruit. "Uninterruptedly afterwards," says Eichhorn, "through the whole seventeenth century, the moral and casuistical literature of the Church of Rome was immensely rich; and it caused a lively and extensive movement in a province which had long been at peace. The first impulse came from the Jesuits, to whom the Jansenists opposed themselves. We must distinguish from both the theological moralists, who remained faithful to their ancient teaching."¹

5. We may be blamed, perhaps, for obtruding a pedantic

¹ *Geschichte der Cultur*, vol. vi. part i. p. 390.

terminology, if we make the most essential distinction in morality, and one for want of which, more than any other, its debatable controversies have arisen, that between the subjective and objective rectitude of actions; in clearer language, between the provinces of conscience and of reason, between what is well meant and what is well done. The chief business of the priest is naturally with the former. The walls of the confessional are privy to the whispers of self-accusing guilt. No doubt can ever arise as to the subjective character of actions which the conscience has condemned, and for which the penitent seeks absolution. Were they even objectively lawful, they are sins in him, according to the unanimous determination of casuists. But though what the conscience reclaims against is necessarily wrong, relatively to the agent, it does not follow that what it may fail to disapprove is innocent. Choose whatever theory we may please as to the moral standard of actions, they must have an objective rectitude of their own, independently of their agent, without which there could be no distinction of right and wrong, nor any scope for the dictates of conscience. The science of ethics, as a science, can only be conversant with objective morality. Casuistry is the instrument of applying this science, which, like every other, is built on reasoning, to the moral nature and volition of man. It rests for its validity on the great principle, that it is our duty to know, as far as lies in us, what is right, as well as to do what we know to be such. But its application was beset with obstacles; the extenuations of ignorance and error were so various, the difficulty of representing the moral position of the penitent to the judgment of the confessor by any process of language so insuperable, that the most acute understanding might be foiled in the task of bringing home a conviction of guilt to the self-deceiving sinner. Again, he might aggravate needless scruples, or disturb the tranquil repose of innocence.

6. But, though past actions are the primary subject of auricular confession, it was a necessary consequence that the priest would be frequently called upon to advise as to the future, to bind or loose the will in incomplete or meditated lines of conduct. And, as all without exception must come before his tribunal, the rich, the noble, the counsellors of princes, and princes themselves, were to reveal their designs, to expound their uncertainties, to call,

Distinction
of subjective
and
objective
morality.

Directory
office of
the confessor.

in effect, for his sanction in all they might have to do, to secure themselves against transgression by shifting the responsibility on his head. That this tremendous authority of direction, distinct from the rite of penance, though immediately springing from it, should have produced a no more overwhelming influence of the priesthood than it has actually done, great as that has been, can only be ascribed to the re-action of human inclinations which will not be controlled, and of human reason which exerts a silent force against the authority it acknowledges.

7. In the directory business of the confessional, far more ^{Difficulties} than in the penitential, the priest must strive to bring ^{of casuistry.} about that union between subjective and objective rectitude in which the perfection of a moral act consists; without which, in every instance, according to their tenets, some degree of sinfulness, some liability to punishment, remains, and which must at least be demanded from those who have been made acquainted with their duty. But when he came from the broad lines of the moral law, from the decalogue and the gospel, or even from the ethical systems of theology, to the indescribable variety of circumstance which his penitents had to recount, there arose a multitude of problems, and such as perhaps would most command his attention, when they involved the practice of the great, to which he might hesitate to apply an unbending rule. The questions of casuistry, like those of jurisprudence, were often found to turn on the great and ancient doubt of both sciences, whether we should abide by the letter of a general law, or let in an equitable interpretation of its spirit. The consulting party would be apt to plead for the one: the guide of conscience would more securely adhere to the other. But he might also perceive the severity of those rules of obligation which conduce, in the particular instance, to no apparent end, or even defeat their own principle. Hence there arose two schools of casuistry, first in the practice of confession, and afterwards in the books intended to assist it: one strict and uncompromising; the other more indulgent, and flexible to circumstances.

8. The characteristics of these systems were displayed in almost the whole range of morals. They were, however, chiefly seen in the rules of veracity, and especially in promissory obligations. According to the ^{Strict and lax schemes of it.} fathers of the church, and to the rigid casuists in general, a

lie was never to be uttered, a promise was never to be broken. The precepts, especially of revelation, notwithstanding their brevity and figurativeness, were held complete and literal. Hence promises obtained by mistake, fraud, or force, and, above all, gratuitous vows, where God was considered as the promisee, however lightly made, or become intolerably onerous by supervenient circumstances, were strictly to be fulfilled, unless the dispensing power of the church might sometimes be sufficient to release them. Besides the respect due to moral rules, and especially those of Scripture, there had been from early times in the Christian Church a strong disposition to the ascetic scheme of religious morality; a prevalent notion of the intrinsic meritoriousness of voluntary self-denial, which discountenanced all regard in man to his own happiness, at least in this life, as a sort of flinching from the discipline of suffering. And this had doubtless its influence upon the severe casuists.

9. But there had not been wanting those, who, whatever course they might pursue in the confessional, found ^{Convenience} the convenience of an accommodating morality in the ^{of the latter.} secular affairs of the church. Oaths were broken, engagements entered into without faith, for the ends of the clergy, or of those whom they favored in the struggles of the world. And some of the ingenious sophistry, by which these breaches of plain rules are usually defended, was not unknown before the Reformation. But casuistical writings at that time were comparatively few. The Jesuits have the credit of first rendering public a scheme of false morals, which has been denominated from them; and enhanced the obloquy that overwhelmed their order. Their volumes of casuistry were exceedingly numerous: some of them belong to the last twenty years of the sixteenth, but a far greater part to the following century.

10. The Jesuits were prone for several reasons to embrace the laxer theories of obligation. They were less ^{Favored by} tainted than the old monastic orders with that super- ^{the Jesuits.} stition which had flowed into the church from the East,—the meritoriousness of self-inflicted suffering for its own sake. They embraced a life of toil and danger, but not of habitual privation and pain. Dauntless in death and torture, they shunned the mechanical asceticism of the convent. And, secondly, their eyes were bent on a great end,—the good of the

Catholic Church, which they identified with that of their own order. It almost invariably happens, that men who have the good of mankind at heart, and actively prosecute it, become embarrassed, at some time or other, by the conflict of particular duties with the best method of promoting their object. An unaccommodating veracity, an unswerving good faith, will often appear to stand, or stand really, in the way of their ends : and hence the little confidence we repose in enthusiasts, even when, in a popular mode of speaking, they are most sincere ; that is, most convinced of the rectitude of their aim.

11. The course prescribed by Loyola led his disciples, not to solitude, but to the world. They became the associates and counsellors, as well as the confessors, of the great. They had to wield the powers of the earth for the service of heaven. Hence, in confession itself, they were often tempted to look beyond the penitent, and to guide his conscience rather with a view to his usefulness than his integrity. In questions of morality, to abstain from action is generally the means of innocence ; but to act is indispensable for positive good. Thus their casuistry had a natural tendency to become more objective, and to entangle the responsibility of personal conscience in an inextricable maze of reasoning. They had also to retain their influence over men not wholly submissive to religious control, nor ready to abjure the pleasant paths in which they trod ; men of the court and the city, who might serve the church, though they did not adorn it, and for whom it was necessary to make some compromise in furtherance of the main design.

12. It must also be fairly admitted, that the rigid casuists went to extravagant lengths. Their decisions were often not only harsh, but unsatisfactory : the reason demanded in vain a principle of their iron law ; and the common sense of mankind imposed the limitations, which they were incapable of excluding by any thing better than a dogmatic assertion. Thus, in the cases of promissory obligation, they were compelled to make some exceptions ; and these left it open to rational inquiry whether more might not be found. They diverged unnecessarily, as many thought, from the principles of jurisprudence : for the jurists built their determinations, or professed to do so, on what was just and equitable among men ; and though a distinction, frequently very right, was taken between the *forum*

Extravagance of the strict casuists.

exterius and *interius*, the provinces of jurisprudence and casuistry, yet the latter could not, in these questions of mutual obligation, rest upon wholly different ground from the former.

18. The Jesuits, however, fell rapidly into the opposite extreme. Their subtilty in logic, and great ingenuity in devising arguments, were employed in sophisms that undermined the foundations of moral integrity in the heart. They warred with these arms against the conscience which they were bound to protect. The offences of their casuistry, as charged by their adversaries, are very multifarious. One of the most celebrated is the doctrine of equivocation; the innocence of saying that which is true in a sense meant by the speaker, though he is aware that it will be otherwise understood. Another is that of what was called probability; according to which it is lawful, in doubtful problems of morality, to take the course which appears to ourselves least likely to be right, provided any one casuistical writer of good repute has approved it. The multiplicity of books, and want of uniformity in their decisions, made this a broad path for the conscience. In the latter instance, as in many others, the *subjective* nature of moral obligation was lost sight of; and to this the scientific treatment of casuistry inevitably contributed.

Opposite
faults of
Jesuits.

14. Productions so little regarded as those of the jesuitical casuists cannot be dwelt upon. Thomas Sanchez of Cordova is author of a large treatise on matrimony, published in 1592; the best, as far as the canon law is concerned, which has yet been published. But in the casuistical portion of this work the most extraordinary indecencies occur, such as have consigned it to general censure.¹ Some of these, it must be owned, belong to the rite of auricular confession itself, as managed in the Church of Rome, though they give scandal by their publication and apparent excess beyond the necessity of the case. The *Summa Casuum Conscientiæ* of Toletus, a Spanish Jesuit and cardinal, which, though published in 1602, belongs to the sixteenth century, and the casuistical writings of Less, Busenbaum, and Escobar, may just be here mentioned. The *Medulla Casuum Conscientiæ* of the second (Munster, 1645) went through fifty-two editions; the Theolo-

¹ Bayle, art. "Sanchez," expatiates on Cethegum. The later editions of Sanchez this, and condemns the Jesuit; Castilina *De Matrimonio* are castigate.

gia Moralis of the last (Lyon, 1646), through forty.¹ Of the opposition excited by the laxity in moral rules ascribed to the Jesuits, though it began in some manner during this period, we shall have more to say in the next.

15. Suarez of Granada, by far the greatest man in the department of moral philosophy whom the order of Suarez, De Legibus. Loyola produced in this age, or perhaps in any other, may not improbably have treated of casuistry in some part of his numerous volumes. We shall, however, gladly leave this subject to bring before the reader a large treatise of Suarez on the principles of natural law, as well as of all positive jurisprudence. This is entitled *Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore in decem Libros distributus, utriusque Fori Homibus non minus utilis, quam necessarius*. It might with no great impropriety, perhaps, be placed in any of the three sections of this chapter, relating not only to moral philosophy, but to politics in some degree, and to jurisprudence.

16. Suarez begins by laying down the position, that all Titles of his ten books. legislative as well as all paternal power is derived from God, and that the authority of every law resolves itself into his. For either the law proceeds immediately from God, or, if it be human, it proceeds from man as his vicar and minister. The titles of the ten books of this large treatise are as follows: 1. On the nature of law in general, and on its causes and consequences; 2. On eternal, natural law, and that of nations; 3. On positive human law in itself considered relatively to human nature, which is also called civil law; 4. On positive ecclesiastical law; 5. On the differences of human laws, and especially of those that are penal, or in the nature of penal; 6. On the interpretation, the alteration, and the abolition of human laws; 7. On unwritten law, which is called custom; 8. On those human laws which are called favorable, or privileges; 9. On the positive divine law of the old dispensations; 10. On the positive divine law of the new dispensation.

17. This is a very comprehensive chart of general law, and Heads of the second book. entitles Suarez to be accounted such a precursor of Grotius and Puffendorf as occupied most of their ground, especially that of the latter, though he cultivated it in a different manner. His volume is a closely printed folio of 700 pages in double columns. The following

¹ Ranko, die Papste, vol. III.

heads of chapters in the second book will show the questions in which Suarez dealt, and, in some degree, his method of stating and conducting them: 1. Whether there be any eternal law, and what is its necessity; 2. On the subject of eternal law, and on the acts it commands; 3. In what act the eternal law exists (*existit*), and whether it be one or many; 4. Whether the eternal law be the cause of other laws, and obligatory through their means; 5. In what natural law consists; 6. Whether natural law be a preceptive divine law; 7. On the subject of natural law, and on its precepts; 8. Whether natural law be one; 9. Whether natural law bind the conscience; 10. Whether natural law obliges not only to the act (*actus*) but to the mode (*modum*) of virtue, — this obscure question seems to refer to the subjective nature, or motive, of virtuous actions, as appears by the next; 11. Whether natural law obliges us to act from love or charity (*ad modum operandi ex caritate*); 12. Whether natural law not only prohibits certain actions, but invalidates them when done; 13. Whether the precepts of the law of nature are intrinsically immutable; 14. Whether any human authority can alter or dispense with the natural law; 15. Whether God by his absolute power can dispense with the law of nature; 16. Whether an equitable interpretation can ever be admitted in the law of nature; 17. Whether the law of nature is distinguishable from that of nations; 18. Whether the law of nations enjoins or forbids any thing; 19. By what means we are to distinguish the law of nature from that of nations; 20. Certain corollaries; and that the law of nations is both just, and also mutable.

18. These heads may give some slight notion to the reader of the character of the book; as the book itself may serve as a typical instance of that form of theology, of metaphysics, of ethics, of jurisprudence, which occupies the unread and unreadable folios of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially those issuing from the Church of Rome, and may be styled generally the scholastic method. Two remarkable characteristics strike us in these books, which are sufficiently to be judged by reading their table of contents, and by taking occasional samples of different parts. The extremely systematic form they assume, and the multiplicity of divisions, render this practice more satisfactory than it can be in works of less regular

Character
of such
scholastic
treatises.

arrangement. One of these characteristics is that spirit of system itself; and another is their sincere desire to exhaust the subject by presenting it to the mind in every light, and by tracing all its relations and consequences. The fertility of those men who, like Suarez, superior to most of the rest, were trained in the scholastic discipline, to which I refer the methods of the canonists and casuists, is sometimes surprising: their views are not one-sided; they may not solve objections to our satisfaction, but they seldom suppress them; they embrace a vast compass of thought and learning; they write less for the moment, and are less under the influence of local and temporary prejudices, than many who have lived in better ages of philosophy. But, again, they have great defects; their distinctions confuse instead of giving light; their systems, being not founded on clear principles, become embarrassed and incoherent; their method is not always sufficiently consecutive; the difficulties which they encounter are too arduous for them; they labor under the multitude, and are entangled by the discordance of their authorities.

19. Suarez, who discusses all these important problems of his second book with acuteness, and, for his circumstances, with an independent mind, is weighed down by the extent and nature of his learning. If Grotius quotes philosophers and poets too frequently, what can we say of the perpetual reference to Aquinas, Cajetan, Soto, Turrecremata, Vasquius, Isidore, Vincent of Beauvais or Alensis, not to mention the canonists and fathers, which Suarez employs to prove or disprove every proposition? The syllogistic forms are unsparingly introduced. Such writers as Soto or Suarez held all kinds of ornament not less unfit for philosophical argument than they would be for geometry. Nor do they ever appeal to experience or history for the rules of determination. Their materials are nevertheless abundant, consisting of texts of Scripture, sayings of the fathers and schoolmen, established theorems in natural theology and metaphysics, from which they did not find it hard to select premises, which, duly arranged, gave them conclusions.

20. Suarez, after a prolux discussion, comes to the conclusion, that "eternal law is the free determination of the will of God, ordaining a rule to be observed, either, first, generally by all parts of the universe as a means of a common good, whether immediately

Quota-
tions of
Suarez.

His defi-
nition of
eternal
law.

belonging to it in respect of the entire universe, or at least in respect of the singular parts thereof; or, secondly, to be specially observed by intellectual creatures in respect of their free operations."¹ This is not instantly perspicuous; but definitions of a complex nature cannot be rendered such. It is true, however, what the reader may think curious, that this crabbed piece of scholasticism is nothing else, in substance, than the celebrated sentence on law, which concludes the first book of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity. Whoever takes the pains to understand Suarez, will perceive that he asserts exactly that which is unrolled in the majestic eloquence of our countryman.

21. By this eternal law, God is not necessarily bound. But this seems to be said rather for the sake of avoiding phrases which were conventionally rejected by the scholastic theologians, since, in effect, his theory requires the affirmative, as we shall soon perceive; and he here says that the law is God himself (*Deus ipse*), and is immutable. This eternal law is not immediately known to man in this life, but either "in other laws, or through them," which he thus explains: "Men, while pilgrims here (*viatores homines*), cannot learn the divine will in itself, but only as much as by certain signs or effects is proposed to them; and hence it is peculiar to the blessed in heaven, that, contemplating the divine will, they are ruled by it as by a direct law. The former know the eternal law, because they partake of it by other laws, temporal and positive; for, as second causes display the first, and creatures the Creator, so temporal laws (by which he means laws respective of man on earth), being streams from that eternal law, manifest the fountain whence they spring. Yet all do not arrive even at this degree of knowledge; for all are not able to infer the cause from the effect. And thus, though all men necessarily perceive some participation of the eternal laws in themselves, since there is no one endowed with reason who does not in some manner acknowledge, that what is morally good ought to be chosen, and what is evil rejected, so that in this sense men have all some notion of

¹ "Legem eternam esse decretum liberum voluntatis Dei statuente ordinem servandum, aut generaliter ab omnibus partibus universi in ordine ad commune bonum, vel immediate illi conveniens ratione totius universi, vel saltem ratione singularum specierum ejus, aut specialiter servandum a creaturis intellectualibus quoad liberas operationes earum."—C. 2, § 6. Compare with Hooker: Of Law, no law can be said, than that her throne is the bosom of God, &c.

the eternal law, as St. Thomas and Hales and Augustin say; yet, nevertheless, they do not all know it formally, nor are aware of their participation of it, so that it may be said the eternal law is not universally known in a direct manner. But some attain that knowledge, either by natural reasoning, or, more properly, by revelation of faith; and hence we have said that it is known by some only in the inferior laws, but by others through the means of those laws."¹

22. In every chapter, Suarez propounds the arguments of doctors on either side of the problem, ending with his own determination, which is frequently a middle course. On the question, Whether natural law is of itself preceptive, or merely indicative of what is intrinsically right or wrong, or, in other words, whether God, as to this law, is a legislator, he holds this middle line with Aquinas and most theologians (as he says); contending that natural law does not merely indicate right and wrong, but commands the one and prohibits the other on divine authority; though this will of God is not the whole ground of the moral good and evil which belongs to the observance or transgression of natural law, inasmuch as it presupposes a certain intrinsic right and wrong in the actions themselves, to which it superadds the special obligation of a divine law. God, therefore, may be truly called a legislator in respect of natural law."²

23. He next comes to a profound but important inquiry, closely connected with the last, Whether God could have permitted, by his own law, actions against natural reason. Ockham and Gerson had resolved this in the affirmative; Aquinas, the contrary way. Suarez assents to the latter, and thus determines that the law is strictly immutable. It must follow, of course, that the pope cannot alter or dispense with the law of nature; and he might have spared the fourteenth chapter, wherein he controverts the doctrine of Sanchez and some casuists who had maintained so extraordinary a prerogative.³ This, however, is rather episodic. In the fifteenth chapter, he treats more at length the question, Whether God can dispense

¹ Lib. II., c. 4, § 9.

² "Hinc Dei voluntas, prohibitio aut preceptum non est tota ratio bonitatis et malitiae quae est in observatione vel transgressionem legis naturalis, sed supponit in ipsis actibus necessariam quandam honestatem vel turpitudinem, et

illis adjungit specialem legis divinae obligationem." — C. 6, § 11.

³ "Nulla potestas humana, etiam pontificia sit, potest proprium aliquod preceptum legis naturalis abrogare, nec illud proprie et in se mutare, neque in ipso dispensare." — § 8.

with the law of nature; which is not, perhaps, decided in denying his power to repeal it. He begins by distinguishing three classes of moral laws. The first are the most general, such as that good is to be done rather than evil; and with these it is agreed that God cannot dispense. The second is of such as the precepts of the Decalogue, where the chief difficulty had arisen. Ockham, Peter d'Ailly, Gerson, and others, incline to say that he can dispense with all these, inasmuch as they are only prohibitions which he has himself imposed. This tenet, Suarez observes, is rejected by all other theologians as false and absurd. He decidedly holds that there is an intrinsic goodness or malignity in actions independent of the command of God. Scotus had been of opinion, that God might dispense with the commandments of the second table, but not those of the first. Durand seems to have thought the fifth commandment (our sixth) more dispensable than the rest, probably on account of the case of Abraham. But Aquinas, Cajetan, Soto, with many more, deny absolutely the dispensability of the Decalogue in any part. The Gordian knot about the sacrifice of Isaac is cut by a distinction, that God did not act here as a legislator, but in another capacity, as lord of life and death, so that he only used Abraham as an instrument for that which he might have done himself. The third class of moral precepts is of those not contained in the Decalogue; as to which he decides also, that God cannot dispense with them, though he may change the circumstances upon which their obligation rests; as when he releases a vow.

24. The Protestant churches were not generally attentive to casuistical divinity, which smelt too much of the opposite system. Eichhorn observes, that the first book of that class, published among the Lutherans, was by a certain Baldwin of Wittenberg, in 1628.¹

English
casuists:
Perkins,
Hall.

A few books of casuistry were published in England during this period, though nothing, as well as I remember, that can be reckoned a system, or even a treatise, of moral philosophy. Perkins, an eminent Calvinistic divine of the reign of Elizabeth, is the first of these in point of time. His *Cases of Conscience* appeared in 1606. Of this book I can say nothing from personal knowledge. In the works of Bishop Hall several particular questions of this kind are treated, but

¹ Vol. vi. part i. p. 346.

not with much ability. His distinctions are more than usually feeble. Thus usury is a deadly sin: but it is very difficult to commit it, unless we love the sin for its own sake; for almost every possible case of lending money will be found, by his limitations of the rule, to justify the taking a profit for the loan.¹ His casuistry about selling goods is of the same description: a man must take no advantage of the scarcity of the commodity, unless there should be just reason to raise the price, which he admits to be often the case in a scarcity. He concludes by observing, that in this, as in other well-ordered nations, it would be a happy thing to have a regulation of prices. He decides, as all the old casuists did, that a promise extorted by a robber is binding. Sanderson was the most celebrated of the English casuists. His treatise *De Juramenti Obligatione* appeared in 1647.

25. Though no proper treatise of moral philosophy came from any English writer in this period, we have one which must be placed in this class, strangely as the subject has been handled by its distinguished author. Selden published in 1640 his learned work, *De Jure Naturali et Gentium juxta Disciplinam Ebræorum*.² The object of the author was to trace the opinions of the Jews on the law of nature and nations, or of moral obligation, as distinct from the Mosaic law; the former being a law to which they held all mankind to be bound. This theme had been, of course, untouched by the Greek and Roman philosophers, nor was much to be found upon it in modern writers. His purpose is therefore rather historical than argumentative; but he seems so generally to adopt the Jewish theory of natural law, that we may consider him the disciple of the rabbis as much as their historian.

26. The origin of natural law was not drawn by the Jews, as some of the jurists imagined it ought to be, from the habits and instincts of all animated beings, "quod natura omnia animalia docuit," according to the definition of the Pandects. Nor did they deem, as many have done, the consent of mankind and common customs of nations to be a sufficient basis for so permanent and invariable a standard. Upon the discrepancy of moral

¹ Hall's Works (edit. Pratt), vol. viii. p. 375.

² *Juxta* for *secundum*, we need hardly say, is bad Latin: it was, however, very

common, and is even used by Joseph Scaliger, as Voetius mentions, in his treatise *De Vitæ Sermonibus*.

sentiments and practices among mankind, Selden enlarges in the tone which Sextus Empiricus had taught scholars, and which the world had learned from Montaigne. Nor did unassisted reason seem equal to determine moral questions, both from its natural feebleness, and because reason alone does not create an obligation, which depends wholly on the command of a superior.¹ But God, as the ruler of the universe, has partly implanted in our minds, partly made known to us by exterior revelation, his own will, which is our law. These positions he illustrates with a superb display of erudition, especially Oriental, and certainly with more prolixity, and less regard to opposite reasonings, than we should desire.

27. The Jewish writers concur in maintaining, that certain short precepts of moral duty were orally enjoined by God on the parent of mankind, and afterwards Seven Precepts of the Sons of Noah. on the sons of Noah. Whether these were simply preserved by tradition, or whether, by an innate moral faculty, mankind had the power of constantly discerning them, seems to have been an unsettled point. The principal of these divine rules are called, for distinction, The Seven Precepts of the Sons of Noah. There is, however, some variance in the lists, as Selden has given them from the ancient writers. That most received consists of seven prohibitions; namely, of idolatry, blasphemy, murder, adultery, theft, rebellion, and cutting a limb from a living animal. The last of these, the sense of which, however, is controverted, as well as the third, but no other, are indicated in the ninth chapter of Genesis.

28. Selden pours forth his unparalleled stores of erudition on all these subjects, and upon those which are suggested in the course of his explanations. These Character of Selden's work. digressions are by no means the least useful part of his long treatise. They elucidate some obscure passages of Scripture. But the whole work belongs far more to theological than to philosophical investigation; and I have placed it here chiefly out of conformity to usage: for undoubtedly Selden, though a man of very strong reasoning faculties, had not greatly turned them to the principles of natural

¹ Selden says, in his Table Talk, that he can understand no law of nature, but a law of God. He might mean this in the sense of Suarez, without denying an intrinsic distinction of right and wrong.

law. His reliance on the testimony of Jewish writers, many of them by no means ancient, for those primeval traditions as to the sons of Noah, was in the character of his times; but it will scarcely suit the more rigid criticism of our own. His book, however, is excellent for its proper purpose, that of representing Jewish opinion; and is among the greatest achievements in erudition that any English writer has performed.

29. The moral theories of Grotius and Hobbes are so much interwoven with other parts of their philosophy, in the treatise *De Jure Belli* and in the *Leviathan*, that it would be dissecting those works too much, were we to separate what is merely ethical from what falls within the provinces of politics and jurisprudence. The whole must therefore be reserved for the ensuing sections of this chapter. Nor is there much in the writings of Bacon or of Descartes which falls, in the sense we have hitherto been considering it, under the class of moral philosophy. We may, therefore, proceed to another description of books, relative to the passions and manners of mankind, rather than, in a strict sense, to their duties; though of course there will frequently be some intermixture of subjects so intimately allied.

30. In the year 1601, Peter Charron, a French ecclesiastic, published his treatise on Wisdom. The reputation of this work has been considerable: his countrymen are apt to name him with Montaigne; and Pope has given him the epithet of "more wise" than his predecessor, on account, as Warburton expresses it, of his "moderating everywhere the extravagant Pyrrhonism of his friend." It is admitted that he has copied freely from the *Essays* of Montaigne: in fact, a very large portion of the treatise on Wisdom, not less, I should conjecture, than one-fourth, is extracted from them with scarce any verbal alteration. It is not the case that he moderates the sceptical tone which he found there; on the contrary, the most remarkable passages of that kind have been transcribed: but we must do Charron the justice to say, that he has retrenched the indecencies, the egotism, and the superfluities. Charron does not dissemble his debts. "This," he says in his preface, "is a collection of a part of my studies: the form and method are my own. What I have taken from others I have put in their words, not being able to say it better than they have done." In the political

part, he has borrowed copiously from Lipsius and Bodin; and he is said to have obligations to Duvair.¹ The ancients also must have contributed their share. It becomes, therefore, difficult to estimate the place of Charron as a philosopher, because we feel a good deal of uncertainty whether any passage may be his own. He appears to have been a man formed in the school of Montaigne, not much less bold in pursuing the novel opinions of others, but less fertile in original thoughts, so that he often falls into the commonplaces of ethics; with more reading than his model, with more disciplined habits, as well of arranging and distributing his subject, as of observing the sequence of an argument; but, on the other hand, with far less of ingenuity in thinking, and of sprightliness of language.

31. A writer of rather less extensive celebrity than Charron belongs full as much to the school of Montaigne, though he does not so much pillage his Essays. La Mothe le Vayer : his Dialogues. This was La Mothe le Vayer, a man distinguished by his literary character in the court of Louis XIII., and ultimately preceptor both to the Duke of Orleans and the young king (Louis XIV.) himself. La Mothe was habitually and universally a sceptic. Among several smaller works, we may chiefly instance his Dialogues, published many years after his death, under the name of Horatius Tubero. They must have been written in the reign of Louis XIII., and belong, therefore, to the present period. In attacking every established doctrine, especially in religion, he goes much farther than Montaigne, and seems to have taken some of his metaphysical system immediately from Sextus Empiricus. He is profuse of quotation, especially in a dialogue entitled *Le Banquet Sceptique*, the aim of which is to show that there is no uniform taste of mankind as to their choice of food. His mode of arguing against the moral sense is entirely that of Montaigne; or, if there be any difference, is more full of the two fallacies by which that lively writer deceives himself: namely, the accumulating examples of things arbitrary and fanciful, such as modes of dress and conventional usages, with respect to which no one pretends that any natural law can be found; and, when he comes to subjects more truly moral, the turning our attention solely to the external action, and not to the motive or principle, which, under different circumstances, may prompt men to opposite courses.

¹ Biogr. Universelle.

32. These dialogues are not unpleasing to read, and exhibit a polite though rather pedantic style, not uncommon in the seventeenth century. They are, however, very diffuse; and the sceptical paradoxes become merely commonplace by repetition. One of them is more grossly indecent than any part of Montaigne. La Mothe le Vayer is not, on the whole, much to be admired as a philosopher: little appears to be his own, and still less is really good. He contributed, no question, as much as any one, to the irreligion, and contempt for morality, prevailing in that court where he was in high reputation. Some other works of this author may be classed under the same description.

33. We can hardly refer Lord Bacon's Essays to the school of Montaigne, though their title may lead us to suspect that they were in some measure suggested by that most popular writer. The first edition, containing ten essays only, and those much shorter than as we now possess them, appeared, as has been already mentioned, in 1597. They were reprinted with very little variation in 1606. But the enlarged work was published in 1612, and dedicated to Henry Hevel. He calls them, in this dedication, "certain short ~~works~~ ^{pieces} set down rather significantly than curiously, which I have not called Essays. The word is late, but the thing is ~~ancient~~ ^{as Seneca's Exercises to Lucilius}, if you mark them well, as his essays that be dispersed meditations, though ~~covered in the form of exercises~~ ^{covered in the form of exercises}." The resemblance, at all events, to Montaigne is not greater than might be expected of two men equally original in genius and entirely opposite in their characters and circumstances. One, by an instinctive tendency, exercises some of the characteristics of human nature; the other, by constant reflection, scrutinizes and dissects it. One is an indulgent and indulging reader, the other too severe and censorious to be one who seeks to be amused. We delight in one as we wish to be wiser, but this admiration has also its own danger. In one we find traces of the sweet temper and tranquil contemplation of Pythagoras; in the other, more of the practical wisdom and somewhat ambitious concerns of Seneca. It is characteristic of Bacon's philosophical writings, that they have in them a spirit of movement, a perpetual reference to what man is to do in order to an end, rather than to his mere speculation upon what is. In his *Essays*, this is naturally still more prominent. They are, as

quaintly described in the titlepage of the first edition, "places (*loci*) of persuasion and dissuasion;" counsels for those who would be great as well as wise. They are such as sprang from a mind ardent in two kinds of ambition, and hesitating whether to found a new philosophy, or to direct the vessel of the state. We perceive, however, that the immediate reward attending greatness, as is almost always the case, gave it a preponderance in his mind; and hence his Essays are more often political than moral: they deal with mankind, not in their general faculties or habits, but in their mutual strife; their endeavors to rule others, or to avoid their rule. He is more cautious and more comprehensive, though not more acute, than Machiavel, who often becomes too dogmatic through the habit of referring every thing to a particular aspect of political societies. Nothing in the Prince or the discourses on Livy is superior to the Essays on Seditions, on Empire, on Innovations, or generally those which bear on the dexterous management of a people by their rulers. Both these writers have what to our more liberal age appears a counselling of governors for their own rather than their subjects' advantage; but as this is generally represented to be the best means, though not, as it truly is, the real end, their advice tends, on the whole, to promote the substantial benefits of government.

34. The transcendent strength of Bacon's mind is visible in the whole tenor of these Essays, unequal as they must be from the very nature of such compositions. ^{Their excellence.} They are deeper and more discriminating than any earlier, or almost any later, work in the English language, full of recondite observation, long matured and carefully sifted. It is true, that we might wish for more vivacity and ease. Bacon, who had much wit, had little gayety; his Essays are consequently stiff and grave, where the subject might have been touched with a lively hand: thus it is in those on Gardens and on Building. The sentences have sometimes too apophthegmatic a form, and want of coherence; the historical instances, though far less frequent than with Montaigne, have a little the look of pedantry to our eyes. But it is from this condensation, from this gravity, that the work derives its peculiar impressiveness. Few books are more quoted; and, what is not always the case with such books, we may add, that few are more generally read. In this respect, they lead the

van of our prose literature : for no gentleman is ashamed of owning that he has not read the Elizabethan writers ; but it would be somewhat derogatory to a man of the slightest claim to polite letters, were he unacquainted with the *Essays of Bacon*. It is, indeed, little worth while to read this or any other book for reputation's sake ; but very few in our language so well repay the pains, or afford more nourishment to the thoughts. They might be judiciously introduced, with a small number more, into a sound method of education,—one that should make wisdom, rather than mere knowledge, its object ; and might become a text-book of examination in our schools.

35. It is rather difficult to fix upon the fittest place for Feltham's Resolves. bringing forward some books, which, though moral in their subject, belong to the general literature of the age ; and we might strip the province of polite letters of what have been reckoned its chief ornaments. I shall therefore select here such only as are more worthy of consideration for their matter than for the style in which it is delivered. Several that might range, more or less, under the denomination of moral essays, were published both in English and in other languages. But few of them are now read, or even much known by name. One, which has made a better fortune than the rest, demands mention,—the *Resolves of Owen Feltham*. Of this book, the first part of which was published in 1627, the second not till after the middle of the century, it is not uncommon to meet with high praises in those modern writers who profess a faithful allegiance to our older literature. For myself, I can only say that Feltham appears not only a labored and artificial, but a shallow writer. Among his many faults, none strikes me more than a want of depth, which his pointed and sententious manner renders more ridiculous. There are certainly exceptions to this vacuity of original meaning in Feltham : it would be possible to fill a few pages with extracts not undeserving of being read, with thoughts just and judicious, though never deriving much lustre from his diction. He is one of our worst writers in point of style ; with little vigor, he has less elegance ; his English is impure to an excessive degree, and full of words unauthorized by any usage. Pedantry, and the novel phrases which Greek and Latin etymology was supposed to warrant, appear in most productions of this period ; but Feltham attempted to bend the English idiom to his own affectations

The moral reflections of a serious and thoughtful mind are generally pleasing; and to this, perhaps, is partly owing the kind of popularity which the *Resolves of Feltham* have obtained; but they may be had more agreeably and profitably in other books.¹

36. A superior genius to that of Feltham is exhibited in the *Religio Medici* of Sir Thomas Browne. This little book made a remarkable impression: it was soon translated into several languages, and is highly extolled by Conringius and others, who could only judge through these versions. Patin, though he rather slights it himself, tells us in one of his letters that it was very popular at Paris. The character which Johnson has given of the *Religio Medici* is well known; and, though perhaps rather too favorable, appears, in general, just.² The mind of Browne was fertile, and, according to the current use of the word, ingenious; his analogies are original, and sometimes brilliant; and, as his learning is also in things out of the beaten path, this gives a peculiar and uncommon air to all his writings, and especially to the *Religio Medici*. He was, however, far removed from real philosophy, both by his turn of mind and by the nature of his erudition: he seldom reasons; his thoughts are desultory; sometimes he appears sceptical or paradoxical; but credulity, and deference to authority, prevail. He belonged to the class, numerous at that time in our church, who halted between Popery and Protestantism; and this gives him, on all such topics, an appearance of vacilla-

¹ This is a random sample of Feltham's style: "Of all objects of sorrow, a distressed king is the most pitiful, because it presents us most the frailty of humanity, and cannot but most *midnight* the soul of him that is fallen. The sorrows of a deposed king are like the *distortments* of a *darted* conscience, which none can know but he that hath lost a crown."—Cent. i. 61. We find, not long after, the following precious phrase: "The nature that is *eried* with the subtleties of time and practice."—i. 68. In one page we have *obnubilare*, *nested*, *parallel* (as a verb), *fails* (fallings), *uncertain*, *depraving* (calumniating). i. 80. And we are to be disgusted with such vile English, or properly no English, for the sake of the sleepy saws of a trivial morality. Such defects are not compensated by the better and more striking thoughts we may occasionally light upon. In reading Feltham,

nevertheless, I seemed to perceive some resemblance to the tone and way of thinking of the Turkish Spy, which is a great compliment to the former; for the Turkish Spy is neither disagreeable nor superficial. The resemblance must lie in a certain contemplative melancholy, rather serious than severe, in respect to the world and its ways; and as Feltham's *Resolves* seem to have a charm, by the editions they have gone through and the good name they have gained, I can only look for it in this.

² "The *Religio Medici* was no sooner published than it excited the attention of the public by the novelty of paradoxes, the dignity of sentiment, the quick succession of images, the multitude of abstruse allusions, the subtlety of disquisition, and the strength of language."—*Life of Browne* (in Johnson's Works, xii 276).

tion and irresoluteness, which probably represents the real state of his mind. His paradoxes do not seem very original; nor does he arrive at them by any process of argument: they are more like traces of his reading casually suggesting themselves, and supported by his own ingenuity. His style is not flowing, but vigorous; his choice of words not elegant, and even approaching to barbarism as English phrase: yet there is an impressiveness, an air of reflection and sincerity, in Browne's writings, which redeem many of their faults. His egotism is equal to that of Montaigne; but with this difference, that it is the egotism of a melancholy mind, which generally becomes unpleasing. This melancholy temperament is characteristic of Browne. "Let's talk of graves and worms and epitaphs" seems his motto. His best-written work, the *Hydriotaphia*, is expressly an essay on sepulchral urns; but the same taste for the circumstances of mortality leavens also the *Religio Medici*.

37. The thoughts of Sir Walter Raleigh on moral prudence are few, but precious. And some of the bright-sal-
Selden's Table Talk. lies of Selden recorded in his *Table Talk* are of the same description, though the book is too miscellaneous to fall under any single head of classification. The editor of this very short and small volume, which gives, perhaps, a more exalted notion of Selden's natural talents than any of his learned writings, requests the reader to distinguish times, and, "in his fancy, to carry along with him the when and the why many of these things were spoken." This intimation accounts for the different spirit in which he may seem to combat the follies of the prelates at one time, and of the Presbyterians or Puritans at another. These sayings are not always, apparently, well reported: some seem to have been misunderstood, and, in others, the limiting clauses to have been forgotten. But, on the whole, they are full of vigor, raciness, and a kind of scorn of the half-learned, far less rude, but more cutting, than that of Scaliger. It has been said that the *Table Talk* of Selden is worth all the *Ana* of the Continent. In this I should be disposed to concur; but they are not exactly works of the same class.

38. We must now descend much lower, and could find little
Osborn's Advice to his Son. worth remembering. Osborn's *Advice to his Son* may be reckoned among the moral and political writings of this period. It is not very far above mediocrity,

and contains a good deal that is commonplace, yet with a considerable sprinkling of sound sense and observation. The style is rather apophthegmatic, though by no means more so than was then usual.

39. A few books, English as well as foreign, are purposely deferred for the present. I am rather apprehensive that I shall be found to have overlooked some, not unworthy of notice. One, written in Latin by a German writer, has struck me as displaying a spirit which may claim for it a place among the livelier and lighter class, though with serious intent, of moral essays. John Valentine Andræ was a man above his age, and a singular contrast to the narrow and pedantic herd of German scholars and theologians. He regarded all things around him with a sarcastic but benevolent philosophy, keen in exposing the errors of mankind, yet only for the sake of amending them. It has been supposed by many that he invented the existence of the famous Rosicrucian society, not so much probably for the sake of mystification, as to suggest an institution so praiseworthy and philanthropic as he delineated for the imitation of mankind. This, however, is still a debated problem in Germany.¹ But, among his numerous writings, that alone of which I know any thing is entitled, in the original Latin, *Mythologiæ Christianæ, sive Virtutum et Vitiorum Vitæ Humanæ Imaginum, Libri Tres* (Strasburg, 1618). Herder has translated a part of this book in the fifth volume of his *Zerstreute Blätter*; and it is here that I have met with it. Andræ wrote, I believe, solely in Latin; and his works appear to be scarce, at least in England. These short apologues, which Herder has called *Parables*, are written with uncommon terseness of language, a happy and original vein of invention, and a philosophy looking down on common life without ostentation and without passion. He came, too, before Bacon; but he had learned to scorn the disputes of the schools, and had sought for truth with an entire love, even at the hands of Cardan and Campanella. I will give a specimen, in a note, of the peculiar manner of Andræ; but my translation does not perhaps justice to that of Herder. The idea, it may be observed, is now become more trite.²

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each other for superiority, and the voices of the judges were divided. The man of learning talked much, and persuaded

not with much ability. His distinctions are more than usually feeble. Thus usury is a deadly sin: but it is very difficult to commit it, unless we love the sin for its own sake; for almost every possible case of lending money will be found, by his limitations of the rule, to justify the taking a profit for the loan.¹ His casuistry about selling goods is of the same description: a man must take no advantage of the scarcity of the commodity, unless there should be just reason to raise the price, which he admits to be often the case in a scarcity. He concludes by observing, that in this, as in other well-ordered nations, it would be a happy thing to have a regulation of prices. He decides, as all the old casuists did, that a promise extorted by a robber is binding. Sanderson was the most celebrated of the English casuists. His treatise *De Juramenti Obligatione* appeared in 1647.

25. Though no proper treatise of moral philosophy came from any English writer in this period, we have one which must be placed in this class, strangely as the subject has been handled by its distinguished author. Selden published in 1640 his learned work, *De Jure Naturali et Gentium juxta Disciplinam Ebræorum*.² The object of the author was to trace the opinions of the Jews on the law of nature and nations, or of moral obligation, as distinct from the Mosaic law; the former being a law to which they held all mankind to be bound. This theme had been, of course, untouched by the Greek and Roman philosophers, nor was much to be found upon it in modern writers. His purpose is therefore rather historical than argumentative; but he seems so generally to adopt the Jewish theory of natural law, that we may consider him the disciple of the rabbis as much as their historian.

26. The origin of natural law was not drawn by the Jews, as some of the jurists imagined it ought to be, from the habits and instincts of all animated beings, "quod natura omnia animalia docuit," according to the definition of the Pandects. Nor did they deem, as many have done, the consent of mankind and common customs of nations to be a sufficient basis for so permanent and invariable a standard. Upon the discrepancy of moral

¹ Hall's Works (edit. Pratt), vol. viii. p. 375.

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sentiments and practices among mankind, Selden enlarges in the tone which Sextus Empiricus had taught scholars, and which the world had learned from Montaigne. Nor did unassisted reason seem equal to determine moral questions, both from its natural feebleness, and because reason alone does not create an obligation, which depends wholly on the command of a superior.¹ But God, as the ruler of the universe, has partly implanted in our minds, partly made known to us by exterior revelation, his own will, which is our law. These positions he illustrates with a superb display of erudition, especially Oriental, and certainly with more proximity, and less regard to opposite reasonings, than we should desire.

27. The Jewish writers concur in maintaining, that certain short precepts of moral duty were orally enjoined by God on the parent of mankind, and afterwards on the sons of Noah. Whether these were simply preserved by tradition, or whether, by an innate moral faculty, mankind had the power of constantly discerning them, seems to have been an unsettled point. The principal of these divine rules are called, for distinction, The Seven Precepts of the Sons of Noah. There is, however, some variance in the lists, as Selden has given them from the ancient writers. That most received consists of seven prohibitions; namely, of idolatry, blasphemy, murder, adultery, theft, rebellion, and cutting a limb from a living animal. The last of these, the sense of which, however, is controverted, as well as the third, but no other, are indicated in the ninth chapter of Genesis.

28. Selden pours forth his unparalleled stores of erudition on all these subjects, and upon those which are suggested in the course of his explanations. These digressions are by no means the least useful part of his long treatise. They elucidate some obscure passages of Scripture. But the whole work belongs far more to theological than to philosophical investigation; and I have placed it here chiefly out of conformity to usage: for undoubtedly Selden, though a man of very strong reasoning faculties, had not greatly turned them to the principles of natural

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law. His reliance on the testimony of Jewish writers, many of them by no means ancient, for those primeval traditions as to the sons of Noah, was in the character of his times; but it will scarcely suit the more rigid criticism of our own. His book, however, is excellent for its proper purpose, that of representing Jewish opinion; and is among the greatest achievements in erudition that any English writer has performed.

29. The moral theories of Grotius and Hobbes are so much interwoven with other parts of their philosophy, in the treatise *De Jure Belli* and in the *Leviathan*, that it would be dissecting those works too much, were we to separate what is merely ethical from what falls within the provinces of politics and jurisprudence. The whole must therefore be reserved for the ensuing sections of this chapter. Nor is there much in the writings of Bacon or of Descartes which falls, in the sense we have hitherto been considering it, under the class of moral philosophy. We may, therefore, proceed to another description of books, relative to the passions and manners of mankind, rather than, in a strict sense, to their duties; though of course there will frequently be some intermixture of subjects so intimately allied.

30. In the year 1601, Peter Charron, a French ecclesiastic, published his treatise on Wisdom. The reputation of this work has been considerable: his countrymen are apt to name him with Montaigne; and Pope has given him the epithet of "more wise" than his predecessor, on account, as Warburton expresses it, of his "moderating everywhere the extravagant Pyrrhonism of his friend." It is admitted that he has copied freely from the *Essays* of Montaigne: in fact, a very large portion of the treatise on Wisdom, not less, I should conjecture, than one-fourth, is extracted from them with scarce any verbal alteration. It is not the case that he moderates the sceptical tone which he found there; on the contrary, the most remarkable passages of that kind have been transcribed: but we must do Charron the justice to say, that he has retrenched the indecencies, the egotism, and the superfluities. Charron does not dissemble his debts. "This," he says in his preface, "is a collection of a part of my studies: the form and method are my own. What I have taken from others I have put in their words, not being able to say it better than they have done." In the political

part, he has borrowed copiously from Lipsius and Bodin; and he is said to have obligations to Duvair.¹ The ancients also must have contributed their share. It becomes, therefore, difficult to estimate the place of Charron as a philosopher, because we feel a good deal of uncertainty whether any passage may be his own. He appears to have been a man formed in the school of Montaigne, not much less bold in pursuing the novel opinions of others, but less fertile in original thoughts, so that he often falls into the commonplaces of ethics; with more reading than his model, with more disciplined habits, as well of arranging and distributing his subject, as of observing the sequence of an argument; but, on the other hand, with far less of ingenuity in thinking, and of sprightliness of language.

31. A writer of rather less extensive celebrity than Charron belongs full as much to the school of Montaigne, though he does not so much pillage his Essays. La Mothe le Vayer : his Dialogues. This was La Mothe le Vayer, a man distinguished by his literary character in the court of Louis XIII., and ultimately preceptor both to the Duke of Orleans and the young king (Louis XIV.) himself. La Mothe was habitually and universally a sceptic. Among several smaller works, we may chiefly instance his Dialogues, published many years after his death, under the name of Horatius Tubero. They must have been written in the reign of Louis XIII., and belong, therefore, to the present period. In attacking every established doctrine, especially in religion, he goes much farther than Montaigne, and seems to have taken some of his metaphysical system immediately from Sextus Empiricus. He is profuse of quotation, especially in a dialogue entitled *Le Banquet Sceptique*, the aim of which is to show that there is no uniform taste of mankind as to their choice of food. His mode of arguing against the moral sense is entirely that of Montaigne; or, if there be any difference, is more full of the two fallacies by which that lively writer deceives himself: namely, the accumulating examples of things arbitrary and fanciful, such as modes of dress and conventional usages, with respect to which no one pretends that any natural law can be found; and, when he comes to subjects more truly moral, the turning our attention solely to the external action, and not to the motive or principle, which, under different circumstances, may prompt men to opposite courses.

¹ Biogr. Universelle.

32. These dialogues are not unpleasing to read, and exhibit a polite though rather pedantic style, not uncommon in the seventeenth century. They are, however, very diffuse; and the sceptical paradoxes become merely commonplace by repetition. One of them is more grossly indecent than any part of Montaigne. La Mothe le Vayer is not, on the whole, much to be admired as a philosopher: little appears to be his own, and still less is really good. He contributed, no question, as much as any one, to the irreligion, and contempt for morality, prevailing in that court where he was in high reputation. Some other works of this author may be classed under the same description.

33. We can hardly refer Lord Bacon's *Essays* to the school of Montaigne, though their title may lead us to suspect that they were in some measure suggested by that most popular writer. The first edition, containing ten essays only, and those much shorter than as we now possess them, appeared, as has been already mentioned, in 1597. They were reprinted with very little variation in 1606. But the enlarged work was published in 1612, and dedicated to Prince Henry. He calls them, in this dedication, "certain brief notes, set down rather significantly than curiously, which I have called *Essays*." The word is late, but the thing is ancient; for Seneca's *Epistles to Lucilius*, if you mark them well, are but essays, that is, dispersed meditations, though conveyed in the form of epistles." The resemblance, at all events, to Montaigne, is not greater than might be expected in two men equally original in genius, and entirely opposite in their characters and circumstances. One, by an instinctive felicity, catches some of the characteristics of human nature; the other, by profound reflection, scrutinizes and dissects it. One is too negligent for the inquiring reader, the other too formal and sententious for one who seeks to be amused. We delight in one, we admire the other; but this admiration has also its own delight. In one we find more of the sweet temper and tranquil contemplation of Plutarch; in the other, more of the practical wisdom and somewhat ambitious prospects of Seneca. It is characteristic of Bacon's philosophical writings, that they have in them a spirit of movement, a perpetual reference to what man is to do in order to an end, rather than to his mere speculation upon what is. In his *Essays*, this is naturally still more prominent. They are, as

quaintly described in the titlepage of the first edition, "places (*loci*) of persuasion and dissuasion;" counsels for those who would be great as well as wise. They are such as sprang from a mind ardent in two kinds of ambition, and hesitating whether to found a new philosophy, or to direct the vessel of the state. We perceive, however, that the immediate reward attending greatness, as is almost always the case, gave it a preponderance in his mind; and hence his Essays are more often political than moral: they deal with mankind, not in their general faculties or habits, but in their mutual strife; their endeavors to rule others, or to avoid their rule. He is more cautious and more comprehensive, though not more acute, than Machiavel, who often becomes too dogmatic through the habit of referring every thing to a particular aspect of political societies. Nothing in the Prince or the discourses on Livy is superior to the Essays on Seditions, on Empire, on Innovations, or generally those which bear on the dexterous management of a people by their rulers. Both these writers have what to our more liberal age appears a counselling of governors for their own rather than their subjects' advantage; but as this is generally represented to be the best means, though not, as it truly is, the real end, their advice tends, on the whole, to promote the substantial benefits of government.

34. The transcendent strength of Bacon's mind is visible in the whole tenor of these Essays, unequal as they must be from the very nature of such compositions. Their excellence. They are deeper and more discriminating than any earlier, or almost any later, work in the English language, full of recondite observation, long matured and carefully sifted. It is true, that we might wish for more vivacity and ease. Bacon, who had much wit, had little gayety; his Essays are consequently stiff and grave, where the subject might have been touched with a lively hand: thus it is in those on Gardens and on Building. The sentences have sometimes too apophthegmatic a form, and want of coherence; the historical instances, though far less frequent than with Montaigne, have a little the look of pedantry to our eyes. But it is from this condensation, from this gravity, that the work derives its peculiar impressiveness. Few books are more quoted; and, what is not always the case with such books, we may add, that few are more generally read. In this respect, they lead the

van of our prose literature : for no gentleman is ashamed of owning that he has not read the Elizabethan writers ; but it would be somewhat derogatory to a man of the slightest claim to polite letters, were he unacquainted with the *Essays of Bacon*. It is, indeed, little worth while to read this or any other book for reputation's sake ; but very few in our language so well repay the pains, or afford more nourishment to the thoughts. They might be judiciously introduced, with a small number more, into a sound method of education, — one that should make wisdom, rather than mere knowledge, its object ; and might become a text-book of examination in our schools.

35. It is rather difficult to fix upon the fittest place for Feltham's Resolves. bringing forward some books, which, though moral in their subject, belong to the general literature of the age ; and we might strip the province of polite letters of what have been reckoned its chief ornaments. I shall therefore select here such only as are more worthy of consideration for their matter than for the style in which it is delivered. Several that might range, more or less, under the denomination of moral essays, were published both in English and in other languages. But few of them are now read, or even much known by name. One, which has made a better fortune than the rest, demands mention, — the *Resolves of Owen Feltham*. Of this book, the first part of which was published in 1627, the second not till after the middle of the century, it is not uncommon to meet with high praises in those modern writers who profess a faithful allegiance to our older literature. For myself, I can only say that Feltham appears not only a labored and artificial, but a shallow writer. Among his many faults, none strikes me more than a want of depth, which his pointed and sententious manner renders more ridiculous. There are certainly exceptions to this vacuity of original meaning in Feltham : it would be possible to fill a few pages with extracts not undeserving of being read, with thoughts just and judicious, though never deriving much lustre from his diction. He is one of our worst writers in point of style ; with little vigor, he has less elegance ; his English is impure to an excessive degree, and full of words unauthorized by any usage. Pedantry, and the novel phrases which Greek and Latin etymology was supposed to warrant, appear in most productions of this period ; but Feltham attempted to bend the English idiom to his own affectations

The moral reflections of a serious and thoughtful mind are generally pleasing; and to this, perhaps, is partly owing the kind of popularity which the *Resolves of Feltham* have obtained; but they may be had more agreeably and profitably in other books.¹

36. A superior genius to that of Feltham is exhibited in the *Religio Medici* of Sir Thomas Browne. This little book made a remarkable impression: it was soon translated into several languages, and is highly extolled by Conringius and others, who could only judge through these versions. Patin, though he rather slights it himself, tells us in one of his letters that it was very popular at Paris. The character which Johnson has given of the *Religio Medici* is well known; and, though perhaps rather too favorable, appears, in general, just.² The mind of Browne was fertile, and, according to the current use of the word, ingenious; his analogies are original, and sometimes brilliant; and, as his learning is also in things out of the beaten path, this gives a peculiar and uncommon air to all his writings, and especially to the *Religio Medici*. He was, however, far removed from real philosophy, both by his turn of mind and by the nature of his erudition: he seldom reasons; his thoughts are desultory; sometimes he appears sceptical or paradoxical; but credulity, and deference to authority, prevail. He belonged to the class, numerous at that time in our church, who halted between Popery and Protestantism; and this gives him, on all such topics, an appearance of vacilla-

¹ This is a random sample of Feltham's style: "Of all objects of sorrow, a distressed king is the most pitiful, because it presents us most the frailty of humanity, and cannot but most *midnight* the soul of him that is fallen. The sorrows of a deposed king are like the *distorquements* of a *darted* conscience, which none can know but he that hath lost a crown."—Cent. i. 61. We find, not long after, the following precious phrase: "The nature that is *arised* with the subtleties of time and practice."—i. 68. In one page we have *obnubilate*, *nested*, *parallel* (as a verb), *fails* (falling), *uncertain*, *depraving* (calumniating). i. 50. And we are to be disgusted with such vile English, or properly no English, for the sake of the sleepy saws of a trivial morality. Such defects are not compensated by the better and more striking thoughts we may occasionally light upon. In reading Feltham,

nevertheless, I seemed to perceive some resemblance to the tone and way of thinking of the Turkish Spy, which is a great compliment to the former; for the Turkish Spy is neither disagreeable nor superficial. The resemblance must lie in a certain contemplative melancholy, rather serious than severe, in respect to the world and its ways; and as Feltham's *Resolves* seem to have a charm, by the editions they have gone through and the good name they have gained, I can only look for it in this.

² "The *Religio Medici* was no sooner published than it excited the attention of the public by the novelty of paradoxes, the dignity of sentiment, the quick succession of images, the multitude of abstruse allusions, the subtlety of disquisition, and the strength of language."—Life of Browne (in Johnson's Works, xii 275).

tion and irresoluteness, which probably represents the real state of his mind. His paradoxes do not seem very original; nor does he arrive at them by any process of argument: they are more like traces of his reading casually suggesting themselves, and supported by his own ingenuity. His style is not flowing, but vigorous; his choice of words not elegant, and even approaching to barbarism as English phrase: yet there is an impressiveness, an air of reflection and sincerity, in Browne's writings, which redeem many of their faults. His egotism is equal to that of Montaigne; but with this difference, that it is the egotism of a melancholy mind, which generally becomes unpleasing. This melancholy temperament is characteristic of Browne. "Let's talk of graves and worms and epitaphs" seems his motto. His best-written work, the *Hydriotaphia*, is expressly an essay on sepulchral urns; but the same taste for the circumstances of mortality leavens also the *Religio Medici*.

37. The thoughts of Sir Walter Raleigh on moral prudence
Selden's Table Talk. are few, but precious. And some of the bright sayings of Selden recorded in his *Table Talk* are of the same description, though the book is too miscellaneous to fall under any single head of classification. The editor of this very short and small volume, which gives, perhaps, a more exalted notion of Selden's natural talents than any of his learned writings, requests the reader to distinguish times, and, "in his fancy, to carry along with him the when and the why many of these things were spoken." This intimation accounts for the different spirit in which he may seem to combat the follies of the prelates at one time, and of the Presbyterians or fanatics at another. These sayings are not always, apparently, well reported: some seem to have been misunderstood, and, in others, the limiting clauses to have been forgotten. But, on the whole, they are full of vigor, raciness, and a kind of scorn of the half-learned, far less rude, but more cutting, than that of Scaliger. It has been said that the *Table Talk* of Selden is worth all the *Ana* of the Continent. In this I should be disposed to concur; but they are not exactly works of the same class.

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Osborn's Advice to his Son worth remembering. Osborn's *Advice to his Son* may be reckoned among the moral and political writings of this period. It is not very far above mediocrity,

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each other for superiority, and the voices of the judges were divided. The men of learning talked much, and persuaded

hensive vision in which the philosophical temper consists. Such has very frequently, or more or less perhaps in almost every instance, been the fate of the writer on general politics : if his pen has not been solely employed with a view to the questions that engage attention in his own age, it has generally been guided in a certain degree by regard to them.

41. In the sixteenth century, we have seen that notions of popular rights, and of the admissibility of sovereign power for misconduct, were alternately broached by the two great religious parties of Europe, according to the necessity in which they stood for such weapons against their adversaries. Abandonment of anti-monarchical theories. Passive obedience was preached as a duty by the victorious : rebellion was claimed as a right by the vanquished. The history of France and England, and partly of other countries, was the clew to these politics. But, in the following period, a more tranquil state of public opinion, and a firmer hand upon the reins of power, put an end to such books as those of Languet, Buchanan, Rose, and Mariana. The last of these, by the vindication of tyrannicide, in his treatise *De Rege*, contributed to bring about a re-action in political literature. The Jesuits in France, whom Henry IV. was inclined to favor, publicly condemned the doctrine of Mariana in 1606. A Book by Becanus, and another by Suarez, justifying regicide, were condemned by the Parliament of Paris in 1612.¹ The assassination, indeed, of Henry IV., committed by one, not perhaps, metaphysically speaking, sane, but whose aberration of intellect had evidently been either brought on or nourished by the pernicious theories of that school, created such an abhorrence of the doctrine, that neither the Jesuits nor others ventured afterwards to teach it. Those also who magnified, as far as circumstances would permit, the alleged supremacy of the see of Rome over temporal princes, were little inclined to set up, like Mariana, a popular sovereignty, a right of the multitude not emanating from the church, and to which the church itself might one day be under the necessity of submitting. This became, therefore, a period favorable to the theories of absolute power ; not so much shown by means of their positive assertion through the press, as by the silence of the press, comparatively speaking, on all political theories whatever.

¹ Meseray, *Hist. de la Mère et du Fils*.

42. The political writings of this part of the seventeenth century assumed, in consequence, more of an historical, or, as we might say, a statistical character. Political literature becomes historical. Learning was employed in systematical analyses of ancient or modern forms of government, in dissertations explanatory of institutions, in copious and exact statements of the true, rather than arguments upon the right or the expedient. Some of the very numerous works of Herman Conringius, a professor at Helmstadt, seem to fall within this description. But none are better known than a collection, made by the Elzevirs, at different times near the middle of this century, containing accounts, chiefly published before, of the political constitutions of European commonwealths. This collection, which is in volumes of the smallest size, may be called for distinction the Elzevir Republics. It is very useful in respect of the knowledge of facts it imparts, but rarely contains any thing of a philosophical nature. Statistical descriptions of countries are much allied to these last: some, indeed, are included in the Elzevir series. They were as yet not frequent; but I might have mentioned, while upon the sixteenth century, one of the earliest, — the Description of the Low Countries by Ludovico Guicciardini, brother of the historian.

43. Those, however, were not entirely wanting who took a Bellenden, De Statu. more philosophical view of the social relations of mankind. Among these, a very respectable place should be assigned to a Scotsman, by name Bellenden, whose treatise *De Statu*, in three books, is dedicated to Prince Charles in 1615. The first of these books is entitled *De Statu Prisci Orbis in Religione, Re Politica et Literis*; the second, *Ciceronis Princeps, sive de Statu Principis et Imperii*; the third, *Ciceronis Consul, Senator, Senatusque Romanus, sive de Statu Reipublicæ et Urbis Imperantis Orbi*. The first two books are, in a general sense, political; the last relates entirely to the Roman polity, but builds much political precept on this. Bellenden seems to have taken a more comprehensive view of history in his first book, and to have reflected more philosophically on it, than perhaps any one had done before; at least, I do not remember any work of so early an age which reminds me so much of Vico and the *Grandeur et Décadence* of Montesquieu. We can hardly make an exception for Bodin, because the Scot is so much more regularly histori-

cal, and so much more concise. The first book contains little more than forty pages. Bellenden's learning is considerable, and without that pedantry of quotation which makes most books of the age intolerable. The latter parts have less originality and reach of thought. This book was reprinted, as is well known, in 1787; but the celebrated preface of the editor has had the effect of eclipsing the original author. Parr was constantly read and talked of; Bellenden, never.

44. The Politics of Campanella are warped by a desire to please the court of Rome, which he recommends as Campanella's Politics. fit to enjoy an universal monarchy, at least by supreme control; and observes, with some acuteness, that no prince had been able to obtain an universal ascendant over Christendom, because the presiding vigilance of the holy see has regulated their mutual contentions, exalting one and depressing another, as seemed expedient for the good of religion.¹ This book is pregnant with deep reflection on history: it is enriched, perhaps, by the study of Bodin, but is much more concise. In one of the Dialogues of La Mothe le Vayer, we find the fallacy of some general maxims in politics La Mothe le Vayer. drawn from a partial induction well exposed, by showing the instances where they have wholly failed. Though he pays high compliments to Louis XIII. and to Richelieu, he speaks freely enough, in his sceptical way, of the general advantages of monarchy.

45. Gabriel Naudé, a man of extensive learning, acute understanding, and many good qualities, but rather lax in religious and moral principle, excited some Naudé's Coups d'Etat. attention by a very small volume, entitled *Considérations sur les Coups d'Etat*, which he wrote while young, at Rome, in the service of the Cardinal de Bagne. In this, he maintains the bold contempt of justice and humanity in political emergencies which had brought disgrace on the "Prince" of Machiavel; blaming those who, in his own country, had abandoned the defence of the St. Bartholomew Massacre. The book is in general heavy, and not well written; but, coming from a man of cool head, clear judgment, and considerable historical knowledge, it contains some remarks not unworthy of notice.

¹ "Nullus hactenus Christianus princeps monarchiam super cunctos Christianos populos sibi conservare potuit. Quoniam papa preest illis, et dissipat erigitque illorum consuetudines prout religioni expedit"—c. 8.

46. The ancient philosophers, the civil lawyers, and by far the majority of later writers, had derived the origin of government from some agreement of the community. Bodin, explicitly rejecting this hypothesis, referred it to violent usurpation. But in England, about the beginning of the reign of James, a different theory gained ground with the church: it was assumed, for it did not admit of proof, that a patriarchal authority had been transferred by primogeniture to the heir-general of the human race; so that kingdoms were but enlarged families; and an indefeasible right of monarchy was attached to their natural chief, which, in consequence of the impossibility of discovering him, devolved upon the representative of the first sovereign who could be historically proved to have reigned over any nation. This had not, perhaps, hitherto been maintained at length in any published book, but will be found to have been taken for granted in more than one. It was, of course, in favor with James I., who had a very strong hereditary title; and it might seem to be countenanced by the fact of Highland and Irish clanship, which does really affect to rest on a patriarchal basis.

47. This theory as to the origin of political society, or one akin to it, appears to have been espoused by some on the Continent. Suarez, in the second book of his great work on law, observes, in a remarkable passage, that certain canonists hold civil magistracy to have been conferred by God on some prince, and to remain always in his heirs by succession; but "that such an opinion has neither authority nor foundation. For this power, by its very nature, belongs to no one man, but to a multitude of men. This is a certain conclusion, being common to all our authorities, as we find by St. Thomas, by the civil laws, and by the great canonists and casuists; all of whom agree that the prince has that power of law-giving which the people have given him. And the reason is evident, since all men are born equal, and consequently no one has a political jurisdiction over another, nor any dominion; nor can we give any reason from the nature of the thing why one man should govern another rather than the contrary. It is true that one might allege the primacy which Adam at his creation necessarily possessed, and hence deduce his government over all men, and suppose that to be derived by some one, either through primogenitary descent,

or through the special appointment of Adam himself. Thus Chrysostom has said, that the descent of all men from Adam signifies their subordination to one sovereign. But in fact we could only infer from the creation and natural origin of mankind that Adam possessed a domestic or patriarchal (*œconomicam*), not a political, authority; for he had power over his wife, and afterwards a paternal power over his sons till they were emancipated; and he might even, in course of time, have servants and a complete family, and that power in respect of them which is called patriarchal. But after families began to be multiplied, and single men who were heads of families to be separated, they had each the same power with respect to their own families. Nor did political power begin to exist till many families began to be collected into one entire community. Hence, as that community did not begin by Adam's creation, nor by any will of his, but by that of all who formed it, we cannot properly say that Adam had naturally a political headship in such a society; for there are no principles of reason from which this could be inferred, since, by the law of nature, it is no right of the progenitor to be even king of his own posterity. And, if this cannot be proved by the principles of natural law, we have no ground for asserting that God has given such a power by a special gift or providence, inasmuch as we have no revelation or Scripture testimony to the purpose."¹ So clear, brief, and dispassionate a refutation might have caused our English divines, who became very fond of this patriarchal theory, to blush before the Jesuit of Granada.

48. Suarez maintains it to be of the essence of a law, that it be enacted for the public good. An unjust law is no law, and does not bind the conscience.² In ^{His opinion of law.} this he breathes the spirit of Mariana; but he shuns some of his bolder assertions. He denies the right of rising in arms against a tyrant, unless he is an usurper; and though he is strongly for preserving the concession made by the kings of Spain to their people, that no taxes shall be levied without the consent of the Cortes, does not agree with those who lay it down as a general rule, that no prince can impose taxes on his people by his own will.³ Suarez asserts the direct power of the church over heretical princes, but

¹ *Lib. II. c. 2, § 8.*² *Lib. I. c. 7; and Lib. III. c. 22.*³ *Lib. v. c. 17.*

denies it as to infidels.¹ In this last point, as has been seen, he follows the most respectable authorities of his nation.

49. Bayle has taken notice of a systematic treatise on Politics by John Althusius, a native of Germany. Of this, I have only seen an edition published at Groningen in 1615, and dedicated to the States of West Friesland. It seems, however, from the article in Bayle, that there was one printed at Herborn in 1603. Several German writers inveigh against this work as full of seditious principles, inimical to every government. It is a political system, taken chiefly from preceding authors, and very freely from Bodin; with great learning, but not very profitable to read. The *ephor*i, as he calls them, by which he means the estates of a kingdom, have the right to resist a tyrant. But this right he denies to the private citizen. His chapter on this subject is written more in the tone of the sixteenth than of the seventeenth century, which indeed had scarcely commenced.² He answers in it Albericus Gentilis, Barclay, and others who had contended for passive obedience; not failing to draw support from the canonists and civilians whom he quotes. But the strongest passage is in his dedication to the States of Friesland. Here he declares his principle, that the supreme power or sovereignty (*jus majestatis*) does not reside in the chief magistrate, but in the people themselves, and that no other is proprietor or usufructuary of it; the magistrate being the administrator of this supreme power, but not its owner, nor entitled to use it for his benefit. And these rights of sovereignty are so much confined to the whole community, that they can no more alienate them to another, whether they will or not, than a man can transfer his own life.³

50. Few, even among the Calvinists, whose form of government was in some cases republican, would, in the seventeenth century, have approved this strong language of Althusius. But one of their noted theologians, Paræus, incurred the censure of the University of Oxford, in 1623, for some passages in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, which seemed to impugn their orthodox tenet of un-

¹ Lib. III. c. 10.

² Cap. 38. "De tyrannide et ejus remedia."

³ "Administratorem, procuratorem, gubernatorem juri majestatis, principem

agnosco. Proprietarium vero et usufructuarium majestatis nullum alium quam populum universum in corpus unum symbioticum ex pluribus minoribus consociationibus consociatum," &c.

limited submission. He merely holds, that subjects, when not private men, but inferior magistrates, may defend themselves, and the state, and the true religion, even by arms against the sovereign, under certain conditions; because these superior magistrates are themselves responsible to the laws of God and of the state.¹ It was, in truth, impossible to deny the right of resistance in such cases without "branding the unsmirched brow" of Protestantism itself; for by what other means had the reformed religion been made to flourish in Holland and Geneva, or in Scotland? But in England, where it had been planted under a more auspicious star, there was little occasion to seek this vindication of the Protestant Church, which had not, in the legal phrase, come in by disseizin of the state, but had united with the state to turn out of doors its predecessor. That some of the Anglican refugees under Mary were ripe enough for resistance, or even regicide, has been seen in another place by an extract from one of their most distinguished prelates.

51. Bacon ought to appear as a prominent name in political philosophy, if we had never met with it in any other. But we have anticipated much of his praise on this score; and it is sufficient to repeat generally, that, on such subjects, he is the most sagacious of mankind. It would be almost ridiculous to descend from Bacon, even when his giant shadow does but pass over our scene, to the feebler class of political moralists, such as Saavedra, author of *Idea di un Principe Politico*, a wretched effort of Spain in her degeneracy; but an Italian writer must not be neglected, from the remarkable circumstance, that he is esteemed one of the first who have treated the science of political economy. It must, however, be understood, that, besides what may be found on the subject in the ancients, many valuable observations which must be referred to political economy occur in Bodin; that the Italians had, in the sixteenth century, a few tracts on coinage; that Botero touches some points of the science; and that in England there were, during the

¹ "Subditi non privati, sed in magistratu inferiori constituti, adversus superiores magistratum se et rempublicam et ecclesiam seu veram religionem etiam armis defendere jure possunt, his positis conditionibus: 1. Cum superior magistratus degenerat in tyrannum; 2. Aut ad manifestam idolatriam atque blas-

phemias ipsos vel subditos alios vult cogere; 3. Cum ipsi atrox inferatur injuria; 4. Si aliter incolumes fortune vita et conscientia esse non possint; 5. Ne pretextu religionis aut justitie sua quærant; 6. Servata semper *enueuncip* et moderamine inculpate tutelæ juxta leges." Parvus in *Epist. ad Roman.*, col. 1250.

same age, pamphlets on public wealth, especially one entitled *A Brief Conceit of English Policy*.¹

52. The author to whom we allude is Antonio Serra, a native of Cosenza, whose short treatise on the causes which may render gold and silver abundant in countries that have no mines is dedicated to the Count de Lemos, "from the prison of Vicaria, this tenth day of July, 1613." It has hence been inferred, but without a shadow of proof, that Serra had been engaged in the conspiracy of his fellow-citizen Campanella, fourteen years before. The dedication is in a tone of great flattery, but has no allusion to the cause of his imprisonment, which might have been any other. He proposes, in his preface, not to discuss political government in general, of which he thinks that the ancients have treated sufficiently, if we well understood their works; and still less to speak of justice and injustice, the civil law being enough for this; but merely what are the causes that render a country destitute of mines abundant in gold and silver, which no one has ever considered, though some have taken narrow views, and fancied that a low rate of exchange is the sole means of enriching a country.

53. In the first part of this treatise, Serra divides the causes of wealth, that is, of abundance of money, into general and particular accidents (*accidenti communi e proprij*): meaning, by the former, circumstances which may exist in any country; by the latter, such as are peculiar to some. The common accidents are four, — abundance of manufactures, character of the inhabitants, extent of commerce, and wisdom of government. The peculiar are, chiefly, the fertility of the soil, and convenience of geographical position. Serra prefers manufactures to agriculture: one of his reasons is their indefinite capacity of multiplication; for no man, whose land is fully cultivated by sowing a hundred bushels of wheat, can sow with profit a hundred and fifty; but, in manufactures, he may not only double the produce, but do this a hundred times over, and that with less proportion of expense. Though this is now evident, it is perhaps what had not been much remarked before.

¹ This bears the initials of W. S., which some have idiotically taken for William Shakespeare. I have some reason to believe that there was an edition considerably earlier than that of 1584, but, from cir-

cumstances unnecessary to mention, cannot produce the manuscript authority on which this opinion is founded. It has been reprinted more than once, if I mistake not, in modern times.

54. Venice, according to Serra, held the first place as a commercial city, not only in Italy, but in Europe; ^{His praise of Venice.} "for experience demonstrates that all the merchant-ships which come from Asia to Europe pass through Venice, and thence are distributed to other parts." But, as this must evidently exclude all the traffic by the Cape of Good Hope, we can only understand Serra to mean the trade with the Levant. It is, however, worthy of observation, that we are apt to fall into a vulgar error in supposing that Venice was crushed, or even materially affected, as a commercial city, by the discoveries of the Portuguese.¹ She was, in fact, more opulent, as her buildings of themselves may prove, in the sixteenth century, than in any preceding age. The French trade from Marseilles to the Levant, which began later to flourish, was what impoverished Venice, rather than that of Portugal with the East Indies. This republic was the perpetual theme of admiration with the Italians. Serra compares Naples with Venice: one, he says, exports grain to a vast amount, the other imports its whole subsistence: money is valued higher at Naples, so that there is a profit in bringing it in, — its export is forbidden; at Venice it is free: at Naples the public revenues are expended in the kingdom; at Venice they are principally hoarded. Yet Naples is poor, and Venice rich. Such is the effect of her commerce and of the wisdom of her government, which is always uniform; while in kingdoms, and far more in vicerealties, the system changes with the persons. In Venice the method of choosing magistrates is in such perfection, that no one can come in by corruption or favor, nor can any one rise to high offices who has not been tried in the lower.

55. All causes of wealth, except those he has enumerated, Serra holds to be subaltern or temporary: thus the low rate of exchange is subject to the common accidents of commerce.

¹ [Perhaps it is too much to say, that Venice was not materially affected by the Portuguese commerce with India; when, though she became positively richer in the sixteenth century than before, her progress would have been more rapid had the monopoly of the spice-trade remained in her hands. A remarkable proof of the apprehensions which the discovery of the passage by the Cape excited at Venice, appears by a letter of Luigi da Porto, author of the novel on Romeo and Juliet, written so early as 1590, just ten

years after the voyage of Vasco di Gama. One of the senators recommended his colleagues to employ their money in inducing the Sultan of Egypt to obstruct the voyages of the Portuguese to Calicut, so that the state might possess again the whole commerce in spices: "Il che è stato sin qua gran parte della ricchezza nostra, e l' non poter più farlo, fra breve dovrà esser cagione della nostra povertà e della nostra rovina." — Lettere di L. da Porto, 1832, vol. II. p. 476. — 1847.]

It seems, however, to have been a theory of superficial ~~theories~~ ^{theories} of the wealth that is depended on the ~~exchange~~ ^{exchange} for more than is really the case; and, ~~in the~~ ^{in the} ~~second~~ ^{second} part of this treatise, Serra opposes a ~~theory~~ ^{theory} which, named *De Sanctis*, who had ~~accused~~ ^{accused} it the way ~~more~~ ^{more} for abundance of money in a state. Serra thinks that to reduce the weight of coin may sometimes be as ~~allow~~ ^{allow} as expedient, and better than to raise its denomination. The difference seems not very important. The coin of Naples was exhausted by the revenues of absentee proprietors, which some had proposed to withhold, — a measure to which Serra justly objects. This book has been reprinted at Milan in the collection of Italian economists, and, as it anticipates the intricacies of what has been called the mercantile theory, deserves some attention in following the progress of ~~economic~~ ^{economic}. The first celebrated treatise of Mun — England's *Treasure by Foreign Trade* — was written before 1640; but, not being published till after the Restoration, we may postpone it to the next period.

At last in time among political philosophers before the middle of the century, we find the greatest and most famous, Thomas Hobbes. His treatise *De Cive* was printed in 1642 for his private friends. It obtained, however, a considerable circulation, and excited some animadversion. In 1647, he published it at Amsterdam, with notes to vindicate and explain what had been censured. In 1650, an English treatise, with the Latin title, *De Corpore Politico*, appeared; and, in 1651, the complete system of his philosophy was given to the world in the *Leviathan*. These three works bear somewhat the same relation to one another that the *Advancement of Learning* does to the treatise *De Augmentis Scientiarum*: they are in effect the same; the same order of subjects, the same arguments, and, in most places, either the same words, or such variations as occurred to the second thoughts of the writer; but much is more copiously illustrated and more clearly put in the latter than in the former; while much also, from whatever cause, is withdrawn, or considerably modified. Whether the *Leviathan* is to be reckoned so exclusively his last thoughts that we should presume him to have retracted the passages that do not appear in it, is what every one must determine for himself. I shall endeavor to present a comparative analysis of the three treatises, with some preference to the last.

57. Those, he begins by observing, who have hitherto written upon civil policy, have assumed that man is an animal framed for society; as if nothing else were required for the institution of commonwealths than that men should agree upon some terms of compact which they call laws. But this is entirely false. That men do naturally seek each other's society, he admits, by a note in the published edition of *De Cive*; but political societies are not mere meetings of men, but unions founded on the faith of covenants. Nor does the desire of men for society imply that they are fit for it: many may desire it who will not readily submit to its necessary conditions.¹ This he left out in the two other treatises; thinking it, perhaps, too great a concession to admit any desire of society in man.

*Analysis of
his three
treatises.*

58. Nature has made little odds among men of mature age as to strength or knowledge. No reason, therefore, can be given why one should, by any intrinsic superiority, command others, or possess more than they. But there is a great difference in their passions: some through vainglory seeking pre-eminence over their fellows; some willing to allow equality, but not to lose what they know to be good for themselves. And this contest can only be decided by battle showing which is the stronger.

59. All men desire to obtain good and to avoid evil, especially death. Hence they have a natural right to preserve their own lives and limbs, and to use all means necessary for this end. Every man is judge for himself of the necessity of the means, and the greatness of the danger. And hence he has a right by nature to all things, to do what he wills to others, to possess and enjoy all he can; for he is the only judge whether they tend or not to his preservation. But every other man has the same right. Hence there can be no injury towards another in a state of nature. Not that in such a state a man may not sin against God, or transgress the laws of nature;² but injury, which is doing any thing without right, implies human laws that limit right.

¹ "Societates autem civiles non sunt meri congressus, sed fœdera, quibus faciendis fides et pacta necessaria sunt. . . . Alia res est appetere, alia esse capacem. Appetunt enim illi qui tamen conditiones æquas, sine quibus societas esse non potest, accipere per superbiam non dignantur." Deum, aut leges naturales violare impossibile sit. Nam injustitia erga homines supponit leges humanas, quales in statu naturali nullæ sunt." — *De Cive*, c. 1. This he left out in the later treatises. He says afterward (sect. 28), "Omne damnum homini illatum legis naturalis violatio

² "Non quod in tali statu peccare in atque in Deum injuria est."

60. Thus the state of man in natural liberty is a state of war,—a war of every man against every man, wherein the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place. Irresistible might gives of itself right, which is nothing but the physical liberty of using our power as we will for our own preservation and what we deem conducive to it. But as, through the equality of natural powers, no man possesses this irresistible superiority, this state of universal war is contrary to his own good, which he necessarily must desire. Hence his reason dictates that he should seek peace as far as he can, and strengthen himself by all the helps of war against those with whom he cannot have peace. This, then, is the first fundamental law of nature; for a law of nature is nothing else than a rule or precept found out by reason for the avoiding what may be destructive to our life.

61. From this primary rule another follows,—that a man should be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down his right to all things, and to be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow to other men against himself. This may be done by renouncing his right to any thing, which leaves it open to all, or by transferring it specially to another. Some rights, indeed, as those to his life and limbs, are inalienable; and no man lays down the right of resisting those who attack them. But, in general, he is bound not to hinder those to whom he has granted or abandoned his own right from availing themselves of it: and such hinderance is injustice or injury; that is, it is *sine jure*, his *jus* being already gone. Such injury may be compared to absurdity in argument, being in contradiction to what he has already done, as an absurd proposition is in contradiction to what the speaker has already allowed.

62. The next law of nature, according to Hobbes, is that men should fulfil their covenants. What contracts and covenants are, he explains in the usual manner. None can covenant with God, unless by special revelation: therefore vows are not binding, nor do oaths add any thing to the swearer's obligation. But covenants entered into by fear, he holds to be binding in a state of nature, though they may be annulled by the law. That the observance of justice, that is, of our covenants, is never against reason, Hobbes labors to prove; for, if ever its violation may have turned out suc-

cessful, this, being contrary to probable expectation, ought not to influence us. "That which gives to human actions the relish of justice is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage rarely found; by which a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life to fraud, or breach of promise."¹ A short gleam of something above the creeping selfishness of his ordinary morality!

63. He then enumerates many other laws of nature, such as gratitude, complaisance, equity, all subordinate to the main one of preserving peace by the limitation of the natural right, as he supposes, to usurp all. These laws are immutable and eternal: the science of them is the only true science of moral philosophy; for that is nothing but the science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. In a state of nature, private appetite is the measure of good and evil. But all men agree that peace is good; and therefore the means of peace, which are the moral virtues or laws of nature, are good also, and their contraries evil. These laws of nature are not properly called such, but conclusions of reason as to what should be done or abstained from; they are but theorems concerning what conduces to conservation and defence; whereas law is strictly the word of him that by right has command over others. But, so far as these are enacted by God in Scripture, they are truly laws.

64. These laws of nature, being contrary to our natural passions, are but words of no strength to secure any one without a controlling power. For, till such a power is erected, every man will rely on his own force and skill. Nor will the conjunction of a few men or families be sufficient for security; nor that of a great multitude, guided by their own particular judgments and appetites. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice and other laws of nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be, any civil government or commonwealth at all, because there would be peace without subjection.² Hence it becomes necessary to confer all their power on one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person or represent them; so that every one shall own himself author of what shall be done by such representative. It is a covenant of each with each, that he will be

¹ *Leviathan*, c. 15.

² *Id.*, c. 17.

government is such a number of men who will agree to the same. This is the substance of the great Convention, or compact, by which men are united into a civil society, and we may now trace the progress of the compact in the formation of the civil government, which is the object of the compact. The compact is made by mutual agreement, and each man binds himself to the others.

65. The person, or persons, to whom the authority is given, as an individual, is the sovereign, and possesses sovereign power. This power may spring from agreement in civil society. A commonwealth by agreement is instituted, in which a multitude of men agree and consent, and will submit, that whoever the major part shall agree to represent them shall be the representative of them all. After this has been done, the subjects cannot change their government without its consent: being bound by mutual agreement to obey its orders. If any one man should dissent, the rest would break their covenant with him. But there is no covenant with the sovereign. He cannot have a covenant with the whole multitude as one party, because it has no collective existence till the commonwealth is formed: nor with each man separately, because the acts of the sovereign are no longer his sole acts, but those of the society, including him who would complain of the breach. Nor can the sovereign act unjustly towards a subject: for he who acts by another's authority cannot be guilty of injustice towards him: he may, it is true, commit iniquity, that is, violate the laws of God and nature, but not injury.

66. The sovereign is necessarily judge of all proper means of defence, of what doctrines shall be taught, of all disputes and complaints, of rewards and punishments, of war and peace with neighboring commonwealths, and even of what shall be held by each subject in property. Property, he admits in one place, existed in families before the institution of civil society; but between different families there was no *meum* and *tuum*. These are by the law and command of the sovereign; and hence, though every subject may have a right of property against his fellow, he can have none against the sovereign. These rights are incommunicable, and inseparable from the sovereign power: there are others of minor importance, which he may alienate; but, if any one of the former is taken away from him, he ceases to be truly sovereign.

67. The sovereign power cannot be limited nor divided.

Hence there can be but three simple forms of commonwealth, — monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The first he greatly prefers. The king has no private interest apart from the people, whose wealth, honor, security from enemies, internal tranquillity, are evidently for his own good. But, in the other forms, each man may have a private advantage to seek. In popular assemblies, there is always an aristocracy of orators, interrupted sometimes by the temporary monarchy of one orator. And though a king may deprive a man of all he possesses to enrich a flatterer or favorite, so may also a democratic assembly, where there may be as many Neroes as orators, each with the whole power of the people he governs. And these orators are usually more powerful to hurt others than to save them. A king may receive counsel of whom he will; an assembly, from those only who have a right to belong to it; nor can their counsel be secret. They are also more inconstant both from passion and from their numbers; the absence of a few often undoing all that had been done before. A king cannot disagree with himself; but an assembly may do so, even to producing civil war.

68. An elective or limited king is not the sovereign, but the sovereign's minister; nor can there be a perfect form of government where the present ruler has not power to dispose of the succession. His power, therefore, is wholly without bounds; and correlative must be the people's obligation to obey. Unquestionably there are risks of mischiefs and inconveniences attending a monarchy: but these are less than in the other forms; and the worst of them is not comparable to those of civil war, or the anarchy of a state of nature, to which the dissolution of the commonwealth would reduce us.

69. In the exercise of government, the sovereign is to be guided by one maxim, which contains all his duty: *Salus populi suprema lex*. And in this is to be reckoned not only the conservation of life, but all that renders it happy. For this is the end for which men entered into civil society, that they might enjoy as much happiness as human nature can attain. It would be therefore a violation of the law of nature, and of the trust reposed in them, if sovereigns did not study, as far as by their power it may be, that their subjects should be furnished with every thing necessary, not for life alone, but for the delights of life. And even those who have

acquired empire by conquest must desire to have men fit to serve them, and should, in consistency with their own aims, endeavor to provide what will increase their strength and courage. Taxes, in the opinion of Hobbes, should be laid equally, and rather on expenditure than on revenue: the prince should promote agriculture, fisheries, and commerce, and, in general, whatever makes men happy and prosperous. Many just reflections on the art of government are uttered by Hobbes, especially as to the inexpediency of interfering too much with personal liberty. No man, he observes in another place, is so far free as to be exempted from the sovereign power; but, if liberty consists in the paucity of restraining laws, he sees not why this may not be had in monarchy as well as in a popular government. The dream of so many political writers, a wise and just despotism, is pictured by Hobbes as the perfection of political society.

70. But most of all is the sovereign to be free from any limitation by the power of the priesthood. This is chiefly to be dreaded, that he should command any thing under the penalty of death, and the clergy forbid it under the penalty of damnation. The pretensions of the see of Rome, of some bishops at home, and those of even the lowest citizens, to judge for themselves and determine upon public religion, are dangerous to the state, and the frequent cause of wars. The sovereign, therefore, is alone to judge whether religions are safely to be admitted or not. And it may be urged, that princes are bound to cause such doctrine as they think conducive to their subjects' salvation to be taught, forbidding every other, and that they cannot do otherwise in conscience. This, however, he does not absolutely determine. But he is clearly of opinion, that, though it is not the case where the prince is infidel,¹ the head of the state, in a Christian commonwealth, is head also of the church; that he, rather than any ecclesiastics, is the judge of doctrines; that a church is the same as a commonwealth under the same sovereign, the component members of each being precisely the same. This is not very far removed from the doctrine of Hooker, and still less from the practice of Henry VIII.

¹ "Imperantibus autem non Christianis in temporalibus quidem omnibus eandem debet obedientiam etiam a cive Christiano extra controversiam est: in spiritualibus vero, hoc est, in his quæ pertinent ad modum colendi Dei sequenda est ecclesiæ aliqua Christianorum." — De Cive, c. 12, § 3.

71. The second class of commonwealths, those by forcible acquisition, differ more in origin than in their subsequent character from such as he has been discussing. The rights of sovereignty are the same in both. Dominion is acquired by generation or by conquest; the one parental, the other despotic. Parental power, however, he derives not so much from having given birth to, as from having preserved, the child; and, with originality and acuteness, thinks it belongs by nature to the mother rather than to the father, except where there is some contract between the parties to the contrary. The act of maintenance and nourishment conveys, as he supposes, an unlimited power over the child, extending to life and death; and there can be no state of nature between parent and child. In his notion of patriarchal authority, he seems to go as far as Filmer; but, more acute than Filmer, perceives that it affords no firm basis for political society. By conquest, and sparing the lives of the vanquished, they become slaves; and, so long as they are held in bodily confinement, there is no covenant between them and their master; but, in obtaining corporal liberty, they expressly or tacitly covenant to obey him as their lord and sovereign.

72. The political philosophy of Hobbes had much to fix the attention of the world, and to create a sect of admiring partisans. The circumstances of the time, and the character of the passing generation, no doubt, powerfully conspired with its intrinsic qualities; but a system so original, so intrepid, so disdainful of any appeal but to the common reason and common interests of mankind, so unaffectedly and perspicuously proposed, could at no time have failed of success. From the two rival theories,—on the one hand, that of original compact between the prince and people, derived from antiquity, and sanctioned by the authority of fathers and schoolmen; on the other, that of an absolute patriarchal transmuted into an absolute regal power, which had become prevalent among part of the English clergy,—Hobbes took as much as might conciliate a hearing from both, an original covenant of the multitude and an unlimited authority of the sovereign. But he had a substantial advantage over both these parties, and especially the latter, in establishing the happiness of the community as the sole final cause of government, both in its institution and its continuance; the great fundamental theo-

rem upon which all political science depends, but sometimes obscured or lost in the pedantry of theoretical writers.¹

73. In the positive system of Hobbes we find less cause for praise. We fall in, at the very outset, with a strange and indefensible paradox,—the natural equality of human capacities,—which he seems to have adopted rather in opposition to Aristotle's notion of a natural right in some men to govern, founded on their superior qualities, than because it was at all requisite for his own theory. By extending this alleged equality, or slightness of difference, among men, to physical strength, he has more evidently shown its incompatibility with experience. If superiority in mere strength has not often been the source of political power, it is for two reasons: first, because, though there is a vast interval between the strongest man and the weakest, there is generally not much between the former and him who comes next in vigor; and, secondly, because physical strength is multiplied by the aggregation of individuals, so that the stronger few may be overpowered by the weaker many; while in mental capacity, comprehending acquired skill and habit as well as natural genius and disposition, both the degrees of excellence are removed by a wider distance; and, what is still more important, the aggregation of the powers of individuals does not regularly and certainly augment the value of the whole. That the real or acknowledged superiority of one man to his fellows has been

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"Militat ille liber nunc regibus omnibus,
et qui
Nomine sub quovis regia jura tenent."

He owns that he was accused, to the king, of favoring Cromwell.

"Nam regi accusor falso, quasi facta probarem
Impia Cromwelli, jus scelerique darem."

Creditur; adversis in partibus esse videbar;
Perpetuo jubeor regis abesse domo.

In patriam rideo tutelæ non bene certas,
Sed nullo potui tutior esse loco.

Londonum veniens, ne clam venisse viderer,
Concilio statim [sic] conciliandus eram.

Omnia miles erat, committere omnia et uni
Poscebat; tacitè Cromwell est unus erat

Regis conanti calamo defendere jura,
Quis vitio vertat regia jura potens?"

The last two lines were an admission of the charge. This poem is worth reading, and is, of course, an extraordinary performance at eighty-four. Hobbes (Sir W. Molesworth's edition, vol. i. p. xciii. 1863.)

the ordinary source of power, is sufficiently evident from what we daily see among children, and must, it should seem, be admitted by all who derive civil authority from choice, or even from conquest; and therefore is to be inferred from the very system of Hobbes.

74. That a state of nature is a state of war; that men, or at least a very large proportion of men, employ force of every kind in seizing to themselves what is in the possession of others, — is a proposition for which Hobbes incurred as much obloquy as for any one in his writings; yet it is one not easy to controvert. But, soon after the publication of the *Leviathan*, a dislike of the Calvinistic scheme of universal depravity, as well as of his own, led many considerable men into the opposite extreme of elevating too much the dignity of human nature; if by that term they meant, and in no other sense could it be applicable to this question, the real practical character of the majority of the species. Certainly the sociableness of man is as much a part of his nature as his selfishness: but whether this propensity to society would necessarily or naturally have led to the institution of political communities, may not be very clear; while we have proof enough in historical traditions, and in what we observe of savage nations, that mutual defence by mutual concession — the common agreement not to attack the possessions of each other, or to permit strangers to do so — has been the true basis, the final aim, of those institutions, be they more or less complex, to which we give the appellation of commonwealths.

75. In developing, therefore, the origin of civil society, Hobbes, though not essentially differing from his predecessors, has placed the truth in a fuller light. It does not seem equally clear, that his own theory of a mutual covenant between the members of an unanimous multitude to become one people, and to be represented, in all time to come, by such a sovereign government as the majority should determine, affords a satisfactory groundwork for the rights of political society. It is, in the first place, too hypothetical as a fact. That such an agreement may have been sometimes made by independent families, in the first coming-together of communities, it would be presumptuous to deny: it carries upon the face of it no improbability, except as to the design of binding posterity, which seems too refined for such a state of mankind

or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever."¹ This renewal of the state of war, which is the state of nature; this denial of the possibility of doing an injury to any one who does not obey the laws of the commonwealth, — is enough to silence the question why we are obliged still to obey. The established government, and those who maintain it, being strong enough to wage war against gainsayers, give them the option of incurring the consequences of such warfare, or of complying with the laws. But it seems to be a corollary from this, that the stronger part of a commonwealth, which may not always be the majority, have not only a right to despise the wishes, but the interests, of dissentients. Thus, the more we scrutinize the theories of Hobbes, the more there appears a deficiency of that which only a higher tone of moral sentiment can give, — a security for ourselves against the appetites of others, and for them against our own. But it may be remarked, that his supposition of a state of war, not as a permanent state of nature, but as just self-defence, is perhaps the best footing on which we can place the right to inflict severe, and especially capital, punishment upon offenders against the law.

78. The positions so dogmatically laid down as to the impossibility of mixing different sorts of government, were, even in the days of Hobbes, contradicted by experience. Several republics had lasted for ages under a mixed aristocracy and democracy; and there had surely been sufficient evidence that a limited monarchy might exist, though, in the revolution of ages, it might, one way or other, pass into some new type of polity. And these prejudices in favor of absolute power are rendered more dangerous by paradoxes unusual for an Englishman, even in those days of high prerogative when Hobbes began to write, — that the subject has no property relatively to the sovereign; and, what is the fundamental error of his whole system, that nothing done by the prince can be injurious to any one else. This is accompanied by the other portents of Hobbism scattered through these treatises, especially the *Leviathan*, that the distinctions of right and wrong, moral good and evil, are made by the laws; that no man can do amiss who obeys the sovereign authority; that, though pri-

¹ *Lev.*, c. 18.

vate belief is of necessity beyond the prince's control, it is according to his will, and in no other way, that we must worship God.

79. The political system of Hobbes, like his moral system, of which, in fact, it is only a portion, sears up the heart. It takes away the sense of wrong, that has consoled the wise and good in their dangers, the proud appeal of innocence under oppression, like that of Prometheus to the elements, uttered to the witnessing world, to coming ages, to the just ear of Heaven. It confounds the principles of moral approbation, the notions of good and ill desert, in a servile idolatry of the monstrous Leviathan it creates; and, after sacrificing all right at the altar of power, denies to the Omnipotent the prerogative of dictating the laws of his own worship.

SECTION III.

Roman Jurisprudence—Grotius on the Laws of War and Peace—Analysis of this Work—Defence of it against some Strictures.

80. IN the Roman jurisprudence, we do not find such a cluster of eminent men during this period as in the sixteenth century; and it would, of course, be out of our province to search for names little now remembered, perhaps, even in forensic practice. Many of the writings of Fabre of Savoy, who has been mentioned in the present volume, belong to the first years of this century. Farinacci, or Farinaceus, a lawyer of Rome, obtained a celebrity, which, after a long duration, has given way in the progress of legal studies, less directed than formerly towards a superfluous erudition.¹ But the work of Menochius, *De Præsumptionibus*, or, as we should express it, on the rules of evidence, is said to have lost none of its usefulness, even since the decline of the civil law in France.² No book, perhaps, belonging to this period, is so generally known as the Commentaries of Vinnius on the Institutes, which, as far as I know, has not been superseded by any of later date. Conringius of Helmstadt may be reckoned, in some measure,

Civil jurists
of this pe-
riod.

¹ Biogr. Univ.

² Id.

among the writers on jurisprudence, though chiefly in the line of historical illustration. The *Elementa Juris Civilis*, by Zouch, is a mere epitome, but neatly executed, of the principal heads of the Roman law, and nearly in its own words. Arthur Duck, another Englishman, has been praised, even by foreigners, for a succinct and learned, though elementary and popular, treatise on the use and authority of the civil law in different countries of Europe. This little book is not disagreeably written; but it is not, of course, from England that much could be contributed towards Roman jurisprudence.

81. The larger principles of jurisprudence, which link that science with general morals, and especially such as ^{Suarez on} relate to the intercourse of nations, were not left ^{laws.} untouched in the great work of Suarez on laws. I have not, however, made myself particularly acquainted with this portion of his large volume. Spain appears to have been the country in which these questions were originally discussed upon principles broader than precedent, as well as upon precedents themselves; and Suarez, from the general comprehensiveness of his views in legislation and ethics, is likely to have said well whatever he may have said on the subject of international law. But it does not appear that he is much quoted by later writers.

82. The name of Suarez is obscure in comparison of one who soon came forward in the great field of natural jurisprudence. This was Hugo Grotius, whose ^{Grotius, De} famous work, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, was published ^{Jure Belli} at Paris in 1625. It may be reckoned a proof of the extraor- ^{et Pacis.} dinary diligence, as well as quickness of parts, which distinguished this writer, that it had occupied a very short part of his life. He first mentions, in a letter to the younger Thuanus in August, 1623, that he was employed in examining the principal questions which belong to the law of nations.¹ In the same year, he recommends the study of that law to another of his correspondents, in such terms as bespeak his own attention to it.² According to one of his letters to Gassendi, quoted by Stewart, the scheme was suggested to him by Peiresc.

¹ "Versor in examinandis controversiis ill., chap. ii.), but from one antecedently
principis quæ ad jus gentium pertinent." published in 1648, and entitled *Grotii*
— Epist. 76. This is not from the folio *Epistolæ ad Gallos.*
collection of his epistles, so often quoted
in a preceding chapter of this work (part
VOL. III. 12

² "Hoc spatium exacto, nihil restat quod
tibi æque commendam atque studium

83. It is acknowledged by every one, that the publication of this treatise made an epoch in the philosophical, and almost, we might say, in the political, history of Europe. Those who sought a guide to their own conscience or that of others, those who dispensed justice, those who appealed to the public sense of right in the intercourse of nations, had recourse to its copious pages for what might direct or justify their actions. Within thirty or forty years from its publication, we find the work of Grotius generally received as authority by professors of the Continental universities, and deemed necessary for the student of civil law, at least in the Protestant countries of Europe. In England, from the difference of laws and from some other causes which might be assigned, the influence of Grotius was far slower, and even, ultimately, much less general. He was, however, treated with great respect as the founder of the modern law of nations, which is distinguished from what formerly bore that name by its more continual reference to that of nature. But, when a book is little read, it is easily misrepresented; and as a new school of philosophers rose up, averse to much of the principles of their predecessors, but, above all things, to their tediousness, it became the fashion not so much to dispute the tenets of Grotius, as to set aside his whole work, among the barbarous and obsolete schemes of ignorant ages. For this purpose, various charges have been alleged against it by men of deserved eminence, not, in my opinion, very candidly, or with much real knowledge of its contents. They have had, however, the natural effect of creating a prejudice, which, from the sort of oblivion fallen upon the book, is not likely to die away. I shall, therefore, not think myself performing an useless task in giving an analysis of the treatise *De Jure Belli et Pacis*; so that the reader, having seen for himself what it is, may not stand in need of any argu-

juris, non illius privati, ex quo leguleii et rabulæ victitant, sed gentium ac publici; quam præstabilem scientiam Cicero vocans consistere ait in fœderibus, pactio- nibus, conditionibus populorum, regum, nationum, in omni denique jure belli et pacis. Hujus juris principia quomodo ex morali philosophia petenda sunt, mon- strare poterunt Platonis ac Ciceronis de legibus liber. Sed Platonis summas ali- quas leges suffecerit. Neque penitent ex scholasticis Thomam Aquinatem, si non perlegere, saltem inspicere secunda

parte secundæ partis libri, quem Sum- mam Theologiæ inscripuit; præsertim ubi de justitiâ agit ac de legibus. Usus prop- rius monstrabunt Pandectæ, libro primo atque ultimo; et codex Justinianus, li- bro primo et tribus postremis. Nostri temporis juris consulti pauci juris gentium ac publici controversiâs attigere, acque magis eminent, qui id fecerunt, Vasquius, Hottomannus, Gentilius."—Epist. xvi. This passage is useful in showing the views Grotius himself entertained as to the sub- ject and groundwork of his treatise.

ments or testimony to refute those who have represented it as it is not.

84. The book may be considered as nearly original, in its general platform, as any work of man, in an advanced stage of civilization and learning, can be. ^{Its originality.} It is more so, perhaps, than those of Montesquieu and Smith. No one had before gone to the foundations of international law so as to raise a complete and consistent superstructure; few had handled even separate parts, or laid down any satisfactory rules concerning it. Grotius enumerates a few preceding writers, especially Ayala and Albericus Gentilis; but does not mention Soto in this place. Gentilis, he says, is wont, in determining controverted questions, to follow either a few precedents not always of the best description, or even the authority of modern lawyers, in their answers to cases, many of which are written with more regard to what the consulting parties desire, than to what real justice and equity demand.

85. The motive assigned for this undertaking is the noblest. "I saw," he says, "in the whole Christian world, a ^{Its motive} license of fighting, at which even barbarians might ^{and object} blush; wars begun on trifling pretexts, or none at all, and carried on without reverence for any divine or human law, as if that one declaration of war let loose every crime." The sight of such a monstrous state of things had induced some, like Erasmus, to deny the lawfulness of any war to a Christian. But this extreme, as he justly observes, is rather pernicious than otherwise; for, when a tenet so paradoxical and impracticable is maintained, it begets a prejudice against the more temperate course which he prepares to indicate. "Let, therefore," he says afterwards, "the laws be silent in the midst of arms; but those laws only which belong to peace, the laws of civil life and public tribunals, not such as are eternal, and fitted for all seasons, unwritten laws of nature, which subsist in what the ancient form of the Romans denominated 'a pure and holy war.'"¹

86. "I have employed, in confirmation of this natural and national law, the testimonies of philosophers, of his- ^{His authorities.} torians, of poets, lastly even of orators: not that we should indiscriminately rely upon them; for they are apt to

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acquired empire by conquest must desire to have men fit to serve them, and should, in consistency with their own aims, endeavor to provide what will increase their strength and courage. Taxes, in the opinion of Hobbes, should be laid equally, and rather on expenditure than on revenue: the prince should promote agriculture, fisheries, and commerce, and, in general, whatever makes men happy and prosperous. Many just reflections on the art of government are uttered by Hobbes, especially as to the inexpediency of interfering too much with personal liberty. No man, he observes in another place, is so far free as to be exempted from the sovereign power; but, if liberty consists in the paucity of restraining laws, he sees not why this may not be had in monarchy as well as in a popular government. The dream of so many political writers, a wise and just despotism, is pictured by Hobbes as the perfection of political society.

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the ordinary source of power, is sufficiently evident from what we daily see among children, and must, it should seem, be admitted by all who derive civil authority from choice, or even from conquest; and therefore is to be inferred from the very system of Hobbes.

74. That a state of nature is a state of war; that men, or at least a very large proportion of men, employ force of every kind in seizing to themselves what is in the possession of others, — is a proposition for which Hobbes incurred as much obloquy as for any one in his writings; yet it is one not easy to controvert. But, soon after the publication of the *Leviathan*, a dislike of the Calvinistic scheme of universal depravity, as well as of his own, led many considerable men into the opposite extreme of elevating too much the dignity of human nature; if by that term they meant, and in no other sense could it be applicable to this question, the real practical character of the majority of the species. Certainly the sociableness of man is as much a part of his nature as his selfishness: but whether this propensity to society would necessarily or naturally have led to the institution of political communities, may not be very clear; while we have proof enough in historical traditions, and in what we observe of savage nations, that mutual defence by mutual concession — the common agreement not to attack the possessions of each other, or to permit strangers to do so — has been the true basis, the final aim, of those institutions, be they more or less complex, to which we give the appellation of commonwealths.

75. In developing, therefore, the origin of civil society, Hobbes, though not essentially differing from his predecessors, has placed the truth in a fuller light. It does not seem equally clear, that his own theory of a mutual covenant between the members of an unanimous multitude to become one people, and to be represented, in all time to come, by such a sovereign government as the majority should determine, affords a satisfactory groundwork for the rights of political society. It is, in the first place, too hypothetical as a fact. That such an agreement may have been sometimes made by independent families, in the first coming-together of communities, it would be presumptuous to deny: it carries upon the face of it no improbability, except as to the design of binding posterity, which seems too refined for such a state of mankind

as we must suppose; but it is surely possible to account for the general fact of civil government in a simpler way; and what is most simple, though not always true, is, on the first appearance, most probable. If we merely suppose an agreement, unanimous of course in those who concur in it, to be governed by one man, or by one council, promising that they shall wield the force of the whole against any one who shall contravene their commands issued for the public good, the foundation is as well laid, and the commonwealth as firmly established, as by the double process of a mutual covenant to constitute a people, and a popular determination to constitute a government. It is true that Hobbes distinguishes a commonwealth by institution, which he supposes to be founded on this unanimous consent, from one by acquisition, for which force alone is required. But as the force of one man goes but a little way towards compelling the obedience of others, so as to gain the name of sovereign power, unless it is aided by the force of many who voluntarily conspire to its ends, this sort of commonwealth by conquest will be found to involve the previous institution of the more peaceable kind.

76. This theory of a mutual covenant is defective also in a most essential point. It furnishes no adequate basis for any commonwealth beyond the lives of those who established it. The right, indeed, of men to bind their children, and through them a late posterity, is sometimes asserted by Hobbes, but in a very transient manner, and as if he was aware of the weakness of his ground. It might be inquired, whether the force on which alone he rests the obligation of children to obey can give any right beyond its own continuance; whether the absurdity he imputes to those who do not stand by their own engagements is imputable to such as disregard the covenants of their forefathers; whether, in short, any law of nature requires our obedience to a government we deem hurtful, because, in a distant age, a multitude whom we cannot trace bestowed unlimited power on some unknown persons from whom that government pretends to derive its succession.

77. A better ground for the subsisting rights of his *Leviathan* is sometimes suggested, though faintly, by Hobbes himself: "If one refuse to stand to what the major part shall ordain, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly; and whether he be of the congregation or not, whether his consent be asked

or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever."¹ This renewal of the state of war, which is the state of nature; this denial of the possibility of doing an injury to any one who does not obey the laws of the commonwealth, — is enough to silence the question why we are obliged still to obey. The established government, and those who maintain it, being strong enough to wage war against gainsayers, give them the option of incurring the consequences of such warfare, or of complying with the laws. But it seems to be a corollary from this, that the stronger part of a commonwealth, which may not always be the majority, have not only a right to despise the wishes, but the interests, of dissentients. Thus, the more we scrutinize the theories of Hobbes, the more there appears a deficiency of that which only a higher tone of moral sentiment can give, — a security for ourselves against the appetites of others, and for them against our own. But it may be remarked, that his supposition of a state of war, not as a permanent state of nature, but as just self-defence, is perhaps the best footing on which we can place the right to inflict severe, and especially capital, punishment upon offenders against the law.

78. The positions so dogmatically laid down as to the impossibility of mixing different sorts of government, were, even in the days of Hobbes, contradicted by experience. Several republics had lasted for ages under a mixed aristocracy and democracy; and there had surely been sufficient evidence that a limited monarchy might exist, though, in the revolution of ages, it might, one way or other, pass into some new type of polity. And these prejudices in favor of absolute power are rendered more dangerous by paradoxes unusual for an Englishman, even in those days of high prerogative when Hobbes began to write, — that the subject has no property relatively to the sovereign; and, what is the fundamental error of his whole system, that nothing done by the prince can be injurious to any one else. This is accompanied by the other portents of Hobbism scattered through these treatises, especially the *Leviathan*, that the distinctions of right and wrong, moral good and evil, are made by the laws; that no man can do amiss who obeys the sovereign authority; that, though pri-

¹ *Lev.*, c. 18.

vate belief is of necessity beyond the prince's control, it is according to his will, and in no other way, that we must worship God.

79. The political system of Hobbes, like his moral system, of which, in fact, it is only a portion, sears up the heart. It takes away the sense of wrong, that has consoled the wise and good in their dangers, the proud appeal of innocence under oppression, like that of Prometheus to the elements, uttered to the witnessing world, to coming ages, to the just ear of Heaven. It confounds the principles of moral approbation, the notions of good and ill desert, in a servile idolatry of the monstrous Leviathan it creates; and, after sacrificing all right at the altar of power, denies to the Omnipotent the prerogative of dictating the laws of his own worship.

SECTION III.

Roman Jurisprudence—Grotius on the Laws of War and Peace—Analysis of this Work—Defence of it against some Strictures.

80. IN the Roman jurisprudence, we do not find such a cluster of eminent men during this period as in the sixteenth century; and it would, of course, be out of our province to search for names little now remembered, perhaps, even in forensic practice. Many of the writings of Fabre of Savoy, who has been mentioned in the present volume, belong to the first years of this century. Farinacci, or Farinaceus, a lawyer of Rome, obtained a celebrity, which, after a long duration, has given way in the progress of legal studies, less directed than formerly towards a superfluous erudition.¹ But the work of Menochius, *De Præsumptionibus*, or, as we should express it, on the rules of evidence, is said to have lost none of its usefulness, even since the decline of the civil law in France.² No book, perhaps, belonging to this period, is so generally known as the *Commentaries of Vinnius on the Institutes*, which, as far as I know, has not been superseded by any of later date. *Conringius of Helmstadt* may be reckoned, in some measure,

Civil jurists
of this pe-
riod.

¹ *Biogr. Univ.*

² *Id.*

among the writers on jurisprudence, though chiefly in the line of historical illustration. The *Elementa Juris Civilis*, by Zouch, is a mere epitome, but neatly executed, of the principal heads of the Roman law, and nearly in its own words. Arthur Duck, another Englishman, has been praised, even by foreigners, for a succinct and learned, though elementary and popular, treatise on the use and authority of the civil law in different countries of Europe. This little book is not disagreeably written; but it is not, of course, from England that much could be contributed towards Roman jurisprudence.

81. The larger principles of jurisprudence, which link that science with general morals, and especially such as ^{Suarez on} relate to the intercourse of nations, were not left ^{laws.} untouched in the great work of Suarez on laws. I have not, however, made myself particularly acquainted with this portion of his large volume. Spain appears to have been the country in which these questions were originally discussed upon principles broader than precedent, as well as upon precedents themselves; and Suarez, from the general comprehensiveness of his views in legislation and ethics, is likely to have said well whatever he may have said on the subject of international law. But it does not appear that he is much quoted by later writers.

82. The name of Suarez is obscure in comparison of one who soon came forward in the great field of natural jurisprudence. This was Hugo Grotius, whose ^{Grotius, De} famous work, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, was published ^{Jure Belli et Pacis.} at Paris in 1625. It may be reckoned a proof of the extraordinary diligence, as well as quickness of parts, which distinguished this writer, that it had occupied a very short part of his life. He first mentions, in a letter to the younger Thuanus in August, 1623, that he was employed in examining the principal questions which belong to the law of nations.¹ In the same year, he recommends the study of that law to another of his correspondents, in such terms as bespeak his own attention to it.² According to one of his letters to Gassendi, quoted by Stewart, the scheme was suggested to him by Peiresc.

¹ "Versor in examinandis controversiis præcipuis quæ ad jus gentium pertinent." — Epist. 76. This is not from the folio collection of his epistles, so often quoted in a preceding chapter of this work (part

III., chap. II.), but from one antecedently published in 1648, and entitled *Grotii Epistolæ ad Gallos*.

² "Hoc spatio exacto, nihil restat quod tibi æque commendam atque studium

83. It is acknowledged by every one, that the publication of this treatise made an epoch in the philosophical, and almost, we might say, in the political, history of Europe. Those who sought a guide to their own conscience or that of others, those who dispensed justice, those who appealed to the public sense of right in the intercourse of nations, had recourse to its copious pages for what might direct or justify their actions. Within thirty or forty years from its publication, we find the work of Grotius generally received as authority by professors of the Continental universities, and deemed necessary for the student of civil law, at least in the Protestant countries of Europe. In England, from the difference of laws and from some other causes which might be assigned, the influence of Grotius was far slower, and even, ultimately, much less general. He was, however, treated with great respect as the founder of the modern law of nations, which is distinguished from what formerly bore that name by its more continual reference to that of nature. But, when a book is little read, it is easily misrepresented; and as a new school of philosophers rose up, averse to much of the principles of their predecessors, but, above all things, to their tediousness, it became the fashion not so much to dispute the tenets of Grotius, as to set aside his whole work, among the barbarous and obsolete schemes of ignorant ages. For this purpose, various charges have been alleged against it by men of deserved eminence, not, in my opinion, very candidly, or with much real knowledge of its contents. They have had, however, the natural effect of creating a prejudice, which, from the sort of oblivion fallen upon the book, is not likely to die away. I shall, therefore, not think myself performing an useless task in giving an analysis of the treatise *De Jure Belli et Pacis*; so that the reader, having seen for himself what it is, may not stand in need of any argu-

juris, non illius privati, ex quo leguleii et rabulae victitant, sed gentium ac publici; quam preestabilem scientiam Cicero vocans consistere ait in fœderibus, pactionibus, conditionibus populorum, regum, nationum, in omni denique jure belli et pacis. Hujus juris principia quomodo ex morali philosophia petenda sunt, monstrare poterunt Platonis ac Ciceronis de legibus libri. Sed Platonis summas aliquas leges suffecerit. Neque ponit ex scholasticis Thomam Aquinatem, si non perlegere, saltem inspicere secunda

parte secundae partis libri, quam Summam Theologiae inscripsit; praesertim ubi de justitia agit ac de legibus. Urum propius monstrabunt Pandectae, libro primo atque ultimo; et codex Justinianus, libro primo et tribus posterioribus. Nostri temporis juris consulti pauci juris gentium ac publici controversias attingere, eoque magis eminent, qui id fecerunt, Vasquius, Hotomanus, Gentilius."—Epist. xvi. This passage is useful in showing the views Grotius himself entertained as to the subject and groundwork of his treatise.

ments or testimony to refute those who have represented it as it is not.

84. The book may be considered as nearly original, in its general platform, as any work of man, in an advanced stage of civilization and learning, can be. ^{Its originality.} It is more so, perhaps, than those of Montesquieu and Smith. No one had before gone to the foundations of international law so as to raise a complete and consistent superstructure; few had handled even separate parts, or laid down any satisfactory rules concerning it. Grotius enumerates a few preceding writers, especially Ayala and Albericus Gentilis; but does not mention Soto in this place. Gentilis, he says, is wont, in determining controverted questions, to follow either a few precedents not always of the best description, or even the authority of modern lawyers, in their answers to cases, many of which are written with more regard to what the consulting parties desire, than to what real justice and equity demand.

85. The motive assigned for this undertaking is the noblest. "I saw," he says, "in the whole Christian world, a license of fighting, at which even barbarians might blush; wars begun on trifling pretexts, or none at all, and carried on without reverence for any divine or human law, as if that one declaration of war let loose every crime." ^{Its motive and object.} The sight of such a monstrous state of things had induced some, like Erasmus, to deny the lawfulness of any war to a Christian. But this extreme, as he justly observes, is rather pernicious than otherwise; for, when a tenet so paradoxical and impracticable is maintained, it begets a prejudice against the more temperate course which he prepares to indicate. "Let, therefore," he says afterwards, "the laws be silent in the midst of arms; but those laws only which belong to peace, the laws of civil life and public tribunals, not such as are eternal, and fitted for all seasons, unwritten laws of nature, which subsist in what the ancient form of the Romans denominated 'a pure and holy war.'"¹

86. "I have employed, in confirmation of this natural and national law, the testimonies of philosophers, of historians, of poets, lastly even of orators: not that we ^{His authorities.} should indiscriminately rely upon them; for they are apt to

¹ "Eas res puro pique duello repetundas censeo." It was a case prodigiously frequent in the opinion of the Romans.

say what may serve their party, their subject, or their cause; but because, when many at different times and places affirm the same thing for certain, we may refer this unanimity to some general cause, which, in such questions as these, can be no other than either a right deduction from some natural principle or some common agreement. The former of these denotes the law of nature; the latter, that of nations: the difference whereof must be understood, not by the language of these testimonies, for writers are very prone to confound the two words, but from the nature of the subject. For whatever cannot be clearly deduced from true premises, and yet appears to have been generally admitted, must have had its origin in free consent. . . . The sentences of poets and orators have less weight than those of history; and we often make use of them, not so much to corroborate what we say, as to throw a kind of ornament over it." "I have abstained," he adds afterwards, "from all that belongs to a different subject, as what is expedient to be done; since this has its own science, that of politics, which Aristotle has rightly treated by not intermingling any thing extraneous to it; while Bodin has confounded that science with this which we are about to treat. If we sometimes allude to utility, it is but in passing, and distinguishing it from the question of justice."¹

87. Grotius derives the origin of natural law from the sociable character of mankind. "Among things common to mankind is the desire of society; that is, not of every kind of society, but of one that is peaceable and ordered according to the capacities of his nature with others of his species. Even in children, before all instruction, a propensity to do good to others displays itself, just as pity in that age is a spontaneous affection." We perceive by this remark, that Grotius looked beyond the merely rational basis of natural law to the moral constitution of human nature. The conservation of such a sociable life is the source of that law which is strictly called natural; which comprehends, in the first place, the abstaining from all that belongs to others, and the restitution of it (if by any means in our possession), the fulfilment of promises, the reparation of injury, and the right of human punishment. In a secondary sense, natural law extends to prudence, temperance, and fortitude, as being suitable to man's nature. And, in a similar lax sense, we have that kind of jus-

Foundation
of natural
law.

¹ "Prolegomena in librum de Jure Belli."

tice itself called distributive (*δανεμτική*), which prefers a better man to a worse, a relation to a stranger, the poorer man to a richer, according to the circumstances of the party and the case.¹ And this natural law is properly defined "the dictate of right reason, pointing out a moral guilt or rectitude to be inherent in any action, on account of its agreement or disagreement with our rational and social nature; and consequently that such an action is either forbidden or enjoined by God, the author of nature."² It is so immutable, that God himself cannot alter it; a position which he afterwards limits by a restriction we have seen in Suarez, that if God command any one to be killed, or his goods to be taken, this would not render murder or theft lawful, but, being commanded by the Lord of life and all things, it would cease to be murder or theft. This seems little better than a sophism unworthy of Grotius; but he meant to distinguish between an abrogation of the law of nature, and a dispensation with it in a particular instance. The original position, in fact, is not stated with sufficient precision, or on a right principle.

88. Voluntary or positive law is either human or revealed. The former is either that of civil communities, ^{Positive} which are assemblages of freemen, living in society ^{law.} for the sake of laws and common utility; or that of nations, which derives its obligation from the consent of all or many nations: a law which is to be proved, like all unwritten law, by continual usage and the testimony of the learned. The revealed law he divides in the usual manner, but holds that no part of the Mosaic, so far as it is strictly a law, is at present binding upon us. But much of it is confirmed by the Christian Scriptures, and much is also obligatory by the law of nature. This last law is to be applied, *a priori*, by the conformity of the act in question to the natural and social nature of man; *a posteriori*, by the consent of mankind: the latter argument, however, not being conclusive, but highly probable, when the agreement is found in all, or in all the more civilized nations.³

89. Perfect rights, after the manner of the jurists, he distinguishes from imperfect. The former are called *sua*, our

¹ Id., § 6-10.

² "Jus naturale est dictatum recte ac consequenter ab auctore nature Deo rationis, indicans actui alicui, ex ejus turpitudinem aut necessitatem moralem, convenientia aut disconvenientia cum ipsa ac consequenter ab auctore nature Deo talem actum aut vetari aut præcipi" — L. i. c. i. § 10.

natura rationali ac sociali, inesse moralem

³ Lib. i. c. i.

own, properly speaking, the objects of what they styled commutative justice: the latter are denominated fitnesses (*aptitudines*), such as equity, gratitude, and domestic affection prescribe, but which are only the objects of distributive or equitable justice. This distinction is of the highest importance in the immediate subject of the work of Grotius; since it is agreed on all hands that no law gives a remedy for the denial of these; nor can we justly, in a state of nature, have recourse to arms in order to enforce them.¹

90. War, however, as he now proceeds to show, is not absolutely unlawful either by the law of nature or that of nations, or of revelation. The proof is, as usual with Grotius, very diffuse; his work being, in fact, a magazine of arguments and examples with rather a supererogatory profusion.² But the Anabaptist and Quaker superstition has prevailed enough to render some of his refutation not unnecessary. After dividing war into public and private, and showing that the establishment of civil justice does not universally put an end to the right of private war (since cases may arise when the magistrate cannot be waited for, and others where his interference cannot be obtained), he shows that the public war may be either solemn and regular according to the law of nations, or less regular on a sudden emergency of self-defence; classing also under the latter any war which magistrates not sovereign may in peculiar circumstances levy.³ And this leads him to inquire what constitutes sovereignty; defining, after setting aside other descriptions, that power to be sovereign whose acts cannot be invalidated at the pleasure of any other human authority, except one, which, as in the case of a successor, has exactly the same sovereignty as itself.⁴

91. Grotius rejects the opinion of those who hold the people to be everywhere sovereign, so that they may restrain and punish kings for misgovernment; quoting many authorities for the irresponsibility of kings. Here he lays down the principles of non-resistance, which he more fully inculcates in the next chapter. But this is done with many distinctions as to the nature of the principality,

¹ Lib. I. c. 1.² C. 2.³ C. 3.⁴ "Summa potestas illa dicitur, cujus actus alterius juri non subiacent, his ut alterius voluntatis humane arbitrio irriti possint reddi."—§ 7.

which may be held by very different conditions. He speaks of patrimonial kingdoms, which, as he supposes, may be alienated like an inheritance. But, where the government can be traced to popular consent, he owns that this power of alienation should not be presumed to be comprised in the grant. Those, he says, are much deceived, who think, that, in kingdoms where the consent of a senate or other body is required for new laws, the sovereignty itself is divided; for these restrictions must be understood to have been imposed by the prince on his own will, lest he should be entrapped into something contrary to his deliberate intention.¹ Among other things in this chapter, he determines that neither an unequal alliance (that is, where one party retains great advantages) nor a feudal homage takes away the character of sovereignty from the inferior; so far, at least, as authority over his own subjects is concerned.

92. In the next chapter, Grotius dwells more at length on the alleged right of subjects to resist their governors, and altogether repels it, with the exception of strict self-defence, or the improbable case of a hostile spirit, on the prince's part, extending to the destruction of his people. Barclay, the opponent of Buchanan and the Jesuits, had admitted the right of resistance against enormous cruelty. If the king has abdicated the government, or manifestly relinquished it, he may, after a time, be considered merely a private person. But mere negligence in government is by no means to be reckoned a relinquishment.² And he also observes, that if the sovereignty be divided between a king and part of his subjects, or the whole, he may be resisted by force in usurping their share, because he is no longer sovereign as to that; which he holds to be the case, even if the right of war be in him; since that must be understood of a foreign war, and it could not be maintained that those who partake the sovereignty have not the right to defend it; in which predicament a king may lose even his own share by the right of war. He proceeds to the case of usurpation; not such as is warranted by long prescription, but while the circumstances that led to the unjust possession subsist. Against such an usurper he thinks it law-

¹ § 18.

² "Si rex aut alius quis imperium abdicavit, aut manifeste habet pro derelicto, in eum post id tempus omnia licent, quae in privatum. Sed minimè pro derelicto habere rem censendus est qui eam tractat negligentius." — O. 4, § 9.

ful to rebel, so long as there is no treaty or voluntary act of allegiance, at least if the government *de jure* sanctions the insurrection. But, where there may be a doubt whether the lawful ruler has not acquiesced in the usurpation, a private person ought rather to stand by possession, than to take the decision upon himself.¹

93. The right of war, which we must here understand in the largest sense, — the employment of force to resist force, though by private men, — resides in all mankind. Solon, he says, taught us that those commonwealths would be happy wherein each man thought the injuries of others were like his own.² The mere sociability of human nature ought to suggest this to us. And, though Grotius does not proceed with this subject, he would not have doubted that we are even bound by the law of nature, not merely that we have a right, to protect the lives and goods of others against lawless violence, without the least reference to positive law or the command of a magistrate.³ If this has been preposterously doubted, or affected to be doubted, in England, of late years, it has been less owing to the pedantry which demands an express written law upon the most pressing emergency, than to lukewarmness, at the best, in the public cause of order and justice. The expediency of vindicating these by the slaughter of the aggressors must depend on the peculiar circumstances; but the right is paramount to any positive laws, even if (which with us is not the case) it were difficult to be proved from them.

94. We now arrive at the first and fundamental inquiry, What is the right of self-defence, including the defence of what is our own? There can, says Grotius, be no just cause of war (that is, of using force; for he is now on the most general ground) but injury. For this reason, he will not admit of wars to preserve the balance of power. An imminent injury to ourselves or our property renders repulsion of the aggressor by force legitimate. But here he argues rather weakly and inconsistently through excess of charity; and, acknowledging the strict right of killing one who would otherwise kill us, thinks it more praiseworthy;

¹ § 20.

² Ἐν ᾧ τῶν ἀδικουμένων οὐχ ἕττον οἱ μὴ ἀδικουμένοι προβαλλόνται καὶ κολάζονται τοὺς ἀδικούντας. "Ut om-

nes desint vincula, sufficit humane nature communio."

³ He says this down expressly afterwards. L. ii. c. 20.

to accept the alternative.¹ The right of killing one who inflicts a smaller personal injury, he wholly denies; and with respect to a robber, while he admits he may be slain by natural law, is of opinion that the gospel has greatly limited the privilege of defending our property by such means. Almost all jurists and theologians of his day, he says, carry it farther than he does.² To public warfare he gives a greater latitude than to private self-defence, but without assigning any satisfactory reason; the true reason being, that so rigid a scheme of ethics would have rendered his book an Utopian theory, instead of a practicable code of law.

95. Injury to our rights, therefore, is a just cause of war. But what are our rights? What is property? whence does it come? what may be its subjects? in whom does it reside? Till these questions are determined, we can have but crude and indefinite notions of injury, and, consequently, of the rights we have to redress it. The disquisition is necessary, but it must be long; unless, indeed, we acquiesce in what we find already written, and seek for no stable principles upon which this grand and primary question in civil society (the rights of property and dominion) may rest. Here then begins what has seemed to many the abandonment by Grotius of his general subject, and what certainly suspends, for a considerable time, the inquiry into international law, but still not, as it seems to me, an episodic digression, at least for the greater part, but a natural and legitimate investigation, springing immediately from the principal theme of the work, connected with it more closely at several intervals, and ultimately reverting into it. But of this the reader will judge as we proceed with the analysis.

96. Grotius begins with rather too romantic a picture of the early state of the world, when men lived on the spontaneous fruits of the earth, with no property, except in what each had taken from the common mother's lap. But this happy condition did not, of course, last very long; and mankind came to separate and exclusive possession, each for himself, and against the world. Original occupancy by persons, and division of lands by the commu-

¹ Lib. II. c. 1, § 8. Gronovius observes pithily and truly on this: "Melius occidi quam occidere injuria; non melius occidi injuria quam occidere jure."

² "Hodie omnes ferme tam jurisconsulti quam theologi doceant recte homines a nobis interficere defendendarum causa." — § 18.

nity, he rightly holds to be the two sources of territorial propriety. Occupation is of two sorts; one by the community (*per universitatem*), the other (*per fundos*) by several possession. What is not thus occupied is still the domain of the state. Grotius conceives that mankind have reserved a right of taking what belongs to others, in extreme necessity. It is a still more remarkable limitation of the right of property, that it carries very far his notions of that of transit; maintaining that not only rivers, but the territory itself, of a state may be peaceably entered, and that permission cannot be refused, consistently with natural law, even in the case of armies: nor is the apprehension of incurring the hostility of the power, who is thus attacked by the army passing through our territory, a sufficient excuse.¹ This, of course, must now be exploded. Nor can, he thinks, the transit of merchandise be forbidden or impeded by levying any further tolls than are required for the incident expenses. Strangers ought to be allowed to settle, on condition of obeying the laws, and even to occupy any waste tracts in the territory;² a position equally untenable. It is less unreasonably that he maintains the general right of mankind to buy what they want, if the other party can spare it; but he extends too far his principle, that no nation can be excluded by another from privileges which it concedes to the rest of the world. In all these positions, however, we perceive the enlarged and philanthropic spirit of the system of Grotius, and his disregard of the usages of mankind when they clashed with his Christian principles of justice. But, as the very contrary supposition has been established in the belief of the present generation, it may be doubtful whether his own testimony will be thought sufficient.

97. The original acquisition of property was, in the infancy of human societies, by division or by occupancy: it is now by occupancy alone. Paullus has reckoned as a mode of original acquisition, if we have caused any thing to exist, "*Si quid ipsi, ut in rerum natura esset, fecimus.*" This, though not well expressed, must mean the produce of labor. Grotius observes, that this resolves itself into a continuance of a prior right, or a new one by occupancy, and therefore no

¹ "*Sic etiam metus ab eo in quem negandum transitum non valet.*"—*Lib. II. bellum justum movet le qui transit, ad c. 2, § 12.* ² § 16, 17.

peculiar mode of acquisition. In those things which naturally belong to no one, there may be two sorts of occupation, — dominion or sovereignty, and property. And, in the former sense at least, rivers, and bays of the sea, are capable of occupation. In what manner this may be done, he explains at length.¹ But those who occupy a portion of the sea have no right to obstruct others in fishing. This had been the subject of a controversy of Grotius with Selden; the one in his *Mare Liberum* denying, the other in his *Mare Clausum* sustaining, the right of England to exclude the fishermen of Holland from the seas which she asserted to be her own.

98. The right of occupancy exists as to things derelict, or abandoned by their owners. But it is of more ^{Relinquish-} importance to consider the presumptions of such ^{ment of it.} relinquishment by sovereign states, as distinguished from mere prescription. The non-claim of the owner, during a long period, seems the only means of giving a right where none originally existed. It must be the silent acquiescence of one who knows his rights and has his free will. But, when this abandonment has once taken place, it bars unborn claimants; for he who is not born, Grotius says, has no rights: “*Ejus qui nondum est natus nullum est jus.*”²

99. A right over persons may be acquired in three ways, — by generation, by their consent, by their crime. In children, we are to consider three periods, — that of ^{Right over persons.} imperfect judgment, or infancy; that of adult age in ^{By generation.} the father's family; and that of emancipation, or foris-familiation, when they have ceased to form a part of it. In the first of these, a child is capable of property in possession, but not in enjoyment; in the second, he is subject to the parent, only in actions which affect the family; in the third, he is wholly his own master. All beyond this is positive law. The paternal power was almost peculiar to the Romans, though the Persians are said to have had something of the same. Grotius, we perceive, was no ally of those who elevated the patriarchal power, in order to found upon it a despotic polity; nor does he raise it by any means so high as Bodin. The customs of Eastern nations would, perhaps, have warranted somewhat more than he concedes.³

100. Consent is the second mode of acquiring dominion.

¹ C. 2.

² C. 4.

³ Id., 5.

The consociation of male and female is the first species of ^{By consent} it, which is principally in marriage, for which the ^{in marriage.} promise of the woman to be faithful is required. But he thinks that there is no mutual obligation by the law of nature; which seems designed to save the polygamy of the patriarchs. He then discusses the chief questions as to divorce, polygamy, clandestine marriages, and incest; holding, that no unions are forbidden by natural law, except in the direct line. Concubines, in the sense of the Roman jurisprudence, are true Christian wives.¹

101. In all other consociations except marriage, it is a rule ^{In common-} that the majority can bind the minority. Of these, ^{wealths.} the principal is a commonwealth. And here he maintains the right of every citizen to leave his country, and that the state retains no right over those whom it has banished. Subjection, which may arise from one kind of consent, is either private or public: the former is of several species, among which adoption, in the Roman sense, is the noblest, and servitude the meanest. In the latter case, the master has not the right of life and death over his servants, though some laws give him impunity. He is perplexed about the right over persons born in slavery, since his theory of its origin will not support it. But in the case of public subjection, where one state becomes voluntarily subject to another, he finds no difficulty about the unborn, because the people is the same, notwithstanding the succession of individuals; which seems paying too much deference to a legal fiction.²

102. The right of alienating altogether the territory, he ^{Right of} grants to patrimonial sovereigns; but he denies ^{alienating} that a part can be separated from the rest without its ^{subjects.} consent, either by the community or by the sovereign, however large his authority may be. This he extends to subjection of the kingdom to vassalage. The right of ^{Alienation} alienating private property by testament is founded, ^{by testa-} he thinks, in natural law;³ a position wherein I can ^{ment.} by no means concur. In conformity with this, he derives the right of succession by intestacy from the presumed intention of the deceased, and proceeds to dilate on the different rules of succession established by civil laws. Yet the rule, that paternal and maternal heirs shall take respect-

¹ C. 5.² Id.³ C. 6, § 14.

ively what descended from the ancestors on each side, he conceives to be founded in the law of nature, though subject to the right of bequest.¹

103. In treating of the acquisition of property by the law of nations, he means only the arbitrary constitutions of the Roman and other codes. Some of these he deems founded in no solid reason, though the law-givers of every country have a right to determine such matters as they think fit. Thus the Roman law recognizes no property in animals *feræ naturæ*, which that of modern nations gives, he says, to the owner of the soil where they are found, not unreasonably any more than the opposite maxim is unreasonable. So of a treasure found in the earth, and many other cases, wherein it is hard to say that the law of nature and reason prescribes one rule more than another.²

Rights of
property
by positive
law.

104. The rights of sovereignty and property may terminate by extinction of the ruling or possessing family without provision of successors. Slaves then become free; and subjects, their own masters: for there can be no new right by occupancy in such. But a people or community may cease to exist, though the identity of persons, or even of race, is not necessary for its continuance. It may expire by voluntary dispersion, or by subjugation to another state. But mere change of place by simultaneous emigration will not destroy a political society, much less a change of internal government. Hence, a republic becoming a monarchy, it stands in the same relation to other communities as before, and, in particular, is subject to all its former debts.³

¹ C. 7. In this chapter, Grotius decides that parents are not bound by strict justice to maintain their children. The case is stronger the other way, in return for early protection. Barbeyrac thinks that aliment is due to children by strict right during infancy.

² § 8.

³ § 2. At the end of this chapter, Grotius unfortunately raises a question, his solution of which laid him open to censure. He inquires to whom the countries formerly subject to the Roman Empire belong. And here he comes to the inconceivable paradox, that that empire, and the rights of the citizens of Rome, still subsist. Gronovius bitterly

remarks, in a note on this passage: "Mirum est hoc loco summum virum, cum in precipua questione non male sentiret, in tot salebras se conjecisse, totque monstra et chimæras confinxisse, ut aliquid novum diceret, et Germanis potius ludibrium deberet, quam Gallis et Papæ parum placeret." This, however, is very uncandid, as Barbeyrac truly points out; since neither of these could take much interest in a theory which reserved a supremacy over the world to the Roman people. It is probably the weakest passage in all the writings of Grotius, though there are too many which do not enhance his fame.

105. In a chapter on the obligations which the right of property imposes on others than the proprietor, we find some of the more delicate questions in the casuistry of natural law, such as relate to the *bona fide* possessor of another's property. Grotius, always siding with the stricter moralists, asserts that he is bound not only to restore the substance, but the intermediate profits, without any claim for the valuable consideration which he may have paid. His commentator Barbeyrac, of a later and laxer school of casuistry, denies much of this doctrine.¹

106. That great branch of ethics which relates to the obligation of promises has been so diffusively handled by the casuists as well as philosophers, that Grotius deserves much credit for the brevity with which he has laid down the simple principles, and discussed some of the more difficult problems. That mere promises, or *nuda pacta*, where there is neither mutual benefit, nor what the jurists call synallagmatic contract, are binding on the conscience, whatever they may be, or ought to be, in law, is maintained against a distinguished civilian, Francis Connan; nor does Barbeyrac seem to dispute this general tenet of moral philosophers. Puffendorf, however, says that there is a tacit condition in promises of this kind that they can be performed without great loss to the promiser; and Cicero holds them to be released, if their performance would be more detrimental to one party than serviceable to the other. This gives a good deal of latitude; but perhaps they are, in such cases, open to compensation without actual fulfilment. A promise given without deliberation, according to Grotius himself, is not binding. Those founded on deceit or error admit of many distinctions; but he determines, in the celebrated question of extorted promises, that they are valid by the natural, though their obligation may be annulled by the civil, law. But the promisee is bound to release a promise thus unduly obtained.² These instances are sufficient

¹ C. 10. Our own jurisprudence goes upon the principles of Grotius, and even denies the possessor by a bad title, though *bona fide*, any indemnification for what he may have laid out to the benefit of the property; which seems hardly consonant to the strictest rules of natural law.

² C. 11, § 7. It is not very probable that the promisee will fulfil this obligation in such a case; and the decision of

Grotius, though conformable to that of the theological casuists in general, is justly rejected by Puffendorf and Barbeyrac, as well as by many writers of the last century. The principle seems to be, that right and obligation, in matters of agreement, are correlative; and, where the first does not arise, the second cannot exist. Adam Smith and Paley incline to think the promisee ought, under certain

to show the spirit in which Grotius always approaches the decision of moral questions; serious and learned, rather than profound in seeking a principle, or acute in establishing a distinction. In the latter quality, he falls much below his annotator Barbeyrac, who had, indeed, the advantage of coming nearly a century after him.

107. In no part of his work has Grotius dwelt so much on the rules and distinctions of the Roman law as in his chapter on contracts; nor was it very easy or desirable to avoid it.¹ The wisdom of those great men, from the fragments of whose determinations the existing jurisprudence of Europe, in subjects of this kind, has been chiefly derived, could not be set aside without presumption, nor appropriated without ingratitude. Less fettered, at least in the best age of Roman jurisprudence, by legislative interference than our modern lawyers have commonly been, they resorted to no other principles than those of natural justice. That the Roman law, in all its parts, coincides with the best possible platform of natural jurisprudence, it would be foolish to assert; but that in this great province, or rather demesne-land, of justice, the regulation of contracts between man and man, it does not considerably deviate from the right line of reason, has never been disputed by any one in the least conversant with the Pandects.

108. It will be manifest, however, to the attentive reader of Grotius, in this chapter, that he treats the subject of contract as a part of ethics rather than of jurisprudence; and it is only by the frequent parallelism of the two sciences that the contrary could be suspected. Thus he maintains, that, equality being the principle of the contract by sale, either party is forced to restore the difference arising from a misapprehension of the other, even without his own fault; and this whatever may be the amount, though the civil law gives a remedy only where the difference exceeds one-half of the price.² And in several other places he

circumstances, to be kept; but the reasons they give are not founded on the *justitia expletiva*, which the proper obligation of promises, as such, requires. It is also a proof how little the moral sense of mankind goes along with the rigid casuists in this respect, that no one is blamed for defending himself against a

¹ C. 12.

bond given through duress or illegal violence, if the plea be a true one.

In a subsequent passage, l. iii. c. 19, § 4, Grotius seems to carry this theory of the duty of releasing an unjust promise so far as to deny the obligation of the latter, and thus circuitously to agree with the opposite class of casuists.

² § 12.

diverges equally from that law. Not that he ever contemplated what Smith seems to have meant by "natural jurisprudence," a theory of the principles which ought to run through, and to be the foundation of, the laws of all nations. But he knew that the judge in the tribunal, and the inward judge in the breast, even where their subjects of determination appear essentially the same, must have different boundaries to their jurisdiction; and that, as the general maxims and inflexible forms of external law, in attempts to accommodate themselves to the subtleties of casuistry, would become uncertain and arbitrary, so the finer emotions of the conscience would lose all their moral efficacy by restraining the duties of justice to that which can be enforced by the law. In the course of this twelfth chapter, we come to a question much debated in the time of Grotius, — the lawfulness of usury. After admitting, against the common opinion, that it is not repugnant to the law of nature, he yet maintains the prohibition in the Mosaic code to be binding on all mankind.¹ An extraordinary position, it would seem, in one who had denied any part of that system to be truly an universal law. This was, however, the usual determination of casuists; but he follows it up, as was also usual, with so many exceptions as materially relax and invalidate the application of his rule.

109. The next chapter, on promissory oaths, is a corollary to the last two. It was the opinion of Grotius, as it ^{Promissory} ^{oaths.} had been of all theologians, and, in truth, of all mankind, that a promise or contract not only becomes more solemn, and entails on its breach a severer penalty, by means of this adjuration of the Supreme Being, but may even acquire a substantial validity by it, in cases where no prior obligation would subsist.² This chapter is distinguished by a more than usually profuse erudition. But, notwithstanding the rigid observance of oaths which he deems incumbent by natural and revealed law, he admits of a considerable authority in the civil magistrate, or other superior, as a husband or father, to annul the oaths of inferiors beforehand, or to dispense with them afterwards; not that they can release a moral obligation, but that the obligation itself is incurred under a tacit condition of their consent. And he

¹ § 20.

² C. 12.

seems, in rather a singular manner, to hint a kind of approval of such dispensations by the church.¹

110. Whatever has been laid down by Grotius in the last three chapters as to the natural obligations of mankind, has an especial reference to the main purport of this great work, the duties of the supreme power. But the engagements of sovereigns give rise to many questions which cannot occur in those of private men. In the chapter which ensues, on the promises, oaths, and contracts of sovereigns, he confines himself to those engagements which immediately affect their subjects. These it is of great importance, in the author's assumed province of the general confessor or casuist of kings, to place on a right footing; because they have never wanted subservient counsellors, who would wrest the law of conscience, as well as that of the land, to the interests of power. Grotius, in denying that the sovereign may revoke his own contracts, extends this case to those made by him during his minority, without limitation to such as have been authorized by his guardians.² His contracts with his subjects create a true obligation, of which they may claim, though not enforce, the performance. He hesitates whether to call this obligation a civil or only a natural one; and, in fact, it can only be determined by positive law.³ Whether the successors of a sovereign are bound by his engagements, must depend, he observes, on the political constitution, and on the nature of the engagement. Those of an usurper he determines not to be binding, which should probably be limited to domestic contracts, though his language seems large enough to comprise engagements towards foreign states.⁴

111. We now return from what, in strict language, may pass for a long digression, though not a needless one, to the main stream of international law. The title of the fifteenth chapter is on Public Treaties. After several divisions, which it would at present be thought unnecessary to specify so much at length, Grotius enters on a question not then settled by theologians, whether alliances with infidel powers were, in any circumstances, lawful. Francis I. had given

¹ § 20. "Ex hoc fundamento defendi possunt absolutiones juramentorum, quæ olim a principibus, nunc ipsorum principum voluntate, quo magis cautum sit pietati, ab ecclesiæ præsidibus exercentur."

² C. 14, § 1.

³ § 6.

⁴ "Contractibus vero eorum qui sine jure imperium invaserunt, non tenebuntur populi aut veri reges, nam hi jus obligandi populum non habuerunt." § 14.

great scandal in Europe by his league with the Turk. And, though Grotius admits the general lawfulness of such alliances, it is under limitations which would hardly have borne out the court of France in promoting the aggrandizement of the common enemy of Christendom. Another and more extensive head in the casuistry of nations relates to treaties that have been concluded without the authority of the sovereign. That he is not bound by these engagements is evident as a leading rule; but the course which, according to natural law, ought to be taken in such circumstances, is often doubtful. The famous capitulation of the Roman army at the Caudine Forks is in point. Grotius, a rigid casuist, determines that the senate were not bound to replace their army in the condition from which the treaty had delivered them. And this seems to be a rational decision, though the Romans have sometimes incurred the censure of ill faith for their conduct. But if the sovereign has not only by silence acquiesced in the engagement of his ambassador or general, which of itself, according to Grotius, will not amount to an implied ratification, but recognized it by some overt act of his own, he cannot afterwards plead the defect of sanction.¹

112. Promises consist externally in words, really in the intention of the parties. But, as the evidence of this Their interpretation. intention must usually depend on words, we should adapt our general rules to their natural meaning. Common usage is to determine the interpretation of agreements, except where terms of a technical sense have been employed. But if the expressions will bear different senses, or if there is some apparent inconsistency in different clauses, it becomes necessary to collect the meaning conjecturally, from the nature of the subject, from the consequences of the proposed interpretation, and from its bearing on other parts of the agreement. This serves to exclude unreasonable and unfair constructions from the equivocal language of treaties, such as was usual in former times to a degree which the greater prudence of contracting parties, if not their better faith, has rendered impossible in modern Europe. Among other rules of interpretation, whether in private or public engagements, he lays down one, familiar to the jurists, but concerning the validity of which some have doubted,—that things favorable, as they style them, or conferring a benefit, are to be construed largely;

¹ C. 15.

things odious, or onerous to one party, are not to be stretched beyond the letter. Our own law, as is well known, adopts this distinction between remedial and penal statutes; and it seems (wherever that which is favorable in one sense is not odious in another) the most equitable principle in public conventions. The celebrated question, the cause, or, as Polybius more truly calls it, the pretext, of the second Punic War, whether the terms of a treaty binding each party not to attack the allies of the other shall comprehend those who have entered subsequently into alliance, seems, but rather on doubtful grounds, to be decided in the negative. Several other cases from history are agreeably introduced in this chapter.¹

113. It is often, he observes, important to ascertain whether a treaty be personal or real; that is, whether it affect only the contracting sovereign or the state. The treaties of republics are always real or permanent, even if the form of government should become monarchical; but the converse is not true as to those of kings, which are to be interpreted according to the probable meaning where there are no words of restraint or extension. A treaty subsists with a king, though he may be expelled by his subjects; nor is it any breach of faith to take up arms against an usurper, with the lawful sovereign's consent. This is not a doctrine which would now be endured.²

114. Besides those rules of interpretation which depend on explaining the words of an engagement, there are others which must sometimes be employed to extend or limit the meaning beyond any natural construction. Thus, in the old law-case, a bequest, in the event of the testator's posthumous son dying, was held valid where none was born; and instances of this kind are continual in the books of jurisprudence. It is equally reasonable sometimes to restrain the terms of a promise, where they clearly appear to go beyond the design of the promiser, or where supervenient circumstances indicate an exception which he would infallibly have made. A few sections in this place seem, perhaps, more fit to have been inserted in the eleventh chapter.

115. There is a natural obligation to make amends for injury to the natural rights of another, which is extended, by means of the establishment of property and of civil society,

¹ C. 16.

² § 17.

to all which the laws have accorded him.¹ Hence a cor-
 relative right arises, but a right which is to be dis-
 Obligation to repair injury. tinguished from fitness or merit. The jurists were
 accustomed to treat expletive justice, which consists
 in giving to every one what is strictly his own, separately
 from attributive justice, the equitable and right dispensa-
 tion of all things according to desert. With the latter,
 Grotius has nothing to do; nor is he to be charged with
 introducing the distinction of perfect and imperfect rights,
 if, indeed, those phrases are as objectionable as some have
 accounted them. In the far greater part of this chapter, he
 considers the principles of this important province of natural
 law, the obligation to compensate damage, rather as it affects
 private persons than sovereign states. As, in most in-
 stances, this falls within the jurisdiction of civil tribunals,
 the rules laid down by Grotius may, to a hasty reader, seem
 rather intended as directory to the judge, than to the con-
 science of the offending party. This, however, is not by any
 means the case: he is here, as almost everywhere else, a
 master in morality, and not in law. That he is not obequi-
 ously following the Roman law, will appear by his determin-
 ing against the natural responsibility of the owner for
 injuries committed, without his fault, by a slave or a beast.²
 But sovereigns, he holds, are answerable for the piracies and
 robberies of their subjects when they are able to prevent them.
 This is the only case of national law which he discusses;
 but it is one of high importance, being, in fact, one of the
 ordinary causes of public hostility. This liability, however,
 does not exist where subjects, having obtained a lawful com-
 mission by letters-of-marque, become common pirates, and do
 not return home.

116. Thus far, the author begins in the eighteenth chapter,
 Rights by law of nations. we have treated of rights founded on natural law,
 with some little mixture of the arbitrary law of
 nations. We come now to those which depend
 wholly on the latter. Such are the rights of ambassadors.
 We have now, therefore, to have recourse more to the usage
 of civilized people than to theoretical principles. The prac-
 tice of mankind has, in fact, been so much more uniform as to

¹ C. 17.

² This is against what we read in the some classical authority, means *dam- num sine injuria*.
 "Si quadrupes pauperiem fecerit." Pau-
 peries, in the legal sense, which has also

the privileges of ambassadors than other matters of national intercourse, that they early acquired the authority and denomination of public law. The obligation to receive ambassadors from other sovereign states, the respect due to them, their impunity in offences committed by their principals or by themselves, are not, indeed, wholly founded on custom, to the exclusion of the reason of the case; nor have the customs of mankind, even here, been so unlike themselves as to furnish no contradictory precedents: but they afford, perhaps, the best instance of a tacit agreement, distinguishable both from moral right and from positive convention, which is specifically denominated the law of nations. It may be mentioned, that Grotius determines in favor of the absolute impunity of ambassadors; that is, their irresponsibility to the tribunals of the country where they reside, in the case of personal crimes, and even of conspiracy against the government. This, however, he founds altogether upon what he conceives to have been the prevailing usage of civilized states.¹

117. The next chapter, on the right of sepulture, appears more excursive than any other in the whole treatise. The right of sepulture can hardly become a public question, except in time of war; and, as such, it might have been shortly noticed in the third book. It supplies Grotius, however, with a brilliant prodigality of classical learning.² But the next is far more important. It is entitled On Punishments. The injuries done to us by others give rise to our right of compensation, and to our right of punishment. We have to examine the latter with the more care, that many have fallen into mistakes from not duly apprehending the foundation and nature of punishment. Punishment is, as Grotius rather quaintly defines it, "*Malum passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis*,"—evil inflicted on another for the evil which he has committed. It is not a part of attributive, and hardly of expletive justice; nor is it, in its primary design, proportioned to the guilt of the criminal, but to the magnitude of the crime. All men have naturally a right to punish crimes, except those who are themselves equally guilty; but, though the criminal would have no ground to complain, the mere pleasure of revenge is not a sufficient motive to warrant us: there must be an useful end

¹ C. 18.² C. 19.

to render punishment legitimate. This end may be the advantage of the criminal himself or of the injured party, or of mankind in general. The interest of the injured party here considered is not that of reparation, which, though it may be provided for in punishment, is no proper part of it, but security against similar offences of the guilty party or of others. All men may naturally seek this security by punishing the offender; and, though it is expedient in civil society that this right should be transferred to the judge, it is not taken away where recourse cannot be had to the law. Every man may, even by the law of nature, punish crimes by which he has sustained no injury; the public good of society requiring security against offenders, and rendering them common enemies.¹

118. Grotius next proceeds to consider whether these rights of punishment are restrained by revelation, and concludes that a private Christian is not at liberty to punish any criminal, especially with death, for his own security or that of the public; but that the magistrate is expressly empowered by Scripture to employ the sword against malefactors. It is rather an excess of scrupulousness, that he holds it unbecoming to seek offices which give a jurisdiction in capital cases.²

119. Many things essentially evil are not properly punishable by human laws. Such are thoughts and intentions, errors of frailty, or actions from which, though morally wrong, human society suffers no mischief; or the absence of such voluntary virtues as compassion and gratitude. Nor is it always necessary to inflict lawful punishment, many circumstances warranting its remission. The ground of punishment is the guilt of the offender; its motive is the advantage expected from it. No punishment should exceed what is deserved; but it may be diminished according to the prospect of utility, or according to palliating circumstances. But, though punishments should bear proportion to offences, it does not follow that the criminal should suffer no more evil than he has occasioned, which would give him too easy a measure of retribution. The general tendency of all that Grotius has said in this chapter is remarkably indulgent and humane, beyond the practice or even the philosophy of his age.³

¹ C. 20.² 14.³ 14.

120. War is commonly grounded upon the right of punishing injuries; so that the general principles upon which this right depends upon mankind ought well to be understood, before we can judge of so great a matter of national law. States, Grotius thinks, have a right, analogous to that of individuals out of society, to punish heinous offences against the law of nature or of nations, though not affecting themselves, or even any other independent community. But this is to be done very cautiously, and does not extend to violations of the positive divine law, or to any merely barbarous and irrational customs. Wars undertaken only on this score are commonly suspicious. But he goes on to determine that war may be justly waged against those who deny the being and providence of God, though not against idolaters, much less for the sake of compelling any nation to embrace Christianity, unless they prosecute its professors, in which case they are justly liable to punishment. He pronounces strongly in this place against the prosecution of heretics.¹

121. This is the longest chapter in the work of Grotius. Several of his positions, as the reader may probably have observed, would not bear a close scrutiny; the rights of individuals in a state of nature, of magistrates in civil society, and of independent communities, are not kept sufficiently distinct; the equivocal meaning of right, as it exists correlatively between two parties, and as it comprehends the general obligations of moral law, is not always guarded against. It is, notwithstanding these defects, a valuable commentary, regard being had to the time when it appeared, on the principles both of penal jurisprudence and of the rights of war.

122. It has been a great problem, whether the liability to punishment can be transmitted from one person to another. This may be asked as to those who have been concerned in the crime, and those who have not. In the first case, they are liable as for their own offence, in having commanded, connived at, permitted, assisted, the actors in the crime before or after its perpetration. States are answerable for the delinquencies of their subjects when unpunished. They are also bound either to punish, or to deliver up, those who take refuge within their dominions from the justice of their own country. He seems, however, to admit afterwards, that they need only command such persons

Their responsibility.

¹ C. 20.

to quit the country. But they have a right to inquire into and inform themselves of the guilt alleged; the ancient privileges of suppliants being established for the sake of those who have been unjustly persecuted at home. The practice of modern Europe, he owns, has limited this right of demanding the delivery or punishment of refugees within narrow bounds. As to the punishment of those who have been wholly innocent of the offence, Grotius holds it universally unjust, but distinguishes it from indirect evil, which may often fall on the innocent. Thus, when the estate of a father is confiscated, his children suffer, but are not punished; since their succession was only a right contingent on his possession at his death.¹ It is a consequence from this principle, that a people, so far subject to its sovereign as to have had no control upon his actions, cannot justly incur punishment on account of them.

123. After distinguishing the causes of war into pretexts and motives, and setting aside wars without any assignable justification as mere robberies, he mentions several pretexts which he deems insufficient; such as the aggrandizement of a neighbor, his construction of fortresses, the right of discovery where there is already a possessor, however barbarous, the necessity of occupying more land. And here he denies, both to single men and to a people, the right of taking up arms in order to recover their liberty. He laughs at the pretended right of the emperor or of the pope to govern the world, and concludes with a singular warning against wars undertaken upon any pretended explanation of scriptural prophecies.² It will be anticipated, from the scrupulousness of Grotius in all his casuistry, that he enjoins sovereigns to abstain from war in a doubtful cause, and to use all convenient methods of avoiding it by conference, arbitration, or even by lot. Single combat itself, as a mode of lot, he does not wholly reject in this place. In answer to a question often put, whether a war can

¹ C. 21, § 10. Hence it would follow, by the principle of Grotius, that our law of forfeiture in high treason is just, being part of the direct punishment of the guilty; but that of attainder, or corruption of blood, is unjust, being an infliction on the innocent alone. I incline to concur in this distinction, and think it at least plausible, though it was seldom or never taken in the discussions con-

cerning those two laws. Confiscation is no more unjust towards the posterity of an offender than fine, from which of course it only differs in degree; and, on the other hand, the law has as much right to exclude that posterity from enjoying property at all, as from enjoying that which descends from a third party through the blood, as we call it, of a criminal ancestor.

² C. 22.

be just on both sides, he replies, that, in relation to the cause or subject, it cannot be so, since there cannot be two opposite rights; but, since men may easily be deceived as to the real right, a war may be just on both sides with respect to the agents.¹ In another part of his work, he observes that resistance, even where the cause is not originally just, may become such by the excess of the other party.

124. The duty of avoiding war, even in a just cause, as long as possible, is rather part of moral virtue in ^{And expediency.} a large sense than of mere justice. But, besides the obligations imposed on us by humanity and by Christian love, it is often expedient, for our own interests, to avoid war. Of this, however, he says little; it being plainly a matter of civil prudence with which he has no concern.² Dismissing, therefore, the subject of this chapter, he comes to the justice of wars undertaken for the sake of ^{War for the sake of other subjects.} others. Sovereigns, he conceives, are not bound to take up arms in defence of any one of their subjects who may be unjustly treated. Hence a state may abandon those whom it cannot protect without great loss to the rest; but whether an innocent subject may be delivered up to an enemy, is a more debated question. Soto and Vasquez, casuists of great name, had denied this: Grotius, however, determines it affirmatively. This seems a remarkable exception from the general inflexibility of his adherence to the rule of right. For on what principle of strict justice can a people, any more than private persons, sacrifice, or put in jeopardy, the life of an innocent man? Grotius is influenced by the supposition, that the subject ought voluntarily to surrender himself into the hands of the enemy, for the public good; but no man forfeits his natural rights by refusing to perform an action not of strict social obligation.³

125. Next to subjects are allies, whom the state has bound ^{Allies.} itself to succor; and friendly powers, though without alliance, may also be protected from unjust attack. This extends even to all mankind; though war in behalf of strangers is not obligatory. It is also lawful to deliver the subjects of others from extreme ^{Strangers.} oppression of their rulers; and, though this has often been a mere pretext, we are not on that account to

¹ C. 22.² C. 24.³ C. 25.

deny the justice of an honest interference. He even thinks the rights of foreign powers, in such a case, more unequivocal than that of the oppressed people themselves. At the close of this chapter, he protests strongly against those who serve in any cause for the mere sake of pay; and holds them worse than the common executioner, who puts none but criminals to death.¹

126. In the twenty-sixth and concluding chapter of this second book, Grotius investigates the lawfulness of bearing arms at the command of superiors, and determines that subjects are indispensably bound not to serve in a war which they conceive to be clearly unjust. He even inclines, though admitting the prevailing opinion to be otherwise, to think, that, in a doubtful cause, they should adhere to the general moral rule in case of doubt, and refuse their personal service. This would evidently be impracticable, and ultimately subversive of political society. It, however, denotes the extreme scrupulosity of his mind. One might smile at another proof of this, where he determines that the hangman, before the performance of his duty, should satisfy himself as to the justice of the sentence.²

127. The rights of war, that is, of commencing hostility, have thus far been investigated with a comprehensiveness that has sometimes almost hidden the subject. We come now, in the third book, to rights in war. Whatever may be done in war is permitted either by the law of nature or that of nations. Grotius begins with the first. The means morally, though not physically, necessary to attain a lawful end, are themselves lawful; a proposition which he seems to understand relatively to the rights of others, not to the absolute moral quality of actions; distinctions which are apt to embarrass him. We have, therefore, a right to employ force against an enemy, though it may be the cause of suffering to innocent persons. The principles of natural law authorize us to prevent neutrals from furnishing an enemy with the supplies of war, or with any thing else essential for his resistance to our just demands of redress, such as provisions in a state of siege. And it is remarkable that he refers this latter question to natural law, because he had not found any clear decision of it by the positive law of nations.³

¹ C. 25.² C. 26.³ L. III. c. 1.

128. In acting against an enemy, force is the nature of war. But it may be inquired whether deceit is not also a lawful means of success. The practice of nations, and the authority of most writers, seem to warrant it. Grotius dilates on different sorts of artifice, and, after admitting the lawfulness of such as deceive by indications, comes to the question of words equivocal or wholly false. This he first discusses on the general moral principle of veracity, more prolixly, and with more deference to authority, than would suit a modern reader; yet this basis is surely indispensable for the support of any decision in public casuistry. The right, however, of employing falsehood towards an enemy, which he generally admits, does not extend to promises, which are always to be kept, whether express or implied, especially when confirmed by oath; and more greatness of mind, as well as more Christian simplicity, would be shown by abstaining wholly from falsehood in war. The law of nature does not permit us to tempt any one to do that which in him would be criminal, as to assassinate his sovereign, or to betray his trust; but we have a right to make use of his voluntary offers.¹

129. Grotius now proceeds from the consideration of natural law or justice to that of the general customs of mankind, in which, according to him, the arbitrary law of nations consists. By this, in the first place, though naturally no one is answerable for another, it has been established, that the property of every citizen is, as it were, mortgaged for the liabilities of the state to which he belongs. Hence, if justice is refused to us by the sovereign, we have a right to indemnification out of the property of his subjects. This is commonly called reprisals; and it is a right which every private person would enjoy, were it not for the civil laws of most countries, which compel him to obtain the authorization of his own sovereign or of some tribunal. By an analogous right, the subjects of a foreign state have sometimes been seized in return for one of our own subjects unjustly detained by their government.²

130. A regular war, by the law of nations, can only be waged between political communities. Wherever there is a semblance of civil justice and fixed law, such a community exists, however violent may be its actions. But a body of pirates or robbers are not one. Absolute inde-

Use of
deceit.

Rules and
customs of
nations.
Reprisals.

Declarations
of war.

¹ L. III. c. 1.

² C. 2.

pendence, however, is not required for the right of war. A formal declaration of war, though not necessary by the law of nature, has been rendered such by the usage of civilized nations. But it is required even by the former, that we should demand reparation for an injury, before we seek redress by force. A declaration of war may be conditional or absolute; and it has been established as a ratification of regular hostilities, that they may not be confounded with the unwarranted acts of private men. No interval of time is required for their commencement after declaration.¹

131. All is lawful during war, in one sense of the word, which by the law and usage of nations is dispensable. And this, in formal hostilities, is as much the right of one side as of the other. The subjects of our enemy, whether active on his side or not, become liable to these extreme rights of slaughter and pillage; but it seems that, according to the law of nations, strangers should be exempted from them, unless, by remaining in the country, they serve his cause. Women, children, and prisoners may be put to death; quarter or capitulation for life refused. On the other hand, if the law of nations is less strict in this respect than that of nature, it forbids some things which naturally might be allowable means of defence, as the poisoning an enemy, or the wells from which he is to drink. The assassination of an enemy is not contrary to the law of nations, unless by means of traitors; and even this is held allowable against a rebel or robber, who are not protected by the rules of formal war. But the violation of women is contrary to the law of nations.² The rights of war with respect to enemies' property are unlimited, without exception even of churches or sepulchral monuments, sparing always the bodies of the dead.³

132. By the law of nature, Grotius thinks that we acquire a property in as much of the spoil as is sufficient to indemnify us, and to punish the aggressor. But the law of nations carries this much farther, and gives an unlimited property in all that has been acquired by conquest, which mankind are bound to respect. This right commences as soon as the enemy has lost all chance of recovering his losses; which is, in movables, as soon as they are in a place within our sole power. The transfer of property in territories is not so speedy. The goods of neutrals are not thus transferred, when found in the cities or

¹ C. 2.² C. 4.³ C. 5.

on board the vessels of an enemy. Whether the spoil belongs to the captors, or to their sovereign, is so disputed a question, that it can hardly be reckoned a part of that law of nations, or universal usage, with which Grotius is here concerned. He thinks, however, that what is taken in public enterprises appertains to the state; and that this has been the general practice of mankind. The civil laws of each people may modify this, and have frequently done so.¹

133. Prisoners, by the law of nations, become slaves of the captor, and their posterity also. He may ^{Prisoners become slaves.} treat them as he pleases with impunity. This has been established by the custom of mankind, in order that the conqueror might be induced to spare the lives of the vanquished. Some theologians deny the slave, even when taken in an unjust war, the right of making his escape; from whom Grotius dissents. But he has not a right, in conscience, to resist the exercise of his master's authority. This law of nations as to the slavery of prisoners, as he admits, has not been universally received, and is now abolished in Christian countries, out of respect to religion.² But, strictly, as an individual may be reduced into slavery, so may a whole conquered people. It is, of course, at the discretion of the conqueror to remit a portion of his right, and to leave as much of their liberties and possessions untouched as he pleases.³

134. The next chapter relates to the right of postliminium; one depending so much on the peculiar fictions of the Roman jurists, that it seems strange to discuss it as ^{Right of postliminium.} part of an universal law of nations at all. Nor does it properly belong to the rights of war which are between belligerent parties. It is certainly consonant to natural justice, that a citizen returning from captivity should be fully restored to every privilege and all property that he had enjoyed at home. In modern Europe, there is little to which the *jus postliminii* can, even by analogy, be applied. It has been determined, in courts of admiralty, that vessels recaptured after a short time do not revert to their owner. This chapter must be reckoned rather episodical.⁴

135. We have thus far looked only at the exterior right, accorded by the law of nations to all who wage regular hostilities in a just or unjust quarrel. This right is one of impunity

¹ C. 6.² C. 7.³ C. 8.⁴ C. 9.

alone; but before our own conscience, or the tribunal of moral approbation in mankind, many things hitherto spoken of as lawful must be condemned. In the first place, an unjust war renders all acts of force committed in its prosecution unjust, and binds the aggressor before God to reparation. Every one, general or soldier, is responsible in such cases for the wrong he has commanded or perpetrated. Nor can any one knowingly retain the property of another obtained by such a war, though he should come to the possession of it with good faith.¹ And as nothing can be done, consistently with moral justice, in an unjust war, so, however legitimate our ground for hostilities may be, we are not at liberty to transgress the boundaries of equity and humanity. In this chapter, Grotius, after dilating with a charitable abundance of examples and authorities in favor of clemency in war, even towards those who have been most guilty in provoking it, specially indicates women, old men, and children, as always to be spared; extending this also to all whose occupations are not military. Prisoners are not to be put to death, nor are towns to be refused terms of capitulation. He denies that the law of retaliation, or the necessity of striking terror, or the obstinate resistance of an enemy, dispenses with the obligation of saving his life. Nothing but some personal crime can warrant the refusal of quarter, or the death of a prisoner. Nor is it allowable to put hostages to death.²

136. All unnecessary devastation ought to be avoided, such as the destruction of trees, of houses, especially ornamental and public buildings, and of every thing not serviceable in war, nor tending to prolong it, as pictures and statues. Temples and sepulchres are to be spared for the same or even stronger reasons. Though it is not the object of Grotius to lay down any political maxims, he cannot refrain in this place from pointing out several considerations of expediency, which should induce us to restrain the license of arms within the limits of natural law.³ There is no right by nature to more booty, strictly speaking, than is sufficient for our indemnity, wherein are included the expenses of the war; and the property of innocent persons, being subjects of our enemies, is only liable in failure of those who are primarily aggressors.⁴

Moderation
required as
to spoil.

¹ C. 10.

² C. 11.

³ C. 12.

⁴ C. 13.

137. The persons of prisoners are only liable, in strict moral justice, so far as is required for satisfaction ^{And as to} of our injury. The slavery into which they may be ^{prisoners.} reduced ought not to extend farther than an obligation of perpetual servitude in return for maintenance. The power over slaves by the law of nature is far short of what the arbitrary law of nations permits, and does not give a right of exacting too severe labor, or of inflicting punishment beyond desert. The *peculium*, or private acquisitions of a slave by economy or donation, ought to be reckoned his property. Slaves, however, captured in a just war, though one in which they have had no concern, are not warranted in conscience to escape, and recover their liberty. But the children of such slaves are not in servitude by the law of nature, except so far as they have been obliged to their master for subsistence in infancy. With respect to prisoners, the better course is to let them redeem themselves by a ransom, which ought to be moderate.¹

138. The acquisition of that sovereignty which was enjoyed by a conquered people, or by their rulers, is not only ^{Also in} legitimate, so far as is warranted by the punishment ^{conquest.} they have deserved, or by the value of our own loss, but also so far as the necessity of securing ourselves extends. This last is what is often unsafe to remit out of clemency. It is a part of moderation in victory to incorporate the conquered with our own citizens on equal terms, or to leave their independence on reasonable precautions for our own security. If this cannot be wholly conceded, their civil laws and municipal magistracies may be preserved, and, above all, the free exercise of their religion. The interests of conquerors are as much consulted, generally, as their reputation, by such lenient use of their advantages.²

139. It is consonant to natural justice that we should restore to the original owners all of which they have been despoiled in an unjust war, when it falls ^{And in} into our hands by a lawful conquest, without regard ^{restitution} to the usual limits of postliminium. Thus, if an ^{to right} ambitious state comes to be stripped of its usurpations, this ^{owners.} should be not for the benefit of the conqueror, but of the ancient possessors. Length of time, however, will raise the presumption of abandonment.³ Nothing should be taken

¹ C. 14.² C. 15.³ C. 16.

in war from neutral states, except through necessity and with compensation. The most ordinary case is that of the passage of troops. The neutral is bound to strict impartiality in a war of doubtful justice.¹ But it seems to be the opinion of Grotius, that, by the law of nature, every one, even a private man, may act in favor of the innocent party as far as the rights of war extend, except that he cannot appropriate to himself the possessions of the enemy; that right being one founded on indemnification. But civil and military laws have generally restrained this to such as obey the express order of their government.²

140. The license of war is restrained either by the laws of nature and nations, which have been already discussed, or by particular engagement. The obligation of promises extends to enemies, who are still parts of the great society of mankind. Faith is to be kept even with tyrants, robbers, and pirates. He here again adverts to the case of a promise made under an unjust compulsion; and possibly his reasoning on the general principle is not quite put in the most satisfactory manner. It would now be argued that the violation of engagements towards the worst of mankind, who must be supposed to have some means of self-defence, on account of which we propose to treat with them, would produce a desperation among men in similar circumstances injurious to society. Or it might be urged, that men do not lose by their crimes a right to the performance of all engagements, especially when they have fulfilled their own share in them, but only of such as involve a positive injustice towards the other party. In this place he repeats his former doctrine, that the most invalid promise may be rendered binding by the addition of an oath. It follows, from the general rule, that a prince is bound by his engagements to rebel subjects; above all, if they have had the precaution to exact his oath. And thus a change in the constitution of a monarchy may legitimately take place, and it may become mixed instead of absolute by the irrevocable concession of the sovereign. The rule, that promises made under an unjust compulsion are not obligatory, has no application in a public and regular war.³ Barbeyrac remarks on this, that if a conqueror,

¹ C. 17.

² C. 19.

³ C. 19, § 11. There seems, as has been intimated above, to be some inconsistency in the doctrine of Grotius with respect to the general obligation of such promises, which he maintains in the second book; and now, as far as I collect his meaning, denies by implication.

like Alexander, subdues an unoffending people with no specious pretext at all, he does not perceive why they should be more bound in conscience to keep the promises of obedience they may have been compelled to enter into, than if he had been an ordinary bandit. And this remark shows us, that the celebrated problem in casuistry, as to the obligation of compulsory promises, has far more important consequences than the payment of a petty sum to a robber. In two cases, however, Grotius holds that we are dispensed from keeping an engagement towards an enemy. One of these is, when it has been conditional, and the other party has not fulfilled his part of the convention. This is, of course, obvious, and can only be open to questions as to the precedence of the condition. The other case is where we retain what is due to us by way of compensation, notwithstanding our promise. This is permissible in certain instances.¹

141. The obligation of treaties of peace depends on their being concluded by the authority which, according to the constitution of the state, is sovereign for this purpose. Kings who do not possess a patrimonial sovereignty cannot alienate any part of their dominions without the consent of the nation or its representatives: they must even have the consent of the city or province which is thus to be transferred. In patrimonial kingdoms, the sovereign may alienate the whole, but not always a part, at pleasure. He seems, however, to admit an ultimate right of sovereignty, or *dominium eminens*, by which all states may dispose of the property of their subjects, and consequently alienate it for the sake of a great advantage, but subject to the obligation of granting them an indemnity. He even holds that the community is naturally bound to indemnify private subjects for the losses they sustain in war, though this right of reparation may be taken away by civil laws. The right of alienation by a treaty of peace is only questionable between the sovereign and his subjects: foreign states may presume its validity in their own favor.²

Treaties
concluded
by com-
petent
authority.

142. Treaties of peace are generally founded on one of two principles; that the parties shall return to the condition wherein they were before the commencement of hostilities, or that they shall retain what they possess at their conclusion. The last is to be presumed in a case

Matters
relating to
them.

¹ C. 19.

² C. 20.

of doubtful interpretation. A treaty of peace extinguishes all public grounds of quarrel, whether known to exist or not, but does not put an end to the claims of private men subsisting before the war, the extinguishment of which is never to be presumed. The other rules of interpretation which he lays down are, as usual with him, derived rather from natural equity than the practice of mankind, though with no neglect or scorn of the latter. He maintains the right of giving an asylum to the banished, but not of receiving large bodies of men who abandon their country.¹

143. The decision of lot may be adopted in some cases, in order to avoid a war, wherein we have little chance of resisting an enemy. But that of single combat, according to Grotius's opinion, though not repugnant to the law of nature, is incompatible with Christianity; unless in the case where a party, unjustly assailed, has no other means of defence. Arbitration by a neutral power is another method of settling differences, and in this we are bound to acquiesce. Wars may also be terminated by implicit submission or by capitulation. The rights which this gives to a conqueror have been already discussed. He concludes this chapter with a few observations upon hostages and pledges. With respect to the latter, he holds that they may be reclaimed after any lapse of time, unless there is a presumption of tacit abandonment.²

144. A truce is an interval of war, and does not require a fresh declaration at its close. No act of hostility is lawful during its continuance: the infringement of this rule by either party gives the other a right to take up arms without delay. Safe conducts are to be construed liberally, rejecting every meaning of the words which does not reach their spirit. Thus a safe conduct to go to a place implies the right of returning unmolested. The ransom of prisoners ought to be favored.³ A state is bound by the conventions in war made by its officers, provided they are such as may reasonably be presumed to lie within their delegated authority, or such as they have a special commission to warrant, known to the other contracting party. A state is also bound by its tacit ratification in permitting the execution of any part of such a treaty, though in itself not obligatory, and also by availing itself of any advantage thereby. Grotius dwells afterwards on many distinctions relating to this subject, which,

¹ C. 20.² 14.³ C. 21.

however, as far as they do not resolve themselves into the general principle, are to be considered on the ground of positive regulation.¹

145. Private persons, whether bearing arms or not, are as much bound as their superiors by the engagements they contract with an enemy. This applies particularly to the parole of a prisoner. The engagement not to serve again, though it has been held null by some jurists, as contrary to our obligation towards our country, is valid. It has been a question, whether the state ought to compel its citizens to keep their word towards the enemy. The better opinion is, that it should do so; and this has been the practice of the most civilized nations.² Those who put themselves under the protection of a state engage to do nothing hostile towards it. Hence such actions as that of Zopyrus, who betrayed Babylon under the guise of a refugee, are not excusable. Several sorts of tacit engagements are established by the usage of nations, as that of raising a white flag in token of a desire to suspend arms. These are exceptions from the general rule which authorizes deceit in war.³ In the concluding chapter of the whole treatise, Grotius briefly exhorts all states to preserve good faith and to seek peace at all times, upon the mild principles of Christianity.⁴

146. If the reader has had the patience to make his way through the abstract of Grotius, *De Jure Belli*, that we have placed before him, he will be fully prepared to judge of the criticisms made upon this treatise by Paley and Dugald Stewart. "The writings of Grotius and Puffendorf," says the former, "are of too forensic a cast, too much mixed up with civil law and with the jurisprudence of Germany, to answer precisely the design of a system of ethics, the direction of private consciences in the general conduct of human life." But it was not the intention of Grotius (we are not at present concerned with Puffendorf) to furnish a system of ethics; nor did any one ever hold forth his treatise in this light. Upon some most important branches of morality he has certainly dwelt so fully as to answer the purpose of "directing the private conscience in the conduct of life." The great aim, however, of his inquiries was to ascertain the principles of natural right applicable to independent communities.

¹ C. 22.² C. 23.³ C. 24.⁴ C. 25.

147. Paley, it must be owned, has a more specious ground of accusation in his next charge against Grotius for the profusion of classical quotations. "To any thing more than ornament they can make no claim. To propose them as serious arguments, gravely to attempt to establish or fortify a moral duty by the testimony of a Greek or Roman poet, is to trifle with the reader, or rather take off his attention from all just principles in morals."

148. A late eminent writer has answered this from the text of Grotius, but in more eloquent language than Grotius could have employed. "Another answer," says Mackintosh, "is due to some of those who have criticised Grotius; and that answer might be given in the words of Grotius himself. He was not of such a stupid and servile cast of mind, as to quote the opinions of poets or orators, of historians and philosophers, as those of judges from whose decision there was no appeal. He quotes them, as he tells us himself, as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental principles of morals. On such matters, poets and orators are the most unexceptionable of all witnesses: for they address themselves to the general feelings and sympathies of mankind; they are neither warped by system, nor perverted by sophistry; they can attain none of their objects, they can neither please nor persuade, if they dwell on moral sentiments not in unison with those of their readers. No system of moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature, and the according judgment of all ages and nations. But where are these feelings and that judgment recorded and preserved? In those very writings which Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usages and laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observation of common life, are, in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophize without regard to fact and experience,—the sole foundation of all true philosophy."¹

¹ Mackintosh, *Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations*, p. 23 (edit. 1828).

149. The passage in Grotius which has suggested this noble defence will be found above. It will be seen, on reference to it, that he proposes to quote the poets and orators cautiously, and rather as ornamental than authoritative supports of his argument. In no one instance, I believe, will he be found to "enforce a moral duty," as Paley imagines, by their sanction. It is, nevertheless, to be fairly acknowledged, that he has sometimes gone a good deal farther than the rules of a pure taste allow in accumulating quotations from the poets; and that, in an age so impatient of prolixity as the last, this has stood much in the way of the general reader.

150. But these criticisms of Paley contain very trifling censure in comparison with the unbounded scorn ^{Censures} poured on Grotius by Dugald Stewart, in his first ^{of Stewart.} Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy. I have never read these pages of an author whom I had unfortunately not the opportunity of personally knowing, but whose researches have contributed so much to the delight and advantage of mankind, without pain and surprise. It would be too much to say, that, in several parts of this Dissertation, by no means in the first class of Stewart's writings, other proofs of precipitate judgment do not occur; but that he should have spoken of a work so distinguished by fame, and so effective, as he himself admits, over the public mind of Europe, in terms of unmingled depreciation, without having done more than glanced at some of its pages, is an extraordinary symptom of that tendency towards prejudices, hasty but inveterate, of which this eminent man seems to have been not a little susceptible. The attack made by Stewart on those who have taken the law of nature and nations as their theme, and especially on Grotius, who stands forward in that list, is protracted for several pages; and it would be tedious to examine every sentence in succession. Were I to do so, it is not, in my opinion, an exaggeration to say, that almost every successive sentence would lie open to criticism. But let us take the chief heads of accusation.

151. "Grotius," we are told, "under the title *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, has aimed at a complete system ^{Answer to} of natural law. Condillac says, that he chose the ^{them.} title in order to excite a more general curiosity." The total erroneousness of this passage must appear to every one who

has seen what Grotius declares to have been his primary object. He chose the title because it came nearest to express that object,—the ascertainment of laws binding on independent communities in their mutual relations, whether of war or peace. But as it was not possible to lay down any solid principles of international right till the notions of right of sovereignty, of dominion over things and persons, of war itself, were clearly established, it became indispensable to build upon a more extensive basis than later writers on the law of nations, who found the labor performed to their hands, have thought necessary. All ethical philosophy, even in those parts which bear a near relation to jurisprudence and to international law, was, in the age of Grotius, a chaos of incoherent and arbitrary notions, brought in from various sources,—from the ancient schools, from the Scriptures, the fathers, the canons, the casuistical theologians, the rabbins, the jurists, as well as from the practice and sentiments of every civilized nation, past and present, the Jews, the Greeks and Romans, the trading republics, the chivalrous kingdoms of modern Europe. If Grotius has not wholly disentangled himself from this bewildering maze, through which he painfully traces his way by the lights of reason and revelation, he has at least cleared up much, and put others still oftener in the right path, where he has not been able to follow it. Condillac, as here quoted by Stewart, has anticipated Paley's charge against Grotius, of laboring to support his conclusions by the authority of others, and of producing a long string of quotations to prove the most indubitable propositions. In what degree this very exaggerated remark is true, we have already seen. But it should be kept in mind, that neither the disposition of the age in which Grotius lived, nor the real necessity of illustrating every part of his inquiries by the precedent usages of mankind, would permit him to treat of moral philosophy as of the abstract theorems of geometry. If his erudition has sometimes obstructed or misled him, which perhaps has not so frequently happened as these critics assume, it is still true, that a contemptuous ignorance of what has been done or has been taught, such as belonged to the school of Condillac and to that of Paley, does not very well qualify the moral philosopher for inquiry into the principles which are to regulate human nature.

152. "Among the different ideas," Stewart observes, "which

have been formed of natural jurisprudence, one of the most common, especially in the earlier systems, supposes its object to be, to lay down those rules of justice which would be binding on men living in a social state without any positive institutions; or, as it is frequently called by writers on this subject, living together in a state of nature. This idea of the province of jurisprudence seems to have been uppermost in the mind of Grotius in various parts of his treatise." After some conjectures on the motives which led the early writers to take this view of national law, and admitting that the rules of justice are in every case precise and indispensable, and that their authority is altogether independent of that of the civil magistrate, he deems it "obviously absurd to spend much time in speculating about the principles of this natural law, as applicable to men before the institution of governments." It may possibly be as absurd as he thinks it. But where has Grotius shown, that this condition of natural society was uppermost in his thoughts? Of the state of nature, as it existed among individuals before the foundation of any civil institutions, he says no more than was requisite in order to exhibit the origin of those rights which spring from property and government. But that he has, in some part especially of his second book, dwelt upon the rules of justice binding on men subsequent to the institution of property, but independently of positive laws, is most certain; nor is it possible for any one to do otherwise who does not follow Hobbes in confounding moral with legal obligation; a theory to which Mr. Stewart was of all men the most averse.

153. Natural jurisprudence is a term that is not always taken in the same sense. It seems to be of English origin; nor am I certain, though my memory may deceive me, that I have ever met with it in Latin or in French. Strictly speaking, as jurisprudence means the science of law, and is especially employed with respect to the Roman, natural jurisprudence must be the science of morals, or the law of nature. It is, therefore, in this sense, co-extensive with ethics, and comprehends the rules of temperance, liberality, and benevolence, as much as those of justice. Stewart, however, seems to consider this idea of jurisprudence as an arbitrary extension of the science derived from the technical phraseology of the Roman law. "Some vague notion of this kind," he says, "has manifestly given birth to many of the digressions of

Grotius." It may have been seen by the analysis of the entire treatise of Grotius, above given, that none of his digressions, if such they are to be called, have originated in any vague notion of an identity, or proper analogy, between the strict rules of justice and those of the other virtues. The Aristotelian division of justice into commutative and distributive, which Grotius has adopted, might seem in some respect to bear out this supposition; but it is evident, from the context of Stewart's observations, that he was referring only to the former species, or justice in its more usual sense, the observance of perfect rights, whose limits may be accurately determined, and whose violation may be redressed.

154. Natural jurisprudence has another sense imposed upon it by Adam Smith. According to this sense, its object, in the words of Stewart, is "to ascertain the general principles of justice which ought to be recognized in every municipal code, and to which it ought to be the aim of every legislator to accommodate his institutions." Grotius, in Smith's opinion, was "the first who attempted to give the world any thing like a system of those principles which ought to run through, and to be the foundation of, the laws of all nations; and his treatise on the laws of peace and war, with all its imperfections, is, perhaps, at this day the most complete book that has yet been given on the subject."

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are so common in writers of great reputation, that, where they do not transgress more than Grotius has done, the censure of irrelevancy has been always reckoned hypercritical.

157. "The Roman system of jurisprudence," Mr. Stewart proceeds "seems to have warped, in no inconsiderable degree, the notions of Grotius on all questions connected with the theory of legislation, and to have diverted his attention from that philosophical idea of law so well expressed by Cicero: 'Non a prætoris edicto, neque a duodecim tabulis, sed penitus ex intima philosophia hauriendam juris disciplinam.' In this idolatry, indeed, of the Roman law, he has not gone so far as some of his commentators, who have affirmed that it is only a different name for the law of nature; but that his partiality for his professional pursuits has often led him to overlook the immense difference between the state of society in ancient and modern Europe will not, I believe, now be disputed." It is probable that it will be disputed by all who are acquainted with Grotius. The questions connected with the theory of legislation which he has discussed are chiefly those relating to the acquisition and alienation of property in some of the earlier chapters of the second book. That he has not, in these disquisitions, adopted all the determinations of the Roman jurists, is certain: whether he may in any particular instance have adhered to them more than the best theory of legislation would admit, is a matter of variable opinion. But Stewart, wholly unacquainted with the civil laws, appears to have much underrated their value. In most questions of private right, they form the great basis of every modern legislation; and as all civilized nations, including our own, have derived a large portion of their jurisprudence from this source, so even the theorists, who would disdain to be ranked as disciples of Paullus and Papinian, are not ashamed to be their plagiarists.

158. It has been thrown out against Grotius by Rousseau,¹ — and the same insinuation may be found in other writers, — that he confounds the fact with the right, and the duties of nations with their practice. How little foundation there is for this calumny is sufficiently apparent to our readers. Scrupulous, as a casuist, to an excess hardly reconcilable with the security and welfare of good men, he was the first, beyond the precincts of the con-

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fessional or the church, to pour the dictates of a saint-like innocence into the ears of princes. It is true, that in recognizing the legitimacy of slavery, and in carrying too far the principles of obedience to government, he may be thought to have deprived mankind of some of their security against injustice; but this is exceedingly different from a sanction to it. An implicit deference to what he took for divine truth was the first axiom in the philosophy of Grotius. If he was occasionally deceived in his application of this principle, it was but according to the notions of his age; but those who wholly reject the authority must, of course, want a common standard by which his speculations in moral philosophy can be reconciled with their own.

159. I must now quit a subject upon which, perhaps, I have dwelt too long. The high fame of Dugald Stewart has rendered it a sort of duty to vindicate from his hasty censures the memory of one still more illustrious in reputation, till the lapse of time and the fickleness of literary fashion conspired with the popularity of his assailants to magnify his defects, and meet the very name of his famous treatise with a kind of scornful ridicule. That Stewart had never read much of Grotius, or even gone over the titles of his chapters, is very manifest; and he displays a similar ignorance as to the other writers on natural law, who for more than a century afterwards, as he admits himself, exercised a great influence over the studies of Europe. I have commented upon very few, comparatively, of the slips which occur in his pages on this subject.

160. The arrangement of Grotius has been blamed as unscientific by a more friendly judge, Sir James Mackintosh. ^{His arrangement.} Though I do not feel very strongly the force of his objections, it is evident that the law of nature might have been established on its basis, before the author passed forward to any disquisition upon its reference to independent communities. This would have changed a good deal the principal object that Grotius had in view, and brought his treatise, in point of method, very near to that of Puffendorf. But assuming, as he did, the authority recognized by those for whom he wrote, that of the Scriptures, he was less inclined to dwell on the proof which reason affords for a natural law, though fully satisfied of its validity even without reference to the Supreme Being.

161. The real faults of Grotius, leading to erroneous determinations, seem to be rather an unnecessary ~~his action~~ scrupulousness, and somewhat of old theological prejudice, from which scarce any man in his age, who was not wholly indifferent to religion, had liberated himself. The notes of Barbeyrac seldom fail to correct this leaning. Several later writers on international law have treated his doctrine of an universal law of nations, founded on the agreement of mankind, as an empty chimera of his invention. But if he only meant by this the tacit consent, or, in other words, the general custom, of civilized nations, it does not appear that there is much difference between his theory and that of Wolf or Vattel.

CHAPTER V.

HISTORY OF POETRY FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I. — ON ITALIAN POETRY.

Characters of the Poets of the Seventeenth Century — Sometimes too much depreciated — Marini — Tassoni — Chiabrera.

1. At the close of the sixteenth century, few remained in Italy to whom posterity has assigned a considerable reputation for their poetry. But the ensuing period has stood lower, for the most part, in the opinion of later ages, than any other since the revival of letters.

Low estimation of the Seicentisti.

The *seicentisti*, the writers of the seventeenth century, were stigmatized in modern criticism, till the word has been associated with nothing but false taste and every thing that should be shunned and despised. Those who had most influence in leading the literary judgment of Italy went back, some almost exclusively to the admiration of Petrarch and his contemporaries, some to the various writers who cultivated their native poetry in the sixteenth century. Salvini is of the former class; Muratori, of the latter.¹

2. The last age, that is the concluding twenty years of the eighteenth century, brought with it, in many respects, a change of public sentiment in Italy. A masculine turn of thought, an expanded grasp of philosophy, a thirst, ardent to excess, for great exploits and noble praise, has distinguished the Italian people of the last fifty years from their progenitors of several preceding generations. It is possible that the enhanced relative importance of the Lombards in their national literature may have not been

Not quite so great as formerly.

¹ Muratori, *Della Perfetta Poesia*, is one of the best books of criticism in the Italian language: in the second volume are contained some remarks by Salvini, a bigoted Florentine.

without its influence in rendering the public taste less fastidious as to purity of language, less fine in that part of æsthetic discernment which relates to the grace and felicity of expression, while it became also more apt to demand originality, nervousness, and the power of exciting emotion. The writers of the seventeenth century may, in some cases, have gained by this revolution; but those of the preceding ages, especially the Petrarchists whom Bembo had led, have certainly lost ground in national admiration.

3. Rubbi, editor of the voluminous collection called *Parnaso Italiano*, had the courage to extol the *seicentisti* for their genius and fancy, and even to place them, in all but style, above their predecessors. "Give them," he says, "but grace and purity, take from them their capricious exaggerations, their perpetual and forced metaphors, you will think Marini the first poet of Italy; and his followers, with their fulness of imagery and personification, will make you forget their monotonous predecessors. I do not advise you to make a study of the *seicentisti*; it would spoil your style, perhaps your imagination: I only tell you that they were the true Italian poets. They wanted a good style, it is admitted; but they were so far from wanting genius and imagination, that these perhaps tended to impair their style."¹

4. It is probable that every native critic would think some parts of this panegyric, and especially the strongly hyperbolic praise of Marini, carried too far. But I am not sure that we should be wrong in agreeing with Rubbi, that there is as much *catholic* poetry, by which I mean that which is good in all ages and countries, in some of the minor productions of the seventeenth as in those of the sixteenth age. The sonnets, especially, have more individuality and more meaning. In this, however, I should wish to include the latter portion of the seventeenth century. Salfi, a writer of more taste and judgment than Rubbi, has recently taken the same side, and remarked the superior originality, the more determined individuality, the greater variety of subjects; above all, what the Italians now most value, the more earnest patriotism of the later poets.² Those

¹ *Parnaso Italiano*, vol. xii. (Avvertimento.) Rubbi, however, gives but two, out of his long collection in fifty volumes, to the writers of the seventeenth century.

² Salfi, *Hist. Litt. de l'Italie* (continuation de Ginguené), vol. xii. p. 424.

immediately before us, belonging to the first half of the century, are less numerous than in the former age: the sonneteers especially have produced much less; and in the collections of poetry, even in that of Rubbi, notwithstanding his eulogy, they take up very little room. Some, however, have obtained a durable renown, and are better known in Europe than any, except the Tassos, that flourished in the last fifty years of the golden age.

5. It must be confessed, that the praise of a masculine genius, either in thought or language, cannot be bestowed on the poet of the seventeenth century ^{Adone of Marini.} whom his contemporaries most admired, — Giovanni Battista Marini. He is, on the contrary, more deficient than all the rest in such qualities, and is indebted to the very opposite characteristics for the sinister influence which he exerted on the public taste. He was a Neapolitan by birth, and gave to the world his famous *Adone* in 1623. As he was then fifty-four years old, it may be presumed, from the character of the poem, that it was in great part written long before; and he had already acquired a considerable reputation by his other works. The *Adone* was received with an unbounded and ill-judging approbation: ill-judging in a critical sense, because the faults of this poem are incapable of defence; but not unnatural, as many parallel instances of the world's enthusiasm have shown. No one had before carried the corruption of taste so far: extravagant metaphors, false thoughts, and conceits on equivocal words, are very frequent in the *Adone*; and its author stands accountable, in some measure, for his imitators, who, during more than half a century, looked up to Marini with emulous folly, and frequently succeeded in greater deviations from pure taste, without his imagination and elegance.

6. The *Adone* is one of the longest poems in the world; containing more than 45,000 lines. He has shown ^{its character} some ingenuity in filling up the canvas of so slight a story by additional incidents from his own invention, and by long episodes allusive to the times in which he lived. But the subject, expanded so interminably, is essentially destitute of any superior interest, and fit only for an enervated people, barren of high thoughts and high actions, — the Italy, notwithstanding some bright exceptions, of the seventeenth century. If we could overcome this essential source

has seen what Grotius declares to have been his primary object. He chose the title because it came nearest to express that object,—the ascertainment of laws binding on independent communities in their mutual relations, whether of war or peace. But as it was not possible to lay down any solid principles of international right till the notions of right of sovereignty, of dominion over things and persons, of war itself, were clearly established, it became indispensable to build upon a more extensive basis than later writers on the law of nations, who found the labor performed to their hands, have thought necessary. All ethical philosophy, even in those parts which bear a near relation to jurisprudence and to international law, was, in the age of Grotius, a chaos of incoherent and arbitrary notions, brought in from various sources,—from the ancient schools, from the Scriptures, the fathers, the canons, the casuistical theologians, the rabbins, the jurists, as well as from the practice and sentiments of every civilized nation, past and present, the Jews, the Greeks and Romans, the trading republics, the chivalrous kingdoms of modern Europe. If Grotius has not wholly disentangled himself from this bewildering maze, through which he painfully traces his way by the lights of reason and revelation, he has at least cleared up much, and put others still oftener in the right path, where he has not been able to follow it. Condillac, as here quoted by Stewart, has anticipated Paley's charge against Grotius, of laboring to support his conclusions by the authority of others, and of producing a long string of quotations to prove the most indubitable propositions. In what degree this very exaggerated remark is true, we have already seen. But it should be kept in mind, that neither the disposition of the age in which Grotius lived, nor the real necessity of illustrating every part of his inquiries by the precedent usages of mankind, would permit him to treat of moral philosophy as of the abstract theorems of geometry. If his erudition has sometimes obstructed or misled him, which perhaps has not so frequently happened as these critics assume, it is still true, that a contemptuous ignorance of what has been done or has been taught, such as belonged to the school of Condillac and to that of Paley, does not very well qualify the moral philosopher for inquiry into the principles which are to regulate human nature.

152. "Among the different ideas," Stewart observes, "which

have been formed of natural jurisprudence, one of the most common, especially in the earlier systems, supposes its object to be, to lay down those rules of justice which would be binding on men living in a social state without any positive institutions; or, as it is frequently called by writers on this subject, living together in a state of nature. This idea of the province of jurisprudence seems to have been uppermost in the mind of Grotius in various parts of his treatise. After some conjectures on the motives which led the early writers to take this view of national law, and admitting that the rules of justice are in every case precise and indispensable, and that their authority is altogether independent of that of the civil magistrate, he deems it "obviously absurd to spend much time in speculating about the principles of this natural law, as applicable to men before the institution of governments." It may possibly be as absurd as he thinks it. But where has Grotius shown, that this condition of natural society was uppermost in his thoughts? Of the state of nature, as it existed among individuals before the foundation of any civil institutions, he says no more than was requisite in order to exhibit the origin of those rights which spring from property and government. But that he has, in some part especially of his second book, dwelt upon the rules of justice binding on men subsequent to the institution of property, but independently of positive laws, is most certain; nor is it possible for any one to do otherwise who does not follow Hobbes in confounding moral with legal obligation; a theory to which Mr. Stewart was of all men the most averse.

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Grotius
vindicated
against
Rousseau.

fessional or the church, to pour the dictates of a saint-like innocence into the ears of princes. It is true, that in recognizing the legitimacy of slavery, and in carrying too far the principles of obedience to government, he may be thought to have deprived mankind of some of their security against injustice; but this is exceedingly different from a sanction to it. An implicit deference to what he took for divine truth was the first axiom in the philosophy of Grotius. If he was occasionally deceived in his application of this principle, it was but according to the notions of his age; but those who wholly reject the authority must, of course, want a common standard by which his speculations in moral philosophy can be reconciled with their own.

159. I must now quit a subject upon which, perhaps, I have dwelt too long. The high fame of Dugald Stewart has rendered it a sort of duty to vindicate from his hasty censures the memory of one still more illustrious in reputation, till the lapse of time and the fickleness of literary fashion conspired with the popularity of his assailants to magnify his defects, and meet the very name of his famous treatise with a kind of scornful ridicule. That Stewart had never read much of Grotius, or even gone over the titles of his chapters, is very manifest; and he displays a similar ignorance as to the other writers on natural law, who for more than a century afterwards, as he admits himself, exercised a great influence over the studies of Europe. I have commented upon very few, comparatively, of the slips which occur in his pages on this subject.

160. The arrangement of Grotius has been blamed as unscientific by a more friendly judge, Sir James Mackintosh. ^{His arrangement.} Though I do not feel very strongly the force of his objections, it is evident that the law of nature might have been established on its basis, before the author passed forward to any disquisition upon its reference to independent communities. This would have changed a good deal the principal object that Grotius had in view, and brought his treatise, in point of method, very near to that of Puffendorf. But assuming, as he did, the authority recognized by those for whom he wrote, that of the Scriptures, he was less inclined to dwell on the proof which reason affords for a natural law, though fully satisfied of its validity even without reference to the Supreme Being.

161. The real faults of Grotius, leading to erroneous determinations, seem to be rather an unnecessary *His defects.* scrupulousness, and somewhat of old theological prejudice, from which scarce any man in his age, who was not wholly indifferent to religion, had liberated himself. The notes of Barbeyrac seldom fail to correct this leaning. Several later writers on international law have treated his doctrine of an universal law of nations, founded on the agreement of mankind, as an empty chimera of his invention. But if he only meant by this the tacit consent, or, in other words, the general custom, of civilized nations, it does not appear that there is much difference between his theory and that of Wolf or Vattel.

CHAPTER V.

HISTORY OF POETRY FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I.—ON ITALIAN POETRY.

Characters of the Poets of the Seventeenth Century—Sometimes too much depreciated—Marini—Tassoni—Chiabrera.

1. AT the close of the sixteenth century, few remained in Italy to whom posterity has assigned a considerable reputation for their poetry. But the ensuing period has stood lower, for the most part, in the opinion of later ages, than any other since the revival of letters.

Low estimation of the Seicentisti.

The *seicentisti*, the writers of the seventeenth century, were stigmatized in modern criticism, till the word has been associated with nothing but false taste and every thing that should be shunned and despised. Those who had most influence in leading the literary judgment of Italy went back, some almost exclusively to the admiration of Petrarch and his contemporaries, some to the various writers who cultivated their native poetry in the sixteenth century. Salvini is of the former class; Muratori, of the latter.¹

2. The last age, that is the concluding twenty years of the eighteenth century, brought with it, in many respects, a change of public sentiment in Italy. A masculine turn of thought, an expanded grasp of philosophy, a thirst, ardent to excess, for great exploits and noble praise, has distinguished the Italian people of the last fifty years from their progenitors of several preceding generations. It is possible that the enhanced relative importance of the Lombards in their national literature may have not been

Not quite so great as formerly.

¹ Muratori, *Della Perfetta Poesia*, is one of the best books of criticism in the Italian language: in the second volume are contained some remarks by Salvini, a bigoted Florentine.

without its influence in rendering the public taste less fastidious as to purity of language, less fine in that part of æsthetic discernment which relates to the grace and felicity of expression, while it became also more apt to demand originality, nervousness, and the power of exciting emotion. The writers of the seventeenth century may, in some cases, have gained by this revolution; but those of the preceding ages, especially the Petrarchists whom Bembo had led, have certainly lost ground in national admiration.

3. Rubbi, editor of the voluminous collection called *Parnaso Italiano*, had the courage to extol the *seicentisti* for their genius and fancy, and even to place them, in all but style, above their predecessors. "Give them," he says, "but grace and purity, take from them their capricious exaggerations, their perpetual and forced metaphors, you will think Marini the first poet of Italy; and his followers, with their fulness of imagery and personification, will make you forget their monotonous predecessors. I do not advise you to make a study of the *seicentisti*; it would spoil your style, perhaps your imagination: I only tell you that they were the true Italian poets. They wanted a good style, it is admitted; but they were so far from wanting genius and imagination, that these perhaps tended to impair their style."¹

4. It is probable that every native critic would think some parts of this panegyric, and especially the strongly hyperbolical praise of Marini, carried too far. But I am not sure that we should be wrong in agreeing with Rubbi, that there is as much *catholic* poetry, by which I mean that which is good in all ages and countries, in some of the minor productions of the seventeenth as in those of the sixteenth age. The sonnets, especially, have more individuality and more meaning. In this, however, I should wish to include the latter portion of the seventeenth century. Salfi, a writer of more taste and judgment than Rubbi, has recently taken the same side, and remarked the superior originality, the more determined individuality, the greater variety of subjects; above all, what the Italians now most value, the more earnest patriotism of the later poets.² Those

¹ *Parnaso Italiano*, vol. xii. (Avvertimento.) Rubbi, however, gives but two, out of his long collection in fifty volumes, to the writers of the seventeenth century.

² Salfi, *Hist. Litt. de l'Italie* (continuation de Ginguené), vol. xii. p. 424.

immediately before us, belonging to the first half of the century, are less numerous than in the former age: the sonneteers especially have produced much less; and in the collections of poetry, even in that of Rubbi, notwithstanding his eulogy, they take up very little room. Some, however, have obtained a durable renown, and are better known in Europe than any, except the Tassos, that flourished in the last fifty years of the golden age.

5. It must be confessed, that the praise of a masculine genius, either in thought or language, cannot be bestowed on the poet of the seventeenth century Adone of Marini. whom his contemporaries most admired, — Giovanni Battista Marini. He is, on the contrary, more deficient than all the rest in such qualities, and is indebted to the very opposite characteristics for the sinister influence which he exerted on the public taste. He was a Neapolitan by birth, and gave to the world his famous *Adone* in 1623. As he was then fifty-four years old, it may be presumed, from the character of the poem, that it was in great part written long before; and he had already acquired a considerable reputation by his other works. The *Adone* was received with an unbounded and ill-judging approbation: ill-judging in a critical sense, because the faults of this poem are incapable of defence; but not unnatural, as many parallel instances of the world's enthusiasm have shown. No one had before carried the corruption of taste so far: extravagant metaphors, false thoughts, and conceits on equivocal words, are very frequent in the *Adone*; and its author stands accountable, in some measure, for his imitators, who, during more than half a century, looked up to Marini with emulous folly, and frequently succeeded in greater deviations from pure taste, without his imagination and elegance.

6. The *Adone* is one of the longest poems in the world; containing more than 45,000 lines. He has shown its character some ingenuity in filling up the canvas of so slight a story by additional incidents from his own invention, and by long episodes allusive to the times in which he lived. But the subject, expanded so interminably, is essentially destitute of any superior interest, and fit only for an enervated people, barren of high thoughts and high actions, — the Italy, notwithstanding some bright exceptions, of the seventeenth century. If we could overcome this essential source

of weariness, the Adone has much to delight our fancy and our ear. Marini is, more than any other poet, the counterpart of Ovid: his fertility of imagination, his ready accumulation of circumstances and expressions, his easy flow of language, his harmonious versification, are in no degree inferior; his faults are also the same; for in Ovid we have all the overstrained figures and false conceits of Marini. But the Italian poet was incapable of imitating the truth to nature, and depth of feeling, which appear in many parts of his ancient prototype; nor has he as vigorous an expression. Never does Marini rise to any high pitch: few stanzas, perhaps, are remembered by natives for their beauty; but many are graceful and pleasing, all are easy and musical.¹ "Perhaps," says Salfi, "with the exception of Ariosto, no one has been more a poet by nature than he;"² a praise, however, which may justly seem hyperbolical to those who recall their attention to the highest attributes of poetry.

7. Marini belongs to that very numerous body of poets, And popu- who, delighted with the spontaneity of their ideas, larity. never reject any that arise: their parental love forbids all preference; and an impartial law of gavelkind shares their page among all the offspring of their brain. Such were Ovid and Lucan, and such have been some of our own poets of great genius and equal fame. Their fertility astonishes the reader, and he enjoys for a time the abundant banquet; but satiety is too sure a consequence, and he returns with less pleasure to a second perusal. The censure of criticism falls invariably, and sometimes too harshly, on this sort of poetry: it is one of those cases where the critic and the world are most at variance; but the world is apt, in this

¹ Five stanzas of the seventh canto, being a choral song of satyrs and bacchanti, are thrown into *versi sdruccioli*, and have been accounted by the Italians an extraordinary effort of skill, from the difficulty of sustaining a metre, which is not strong in rhymes, with so much spirit and ease. Each verse also is divided into three parts, themselves separately *sdruccioli*, though not rhyming. One stanza will make this clear:—

"Hor d' allera s' adornino, e di pampino
I giovani, e le vergini più tenere,
E gemine nell' anima si stampino
L' imagine di Libero, e di Venero.
Tutti ardano, s' accendano, ed avampino,
Qual Semele, ch' al folgore fa cenere;

E cantino a Cupidine, ed a Bromio,
Con numeri poetici un encomio."

Cant. vii. st. 118.

Though this metrical skill may not be of the highest merit in poetry, it is no more to be slighted than facility of touch in a painter.

² Vol. xiv. p. 147. The character of Marini's poetry which this critic has given is in general very just, and in good taste. Corniani (vii. 123) has also done justice, and no more than justice, to Marini. Tiraboschi has hardly said enough in his favor; and as to Muratori, it was his business to restore and maintain a purity of taste, which rendered him severe towards the excesses of such poets as Marini.

instance, to reverse its own judgment, and yield to the tribunal it had rejected. "To Marini," says an eminent Italian writer, "we owe the lawlessness of composition: the ebullition of his genius, incapable of restraint, burst through every bulwark, enduring no rule but that of his own humor, which was all for sonorous verse, bold and ingenious thoughts, fantastical subjects, a phraseology rather Latin than Italian; and, in short, aimed at pleasing by a false appearance of beauty. It would almost pass belief how much this style was admired, were it not so near our own time, that we hear, as it were, the echo of its praise; nor did Dante or Petrarch or Tasso, or perhaps any of the ancient poets, obtain in their lives so much applause."¹ But Marini, who died in 1625, had not time to enjoy much of this glory. The length of this poem, and the diffuseness which produces its length, render it nearly impossible to read through the *Adone*; and it wants that inequality which might secure a preference to detached portions. The story of *Psyche*, in the fourth canto, may perhaps be as fair a specimen of Marini as could be taken: it is not easy to destroy the beauty of that fable, nor was he unfitted to relate it with grace and interest; but he has displayed all the blemishes of his own style.²

8. The *Secchia Rapita* of Alessandro Tassoni, published at Paris in 1622, is better known in Europe than Secchia
Rapita of
Tassoni. might have been expected from its local subject, idiom-
atic style, and unintelligible personalities. It turns,
as the title imports, on one of the petty wars, frequent among
the Italian cities as late as the beginning of the fourteenth
century, wherein the Bolognese endeavored to recover the
bucket of a well, which the citizens of Modena in a prior
incursion had carried off. Tassoni, by a poetical anachro-
nism, mixed this with an earlier contest of rather more dignity
between the little republics, wherein Enzo, King of Sardinia,
a son of Frederic II., had been made prisoner. He has been
reckoned by many the inventor, or at least the reproducer

¹ Crescimbeni, ii. 470.

² The *Adone* has been frequently charged with want of decency. It was put to the ban of the Roman Inquisition; and grave writers have deemed it necessary to protest against its licentiousness. André even goes so far as to declare, that no one can read the *Adone* whose heart as well as taste is not corrupt; and that, both for the

sake of good morals and good poetry, it should be taken out of every one's hands. After such invectives, it may seem extraordinary, that, though the poem of Marini must by its nature be rather voluptuous, it is by far less open to such an objection than the *Orlando Furioso*, nor more, I believe, than the *Fairy Queen*. No charge is apt to be made so capriciously as this.

and the *Sorga* in the followers of Petrarch. Chiabrera borrowed from Pindar that grandeur of sound, that pomp of epithets, that rich swell of imagery, that unvarying majesty of conception, which distinguish the odes of both poets. He is less frequently harsh or turgid, though the latter blemish has been sometimes observed in him, but wants also the masculine condensation of his prototype; nor does he deviate so frequently, or with so much power of imagination, into such digressions as those which generally shade from our eyes, in a skilful profusion of ornament, the victors of the Grecian games whom Pindar professes to celebrate. The poet of the house of Medici and of other princes of Italy, great at least in their own time, was not so much compelled to desert his immediate subject, as he who was paid for an ode by some wrestler or boxer, who could only become worthy of heroic song by attaching his name to the ancient glories of his native city. The profuse employment of mythological allusions, frigid as it appears at present, was so customary, that we can hardly impute to it much blame; and it seemed peculiarly appropriate to a style which was studiously formed on the Pindaric model.¹ The odes of Chiabrera are often panegyric; and his manner was well fitted for that style, though sometimes we have ceased to admire those whom he extols. But he is not eminent for purity of taste, nor, I believe, of Tuscan language: he endeavored to force the idiom, more than it would bear, by constructions and inversions borrowed from the ancient tongues; and these odes, splendid and noble as they are, bear, in the estimation of critics, some marks of the seventeenth century.² The satirical epistles of Chiabrera are praised by Salfi as written in a moral Horatian tone, abounding with his own experience, and allusions to his time.³ But in no other kind of poetry has he been so highly successful as in the lyric; and, though the Grecian robe is never cast away, he imitated Anacreon with as much skill as Pindar. "His lighter odes," says Crescimbeni, "are most beautiful and elegant, full of grace, vivacity, spirit, and delicacy, adorned with pleasing inventions, and differing in nothing but language from those of Anacreon. His dithyrambs I hold

¹ Salfi justifies the continual introduction of mythology by the Italian poets, on the ground that it was a part of their national inheritance, associated with the monuments and recollections of their glory. This would be more to the purpose, if

their mythology had not been almost exclusively Greek. But perhaps all that was of classical antiquity might be blended in their sentiments with the memory of Rome.

² Salfi, xii. 250.

³ Id., xiii. 2012.

incapable of being excelled, all the qualities required in such compositions being united with a certain nobleness of expression which elevates all it touches upon."¹

10. The greatest lyric poet of Greece was not more the model of Chiabrera than his Roman competitor was of Testi. "Had he been more attentive to the choice of his expression," says Crescimbeni, "he might have earned the name of the Tuscan Horace." The faults of his age are said to be frequently discernible in Testi; but there is, to an ordinary reader, an Horatian elegance, a certain charm of grace and ease, in his canzoni, which render them pleasing. One of these, beginning, *Ruscelletto orgoglioso*, is highly admired by Muratori, the best, perhaps, of the Italian critics, and one not slow to censure any defects of taste. It apparently alludes to some enemy in the court of Modena.² The character of Testi was ambitious and restless, his life spent in seeking and partly in enjoying public offices, but terminated in prison. He had taken, says a later writer, Horace for his model; and perhaps, like him, he wished to appear sometimes a stoic, sometimes an epicurean; but he knew not, like him, how to profit by the lessons either of Zeno or Epicurus, so as to lead a tranquil and independent life.³

11. The imitators of Chiabrera were generally unsuccessful: they became hyperbolic and exaggerated. ^{His follow- era.} The Translation of Pindar by Alessandro Adimari, though not very much resembling the original, has been praised for its own beauty. But these poets are not to be confounded with the Marinists, to whom they are much superior. Ciampoli, whose Rime were published in 1628, may perhaps be the best after Chiabrera.⁴ Several obscure epic poems, some of which are rather to be deemed romances, are commemorated by the last historian of Italian literature. Among these is the Conquest of Granada by Graziani, published in 1650. Salfi justly observes, that the subject is truly epic; but the poem itself seems to be nothing but a series of episodical intrigues without unity. The style, according to the same writer, is redundant, the similes too frequent and monotonous; yet he prefers it to all the heroic poems which had intervened since that of Tasso.⁵

¹ Storia della Volgare Poesia, ii. 483.

² This canzone is in Mathias, Componimenti Lirici, ii. 190.

³ Salfi, xii. 281.

⁴ Salfi, p. 306; Tiraboschi, xi. 364.

⁵ Baillet, on the authority of others, speaks less honorably of Ciampoli. N. 1451.

⁶ Id. vol. xiii. p. 94-129.

SECT. II. — ON SPANISH POETRY.

Romances — The Argensolas — Villegas — Gongora, and his School.

12. THE Spanish poetry of the sixteenth century might be arranged in three classes. In the first, we might place that which was formed in the ancient school, though not always preserving its characteristics, — the short trochaic metres, employed in the song or the ballad, altogether national, or aspiring to be such, either in their subjects or in their style. In the second would stand that to which the imitation of the Italians had given rise, — the school of Boscan and Garcilasso; and with these we might place also the epic poems, which do not seem to be essentially different from similar productions of Italy. A third and not inconsiderable division, though less extensive than the others, is composed of the poetry of good sense, — the didactic, semi-satirical Horatian style, of which Mendoza was the founder, and several specimens of which occur in the *Parnaso Español* of Sedano.

13. The romances of the Cid, and many others, are referred by the most competent judges to the reign of Philip III.¹ These are by no means among the best of Spanish romances; and we should naturally expect that so artificial a style as the imitation of ancient manners and sentiments by poets in wholly a different state of society, though some men of talent might succeed in it, would soon degenerate into an affected mannerism. The Italian style continued to be cultivated: under Philip III., the decline of Spain in poetry, as in arms and national power, was not so striking as after-

¹ Duran, *Romancero de Romances Doctrinales, Amatorios, Festivos, &c.* 1829. The Moorish romances, with a few exceptions, and those of the Cid, are ascribed by this author to the latter part of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century. In the preface to a former publication, *Romances Moriscos*, this writer has said, "Casi todos los romances que publicamos en este libro pertenecen al siglo 16mo, y algunos pocos á principio del 17mo. Los autores son desconocidos, pero sus obras han llegado, y merecido llegar á la posteridad." It seems manifest from in-

ternal evidence, without critical knowledge of the language, that those relating to the Cid are not of the middle ages, though some seem still inclined to give them a high antiquity. It is not sufficient to say, that the language has been modernized: the whole structure of these ballads is redolent of a low age; and, if the Spanish critics agree in this, I know not why foreigners should strive against them. [It is hardly, perhaps, necessary to warn the reader, that the celebrated long poem on the Cid is not reckoned among these romances. — 1842.]

which Spanish poets belong to the age of that prince, and even that of Philip III. was not destitute of men of merited reputation. Among the best were two brothers, Luperón, the elder, and Bartholomew Argensola. These were chiefly distinguished in what I have called the third or Eclectic manner of Spanish poetry, though they by no means confined themselves to any regular style. "Luperón," says Bouterwek, "formed his style after Horace with no less accuracy than Luis de León; but he did not possess the sort of enthusiasm of that devout poet, who in the religious spirit of his poetry, is so totally unlike Horace. An understanding of such solid and ingenious subject as no extravagant license, yet full of true poetic feeling, and an imagination more plastic than creative, impart a more perfect Horatian coloring to the odes, as well as to the canzonets and sonnets of Luperón. He closely imitated Horace in his domestic satires, a style of composition in which no Spanish poet had preceded him. But he never succeeded in attaining the bold combination of ideas which characterizes the old style of Horace; and his conceptions have therefore seldom any thing like the Horatian energy. On the other hand, all his poems express no less precision of language than the models after which he formed his style. His odes, in particular, are characterized by a picturesque tone of expression which he seems to have imbibed from Virgil rather than from Horace. The extravagant metaphors by which some of Herrera's odes are deformed were uniformly avoided by Luperón."¹ The genius of Bartholomew Argensola was very like that of his brother, nor are their writings easily distinguishable; but Bouterwek assigns, on the whole, a higher place to Bartholomew. Diez inclines to the same judgment, and thinks the eulogy of Nicolás Antonio on these brothers, extravagant as it seems, not beyond their merits.

14. But another poet, Manuel Estevan de Villegas, whose poems, written in very early youth, entitled *Amatorias* or *Eroticas*, were published in 1620, has attained a still higher reputation, especially in other parts

¹ Antonio bestows unbounded praise on a poem of the epic class, the *Bernardo de Balbuena*, published at Madrid in 1624, though he complains that in his own age it lay hid in the corners of booksellers' shops. Balbuena, in his opinion, has left all Spanish poets far behind him. The subject of his poem is the very common

fable of Ronservalles. Diez, while he denies this absolute pre-eminence of Balbuena, gives him a respectable place among the many epic writers of Spain. But I do not find him mentioned in Bouterwek: in fact, most of these poems are very scarce, and are treasures for the bibliomane. ² Hist. of Spanish Literature, p. 285.

of Europe. Dieze calls him "one of the best lyric poets of Spain, excellent in the various styles he has employed, but above all in his odes and songs. His original poems are full of genius: his translations of Horace and Anacreon might often pass for original. Few surpass him in harmony of verse: he is the Spanish Anacreon, the poet of the Graces."¹ Bouterwek, a more discriminating judge than Dieze, who is perhaps rather valuable for research than for taste, has observed, that "the graceful luxuriance of the poetry of Villegas has no parallel in modern literature; and, generally speaking, no modern writer has so well succeeded in blending the spirit of ancient poetry with the modern. But constantly to observe that correctness of ideas, which distinguished the classical compositions of antiquity, was by Villegas, as by most Spanish poets, considered too rigid a requisition, and an unnecessary restraint on genius. He accordingly sometimes degenerates into conceits and images, the monstrous absurdity of which is characteristic of the author's nation and age. For instance, in one of his odes, in which he entreats Lyda to suffer her tresses to flow, he says, that, 'agitated by Zephyr, her locks would occasion a thousand deaths, and subdue a thousand lives;' and then he adds, in a strain of extravagance surpassing that of the Marinists, 'that the sun himself would cease to give light, if he did not snatch beams from her radiant countenance to illumine the east.' But faults of this glaring kind are by no means frequent in the poetry of Villegas; and the fascinating grace with which he emulates his models operates with so powerful a charm, that the occasional occurrence of some little affectations, from which he could scarcely be expected entirely to abstain, is easily overlooked by the reader."²

15. Quevedo, who, having borne the surname of Villegas, has sometimes been confounded with the poet we have just named, is better known in Europe for his ^{Quevedo.} prose than his verse; but he is the author of numerous poems, both serious and comic or satirical. The latter are by much the more esteemed of the two. He wrote burlesque poetry with success, but it is frequently unintelligible except to natives. In satire he adopted the Juvenalian style.³ A few more might perhaps be added, especially Espinel, a poet

¹ Geschichte der Spanischen Dichtkunst, p. 210.

² Bouterwek, i. 479. ³ Id., p. 468.

of the classic school; Borja de Esquillace, once viceroy of Peru, who is called by Bouterwek the last representative of that style in Spain, but more worthy of praise for withstanding the bad taste of his contemporaries than for any vigor of genius; and Christopher de la Mena.¹ No Portuguese poetry about this time seems to be worthy of notice in European literature, though Manuel Faria y Sousa and a few more might attain a local reputation by sonnets and other amatory verse.

16. The original blemish of Spanish writing, both in prose and verse, had been an excess of effort to say every thing in an unusual manner, a deviation from the beaten paths of sentiment and language in a wider curve than good taste permits. Taste is the presiding faculty which regulates, in all works within her jurisdiction, the struggling powers of imagination, emotion, and reason. Each has its claim to mingle in the composition; each may sometimes be allowed in a great measure to predominate; and a phlegmatic application of what men call common sense in æsthetic criticism is almost as repugnant to its principles as a dereliction of all reason for the sake of fantastic absurdity. Taste also must determine, by an intuitive sense of right somewhat analogous to that which regulates the manners of polished life, to what extent the most simple, the most obvious, the most natural, and therefore, in a popular meaning, the most true, is to be modified by a studious introduction of the new, the striking, and the beautiful; so that neither what is insipid and trivial, nor yet what is forced and affected, may displease us. In Spain, as we have observed, the latter was always the prevailing fault. The public taste had been formed on bad models: on the Oriental poetry, metaphorical beyond all perceptible analogy; and on that of the Provençals, false in sentiment, false in conception, false in image and figure. The national character, proud, swelling, and ceremonious, conspired to give an inflated tone: it was also grave and sententious rather than lively or delicate, and therefore fond of a strained and ambitious style. These vices of writing are carried to excess in romances of chivalry, which became ridiculous in the eyes of sensible men, but were certainly very popular; they affect also, though in a different manner, much of the

Defects of
taste in
Spanish
verse.

¹ Bouterwek, p. 498.

Spanish prose of the sixteenth century, and they belong to a great deal of the poetry of that age; though it must be owned that much appears wholly exempt from them, and written in a very pure and classical spirit. Cervantes strove by example and by precept to maintain good taste; and some of his contemporaries took the same line.¹ But they had to fight against the predominant turn of their nation, which soon gave the victory to one of the worst manners of writing that ever disgraced public favor.

17. Nothing can be more opposite to what is strictly called a classical style, or one formed upon the best models of Greece and Rome, than pedantry. This was, nevertheless, the weed that overspread the face of literature in those ages when Greece and Rome were the chief objects of veneration. Without an intimate discernment of their beauty, it was easy to copy allusions that were no longer intelligible, to counterfeit trains of thought that belonged to past times, to force reluctant idioms into modern form, as some are said to dress after a lady for whom nature has done more than for themselves. From the revival of letters downwards, this had been more or less observable in the learned men of Europe, and, after that class grew more extensive, in the current literature of modern languages. Pedantry, which consisted in unnecessary and perhaps unintelligible references to ancient learning, was afterwards combined with other artifices to obtain the same end, — far-fetched metaphors and extravagant conceits. The French versifiers of the latter end of the sixteenth century were eminent in both, as the works of Ronsard and Du Bartas attest. We might, indeed, take the Creation of Du Bartas more properly than the Euphuës of our English Lilly, which, though very affected and unpleasing, does hardly such violence to common speech and common sense, for the type of the style which, in the early part of the seventeenth century, became popular in several countries, but especially in Spain, through the misplaced labors of Gongora.

18. Luis de Gongora, a man of very considerable talents, and capable of writing well, as he has shown, in different styles of poetry, was unfortunately led by an ambitious desire of popularity to introduce one which should

Pedantry
and far-
fetched
allusions.

Gongora.

¹ Cervantes, in his *Viage del Parnaso*, style; but this, Diene says, is all ironical. praise Gongora, and even imitates his *Gesch. der Dichtkunst*, p. 260.

[illegible]

one who retained that name, and, like their master, affected a certain precision of style; another, called *conceptistas*, which went still greater lengths in extravagance, desirous only, it might seem, of expressing absurd ideas in unnatural language.¹ The prevalence of such a disease, for no other analogy can so fitly be used, would seem to have been a bad presage for Spain; but, in fact, like other diseases, it did but make the tour of Europe, and rage worse in some countries than in others. It had spent itself in France, when it was at its height in Italy and England. I do not perceive the close connection of the *estilo culto* of Gongora with that of Marini, whom both Bouterwek and Lord Holland suppose to have formed his own taste on the Spanish school. It seems rather too severe an imputation on that most ingenious and fertile poet, who, as has already been observed, has no fitter parallel than Ovid. The strained metaphors of the *Adone* are easily collected by critics, and seem extravagant in juxtaposition; but they recur only at intervals: while those of Gongora are studiously forced into every line, and are, besides, incomparably more refined and obscure. His style, indeed, seems to be like that of Lycophron, without the excuse of that prophetic mystery which breathes a certain awfulness over the symbolic language of the Cassandra. Nor am I convinced that our own metaphysical poetry in the reigns of James and Charles had much to do with either Marini or Gongora, except as it bore marks of the same vice, — a restless ambition to excite wonder by overstepping the boundaries of nature.

SECTION III.

Malherbe — Rognier — Other French Poets.

20. MALHERBE, a very few of whose poems belong to the last century, but the greater part to the first twenty years of the present, gave a polish and a grace to the lyric poetry of France, which has rendered his name celebrated in her criticism. The public taste of that country is

¹ Bouterwek, p. 498.

(or I should rather say, used to be) more intolerant of defects in poetry, than rigorous in its demands of excellence. Malherbe, therefore, who substituted a regular and accurate versification, a style pure and generally free from pedantic or colloquial phrases, and a sustained tone of what were reckoned elevated thoughts, for the more unequal strains of the sixteenth century, acquired a reputation which may lead some of his readers to disappointment. And this is likely to be increased by a very few lines of great beauty which are known by heart. These stand too much alone in his poems. In general, we find in them neither imagery nor sentiment that yield us delight. He is less mythological, less affected, less given to frigid hyperboles, than his predecessors, but far too much so for any one accustomed to real poetry. In the panegyric odes, Malherbe displays some felicity and skill: the poet of kings and courtiers, he, wisely perhaps, wrote, even when he could have written better, what kings and courtiers would understand and reward. Polished and elegant, his lines seldom pass the conventional tone of poetry; and, while he is never original, he is rarely impressive. Malherbe may stand in relation to Horace as Chiabrera does to Pindar: the analogy is not very close; but he is far from deficient in that calm philosophy which forms the charm of the Roman poet, and we are willing to believe that he sacrificed his time reluctantly to the praises of the great. It may be suspected that he wrote verses for others; a practice not unusual, I believe, among these courtly rhymers: at least his *Alcandre* seems to be Henry IV., *Chrysanthe* or *Oranthe* the Princess of Condé. He seems himself in some passages to have affected gallantry towards Mary of Medicis, which at that time was not reckoned an impertinence.

21. Bouterwek has criticised Malherbe with some justice, but with greater severity.¹ He deems him no poet; which, in a certain sense, is surely true. But we narrow our definition of poetry too much, when we exclude from it the versification of good sense and select diction. This may probably be ascribed to Malherbe; though Bouhours, an acute and somewhat rigid critic, has pointed out some passages which he deems nonsensical. Another writer of the same age, Rapin, whose own taste was not very glowing, observes that there is much prose in Malherbe; and that,

Criticisms
upon his
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well as he merits to be called correct, he is a little too desirous of appearing so, and often becomes frigid.¹ Boileau has extolled him, perhaps, somewhat too highly, and La Harpe is inclined to the same side; but, in the modern state of French criticism, the danger is that the Malherbes will be too much depreciated.

22. The satires of Regnier have been highly praised by Boileau; a competent judge, no doubt, in such matters. Some have preferred Regnier even to himself, ^{Satires of Regnier.} and found in this old Juvenal of France a certain stamp of satirical genius which the more polished critic wanted.² These satires are unlike all other French poetry of the age of Henry IV.: the tone is vehement, somewhat rugged and coarse, and reminds us a little of his contemporaries Hall and Donne, whom, however, he will generally and justly be thought much to excel. Some of his satires are borrowed from Ovid or from the Italians.³ They have been called gross and licentious; but this only applies to one, the rest are unexceptionable. Regnier, who had probably some quarrel with Malherbe, speaks with contempt of his elaborate polish. But the taste of France, and especially of that highly cultivated nobility who formed the court of Louis XIII. and his son, no longer endured the rude, though sometimes animated, versification of the older poets. Next to Malherbe in reputation stood Racan and Maynard, both more or less of his school. Of these it was said by their master, that ^{Racan;} Racan wanted the diligence of Maynard, as Maynard ^{Maynard.} did the spirit of Racan; and that a good poet might be made out of the two.⁴ A foreigner will in general prefer the former, who seems to have possessed more imagination and sensibility, and a keener relish for rural beauty. Maynard's verses, according to Pelisson, have an ease and elegance that few can imitate, which proceeds from his natural and simple construction.⁵ He had more success in epigram than in his sonnets, which Boileau has treated with little respect. Nor

¹ *Réflexions sur la Poétique*, p. 147. — "Malherbe a esté le premier qui nous a remis dans le bon chemin, joignant la pureté au grand style; mais comme il commença cette manière, il ne put la porter jusques dans sa perfection; il y a bien de la prose dans ses vers." In another place he says, "Malherbe est exact et correct; mais il ne hante rien, et par l'envie qu'il a d'être trop sage, il est souvent froid." — p. 209.
² Bouterwek, p. 246; La Harpe; Biogr. Univ.
³ Nicéron, xi. 397.
⁴ Pelisson, *Hist. de l'Académie*, i. 260; Baillet, *Jugemens des Savans (Poètes)*, n. 1510; La Harpe, *Cours de Littérature*; Bouterwek, v. 200. ⁵ Idem

wards. Several poets belong to the age of that prince; and even that of Philip IV. was not destitute of men of merited reputation.¹ Among the best were two brothers, Lupercio and Bartholomew Argensola. These were chiefly distinguished in what I have called the third or Horatian manner of Spanish poetry, though they by no means confined themselves to any peculiar style. "Lupercio," says Bouterwek, "formed his style after Horace with no less assiduity than Luis de Leon; but he did not possess the soft enthusiasm of that pious poet, who, in the religious spirit of his poetry, is so totally unlike Horace. An understanding at once solid and ingenious, subject to no extravagant illusion, yet full of true poetic feeling, and an imagination more plastic than creative, impart a more perfect Horatian coloring to the odes, as well as to the canciones and sonnets, of Lupercio. He closely imitated Horace in his didactic satires, a style of composition in which no Spanish poet had preceded him. But he never succeeded in attaining the bold combination of ideas which characterizes the ode-style of Horace; and his conceptions have therefore seldom any thing like the Horatian energy. On the other hand, all his poems express no less precision of language than the models after which he formed his style. His odes, in particular, are characterized by a picturesque tone of expression which he seems to have imbibed from Virgil rather than from Horace. The extravagant metaphors by which some of Herrera's odes are deformed were uniformly avoided by Lupercio."² The genius of Bartholomew Argensola was very like that of his brother, nor are their writings easily distinguishable; but Bouterwek assigns, on the whole, a higher place to Bartholomew. Dieze inclines to the same judgment, and thinks the eulogy of Nicolas Antonio on these brothers, extravagant as it seems, not beyond their merits.

14. But another poet, Manuel Estevan de Villegas, whose poems, written in very early youth, entitled *Amatorias* or *Eroticas*, were published in 1620, has attained a still higher reputation, especially in other parts

¹ Antonio bestows unbounded praise on a poem of the epic class, the *Bernardo of Balbuena*, published at Madrid in 1624, though he complains that in his own age it lay hid in the corners of booksellers' shops. Balbuena, in his opinion, has left all Spanish poets far behind him. The subject of his poem is the very common

fable of *Roncesvalles*. Dims, while he denies this absolute pre-eminence of Balbuena, gives him a respectable place among the many epic writers of Spain. But I do not find him mentioned in Bouterwek: in fact, most of these poems are very scarce, and are treasures for the bibliomane. ² Hist. of Spanish Literature, p. 283.

of Europe. Dieze calls him "one of the best lyric poets of Spain, excellent in the various styles he has employed, but above all in his odes and songs. His original poems are full of genius: his translations of Horace and Anacreon might often pass for original. Few surpass him in harmony of verse: he is the Spanish Anacreon, the poet of the Graces."¹ Bouterwek, a more discriminating judge than Dieze, who is perhaps rather valuable for research than for taste, has observed, that "the graceful luxuriance of the poetry of Villegas has no parallel in modern literature; and, generally speaking, no modern writer has so well succeeded in blending the spirit of ancient poetry with the modern. But constantly to observe that correctness of ideas, which distinguished the classical compositions of antiquity, was by Villegas, as by most Spanish poets, considered too rigid a requisition, and an unnecessary restraint on genius. He accordingly sometimes degenerates into conceits and images, the monstrous absurdity of which is characteristic of the author's nation and age. For instance, in one of his odes, in which he entreats Lyda to suffer her tresses to flow, he says, that, 'agitated by Zephyr, her locks would occasion a thousand deaths, and subdue a thousand lives;' and then he adds, in a strain of extravagance surpassing that of the Marinists, 'that the sun himself would cease to give light, if he did not snatch beams from her radiant countenance to illumine the east.' But faults of this glaring kind are by no means frequent in the poetry of Villegas; and the fascinating grace with which he emulates his models operates with so powerful a charm, that the occasional occurrence of some little affectations, from which he could scarcely be expected entirely to abstain, is easily overlooked by the reader."²

15. Quevedo, who, having borne the surname of Villegas, has sometimes been confounded with the poet we have just named, is better known in Europe for his Quevedo. prose than his verse; but he is the author of numerous poems, both serious and comic or satirical. The latter are by much the more esteemed of the two. He wrote burlesque poetry with success, but it is frequently unintelligible except to natives. In satire he adopted the Juvenalian style.³ A few more might perhaps be added, especially Espinel, a poet

¹ *Geschichte der Spanischen Dichtkunst*, p. 210.

² Bouterwek, i. 479.

³ *Id.*, p. 468.

of the classic school; Borja de Esquillace, once viceroy of Peru, who is called by Bouterwek the last representative of that style in Spain, but more worthy of praise for withstanding the bad taste of his contemporaries than for any vigor of genius; and Christopher de la Mena.¹ No Portuguese poetry about this time seems to be worthy of notice in European literature, though Manuel Faria y Sousa and a few more might attain a local reputation by sonnets and other amatory verse.

16. The original blemish of Spanish writing, both in prose and verse, had been an excess of effort to say every thing in an unusual manner, a deviation from the beaten paths of sentiment and language in a wider curve than good taste permits. Taste is the presiding faculty which regulates, in all works within her jurisdiction, the struggling powers of imagination, emotion, and reason. Each has its claim to mingle in the composition; each may sometimes be allowed in a great measure to predominate; and a phlegmatic application of what men call common sense in æsthetic criticism is almost as repugnant to its principles as a dereliction of all reason for the sake of fantastic absurdity. Taste also must determine, by an intuitive sense of right somewhat analogous to that which regulates the manners of polished life, to what extent the most simple, the most obvious, the most natural, and therefore, in a popular meaning, the most true, is to be modified by a studious introduction of the new, the striking, and the beautiful; so that neither what is insipid and trivial, nor yet what is forced and affected, may displease us. In Spain, as we have observed, the latter was always the prevailing fault. The public taste had been formed on bad models: on the Oriental poetry, metaphorical beyond all perceptible analogy; and on that of the Provençals, false in sentiment, false in conception, false in image and figure. The national character, proud, swelling, and ceremonious, conspired to give an inflated tone: it was also grave and sententious rather than lively or delicate, and therefore fond of a strained and ambitious style. These vices of writing are carried to excess in romances of chivalry, which became ridiculous in the eyes of sensible men, but were certainly very popular; they affect also, though in a different manner, much of the

Defects of
taste in
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Spanish prose of the sixteenth century, and they belong to a great deal of the poetry of that age; though it must be owned that much appears wholly exempt from them, and written in a very pure and classical spirit. Cervantes strove by example and by precept to maintain good taste; and some of his contemporaries took the same line.¹ But they had to fight against the predominant turn of their nation, which soon gave the victory to one of the worst manners of writing that ever disgraced public favor.

17. Nothing can be more opposite to what is strictly called a classical style, or one formed upon the best models of Greece and Rome, than pedantry. This was, nevertheless, the weed that overspread the face of literature in those ages when Greece and Rome were the chief objects of veneration. Without an intimate discernment of their beauty, it was easy to copy allusions that were no longer intelligible, to counterfeit trains of thought that belonged to past times, to force reluctant idioms into modern form, as some are said to dress after a lady for whom nature has done more than for themselves. From the revival of letters downwards, this had been more or less observable in the learned men of Europe, and, after that class grew more extensive, in the current literature of modern languages. Pedantry, which consisted in unnecessary and perhaps unintelligible references to ancient learning, was afterwards combined with other artifices to obtain the same end, — far-fetched metaphors and extravagant conceits. The French versifiers of the latter end of the sixteenth century were eminent in both, as the works of Ronsard and Du Bartas attest. We might, indeed, take the Creation of Du Bartas more properly than the Euphues of our English Lilly, which, though very affected and unpleasing, does hardly such violence to common speech and common sense, for the type of the style which, in the early part of the seventeenth century, became popular in several countries, but especially in Spain, through the misplaced labors of Gongora.

18. Luis de Gongora, a man of very considerable talents, and capable of writing well, as he has shown, in different styles of poetry, was unfortunately led by an ambitious desire of popularity to introduce one which should

Pedantry
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render his name immortal, as it has done in a mode which he did not design. This was his *estilo culto*, as it was usually called, or highly polished phraseology, wherein every word seems to have been out of its natural place. "In fulfilment of this object," says Bouterwek, "he formed for himself, with the most laborious assiduity, a style as uncommon as affected, and opposed to all the ordinary rules of the Spanish language, either in prose or verse. He particularly endeavored to introduce into his native tongue the intricate constructions of the Greek and Latin, though such an arrangement of words had never been attempted in Spanish composition. He consequently found it necessary to invent a particular system of punctuation, in order to render the sense of his verses intelligible. Not satisfied with this patchwork kind of phraseology, he affected to attach an extraordinary depth of meaning to each word, and to diffuse an air of superior dignity over his whole style. In Gongora's poetry, the most common words received a totally new signification; and, in order to impart perfection to his *estilo culto*, he summoned all his mythological learning to his aid."¹ "Gongora," says an English writer, "was the founder of a sect in literature. The style called in Castilian *cultismo* owes its origin to him. This affectation consists in using language so pedantic, metaphors so strained, and constructions so involved, that few readers have the knowledge requisite to understand the words; and still fewer, ingenuity to discover the allusion, or patience to unravel the sentences. These authors do not avail themselves of the invention of letters for the purpose of conveying but of concealing their ideas."²

19. The Gongorists formed a strong party in literature, and carried with them the public voice. If we were to believe some writers of the seventeenth century, he was the greatest poet of Spain.³ The age of Cervantes was over, nor was there vitality enough in the criticism of the reign of Philip IV. to resist the contagion. Two sects soon appeared among these *cultoristas*:

¹ Bouterwek, p. 434.

² Lord Holland's Lope de Vega, p. 64.

³ Diessé, p. 250. Nicolas Antonio, to the disgrace of his judgment, maintains this with the most extravagant eulogy on Gongora; and Baillet copies him: but the next age unhesitatingly reversed the sen-

tence. The Portuguese have laid claim to the *estilo culto* as their property; and one of their writers who practices it — Manuel de Faria y Sousa — gives Don Sebastian the credit of having been the first who wrote it in prose.

one who retained that name, and, like their master, affected a certain precision of style; another, called *conceptistas*, which went still greater lengths in extravagance, desirous only, it might seem, of expressing absurd ideas in unnatural language.¹ The prevalence of such a disease, for no other analogy can so fitly be used, would seem to have been a bad presage for Spain; but, in fact, like other diseases, it did but make the tour of Europe, and rage worse in some countries than in others. It had spent itself in France, when it was at its height in Italy and England. I do not perceive the close connection of the *estilo culto* of Gongora with that of Marini, whom both Bouterwek and Lord Holland suppose to have formed his own taste on the Spanish school. It seems rather too severe an imputation on that most ingenious and fertile poet, who, as has already been observed, has no fitter parallel than Ovid. The strained metaphors of the *Adone* are easily collected by critics, and seem extravagant in juxtaposition; but they recur only at intervals: while those of Gongora are studiously forced into every line, and are, besides, incomparably more refined and obscure. His style, indeed, seems to be like that of Lycophron, without the excuse of that prophetic mystery which breathes a certain awfulness over the symbolic language of the Cassandra. Nor am I convinced that our own metaphysical poetry in the reigns of James and Charles had much to do with either Marini or Gongora, except as it bore marks of the same vice, — a restless ambition to excite wonder by overstepping the boundaries of nature.

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22. The satires of Regnier have been highly praised by Boileau; a competent judge, no doubt, in such mat- ^{Satires of} ters. Some have preferred Regnier even to himself, ^{Regnier.} and found in this old Juvenal of France a certain stamp of satirical genius which the more polished critic wanted.² These satires are unlike all other French poetry of the age of Henry IV.: the tone is vehement, somewhat rugged and coarse, and reminds us a little of his contemporaries Hall and Donne, whom, however, he will generally and justly be thought much to excel. Some of his satires are borrowed from Ovid or from the Italians.³ They have been called gross and licentious; but this only applies to one, the rest are unexceptionable. Regnier, who had probably some quarrel with Malherbe, speaks with contempt of his elaborate polish. But the taste of France, and especially of that highly cultivated nobility who formed the court of Louis XIII. and his son, no longer endured the rude, though sometimes animated, versification of the older poets. Next to Malherbe in reputation stood Racan and Maynard, both more or less of his school. Of these it was said by their master, that ^{Racan;} Racan wanted the diligence of Maynard, as Maynard ^{Maynard.} did the spirit of Racan; and that a good poet might be made out of the two.⁴ A foreigner will in general prefer the former, who seems to have possessed more imagination and sensibility, and a keener relish for rural beauty. Maynard's verses, according to Pellisson, have an ease and elegance that few can imitate, which proceeds from his natural and simple construction.⁵ He had more success in epigram than in his sonnets, which Boileau has treated with little respect. Nor

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³ *Niceron*, xi. 397.

⁴ Pellisson, *Hist. de l'Académie*, i. 260; Baillet, *Jugemens des Savans (Poètes)*, n. 1510; *La Harpe*, *Cours de Littérature*; Bouterwek, v. 280. ⁵ *Idem*

does he speak better of Malleville, who chose no other species of verse, but seldom produced a finished piece, though not deficient in spirit and delicacy. Viaud, more frequently known by the name of Théophile, a writer of no great elevation of style, is not destitute of imagination. Such at least is the opinion of Rapin and Bouterwek.¹

23. The poems of Gombauld were, in general, published before the middle of the century; his epigrams, which are most esteemed, in 1657. These are often lively and neat. But a style of playfulness and gayety had been introduced by Voiture. French poetry under Ronsard and his school, and even that of Malherbe, had lost the lively tone of Marot, and became serious almost to severity. Voiture, with an apparent ease and grace, though without the natural air of the old writers, made it once more amusing. In reality, the style of Voiture is artificial and elaborate; but, like his imitator Prior among us, he has the skill to disguise this from the reader. He must be admitted to have had, in verse as well as prose, a considerable influence over the taste of France. He wrote to please women, and women are grateful when they are pleased. Sarrazin, says his biographer, though less celebrated than Voiture, deserves perhaps to be rated above him; with equal ingenuity, he is far more natural.² The German historian of French literature has spoken less respectfully of Sarrazin, whose verses are the most insipid rhymed prose, such as he, not unhappily, calls *toilet-poetry*.³ This is a style which finds little mercy on the right bank of the Rhine; but the French are better judges of the merit of Sarrazin.

¹ Bouterwek, 252. Rapin says, "Théophile a l'imagination grande et le sens petit. Il a des hardieses heureuses à force de se permettre tout." — *Réflexions sur la Poétique*, p. 200.

² *Biogr. Univ*; Baillet, n. 1582.

³ Bouterwek, v. 256. Specimens of all these poets will be found in the collection of Auguis, vol. vi.; and I must own, that, with the exceptions of Malherbe, Regnier, and one or two more, my own acquaintance with them extends little farther.

SECTION IV.

Rise of Poetry in Germany—Opitz and his Followers—Dutch Poets.

24. THE German language had never been more despised by the learned and the noble than at the beginning of the seventeenth century, which seems to be the ^{Low state} of German lowest point in its native literature. The capacity ^{literature.} was not wanting; many wrote Latin verse with success; the collection made by Gruter is abundant in these cultivators of a foreign tongue, several of whom belong to the close of the preceding age. But, among these, it is said that whoever essayed to write their own language did but fail; and the instances adduced are very few. The upper ranks began about this time to speak French in common society; the burghers, as usual, strove to imitate them; and, what was far worse, it became the mode to intermingle French words with German, not singly and sparingly, as has happened in other times and countries, but in a jargon affectedly piebald and macaronic. Some hope might have been founded on the literary academies, which, in emulation of Italy, sprung up in this period. The oldest is The Fruitful Society (*Die* ^{Literary} *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft*), known also as the ^{Societas.} Order of Palms, established at Weimar in 1617.¹ Five princes enrolled their names at the beginning. It held forth the laudable purpose of purifying and correcting the mother tongue and of promoting its literature, after the manner of the Italian academies. But it is not unusual for literary associations to promise much, and fail of performance: one man is more easily found to lay down a good plan, than many to co-operate in its execution. Probably this was merely the scheme of some more gifted individual, perhaps Werder, who translated Ariosto and Tasso;² for little good was effected by the institution. Nor did several others, which at different times in the seventeenth century arose over Germany, deserve more praise. They copied the academies of Italy in their quaint names and titles, in their by-laws, their petty ceremonies and symbolic distinctions, to which, as we always find in

¹ Bouterwek, x. 85.² Id., x. 29.

these self-elected societies, they attached vast importance, and thought themselves superior to the world by doing nothing for it. "They are gone," exclaims Bouterwek, "and have left no clear vestige of their existence." Such had been the Meistersingers before them; and little else, in effect, were the academies, in a more genial soil, of their own age. Notwithstanding this, though I am compelled to follow the historian of German literature, it must strike us that these societies seem to manifest a public esteem for something intellectual, which they knew not precisely how to attain; and it is to be observed, that several of the best poets in the seventeenth century belonged to them.

25. A very small number of poets, such as Meckerlin and Spee, in the early part of the seventeenth century, though with many faults in point of taste, have been commemorated by the modern historians of literature. But they were wholly eclipsed by one whom Germany regards as the founder of her poetic literature, Martin Opitz, a native of Silesia, honored with a laurel crown by the emperor, in 1628, and raised to offices of distinction and trust in several courts. The national admiration of Opitz seems to have been almost enthusiastic; yet Opitz was far from being the poet of enthusiasm. Had he been such, his age might not have understood him. His taste was French and Dutch; two countries of which the poetry was pure and correct, but not imaginative. No great elevation, no energy of genius, will be found in this German Heinsius or Malherbe. Opitz displayed, however, another kind of excellence. He wrote the language with a purity of idiom, in which Luther alone, whom he chose as his model, was superior: he gave more strength to the versification, and paid a regard to the collocation of syllables according to their quantity, or length of time required for articulation, which the earlier poets had neglected. He is, therefore, reckoned the inventor of a rich and harmonious rhythm; and he also rendered the Alexandrine verse much more common than before.¹ His sense is good; he writes as one conversant with the ancients, and with mankind: if he is too didactic and learned for a poet in the higher import of the word; if his taste appears fettered by the models

¹ Bouterwek (p. 94) thinks this no advantage: a rhymed prose in Alexandrines overspread the German literature of the seventeenth and first part of the eighteenth century.

he took for imitation; if he even retarded, of which we can hardly be sure, the development of a more genuine nationality in German literature,—he must still be allowed, in a favorable sense, to have made an epoch in its history.¹

26. Opitz is reckoned the founder of what was called the first Silesian school, rather so denominated from him ^{His followers.} than as determining the birthplace of its poets. They were chiefly lyric, but more in the line of songs and short effusions in trochaic metre than of the regular ode, and sometimes display much spirit and feeling. The German song always seems to bear a resemblance to the English: the identity of metre and rhythm conspires with what is more essential, a certain analogy of sentiment. Many, however, of Opitz's followers, like himself, took Holland for their Parnassus, and translated their songs from Dutch. Fleming was distinguished by a genuine feeling for lyric poetry: he made Opitz his model, but, had he not died young, would probably have gone beyond him; being endowed by nature with a more poetical genius. Gryph or Gryphius, who belonged to the Fruitful Society, and bore in that the surname of the Immortal, with faults that strike the reader in every page, is also superior in fancy and warmth to Opitz. But Gryph is better known in German literature by his tragedies. The hymns of the Lutheran Church are by no means the lowest form of German poetry. They have been the work of every age since the Reformation; but Dach and Gerhard, who, especially the latter, excelled in these devotional songs, lived about the middle of the seventeenth century. The shade of Luther seemed to protect the church from the profanation of bad taste; or, as we should rather say, it was the intense

¹ Bouterwek, x. 89–119, has given an elaborate critique of the poetry of Opitz: "He is the father, not of German poetry, but of the modern German language of poetry, *der neueren deutschen Dichtersprache*."—p. 93. The fame of Opitz spread beyond his country, little as his language was familiar. "Non perit Germania," Grotius writes to him, in 1631, "Opiti doctissime, quæ te habet locupletissimum testem, quid lingua Germanica, quid ingenia Germanica valeant."—Epist. 272. And afterwards, in 1638, thanking him for the present of his translation of the Psalms: "Dignus erat rex poëta interprete Germanorum poëtarum regis; nihil enim tibi blandiens dico; ita sentio à te primum Germanicæ poësi formam datam et habi-

tum quo cum aliis gentibus possit contendere."—Ep. 969. Baillet observes, that Opitz passes for the best of German poets, and the first who gave rules to that poetry, and raised it to the state it had since reached; so that he is rather to be accounted its father than its improver. *Jugemens des Savans* (Postes), n. 1436. But reputation is transitory. Though ten editions of the poems of Opitz were published within the seventeenth century,—which Bouterwek thinks much for Germany at that time, though it would not be so much in some countries,—scarce any one, except the lovers of old literature, now asks for these obsolete productions. p. 90.

theopathy of the German nation, and the simple majesty of their ecclesiastical music.¹

27. It has been the misfortune of the Dutch, a great people, a people fertile of men of various ability and erudition, a people of scholars, of theologians and philosophers, of mathematicians, of historians, of painters, and, we may add, of poets, that these last have been the mere violets of the shade, and have peculiarly suffered by the narrow limits within which their language has been spoken or known. The Flemish dialect of the Southern Netherlands might have contributed to make up something like a national literature, extensive enough to be respected in Europe, if those provinces, which now affect the name of Belgium, had been equally fertile of talents with their neighbors.

28. The golden age of Dutch literature is this first part of the seventeenth century. Their chief poets are Spiegel, Hooft, Cats, and Vondel. The first, who has been styled the Dutch Ennius, died in 1612: his principal poem, of an ethical kind, is posthumous, but may probably have been written towards the close of the preceding century. "The style is vigorous and concise; it is rich in imagery and powerfully expressed, but is deficient in elegance and perspicuity."² Spiegel had rendered much service to his native tongue, and was a member of a literary academy which published a Dutch grammar in 1584. Koornhert and Dousa, with others known to fame, were his colleagues; and be it remembered, to the honor of Holland, that in Germany or England, or even in France, there was as yet no institution of this kind. But as Holland at the end of the sixteenth century, and for many years afterwards, was pre-eminently the literary country of Europe, it is not surprising that some endeavors were made, though unsuccessfully as to European renown, to cultivate the native language. This language is also more soft, though less sonorous, than the German.

29. Spiegel was followed by a more celebrated poet, Peter Hooft; Hooft, who gave sweetness and harmony to Dutch verse. "The great creative power of poetry," it has been said, "he did not possess; but his language is correct, his style agreeable, and he did much to introduce a better epoch."³ His amatory and Anacreontic lines have never been excelled in the language; and Hooft is also distin-

¹ Bouterwek, x. 218; Eichhorn, iv. 668

² Biogr. Univ.

³ Id.

guished both as a dramatist and an historian. He has been called the Tacitus of Holland. But here again his praises must by the generality be taken upon trust. Cats is a poet of a different class: ease, abundance, simplicity, clearness, and purity, are the qualities of his style; his imagination is gay, his morality popular and useful. No one was more read than Father Cats, as the people call him; but he is often trifling and monotonous. Cats, though he wrote for the multitude, whose descendants still almost know his poems by heart, was a man whom the republic held in high esteem: twice ambassador in England, he died great pensionary of Holland, in 1651. Vondel, a native of Cologne, but the glory, as he is deemed, of Dutch poetry, was best known as a tragedian. In his tragedies, the lyric part, the choruses which he retained after the ancient model, have been called the sublimest of odes. But some have spoken less highly of Vondel.¹

30. Denmark had no literature in the native language, except a collection of old ballads, full of Scandinavian legends, till the present period; and in this it ^{Danish} does not appear that she had more than one poet, a Norwegian bishop, named Arrebo. Nothing, I believe, was written in Swedish. Slavonian, that is, Polish and Russian, poets there were; but we know so little of those languages, that they cannot enter, at least during so distant a period, into the history of European literature.

SECT. V.—ON ENGLISH POETRY.

Imitators of Spenser—The *Fletchers*—Philosophical Poets—Denham—Donne—Cowley.—Historical and Narrative Poets—Shakespeare's Sonnets—Lyric Poets—Milton's *Lycidas*, and other Poems.

31. THE English poets of these fifty years are very numerous; and, though the greater part are not familiar to the general reader, they form a favorite study of those who cultivate our poetry, and are sought by all collectors of scarce and interesting literature. ^{English Poets numerous in this age.} Many of them have, within half a century, been reprinted

¹ *Foreign Quart. Rev.*, vol. iv. p. 49. I am indebted to Eichhorn, vol. iv. part i.; for this short account of the Dutch poets, and to the *Biographie Universelle*.

separately; and many more, in the useful and copious collections of Anderson, Chalmers, and other editors. Extracts have also been made by Headley, Ellis, Campbell, and Southey. It will be convenient to arrange them rather according to the schools to which they belonged, than in mere order of chronology.

32. Whatever were the misfortunes of Spenser's life, what-
Phineas ever neglect he might have experienced at the hands
Fletcher. of a statesman grown old in cares which render a man insensible to song, his spirit might be consoled by the prodigious reputation of the Faery Queen. He was placed at once by his country above all the great Italian names, and next to Virgil among the ancients: it was a natural consequence that some should imitate what they so deeply revered. An ardent admiration for Spenser inspired the genius of two young brothers, Phineas and Giles Fletcher. The first, very soon after the queen's death, as some allusions to Lord Essex seemed to denote, composed, though he did not so soon publish, a poem entitled *The Purple Island*. By this strange name he expressed a subject more strange: it is a minute and elaborate account of the body and mind of man. Through five cantos the reader is regaled with nothing but allegorical anatomy, in the details of which Phineas seems tolerably skilled, evincing a great deal of ingenuity in diversifying his metaphors, and in presenting the delineation of his imaginary island with as much justice as possible to the allegory without obtruding it on the reader's view. In the sixth canto, he rises to the intellectual and moral faculties of the soul, which occupy the rest of the poem. From its nature, it is insuperably wearisome; yet his language is often very poetical, his versification harmonious, his invention fertile. But that perpetual monotony of allegorical persons, which sometimes displeases us even in Spenser, is seldom relieved in Fletcher; the understanding revolts at the confused crowd of inconceivable beings in a philosophical poem; and the justness of analogy, which had given us some pleasure in the anatomical cantos, is lost in tedious descriptions of all possible moral qualities, each of them personified, which can never co-exist in the *Purple Island* of one individual.

33. Giles Fletcher, brother of Phineas, in *Christ's Victory and Triumph*, though his subject has not all the unity that might be desired, had a manifest superiority in its choice.

Each uses a stanza of his own: Phineas, one of seven lines; Giles, one of eight. This poem was published in Giles 1610. Each brother alludes to the work of the Fletcher. other, which must be owing to the alterations made by Phineas in his *Purple Island*, written probably the first, but not published, I believe, till 1633. Giles seems to have more vigor than his elder brother, but less sweetness, less smoothness, and more affectation in his style. This, indeed, is deformed by words neither English nor Latin, but simply barbarous; such as *clamping*, *emblazon*, *deprostrate*, *purpured*, *glitterand*, and many others. They both bear much resemblance to Spenser. Giles sometimes ventures to cope with him, even in celebrated passages, such as the description of the Cave of Despair.¹ And he has had the honor, in turn, of being followed by Milton, especially in the first meeting of our Saviour with Satan, in the *Paradise Regained*. Both of these brothers are deserving of much praise: they were endowed with minds eminently poetical, and not inferior in imagination to any of their contemporaries. But an injudicious taste, and an excessive fondness for a style which the public was rapidly abandoning, — that of allegorical personification, — prevented their powers from being effectively displayed.

34. Notwithstanding the popularity of Spenser, and the general pride in his name, that allegorical and imaginative school of poetry, of which he was the philosophical poetry. greatest ornament, did not by any means exclude a very different kind. The English, or such as by their education gave the tone in literature, had become, in the latter years of the queen, and still more under her successor, a deeply thinking, a learned, a philosophical people. A sententious reasoning, grave, subtle and condensed, or the novel and remote analogies of wit, gained praise from many whom the creations of an excursive fancy could not attract. Hence much of the poetry of James's reign is distinguished from that of Elizabeth, except perhaps her last years, by partaking of the general character of the age; deficient in simplicity, grace, and feeling, often obscure and pedantic, but impressing us with a respect for the man, where we do not recognize the poet. From this condition of public taste arose two schools of poetry, different in character, if not unequal in merit, but both appealing to the reasoning more than to the imaginative faculty as their judge.

¹ Christ's Vict. and Triumph, ll. 22.

35. The first of these may own as its founder Sir John Davies, whose poem on the Immortality of the Soul, Lord Brooke. published in 1599, has had its due honor in our last volume. Davies is eminent for perspicuity; but this cannot be said for another philosophical poet, Sir Fulke Greville, afterwards Lord Brooke, the bosom friend of Sir Philip Sidney, and once the patron of Jordano Bruno. The titles of Lord Brooke's poems, *A Treatise of Human Learning*, *A Treatise of Monarchy*, *A Treatise of Religion*, *An Inquisition upon Fame and Honor*, lead us to anticipate more of sense than fancy. In this we are not deceived: his mind was pregnant with deep reflection upon multifarious learning; but he struggles to give utterance to thoughts which he had not fully endowed with words, and amidst the shackles of rhyme and metre, which he had not learned to manage. Hence of all our poets he may be reckoned the most obscure; in aiming at condensation, he becomes elliptical beyond the bounds of the language; and his rhymes, being forced for the sake of sound, leave all meaning behind. Lord Brooke's poetry is chiefly worth notice as an indication of that thinking spirit upon political science which was to produce the riper speculations of Hobbes and Harrington and Locke.

36. This argumentative school of verse was so much in unison with the character of that generation, that Daniel, a poet of a very different temper, adopted it in his panegyric addressed to James soon after his accession, and in some other poems. It had an influence upon others who trod generally in a different track, as is especially perceived in Giles Fletcher. The *Cooper's Hill* of Sir John Denham's
Cooper's
Hill. Denham, published in 1643, belongs, in a considerable degree, to this reasoning class of poems. It is also descriptive; but the description is made to slide into philosophy. The plan is original, as far as our poetry is concerned; and I do not recollect any exception in other languages. Placing himself upon an eminence not distant from Windsor, he takes a survey of the scene; he finds the tower of St. Paul's on its farthest horizon, the Castle much nearer, and the Thames at his feet. These, with the ruins of an abbey, supply, in turn, materials for a reflecting rather than imaginative mind, and, with a stag-hunt, which he has very well described, fill up the canvas of a poem of no great length, but once of no trifling reputation.

37. The epithet, *majestic* Denham, conferred by Pope, conveys rather too much; but Cooper's Hill is no ordinary poem. It is nearly the first instance of vigorous and rhythmical couplets; for Denham is incomparably less feeble than Browne, and less prosaic than Beaumont. Close in thought, and nervous in language like Davies, he is less hard and less monotonous; his cadences are animated and various, perhaps a little beyond the regularity that metre demands; they have been the guide to the finer ear of Dryden. Those who cannot endure the philosophic poetry must ever be dissatisfied with Cooper's Hill; no personification, no ardent words, few metaphors beyond the common use of speech, nothing that warms or melts or fascinates the heart. It is rare to find lines of eminent beauty in Denham; and equally so to be struck by any one as feeble or low. His language is always well chosen and perspicuous, free from those strange turns of expression, frequent in our older poets, where the reader is apt to suspect some error of the press, so irreconcilable do they seem with grammar or meaning. The expletive *do*, which the best of his predecessors use freely, seldom occurs in Denham; and he has in other respects brushed away the rust of languid and ineffective redundancies which have obstructed the popularity of men with more native genius than himself.¹

38. Another class of poets in the reigns of James and his son were those whom Johnson has called the meta-
Poets called metaphysical.
 physical; a name rather more applicable, in the ordinary use of the word, to Davies and Brooke. These were such as labored after conceits, or novel turns of thought, usually false, and resting upon some equivocation of language, or exceedingly remote analogy. This style Johnson supposes to have been derived from Marini. But Donne, its founder, as Johnson imagines, in England, wrote

¹ The comparison by Denham between the Thames and his own poetry was once celebrated:—

"Oh, could I flow like thee, and make thy stream
 My bright example, as it is my theme!
 Though deep, yet clear; though gentle,
 yet not dull:
 Strong without rage; without o'erflow-
 ing, full."

Johnson, while he highly extols these lines, truly observes, that "most of the words thus artfully opposed are to be understood simply on one side of the com-

parison, and metaphorically on the other; and, if there be any language which does not express intellectual operations by material images, into that language they cannot be translated." Perhaps these metaphors are so naturally applied to style, that no language of a cultivated people is without them. But the ground of objection is, in fact, that the lines contain nothing but wit, and that wit which turns on a play of words. They are rather ingenious in this respect, and remarkably harmonious, which is probably the secret of their popularity; but, as poetry, they deserve no great praise.

before Marini. It is, in fact, as we have lately observed, the style which, though Marini has earned the discreditable reputation of perverting the taste of his country by it, had been gaining ground through the latter half of the sixteenth century. It was, in a more comprehensive view, one modification of that vitiated taste which sacrificed all ease and naturalness of writing and speaking for the sake of display. The mythological erudition and Grecisms of Ronsard's school, the euphuism of that of Lilly, the *estilo culto* of Gongora, even the pedantic quotations of Burton and many similar writers, both in England and on the Continent, sprang, like the *conceits* of the Italians and of their English imitators, from the same source, a dread of being overlooked if they paced on like their neighbors. And when a few writers had set the example of successful faults, a bad style, where no sound principles of criticism had been established, readily gaining ground, it became necessary that those who had not vigor enough to rise above the fashion should seek to fall in with it. Nothing is more injurious to the cultivation of verse than the trick of desiring, for praise or profit, to attract those by poetry whom nature has left destitute of every quality which genuine poetry can attract. The best, and perhaps the only secure, basis for *public* taste, for an æsthetic appreciation of beauty, in a court, a college, a city, is so general a diffusion of classical knowledge, as by rendering the finest models familiar, and by giving them a sort of authority, will discountenance and check at the outset the vicious novelties which always exert some influence over uneducated minds. But this was not yet the case in England. Milton was perhaps the first writer who eminently possessed a genuine discernment and feeling of antiquity; though it may be perceived in Spenser, and also in a very few who wrote in prose.

39. Donne is generally esteemed the earliest, as Cowley was afterwards the most conspicuous, model of this manner. Many instances of it, however, occur in the lighter poetry of the queen's reign. Donne is the most inharmonious of our versifiers, if he can be said to have deserved such a name by lines too rugged to seem metre. Of his earlier poems, many are very licentious; the later are chiefly devout. Few are good for much; the conceits have not even the merit of being intelligible: it would perhaps be difficult to select three passages that we should care to read again.

40. The second of these poets was Crashaw, a man of some imagination and great piety, but whose softness of heart, united with feeble judgment, led him to admire and imitate whatever was most extravagant in the mystic writings of Saint Teresa. He was, more than Donne, a follower of Marini; one of whose poems, *The Massacre of the Innocents*, he translated with success. It is difficult, in general, to find any thing in Crashaw that bad taste has not deformed. His poems were first published in 1646.

41. In the next year, 1647, Cowley's *Mistress* appeared; the most celebrated performance of the misnamed metaphysical poets. It is a series of short amatory poems, in the Italian style of the age, full of analogies that have no semblance of truth, except from the double sense of words and thoughts that unite the coldness of subtilty with the hyperbolical extravagance of counterfeited passion. A few Anacreontic poems, and some other light pieces of Cowley, have a spirit and raciness very unlike these frigid conceits; and, in the ode on the death of his friend Mr. Harvey, he gave some proofs of real sensibility and poetic grace. The Pindaric odes of Cowley were not published within this period. But it is not worth while to defer mention of them. They contain, like all his poetry, from time to time, very beautiful lines; but the faults are still of the same kind: his sensibility and good sense, nor has any poet more, are choked by false taste; and it would be difficult to fix on any one poem in which the beauties are more frequent than the blemishes. Johnson has selected the elegy on Crashaw as the finest of Cowley's works. It begins with a very beautiful couplet, but I confess that little else seems, to my taste, of much value. *The Complaint*, probably better known than any other poem, appears to me the best in itself. His disappointed hopes give a not unpleasing melancholy to several passages. But his Latin ode in a similar strain is much more perfect. Cowley, perhaps, upon the whole, has had a reputation more above his deserts than any English poet; yet it is very easy to perceive that some, who wrote better than he, did not possess so fine a genius. Johnson has written the life of Cowley with peculiar care; and, as his summary of the poet's character is more favorable than my own, it may be candid to insert it in this place, as at least very discriminating, elaborate, and well expressed.

42. "It may be affirmed without any encomiastic fervor, that he brought to his poetic labors a mind replete with learning, and that his pages are embellished with all the ornaments which books could supply; that he was the first who imparted to English numbers the enthusiasm of the greater ode, and the gayety of the less;¹ that he was equally qualified for sprightly sallies and for lofty flights; that he was among those who freed translation from servility, and, instead of following his author at a distance, walked by his side; and that, if he left versification yet improvable, he left likewise, from time to time, such specimens of excellence as enabled succeeding poets to improve it."

43. The poets of historical or fabulous narrative belong to another class. Of these the earliest is Daniel, whose minor poems fall partly within the sixteenth century. His history of the Civil Wars between York and Lancaster, a poem in eight books, was published in 1604. Faithfully adhering to truth, which he does not suffer so much as an ornamental episode to interrupt, and equally studious to avoid the bolder figures of poetry, it is not surprising that Daniel should be little read. It is, indeed, certain that much Italian and Spanish poetry, even by those whose name has once stood rather high, depends chiefly upon merits which he abundantly possesses, — a smoothness of rhythm, and a lucid narration in simple language. But that which from the natural delight in sweet sound is enough to content the ear in the Southern tongues, will always seem bald and tame in our less harmonious verse. It is the chief praise of Daniel, and must have contributed to what popularity he enjoyed in his own age, that his English is eminently pure, free from affectation of archaism and from pedantic innovation, with very little that is now obsolete. Both in prose and in poetry, he is, as to language, among the best writers of his time, and wanted but a greater confidence in his own power, or, to speak less indulgently, a greater share of it, to sustain his correct taste, calm sense, and moral feeling.

44. Next to Daniel in time, and much above him in reach of mind, we place Michael Drayton, whose *Barons' Polyolbion*. Wars have been mentioned under the preceding period, but whose more famous work was published partly in

¹ Was not Milton's Ode on the Nativity would Johnson have thought Cowley superior in gayety to Sir John Suckling?

1613, and partly in 1622. Drayton's *Polyolbion* is a poem of about 80,000 lines in length, written in Alexandrine couplets; a measure, from its monotony, and perhaps from its frequency in doggerel ballads, not at all pleasing to the ear. It contains a topographical description of England, illustrated with a prodigality of historical and legendary erudition. Such a poem is essentially designed to instruct, and speaks to the understanding more than to the fancy. The powers displayed in it are, however, of a high cast. It has generally been a difficulty with poets to deal with a necessary enumeration of proper names. The catalogue of ships is not the most delightful part of the *Iliad*; and Ariosto never encountered such a roll of persons or places without sinking into the tamest insipidity. Virgil is splendidly beautiful upon similar occasions; but his decorative elegance could not be preserved, nor would continue to please, in a poem that kept up, through a great length, the effort to furnish instruction. The style of Drayton is sustained, with extraordinary ability, on an equable line, from which he seldom much deviates, neither brilliant nor prosaic: few or no passages could be marked as impressive, but few are languid or mean. The language is clear, strong, various, and sufficiently figurative; the stories and fictions interspersed, as well as the general spirit and liveliness, relieve the heaviness incident to topographical description. There is probably no poem of this kind, in any other language, comparable together in extent and excellence to the *Polyolbion*; nor can any one read a portion of it without admiration for its learned and highly gifted author. Yet perhaps no English poem, known as well by name, is so little known beyond its name; for, while its immense length deters the common reader, it affords, as has just been hinted, no great harvest for selection, and would be judged very unfairly by partial extracts. It must be owned also, that geography and antiquities may, in modern times, be taught better in prose than in verse; yet whoever consults the *Polyolbion* for such objects will probably be repaid by petty knowledge which he may not have found anywhere else.

45. Among these historical poets I should incline to class William Browne, author of a poem with the quaint title of *Britannia's Pastorals*; though his story, one of little interest, seems to have been invented by himself. Browne, indeed, is of no distinct school among the

*Browne's
Britannia's
Pastorals.*

writers of that age: he seems to recognize Spenser as his master; but his own manner is more to be traced among later than earlier poets. He was a native of Devonshire; and his principal poem, above mentioned, relating partly to the local scenery of that county, was printed in 1613. Browne is truly a poet, full of imagination, grace, and sweetness, though not very nervous or rapid. I know not why Headley, favorable enough for the most part to this generation of the sons of song, has spoken of Browne with unfair contempt. Justice, however, has been done to him by later critics.¹ But I have not observed that they take notice of what is remarkable in the history of our poetical literature, that Browne is an early model of ease and variety in the regular couplet. Many passages in his unequal poem are hardly excelled, in this respect, by the fables of Dryden. It is manifest that Milton was well acquainted with the writings of Browne.

46. The commendation of improving the rhythm of the couplet is due also to Sir John Beaumont, author of *Sir John Beaumont*, a short poem on the battle of Bosworth Field. It was not written, however, so early as the *Britannia's Pastorals* of Browne. In other respects, it has no pretensions to a high rank. But it may be added, that a poem of Drummond, on the visit of James I. to Scotland in 1617, is perfectly harmonious; and, what is very remarkable in that age, he concludes the verse at every couplet with the regularity of Pope.

47. Far unlike the poem of Browne was *Gondibert*, published by Sir William Davenant in 1650. It may probably have been reckoned by himself an epic; but in that age the practice of Spain and Italy had effaced the distinction between the regular epic and the heroic romance. *Gondibert* belongs rather to the latter class by the entire want of truth in the story, though the scene is laid at the court of the Lombard kings; by the deficiency of unity in the action; by the intricacy of the events; and by the resources of the fable, which are sometimes too much in the style of comic fiction. It is so imperfect, only two books and part of the

¹ "Browne," Mr. Southey says, "is a poet who produced no slight effect upon his contemporaries. George Wither, in his happiest pieces, has learned the manner of his friend; and Milton may be traced to him. And, in our days, his peculiarities have been caught, and his beauties imitated by men who will themselves find admirers and imitators hereafter." "His poetry," Mr. Campbell, a far less indulgent judge of the older bards, observes, "is not without beauty; but it is the beauty of mere landscape and allegory, without the manners and passions that constitute human interest." — *Specimens of English Poetry*, iv. 323.

third being completed, that we can hardly judge of the termination it was to receive. Each book, however, after the manner of Spenser, is divided into several cantos. It contains about 6,000 lines. The metre is the four-lined stanza of alternate rhymes; one capable of great vigor, but not perhaps well adapted to poetry of imagination or of passion. These, however, Davenant exhibits but sparingly in *Gondibert*: they are replaced by a philosophical spirit, in the tone of Sir John Davies, who had adopted the same metre, and, as some have thought, nourished by the author's friendly intercourse with Hobbes. *Gondibert* is written in a clear, nervous English style: its condensation produces some obscurity; but pedantry, at least that of language, will rarely be found in it; and Davenant is less infected by the love of conceit and of extravagance than his contemporaries, though I would not assert that he is wholly exempt from the former blemish. But the chief praise of *Gondibert* is due to masculine verse in a good metrical cadence; for the sake of which we may forgive the absence of interest in the story, and even of those glowing words and breathing thoughts which are the soul of genuine poetry. *Gondibert* is very little read; yet it is better worth reading than the *Purple Island*, though it may have less of that which distinguishes a poet from another man.

48. The sonnets of Shakspeare — for we now come to the minor, that is the shorter and more lyric, poetry of ^{Sonnets of} the age — were published in 1609, in a manner as ^{Shakspeare.} mysterious as their subject and contents. They are dedicated by an editor (Thomas Thorpe, a bookseller) "to Mr. W. H., the only begetter of these sonnets."¹ No one, as far as I remember, has ever doubted their genuineness; no one can doubt that they express not only real but intense emotions of the heart: but when they were written, who was the W. H. quaintly called their begetter, by which we can only understand the cause of their being written, and to what persons or circumstances they allude, has of late years been the subject of much curiosity. These sonnets were long over-

¹ The precise words of the dedication are the following: —

"To the only Begetter
Of these ensuing Sonnets,
Mr. W. H.,
All Happiness
And that eternity promised
By our ever-living poet

Wisheth the
Well-wishing Adventurer
In setting forth
T. T.

The titlepage runs: "Shakspeare's Sonnets, never before imprinted, 4to. 1609. G. Ed for T. T."

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¹ This has been done in a late publication, *Shakspeare's Autobiographical Poem*, by George Armitage Brown (1838). It might have occurred to any attentive reader; but I do not know that the analysis was ever so completely made before, though almost every one has been aware that different persons are addressed in the

former and latter part of the sonnets. Mr. Brown's work did not fall into my hands till nearly the time that these sheets passed through the press, which I mention on account of some coincidences of opinion, especially as to Shakspeare's knowledge of Latin.

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¹ "It seems to me, that the sonnets could only have come from a man deeply in love, and in love with a woman; and there is one sonnet, which, from its incongruity, I take to be a purposed blind."—*Table Talk*, vol. ii. p. 180. This sonnet the editor supposes to be the twentieth, which certainly could not have been addressed to a woman; but the proof is equally strong as to most of the rest. Coleridge's opinion is absolutely untenable; nor do I conceive that any one else is likely to maintain it after reading the sonnets of Shakspeare: but, to those who have not done this, the authority may justly seem imposing.

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Drake has fixed on Lord Southampton as the object of these sonnets, induced probably by the tradition of his friendship with Shakspeare, and by the latter's having dedicated to him his *Venus and Adonis*, as well as by what is remarkable on the face of the series of sonnets,—that Shakspeare looked up to his friend "with reverence and homage." But, unfortunately, this was only the reverence and homage of an inferior to one of high rank, and not such as the virtues of Southampton might have challenged. Proofs of the low moral character of "Mr. W. H." are continual. It was also impossible that Lord Southampton could be called "beauteous and lovely youth," or "sweet boy." Mrs. Jameson, in her *Lives of the Poets*, has adopted the same hypothesis, but is forced

of finding the necessary rhymes in our language has caused most who have attempted the sonnet to swerve from laws which cannot be transgressed, at least to the degree they have often dared, without losing the unity for which that complex mechanism was contrived. Certainly three quatrains of alternate rhymes, succeeded by a couplet, which Drummond, like many other English poets, has sometimes given us, is the very worst form of the sonnet, even if, in deference to a scanty number of Italian precedents, we allow it to pass as a sonnet at all.¹ We possess, indeed, noble poetry in the form of sonnet; yet with us it seems more fitted for grave than amatory composition: in the latter we miss the facility and grace of our native English measures, the song, the madrigal, or the ballad.

52. Carew is the most celebrated among the lighter poets, though no collection has hitherto embraced his entire writings. Headley has said, and Ellis echoes the ^{Carew} praise, that "Carew has the ease without the pedantry of Waller, and perhaps less conceit. Waller is too exclusively considered as the first man who brought versification to any thing like its present standard. Carew's pretensions to the same merit are seldom sufficiently either considered or allowed." Yet, in point of versification, others of the same age seem to have surpassed Carew, whose lines are often very harmonious, but not so artfully constructed or so uniformly pleasing as those of Waller. He is remarkably unequal: the best of his little poems (none of more than thirty lines are good) excel all of his time; but, after a few lines of great beauty, we often come to some ill-expressed or obscure or

¹ The legitimate sonnet consists of two quatrains and two tercets: as much skill, to say the least, is required for the management of the latter as of the former. The rhymes of the last six lines are capable of many arrangements; but by far the worst, and also the least common in Italy, is that we usually adopt,—the fifth and sixth rhyming together, frequently after a full pause, so that the sonnet ends with the point of an epigram. The best, as the Italians hold, is the rhyming together of the three uneven and the three even lines; but, as our language is less rich in consonant terminations, there can be no objection to what has abundant precedents even in theirs,—the rhyming of the first and fourth, second and fifth, third and sixth lines. This, with a break in the sense at

the third line, will make a real sonnet, which Shakspeare, Milton, Bowles, and Wordsworth have often failed to give us, even where they have given us something good instead.

[The common form of the Italian sonnet is called *rime chiuse*; where the rhymes of the two quatrains are 1, 4, 5, 8—2, 3, 6, 7; but the alternate rhyme sometimes, though less regularly, occurs. The tercets are either in *rime incatenate*, or *rime alternate*; and great variety is found in these, even among the early poets. Quadrio prefers the order a, b, a, b, a, b, where there are only two rhyming terminations; but does not object to a, b, c, a, b, c; or even a, b, c, b, a, c. The couplet termination he entirely condemns. Quadrio, *Storia d'ogni Poesia*, iii. 25. — 1842.]

weak or unimagination passage. Few will hesitate to acknowledge that he has more fancy and more tenderness than Waller, but less energy, less judgment and knowledge where to employ any of the equality which never offends, less attention to the unity and thread of his little pieces. I should hesitate to give him on the whole the preference as a poet, taking collectively the attributes of that character; for we must not, in such a *comparative overlook* a good deal of very inferior merit which may be found in the short volume of Carew's poems. The best have great beauty; but he has had, in late criticism, his full share of applause. Two of his most pleasing little poems appear also among those of Herrick; and as Carew's were, I believe, published posthumously. I am rather inclined to prefer the claim of the other poet, independently of some internal evidence as to one of them. In all ages, these very short compositions circulate for a time in polished society, while mistakes as to the real author are natural.¹

53. The minor poetry of Ben Jonson is extremely beautiful. This is partly mixed with his masques and interludes, poetical and musical rather than dramatic pieces, and intended to gratify the imagination by the charms of song, as well as by the varied scenes that were brought before the eye; partly in very short effusions of a single sentiment, among which two epitaphs are known by heart. Jonson possessed an admirable taste and feeling in poetry, which his dramas, except the *Sad Shepherd*, do not entirely lead us to value highly enough; and, when we consider how many other intellectual excellences distinguished him, — wit, observation, judgment, memory, learning, — we must acknowledge that the inscription on his tomb, "O rare Ben Jonson!" is not more pithy than it is true.

¹ One of these poems begins, —

"Amongst the myrtles as I walk'd,
Love and my sighs thus intertalk'd."

Herrick wants four good lines which are in Carew; and, as they are rather more likely to have been interpolated than left out, this leads to a sort of inference that he was the original: there are also some other petty improvements. The second poem is that beginning, —

"Ask me why I send you here
This firstling of the infant year."

Herrick gives the second line strangely,

"This sweet infant of the year,"

which is little else than nonsense; and all

the other variations are for the worse. I must leave it in doubt whether he borrowed, and disfigured a little, or was himself improved upon. I must own that he has a trick of spoiling what he takes. Suckling has an incomparable image on a lady dancing: —

"Her feet beneath the petticoat,
Like little swiss, stole in and out,
As if they feared the light."

Herrick has it thus: —

"Her pretty feet, like snails, did creep
A little out;"

a most singular parallel for an elegant dancer.

54. George Wither, by siding with the less poetical though more prosperous party in the civil war, and by a profusion of temporary writings to serve the ends of faction and folly, has left a name which we were accustomed to despise, till Ellis did justice to "that playful fancy, pure taste, and artless delicacy of sentiment, which distinguish the poetry of his early youth." His best poems were published in 1622, with the title, *Mistress of Philarete*. Some of them are highly beautiful, and bespeak a mind above the grovelling Puritanism into which he afterwards fell. I think there is hardly any thing in our lyric poetry of this period equal to Wither's lines on his Muse, published by Ellis.¹

55. The poetry of Habington is that of a pure and amiable mind, turned to versification by the custom of the age, during a real passion for a lady of birth and virtue, the Castara whom he afterwards married; but it displays no great original power, nor is it by any means exempt from the ordinary blemishes of hyperbolical compliment and far-fetched imagery. The poems of William, Earl of Pembroke, long known by the character drawn for him by Clarendon, and now as the object of Shakspeare's dotting friendship, were ushered into the world after his death, with a letter of extravagant flattery addressed by Donne to Christiana, Countess of Devonshire.² But there is little reliance to be placed on the freedom from interpolation of these posthumous editions. Among these poems attributed to Lord Pembroke, we find one of the best known of Carew's;³ and even the famous lines addressed to the Soul, which some have given to Silvester. The poems, in general, are of little merit; some are grossly indecent; nor would they be mentioned here except for the interest recently attached to the author's name. But they throw no light whatever on the sonnets of Shakspeare.

56. Sir John Suckling is acknowledged to have left far behind him all former writers of song in gayety and ease: it is not equally clear that he has ever since been surpassed. His poetry aims at no higher praise: he shows no sentiment or imagination, either because he had

¹ Ellis's *Specimens of Early English Poets*, iii. 96.

² The only edition that I have seen, or that I find mentioned, of Lord Pembroke's poems, is in 1680. But, as Donne died in 1631, I conceive that there must be one

of earlier date. The Countess of Devonshire is not called dowager: her husband died in 1643.

³ "Ask me no more whither do stray
The golden atoms of the day."

them not, or because he did not require either in the style he chose. Perhaps the Italians may have poetry in that style equal to Suckling's; I do not know that they have, nor do I believe that there is any in French: that there is none in

Latin I am convinced.¹ Lovelace is chiefly known

by a single song: his other poetry is much inferior; and indeed it may be generally remarked, that the flowers of our early verse, both in the Elizabethan and the subsequent age, have been well culled by good taste and a friendly spirit of selection. We must not judge of them, or shall judge of them very favorably, by the extracts of Headley or Ellia.

57. The most amorous and among the best of our amorous poets was Robert Herrick, a clergyman ejected from his living in Devonshire by the Long Parliament, whose "*Hesperides, or Poems Human and Divine*," were published in 1648. Herrick's divine poems are, of course, such as might be presumed by their title and by his calling; of his human, which are poetically much superior, and probably written in early life, the greater portion is light and voluptuous, while some border on the licentious and indecent. A selection was published in 1815, by which, as commonly happens, the poetical fame of Herrick does not suffer: a number of dull epigrams are omitted; and the editor has a manifest preference for what must be owned to be the most elegant and attractive part of his author's rhymes. He has much of the lively grace that distinguishes Anacreon and Catullus, and approaches also, with a less cloying monotony, to the *Basia* of Johannes Secundus. Herrick has as much variety as the poetry of kisses can well have; but his love is in a very slight degree that of sentiment, or even any intense passion: his mistresses have little to recommend them, even in his own eyes, save their beauties; and none of these are omitted in his catalogues. Yet he is abundant in the resources of verse: without the exuberant gayety of Suckling, or perhaps the delicacy of Carew, he is sportive, fanciful, and generally of polished language. The faults of his age are sometimes apparent: though he is not often obscure, he runs, more perhaps for the sake of variety than any other cause, into occasional pedantry. He has his conceits and false thoughts; but these are more than redeemed by the numerous

¹ Suckling's *Epithalamium*, though not written for those "qui muna colitis se-
veriores," has been read by almost all the world, and is a matchless piece of liveliness and facility.

very little poems (for those of Herrick are frequently not longer than epigrams), which may be praised without much more qualification than belongs to such poetry.

58. John Milton was born in 1609. Few are ignorant of his life, in recovering and recording every circumstance of which no diligence has been spared, nor has it often been unsuccessful. Of his Latin poetry, some was written at the age of seventeen; in English, we have nothing, I believe, the date of which is known to be earlier than the sonnet on entering his twenty-third year. In 1634 he wrote *Comus*, which was published in 1637. *Lycidas* was written in the latter year; and most of his shorter pieces soon afterwards, except the sonnets, some of which do not come within the first half of the century.

59. *Comus* was sufficient to convince any one of taste and feeling, that a great poet had arisen in England, and one partly formed in a different school from his contemporaries. Many of them had produced highly beautiful and imaginative passages; but none had evinced so classical a judgment, none had aspired to so regular a perfection. Jonson had learned much from the ancients; but there was a grace in their best models which he did not quite attain. Neither his *Sad Shepherd* nor the *Faithful Shepherdess* of Fletcher have the elegance or dignity of *Comus*. A noble virgin and her young brothers, by whom this masque was originally represented, required an elevation, a purity, a sort of severity of sentiment, which no one in that age could have given but Milton. He avoided, and nothing loath, the more festive notes which dramatic poetry was wont to mingle with its serious strain. But for this he compensated by the brightest hues of fancy and the sweetest melody of song. In *Comus* we find nothing prosaic or feeble, no false taste in the incidents, and not much in the language; nothing over which we should desire to pass on a second perusal. The want of what we may call personality, — none of the characters having names, except *Comus* himself, who is a very indefinite being, — and the absence of all positive attributes of time and place, enhance the ideality of the fiction by a certain indistinctness not displeasing to the imagination.

60. It has been said, I think very fairly, that *Lycidas* is a good test of a real feeling for what is peculiarly called poetry. Many, or, perhaps we might say,

writers of that age: he seems to recognize Spenser as his master; but his own manner is more to be traced among later than earlier poets. He was a native of Devonshire; and his principal poem, above mentioned, relating partly to the local scenery of that county, was printed in 1613. Browne is truly a poet, full of imagination, grace, and sweetness, though not very nervous or rapid. I know not why Headley, favorable enough for the most part to this generation of the sons of song, has spoken of Browne with unfair contempt. Justice, however, has been done to him by later critics.¹ But I have not observed that they take notice of what is remarkable in the history of our poetical literature, that Browne is an early model of ease and variety in the regular couplet. Many passages in his unequal poem are hardly excelled, in this respect, by the fables of Dryden. It is manifest that Milton was well acquainted with the writings of Browne.

46. The commendation of improving the rhythm of the couplet is due also to Sir John Beaumont, author of *Sir John Beaumont*, a short poem on the battle of Bosworth Field. It was not written, however, so early as the *Britannia's Pastorals* of Browne. In other respects, it has no pretensions to a high rank. But it may be added, that a poem of Drummond, on the visit of James I. to Scotland in 1617, is perfectly harmonious; and, what is very remarkable in that age, he concludes the verse at every couplet with the regularity of Pope.

47. Far unlike the poem of Browne was *Gondibert*, published by Sir William Davenant in 1650. It may probably have been reckoned by himself an epic; but in that age the practice of Spain and Italy had effaced the distinction between the regular epic and the heroic romance. *Gondibert* belongs rather to the latter class by the entire want of truth in the story, though the scene is laid at the court of the Lombard kings; by the deficiency of unity in the action; by the intricacy of the events; and by the resources of the fable, which are sometimes too much in the style of comic fiction. It is so imperfect, only two books and part of the

¹ "Browne," Mr. Southey says, "is a poet who produced no slight effect upon his contemporaries. George Wither, in his happiest pieces, has learned the manner of his friend; and Milton may be traced to him. And, in our days, his peculiarities have been caught, and his beauties imitated by men who will themselves find admirers and imitators hereafter." "His poetry," Mr. Campbell, a far less indulgent judge of the older bards, observes, "is not without beauty; but it is the beauty of mere landscape and allegory, without the manners and passions that constitute human interest."—*Specimens of English Poetry*, iv. 323.

third being completed, that we can hardly judge of the termination it was to receive. Each book, however, after the manner of Spenser, is divided into several cantos. It contains about 6,000 lines. The metre is the four-lined stanza of alternate rhymes; one capable of great vigor, but not perhaps well adapted to poetry of imagination or of passion. These, however, Davenant exhibits but sparingly in *Gondibert*: they are replaced by a philosophical spirit, in the tone of Sir John Davies, who had adopted the same metre, and, as some have thought, nourished by the author's friendly intercourse with Hobbes. *Gondibert* is written in a clear, nervous English style: its condensation produces some obscurity; but pedantry, at least that of language, will rarely be found in it; and Davenant is less infected by the love of conceit and of extravagance than his contemporaries, though I would not assert that he is wholly exempt from the former blemish. But the chief praise of *Gondibert* is due to masculine verse in a good metrical cadence; for the sake of which we may forgive the absence of interest in the story, and even of those glowing words and breathing thoughts which are the soul of genuine poetry. *Gondibert* is very little read; yet it is better worth reading than the *Purple Island*, though it may have less of that which distinguishes a poet from another man.

48. The sonnets of Shakspeare—for we now come to the minor, that is the shorter and more lyric, poetry of ^{Sonnets of} the age—were published in 1609, in a manner as ^{Shakspeare.} mysterious as their subject and contents. They are dedicated by an editor (Thomas Thorpe, a bookseller) “to Mr. W. H., the only begetter of these sonnets.”¹ No one, as far as I remember, has ever doubted their genuineness; no one can doubt that they express not only real but intense emotions of the heart: but when they were written, who was the W. H. quaintly called their begetter, by which we can only understand the cause of their being written, and to what persons or circumstances they allude, has of late years been the subject of much curiosity. These sonnets were long over-

¹ The precise words of the dedication are the following:—

“To the only Begetter
Of these ensuing Sonnets,
Mr. W. H.,
All Happiness
And that eternity promised
By our ever-living poet

Wisheth the
Well-wishing Adventurer
In setting forth
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50. Notwithstanding the frequent beauties of these sonnets, the pleasure of their perusal is greatly diminished by these circumstances; and it is impossible not to wish that Shakespeare had never written them. There is a weakness and folly in all excessive and misplaced affection, which is not redeemed by the touches of nobler sentiments that abound in this long series of sonnets. But there are also faults of a merely critical nature. The obscurity is often such as only conjecture can penetrate; the strain of tenderness and adoration would be too monotonous, were it less unpleasing; and so many frigid conceits are scattered around, that we might almost fancy the poet to have written without genuine emotion, did not such a host of other passages attest the contrary.

51. The sonnets of Drummond of Hawthornden, the most celebrated in that class of poets, have obtained, probably, as much praise as they deserve.¹ But they are polished and elegant, free from conceit and bad taste, in pure unblemished English: some are pathetic or tender in sentiment, and, if they do not show much originality, at least would have acquired a fair place among the Italians of the sixteenth century. Those of Daniel, of Drayton, and of Sir William Alexander, afterwards Earl of Stirling, are perhaps hardly inferior. Some may doubt, however, whether the last poet should be placed on such a level.² But the difficulty

in consequence to suppose some of the earlier sonnets to be addressed to a woman.

Pembroke succeeded to his father in 1601: I incline to think that the sonnets were written about that time, some probably earlier, some later. That they were the same as Meres, in 1598, has mentioned among the compositions of Shakespeare, "his sugred sonnets among his private friends," I do not believe, both on account of the date, and from the peculiarly personal allusions they contain.

[Much has been written lately on the subject of Shakespeare's sonnets; and a natural reluctance to admit any fallings in such a man has led some to fancy that his mistress was no other than his wife, Ann Hathaway, and others to conjecture that he lent his pen to the amours of a friend. But I have seen no ground to alter my own view of the case, except that possibly some other sonnets may have been meant by Meres. — 1842.]

¹ I concur in this with Mr. Campbell, iv. 343. Mr. Southey thinks Drummond "has deserved the high reputation he has

obtained;" which seems to say the same thing, but is in fact different. He observes that Drummond "frequently borrows and sometimes translates from the Italian and Spanish poets." — Southey's *British Poets*, p. 798. The furious invective of Gifford against Drummond for having written private memoranda of his conversations with Ben Jonson, which he did not publish, and which, for aught we know, were perfectly faithful, is absurd. Any one else would have been thankful for so much literary anecdote.

² Lord Stirling is rather monotonous, as sonneteers usually are; and he addresses his mistress by the appellation, "Fair tygress." Campbell observes that there is elegance of expression in a few of Stirling's shorter pieces. — Vol. iv. p. 206. The longest poem of Stirling is entitled *Domesday*, in twelve books, or, as he calls them, hours. It is written in the Italian octave stanza, and has somewhat of the condensed style of the philosophical school, which he seems to have imitated; but his numbers are harsh.

of finding the necessary rhymes in our language has caused most who have attempted the sonnet to swerve from laws which cannot be transgressed, at least to the degree they have often dared, without losing the unity for which that complex mechanism was contrived. Certainly three quatrains of alternate rhymes, succeeded by a couplet, which Drummond, like many other English poets, has sometimes given us, is the very worst form of the sonnet, even if, in deference to a scanty number of Italian precedents, we allow it to pass as a sonnet at all.¹ We possess, indeed, noble poetry in the form of sonnet; yet with us it seems more fitted for grave than amatory composition: in the latter we miss the facility and grace of our native English measures, the song, the madrigal, or the ballad.

52. Carew is the most celebrated among the lighter poets, though no collection has hitherto embraced his entire writings. Headley has said, and Ellis echoes the ^{Carew} praise, that "Carew has the ease without the pedantry of Waller, and perhaps less conceit. Waller is too exclusively considered as the first man who brought versification to any thing like its present standard. Carew's pretensions to the same merit are seldom sufficiently either considered or allowed." Yet, in point of versification, others of the same age seem to have surpassed Carew, whose lines are often very harmonious, but not so artfully constructed or so uniformly pleasing as those of Waller. He is remarkably unequal: the best of his little poems (none of more than thirty lines are good) excel all of his time; but, after a few lines of great beauty, we often come to some ill-expressed or obscure or

¹ The legitimate sonnet consists of two quatrains and two tercets: as much skill, to say the least, is required for the management of the latter as of the former. The rhymes of the last six lines are capable of many arrangements; but by far the worst, and also the least common in Italy, is that we usually adopt, — the fifth and sixth rhyming together, frequently after a full pause, so that the sonnet ends with the point of an epigram. The best, as the Italians hold, is the rhyming together of the three uneven and the three even lines; but, as our language is less rich in consonant terminations, there can be no objection to what has abundant precedents even in theirs, — the rhyming of the first and fourth, second and fifth, third and sixth lines. This, with a break in the sense at

the third line, will make a real sonnet, which Shakspeare, Milton, Bowles, and Wordsworth have often failed to give us, even where they have given us something good instead.

[The common form of the Italian sonnet is called *rima chiusa*; where the rhymes of the two quatrains are 1, 4, 5, 8 — 2, 3, 6, 7; but the alternate rhyme sometimes, though less regularly, occurs. The tercets are either in *rima incatenata*, or *rima alternata*; and great variety is found in these, even among the early poets. Quadrio prefers the order a, b, a, b, a, b, where there are only two rhyming terminations; but does not object to a, b, c, a, b, c; or even a, b, c, b, a, c. The couplet termination he entirely condemns. Quadrio, *Storia d' ogni Poesia*, iii. 25. — 1842.]

weak or inharmonious passage. Few will hesitate to acknowledge, that he has more fancy and more tenderness than Waller, but less choice, less judgment and knowledge where to stop, less of the equability which never offends, less attention to the unity and thread of his little pieces. I should hesitate to give him, on the whole, the preference as a poet, taking collectively the attributes of that character; for we must not, in such a comparison, overlook a good deal of very inferior merit which may be found in the short volume of Carew's poems. The best have great beauty; but he has had, in late criticism, his full share of applause. Two of his most pleasing little poems appear also among those of Herrick; and as Carew's were, I believe, published posthumously, I am rather inclined to prefer the claim of the other poet, independently of some internal evidence as to one of them. In all ages, these very short compositions circulate for a time in polished society, while mistakes as to the real author are natural.¹

53. The minor poetry of Ben Jonson is extremely beautiful. This is partly mixed with his masques and interludes, poetical and musical rather than dramatic pieces, and intended to gratify the imagination by the charms of song, as well as by the varied scenes that were brought before the eye; partly in very short effusions of a single sentiment, among which two epitaphs are known by heart. Jonson possessed an admirable taste and feeling in poetry, which his dramas, except the *Sad Shepherd*, do not entirely lead us to value highly enough; and, when we consider how many other intellectual excellences distinguished him, — wit, observation, judgment, memory, learning, — we must acknowledge that the inscription on his tomb, "O rare Ben Jonson!" is not more pithy than it is true.

¹ One of these poems begins, —

"Amongst the myrtles as I walk'd,
Love and my sighs thus intertalk'd."

Herrick wants four good lines which are in Carew; and, as they are rather more likely to have been interpolated than left out, this leads to a sort of inference that he was the original: there are also some other petty improvements. The second poem is that beginning, —

"Ask me why I send you here
This firstling of the infant year."

Herrick gives the second line strangely,

"This sweet infant of the year,"

which is little else than nonsense; and all

the other variations are for the worse. I must leave it in doubt whether he borrowed, and disfigured a little, or was himself improved upon. I must own that he has a trick of spoiling what he takes. Suckling has an incomparable image on a lady dancing: —

"Her feet beneath the petticoat,
Like little mice, stole in and out,
As if they feared the light."

Herrick has it thus: —

"Her pretty feet, like snails, did creep
A little out;"

a most singular parallel for an elegant dancer.

54. George Wither, by siding with the less poetical though more prosperous party in the civil war, and by a profusion of temporary writings to serve the ends of faction and folly, has left a name which we were accustomed to despise, till Ellis did justice to "that playful fancy, pure taste, and artless delicacy of sentiment, which distinguish the poetry of his early youth." His best poems were published in 1622, with the title, *Mistress of Philarete*. Some of them are highly beautiful, and bespeak a mind above the grovelling Puritanism into which he afterwards fell. I think there is hardly any thing in our lyric poetry of this period equal to Wither's lines on his Muse, published by Ellis.¹

55. The poetry of Habington is that of a pure and amiable mind, turned to versification by the custom of the age, during a real passion for a lady of birth and virtue, the Castara whom he afterwards married; but it displays no great original power, nor is it by any means exempt from the ordinary blemishes of hyperbolical compliment and far-fetched imagery. The poems of William, Earl of Pembroke, long known by the character drawn for him by Clarendon, and now as the object of Shakspeare's dotting friendship, were ushered into the world after his death, with a letter of extravagant flattery addressed by Donne to Christiana, Countess of Devonshire.² But there is little reliance to be placed on the freedom from interpolation of these posthumous editions. Among these poems attributed to Lord Pembroke, we find one of the best known of Carew's;³ and even the famous lines addressed to the Soul, which some have given to Silvester. The poems, in general, are of little merit; some are grossly indecent; nor would they be mentioned here except for the interest recently attached to the author's name. But they throw no light whatever on the sonnets of Shakspeare.

56. Sir John Suckling is acknowledged to have left far behind him all former writers of song in gayety and ease: it is not equally clear that he has ever since been surpassed. His poetry aims at no higher praise: he shows no sentiment or imagination, either because he had

¹ Ellis's *Specimens of Early English Poets*, iii. 96.

² The only edition that I have seen, or that I find mentioned, of Lord Pembroke's poems, is in 1680. But, as Donne died in 1631, I conceive that there must be one

of earlier date. The Countess of Devonshire is not called dowager: her husband died in 1648.

³ "Ask me no more whither do stray
The golden atoms of the day."

them not, or because he did not require either in the style he chose. Perhaps the Italians may have poetry in that style equal to Suckling's; I do not know that they have, nor do I believe that there is any in French: that there is none in Latin I am convinced.¹ Lovelace is chiefly known

Lovelace. by a single song: his other poetry is much inferior; and indeed it may be generally remarked, that the flowers of our early verse, both in the Elizabethan and the subsequent age, have been well culled by good taste and a friendly spirit of selection. We must not judge of them, or shall judge of them very favorably, by the extracts of Headley or Ellis.

57. The most amorous and among the best of our amorous poets was Robert Herrick, a clergyman ejected from his living in Devonshire by the Long Parliament, whose "*Hesperides, or Poems Human and Divine*," were published in 1648. Herrick's divine poems are, of course, such as might be presumed by their title and by his calling; of his human, which are poetically much superior, and probably written in early life, the greater portion is light and voluptuous, while some border on the licentious and indecent. A selection was published in 1815, by which, as commonly happens, the poetical fame of Herrick does not suffer: a number of dull epigrams are omitted; and the editor has a manifest preference for what must be owned to be the most elegant and attractive part of his author's rhymes. He has much of the lively grace that distinguishes Anacreon and Catullus, and approaches also, with a less cloying monotony, to the *Basia* of Johannes Secundus. Herrick has as much variety as the poetry of kisses can well have; but his love is in a very slight degree that of sentiment, or even any intense passion: his mistresses have little to recommend them, even in his own eyes, save their beauties; and none of these are omitted in his catalogues. Yet he is abundant in the resources of verse: without the exuberant gayety of Suckling, or perhaps the delicacy of Carew, he is sportive, fanciful, and generally of polished language. The faults of his age are sometimes apparent: though he is not often obscure, he runs, more perhaps for the sake of variety than any other cause, into occasional pedantry. He has his conceits and false thoughts; but these are more than redeemed by the numerous

¹ Suckling's *Epithalamium*, though not written for those "qui musas colitis severiores," has been read by almost all the world, and is a matchless piece of liveliness and facility.

very little poems (for those of Herrick are frequently not longer than epigrams), which may be praised without much more qualification than belongs to such poetry.

58. John Milton was born in 1609. Few are ignorant of his life, in recovering and recording every circumstance of which no diligence has been spared, nor ^{Milton.} has it often been unsuccessful. Of his Latin poetry, some was written at the age of seventeen; in English, we have nothing, I believe, the date of which is known to be earlier than the sonnet on entering his twenty-third year. In 1634 he wrote *Comus*, which was published in 1637. *Lycidas* was written in the latter year; and most of his shorter pieces soon afterwards, except the sonnets, some of which do not come within the first half of the century.

59. *Comus* was sufficient to convince any one of taste and feeling, that a great poet had arisen in England, and ^{His *Comus*.} one partly formed in a different school from his contemporaries. Many of them had produced highly beautiful and imaginative passages; but none had evinced so classical a judgment, none had aspired to so regular a perfection. Jonson had learned much from the ancients; but there was a grace in their best models which he did not quite attain. Neither his *Sad Shepherd* nor the *Faithful Shepherdess* of Fletcher have the elegance or dignity of *Comus*. A noble virgin and her young brothers, by whom this masque was originally represented, required an elevation, a purity, a sort of severity of sentiment, which no one in that age could have given but Milton. He avoided, and nothing loath, the more festive notes which dramatic poetry was wont to mingle with its serious strain. But for this he compensated by the brightest hues of fancy and the sweetest melody of song. In *Comus* we find nothing prosaic or feeble, no false taste in the incidents, and not much in the language; nothing over which we should desire to pass on a second perusal. The want of what we may call personality, — none of the characters having names, except *Comus* himself, who is a very indefinite being, — and the absence of all positive attributes of time and place, enhance the ideality of the fiction by a certain indistinctness not displeasing to the imagination.

60. It has been said, I think very fairly, that *Lycidas* is a good test of a real feeling for what is peculiarly ^{*Lycidas*.} called poetry. Many, or, perhaps we might say,

most readers do not taste its excellence; nor does it follow that they may not greatly admire Pope and Dryden, or even Virgil and Homer. It is, however, somewhat remarkable that Johnson, who has committed his critical reputation by the most contemptuous depreciation of this poem, had, in an earlier part of his life, selected the tenth eclogue of Virgil for peculiar praise.¹ — the tenth eclogue, which, beautiful as it is, belongs to the same class of pastoral and personal allegory, and requires the same sacrifice of reasoning criticism, as the *Lycidas* itself. In the age of Milton, the poetical world had been accustomed by the Italian and Spanish writers to a more abundant use of allegory than has been pleasing to their posterity; but *Lycidas* is not so much in the nature of an allegory as of a masque: the characters pass before our eyes in imagination, as on the stage; they are chiefly mythological, but not creations of the poet. Our sympathy with the fate of *Lycidas* may not be much stronger than for the desertion of Gallus by his mistress; but many poems will yield an exquisite pleasure to the imagination that produce no emotion in the heart, or none at least except through associations independent of the subject.

61. The introduction of St. Peter, after the fabulous deities of the sea, has appeared an incongruity deserving of censure to some admirers of this poem. It would be very reluctantly that we could abandon to this criticism the most splendid passage it presents. But the censure rests, as I think, on too narrow a principle. In narrative or dramatic poetry, where something like illusion or momentary belief is to be produced, the mind requires an objective possibility, a capacity of real existence, not only in all the separate portions of the imagined story, but in their coherency and relation to a common whole. Whatever is obviously incongruous, whatever shocks our previous knowledge of possibility, destroys, to a certain extent, that acquiescence in the fiction, which it is the true business of the fiction to produce. But the case is not the same in such poems as *Lycidas*. They pretend to no credibility; they aim at no illusion: they are read with the willing abandonment of the imagination to a waking dream, and require only that general possibility, that combination of images which common experience does not reject as incompatible, without which the fancy of the poet would

¹ *Adventurer*, No. 92.

be only like that of the lunatic. And it had been so usual to blend sacred with mythological personages in allegory, that no one probably in Milton's age would have been struck by the objection.

62. The *Allegro* and *Penseroso* are perhaps more familiar to us than any part of the writings of Milton. *Allegro and Penseroso.* They satisfy the critics, and they delight mankind. The choice of images is so judicious, their succession so rapid, the allusions are so various and pleasing, the leading distinction of the poems is so felicitously maintained, the versification is so animated, that we may place them at the head of that long series of descriptive poems which our language has to boast. It may be added, as in the greater part of Milton's writings, that they are sustained at an uniform pitch, with few blemishes of expression, and scarce any feebleness; a striking contrast, in this respect, to all the contemporaneous poetry, except perhaps that of Waller. Johnson has thought, that, while there is no mirth in his melancholy, he can detect some melancholy in his mirth. This seems to be too strongly put; but it may be said that his *Allegro* is rather cheerful than gay, and that even his cheerfulness is not always without effort. In these poems he is indebted to Fletcher, to Burton, to Browne, to Wither, and probably to more of our early versifiers; for he was a great collector of sweets from those wild flowers.

63. The *Ode on the Nativity*, far less popular than most of the poetry of Milton, is perhaps the finest in the *Ode on the Nativity.* English language. A grandeur, a simplicity, a breadth of manner, an imagination at once elevated and restrained by the subject, reign throughout it. If Pindar is a model of lyric poetry, it would be hard to name any other ode so truly Pindaric; but more has naturally been derived from the Scriptures. Of the other short poems, that on the death of the Marchioness of Winchester deserves particular mention. It is pity that the first lines are bad, and the last much worse; for rarely can we find more feeling or beauty than in some other passages.

64. The sonnets of Milton have obtained of late years the admiration of all real lovers of poetry. Johnson *His Sonnets.* has been as impotent to fix the public taste in this instance as in his other criticisms on the smaller poems of the author of *Paradise Lost*. These sonnets are indeed unequal;

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4th. *FRANCE* is the heart part of the nineteenth century, and was particularly fruitful of Latin poetry: it was the pride of her scholars, and sometimes of her scholars. In the age that we have now in review, we do not find so many conspicuous names; but the custom of ~~university~~ *university* education, and especially of the seminaries conducted by the *Jesuits*, kept up a facility of Latin versification, which it was by no means hard pedantic or ridiculous to exhibit in riper years. The French enunciate several with grace: *Crimin*; *Bourbon* (*Borbonius*), whom some have compared with the best of the preceding century, and among whom *primo* that on the death of Henry IV. is reckoned the best; *Corinthen*, equal, as some of his admirers think, to *Sallustianus*, and superior, as others presume, to *Horace*; and *Potavius*, who, having solaced his leisure hours with Greek

and Hebrew, as well as Latin versification, has obtained in the last the general suffrage of critics.¹ I can speak of none of these from direct knowledge, except of Borbonius, whose *Diræ* on the death of Henry have not appeared, to my judgment, deserving of so much eulogy.

67. The Germans wrote much in Latin, especially in the earlier decades of this period. Melissus Schedius, ^{In Germany and Italy.} not undistinguished in his native tongue, might have been mentioned as a Latin poet in the last volume; since most of his compositions were published in the sixteenth century. In Italy we have not many conspicuous names. The bad taste that infested the school of Marini spread also, according to Tiraboschi, over Latin poetry. Martial, Lucan, and Claudian became in their eyes better models than Catullus and Virgil. Baillet, or rather those whom he copies, and among whom Rossi (author of the *Pinacotheca Virorum Illustrum*, under the name of Erythræus, a profuse and indiscriminating panegyrist, for the most part, of his contemporaries) furnishes the chief materials, bestows praise on Cesarini, on Querenghi, whom even Tiraboschi selects from the crowd, and on Maffei Barberini, best known as Pope Urban VIII.

68. Holland stood at the head of Europe in this line of poetry. Grotius has had the reputation of writing ^{In Holland: Heinsius.} with spirit, elegance, and imagination.² But he is excelled by Heinsius, whose elegies, still more than his hexameters, may be ranked high in modern Latin. The habit, however, of classical imitation, has so much weakened all individual originality in these versifiers, that it is often difficult to distinguish them, or to pronounce of any twenty lines that they might not have been written by some other author. Compare, for example, the elegies of Buchanan with those of Heinsius, wherever there are no proper names to guide us.

¹ Baillet, *Jugemens des Savans*, has criticised all these and several more. Rapin's opinion on Latin poetry is entitled to much regard from his own excellence in it. He praises three lyrists, — Casimir, Magdalenet, and Cérantes; the two latter being French. "Barbicus a de l'élevation, mais sans pureté; Magdalenet est pur, mais sans élévation. Cérantes a joint dans ses odes l'un et l'autre; car il écrit noblement, et d'un style assez pur. Après tout, il n'a pas tant de feu que Casimir, lequel avoit bien de l'esprit, et de cet esprit heureux qui fait les poètes. Buchanan a des odes dignes de l'antiquité, mais il a de grandes inégalités par le mélange de son caractère qui n'est pas assez uni." — *Réflexions sur la Poétique*, p. 208.

² [The *Adamus Exul* of Grotius, which, after going through several editions in Holland before the middle of the seventeenth century, has lately been retranslated by Mr. Barham, is not only of considerable poetical merit, but deserving of notice, as having suggested much to Milton. Lauder perceived this, but was strangely led to exaggerate the resemblance by forgery. — 1847.]

[illegible]

Lautrecque matrix virginis crimon
prius.

A review on the poems of Helms
et. la fued in the Retrospective Review.
v. 10 p. 49 but notwithstanding the
laudatory spirit, which is for the most
part non-indiscriminating in that publica-
tion, the reviewer has not done justice to
Helms, and hardly seems, perhaps, a
very competent judge of Latin verse.
The suffrages of those who were so, in
favor of the Retrosive post, are collected
by Hallett. n. 1682.

language the commonplaces with which his subject happens to furnish him. He is to a certain degree, in Latin poetry, what Chiabrera is in Italian, but does not deserve so high a place. Sarbievius was perhaps the first who succeeded much in the Alcaic stanza, which the earlier poets seem to avoid, or to use unskilfully. But he has many unwarrantable licenses in his metre, and even false quantities, as is common to the great majority of these Latin versifiers.

70. Gasper Barlæus had as high a name, perhaps, as any Latin poet of this age. His rhythm is indeed excellent; but, if he ever rises to other excellence, I have not lighted on the passages. Barlæus. A greater equality I have never found than in Barlæus: nothing is bad, nothing is striking. It was the practice with Dutchmen on their marriage to purchase epithalamiums in hexameter verse; and the muse of Barlæus was in request. These nuptial songs are of course about Peleus and Thetis, or similar personages, interspersed with fitting praises of the bride and bridegroom. Such poetry is not likely to rise high. The *epicedia*, or funeral lamentations, paid for by the heir, are little, if at all, better than the *epithalamia*; and the panegyrical effusions on public or private events rather worse. The elegies of Barlæus, as we generally find, are superior to the hexameters: he has here the same smoothness of versification, and a graceful gayety which gives us pleasure. In some of his elegies and epistles, he counterfeits the Ovidian style extremely well, so that they might pass for those of his model. Still there is an equability, a recurrence of trivial thoughts and forms, which, in truth, is too much characteristic of modern Latin to be a reproach to Barlæus. He uses the polysyllabic termination less than earlier Dutch poets. One of the *epithalamia* of Barlæus, it may be observed before we leave him, is entitled *Paradisus*, and recounts the nuptials of Adam and Eve. It is possible that Milton may have seen this: the fourth book of the *Paradise Lost* compresses the excessive diffuseness of Barlæus; but the ideas are in great measure the same. Yet, since this must naturally be the case, we cannot presume imitation. Few of the poems of Barlæus are so redundant as this: he has the gift of stringing together mythological parallels and descriptive poetry without stint; and his discretion does not inform him where to stop.

71. The eight books of *Sylvæ* by Balde, a German eccle-

siastic, are extolled by Baillet and Bouterwek far above their value: the odes are tumid and unclassical; yet Balde. some have called him equal to Horace. Heinsius Greek poem of Heinsius. tried his skill in Greek verse. His *Peplus Græcorum Epigrammatum* was published in 1613. These are what our schoolboys would call very indifferent in point of elegance, and, as I should conceive, of accuracy: articles and expletives (as they used to be happily called) are perpetually employed for the sake of the metre, not of the sense.

72. Scotland might perhaps contend with Holland in this as well as in the preceding age. In the *Deliciæ Poetarum Scotorum*, published in 1637 by Arthur Jonston, we find about an equal produce of each century; the whole number being thirty-seven. Those of Jonston himself, and some elegies by Scot of Scotstarvet, are among the best. The Scots certainly wrote Latin with a good ear, and considerable elegance of phrase. A sort of critical controversy was carried on in the last century as to the versions of the Psalms by Buchanan and Jonston. Though the national honor may seem equally secure by the superiority of either, it has, I believe, been usual in Scotland to maintain the older poet against all the world. I am nevertheless inclined to think, that Jonston's Psalms, all of which are in elegiac metre, do not fall short of those of Buchanan, either in elegance of style or in correctness of Latinity. In the 137th, with which Buchanan has taken much pains, he may be allowed the preference, but not at a great interval; and he has attained this superiority by too much diffuseness.

73. Nothing good, and hardly tolerable, in a poetical sense, Owen's epigrams. had appeared in Latin verse among ourselves till this period. Owen's epigrams (*Audoeni Epigrammata*), a well-known collection, were published in 1607: unequal enough, they are sometimes neat, and more often witty; but they scarcely aspire to the name of poetry. Alabaster's Roxana. Alabaster, a man of recondite Hebrew learning, published in 1632 his tragedy of *Roxana*, which, as he tells us, was written about forty years before for one night's representation, probably at college, but had been lately printed by some plagiarist as his own. He forgets, however, to inform the reader, and thus lays himself open to some recrimination, that his tragedy is very largely borrowed from the *Dalida* of

Groto, an Italian dramatist of the sixteenth century.¹ The story, the characters, the incidents, almost every successive scene, many thoughts, descriptions, and images, are taken from this original; but it is a very free translation, or rather differs from what can be called a translation. The tragedy of Groto is shortened; and Alabaster has thrown much into another form, besides introducing much of his own. The plot is full of all the accumulated horror and slaughter in which the Italians delighted on their stage. I rather prefer the original tragedy. Alabaster has spirit and fire, with some degree of skill; but his notion of tragic style is of the "King Cambyses' vein:" he is inflated and hyperbolical to excess, which is not the case with Groto.

74. But the first Latin poetry which England can vaunt is May's Supplement to Lucan, in seven books, which carry down the history of the Pharsalia to the death of Cæsar. This is not only a very spirited poem, but, in many places at least, an excellent imitation. The versification, though it frequently reminds us of his model, is somewhat more negligent. May seems rarely to fall into Lucan's tumid extravagances, or to emulate his philosophical grandeur: but the narration is almost as impetuous and rapid, the images as thronged; and sometimes we have rather a happy imitation of the ingenious sophisms Lucan is apt to employ. The death of Cato and that of Cæsar are among the passages well worthy of praise. In some lines on Cleopatra's intrigue with Cæsar, while married to her brother, he has seized, with felicitous effect, not only the broken cadences, but the love of moral paradox, we find in Lucan.²

75. Many of the Latin poems of Milton were written in early life; some even at the age of seventeen. His name, and the just curiosity of mankind to trace the development of a

¹ I am indebted for the knowledge of this to a manuscript note I found in the copy of Alabaster's *Roxana* in the British Museum: "Haud multum abest hæc tragedia a pura versione tragediæ Italianæ Ludovici Groti Cæci Hadriensis cui titulus *Delida*." This induced me to read the tragedy of Groto, which I had not previously done.

The title of *Roxana* runs thus: "*Roxana tragedia a plagiarii unguibus vindicata aucta et agnita ab autore Gul. Alabastro. Lond. 1632*"

² "Nec crimen inesse
Concubitu nimium tali, Cleopatra, putabunt
Qui Ptolemæorum thalamos, consuetaque jura
Incestæ novere domûs, fratremque sorori
Conjugio junctam, sacræ sub nomine tædæ
Majus adulterio delictum; turpius inest,
Quis credat? justî ad thalamos Cleopatra
mariti,
Utque minus lecto peccaret, adultera nota
est."

them not, or because he did not require either, in the style he chose. Perhaps the Italians may have poetry in that style equal to Suckling's; I do not know that they have, nor do I believe that there is any in French: that there is none in Latin I am convinced.¹ Lovelace is chiefly known

Lovelace. by a single song: his other poetry is much inferior; and indeed it may be generally remarked, that the flowers of our early verse, both in the Elizabethan and the subsequent age, have been well culled by good taste and a friendly spirit of selection. We must not judge of them, or shall judge of them very favorably, by the extracts of Headley or Ellis.

57. The most amorous and among the best of our amorous poets was Robert Herrick, a clergyman ejected from his living in Devonshire by the Long Parliament, whose "*Hesperides, or Poems Human and Divine*," were published in 1648. Herrick's divine poems are, of course, such as might be presumed by their title and by his calling; of his human, which are poetically much superior, and probably written in early life, the greater portion is light and voluptuous, while some border on the licentious and indecent. A selection was published in 1815, by which, as commonly happens, the poetical fame of Herrick does not suffer: a number of dull epigrams are omitted; and the editor has a manifest preference for what must be owned to be the most elegant and attractive part of his author's rhymes. He has much of the lively grace that distinguishes Anacreon and Catullus, and approaches also, with a less cloying monotony, to the *Basia* of Johannes Secundus. Herrick has as much variety as the poetry of kisses can well have; but his love is in a very slight degree that of sentiment, or even any intense passion: his mistresses have little to recommend them, even in his own eyes, save their beauties; and none of these are omitted in his catalogues. Yet he is abundant in the resources of verse: without the exuberant gayety of Suckling, or perhaps the delicacy of Carew, he is sportive, fanciful, and generally of polished language. The faults of his age are sometimes apparent: though he is not often obscure, he runs, more perhaps for the sake of variety than any other cause, into occasional pedantry. He has his conceits and false thoughts; but these are more than redeemed by the numerous

¹ Suckling's *Epithalamium*, though not written for those "*qui musas colitis severiores*," has been read by almost all the world, and is a matchless piece of liveliness and facility.

very little poems (for those of Herrick are frequently not longer than epigrams), which may be praised without much more qualification than belongs to such poetry.

58. John Milton was born in 1609. Few are ignorant of his life, in recovering and recording every circumstance of which no diligence has been spared, nor ^{Milton.} has it often been unsuccessful. Of his Latin poetry, some was written at the age of seventeen; in English, we have nothing, I believe, the date of which is known to be earlier than the sonnet on entering his twenty-third year. In 1634 he wrote *Comus*, which was published in 1637. *Lycidas* was written in the latter year; and most of his shorter pieces soon afterwards, except the sonnets, some of which do not come within the first half of the century.

59. *Comus* was sufficient to convince any one of taste and feeling, that a great poet had arisen in England, and ^{His *Comus*.} one partly formed in a different school from his contemporaries. Many of them had produced highly beautiful and imaginative passages; but none had evinced so classical a judgment, none had aspired to so regular a perfection. Jonson had learned much from the ancients; but there was a grace in their best models which he did not quite attain. Neither his *Sad Shepherd* nor the *Faithful Shepherdess* of Fletcher have the elegance or dignity of *Comus*. A noble virgin and her young brothers, by whom this masque was originally represented, required an elevation, a purity, a sort of severity of sentiment, which no one in that age could have given but Milton. He avoided, and nothing loath, the more festive notes which dramatic poetry was wont to mingle with its serious strain. But for this he compensated by the brightest hues of fancy and the sweetest melody of song. In *Comus* we find nothing prosaic or feeble, no false taste in the incidents, and not much in the language; nothing over which we should desire to pass on a second perusal. The want of what we may call personality, — none of the characters having names, except *Comus* himself, who is a very indefinite being, — and the absence of all positive attributes of time and place, enhance the ideality of the fiction by a certain indistinctness not unpleasing to the imagination.

60. It has been said, I think very fairly, that *Lycidas* is a good test of a real feeling for what is peculiarly ^{*Lycidas*.} called poetry. Many, or, perhaps we might say,

be only like that of the lunatic. And it had been so usual to blend sacred with mythological personages in allegory, that no one probably in Milton's age would have been struck by the objection.

62. The *Allegro* and *Penseroso* are perhaps more familiar to us than any part of the writings of Milton. *Allegro and Penseroso.* They satisfy the critics, and they delight mankind. The choice of images is so judicious, their succession so rapid, the allusions are so various and pleasing, the leading distinction of the poems is so felicitously maintained, the versification is so animated, that we may place them at the head of that long series of descriptive poems which our language has to boast. It may be added, as in the greater part of Milton's writings, that they are sustained at an uniform pitch, with few blemishes of expression, and scarce any feebleness; a striking contrast, in this respect, to all the contemporaneous poetry, except perhaps that of Waller. Johnson has thought, that, while there is no mirth in his melancholy, he can detect some melancholy in his mirth. This seems to be too strongly put; but it may be said that his *Allegro* is rather cheerful than gay, and that even his cheerfulness is not always without effort. In these poems he is indebted to Fletcher, to Burton, to Browne, to Wither, and probably to more of our early versifiers; for he was a great collector of sweets from those wild flowers.

63. The *Ode on the Nativity*, far less popular than most of the poetry of Milton, is perhaps the finest in the English language. *Ode on the Nativity.* A grandeur, a simplicity, a breadth of manner, an imagination at once elevated and restrained by the subject, reign throughout it. If Pindar is a model of lyric poetry, it would be hard to name any other ode so truly Pindaric; but more has naturally been derived from the Scriptures. Of the other short poems, that on the death of the Marchioness of Winchester deserves particular mention. It is pity that the first lines are bad, and the last much worse; for rarely can we find more feeling or beauty than in some other passages.

64. The sonnets of Milton have obtained of late years the admiration of all real lovers of poetry. Johnson *His Sonnets.* has been as impotent to fix the public taste in this instance as in his other criticisms on the smaller poems of the author of *Paradise Lost*. These sonnets are indeed unequal;

and Hebrew, as well as Latin versification, has obtained in the last the general suffrage of critics.¹ I can speak of none of these from direct knowledge, except of Borbonius, whose *Diræ* on the death of Henry have not appeared, to my judgment, deserving of so much eulogy.

67. The Germans wrote much in Latin, especially in the earlier decades of this period. Melissus Schedius, ^{In Germany} not undistinguished in his native tongue, might have ^{and Italy.} been mentioned as a Latin poet in the last volume; since most of his compositions were published in the sixteenth century. In Italy we have not many conspicuous names. The bad taste that infested the school of Marini spread also, according to Tiraboschi, over Latin poetry. Martial, Lucan, and Claudian became in their eyes better models than Catullus and Virgil. Baillet, or rather those whom he copies, and among whom Rossi (author of the *Pinacotheca Virorum Illustrium*, under the name of Erythræus, a profuse and indiscriminating panegyrist, for the most part, of his contemporaries) furnishes the chief materials, bestows praise on Cesarini, on Querenghi, whom even Tiraboschi selects from the crowd, and on Maffei Barberini, best known as Pope Urban VIII.

68. Holland stood at the head of Europe in this line of poetry. Grotius has had the reputation of writing ^{In Holland:} with spirit, elegance, and imagination.² But he is ^{Heinsius.} excelled by Heinsius, whose elegies, still more than his hexameters, may be ranked high in modern Latin. The habit, however, of classical imitation, has so much weakened all individual originality in these versifiers, that it is often difficult to distinguish them, or to pronounce of any twenty lines that they might not have been written by some other author. Compare, for example, the elegies of Buchanan with those of Heinsius, wherever there are no proper names to guide us.

¹ Baillet, *Jugemens des Savans*, has criticised all these and several more. Rapin's opinion on Latin poetry is entitled to much regard from his own excellence in it. He praises three lyrists, — Casimir, Magdalenet, and Ceriantes; the two latter being French. "Barbicus a de l'élevation, mais sans pureté; Magdalenet est pur, mais sans élévation. Ceriantes a joint dans ses odes l'un et l'autre; car il écrit noblement, et d'un style assez pur. Après tout, il n'a pas tant de feu que Casimir, lequel avoit bien de l'esprit, et de cet esprit heureux qui fait les poètes. Bu-

canan a des odes dignes de l'antiquité, mais il a de grandes inégalités par le mélange de son caractère qui n'est pas assez uni." — *Réflexions sur la Poétique*, p. 208. — ² [The *Adamus Exul* of Grotius, which, after going through several editions in Holland before the middle of the seventeenth century, has lately been retranslated by Mr. Barham, is not only of considerable poetical merit, but deserving of notice, as having suggested much to Milton. Lauder perceived this, but was strangely led to exaggerate the resemblance by forgery. — 1847.]

A more frequent and consistent epithet is found in the whole of *Le Poëte* is a young man. In the subject, there is a slight passage, but that is not necessary. And I believe two whole pages with such connections between the two. *Le Poëte*, however, has that of the *Journal* is particularly full of a pretty little case in the *Journal*. It is not in the *Journal*, which has, nevertheless, that the two passages seem to be very different. As it is not necessary to make a distinct head for the *Journal*, we may not notice in a subject by *Helmsius* *Helmsius* *Helmsius*. This has been the subject of a volume by *Helmsius* for the most part very favorable: and it contains some very beautiful passages. Perhaps the description of the *Journal*'s feelings on the matter, though printed by *Helmsius* and extremely classical in diction, is not quite in the best taste.

Of *Sarbievius* *Helmsius*, a Fictitious Jesuit, is excused by *Ballot* and his associates. But another of the same order, *Casimir Sarbievius*, a Poet, is far better known; and in lyric poetry, which he almost exclusively cultivated, obtained a much higher reputation. He had lived some years at Rome, and is full of Roman allusion. He had read Horace, as Sannazarius had Virgil, and Helmsius Ovid, till the style and tone became spontaneous; but he has more of *centonism* than the other two. Yet, while he constantly reminds us of Horace, it is with as constant an inferiority: we feel that his Rome was not the same Rome; that Urban VIII. was not Augustus, nor the Polish victories on the Danube like those of the sons of Livia. Hence his flattery of the great, though not a step beyond that of his master, seems rather more displeasing, because we have it only on his word that they were truly great. *Sarbievius* seldom rises high or pours out an original feeling; but he is free from conceits, never becomes prosaic, and knows how to put in good

"Oculoque nunc huc pavida nunc
illuc jacti,
Interque matrem virginemque ha-
rent adhuc
Suspense matris gaudia, ac trepidus
pudor.
... serpe, cum blandas puer,
Aut a sopore languidas jactat ma-
nus,
Tuncque labris pectus intactum
petit,
Virginis subitus ora perfundit ru-
bor,

Laudemque matris virginis crimen
putat."

A critique on the poems of Helmsius will be found in the *Retrospective Review*, vol. i. p. 49: but notwithstanding the laudatory spirit, which is for the most part too indiscriminating in that publication, the reviewer has not done justice to Helmsius, and hardly seems, perhaps, a very competent judge of Latin verse. The suffrages of those who were so, in favor of this Batavian poet, are collected by *Ballot*, n. 1462.

language the commonplaces with which his subject happens to furnish him. He is to a certain degree, in Latin poetry, what Chiabrera is in Italian, but does not deserve so high a place. Sarbievius was perhaps the first who succeeded much in the Alcaic stanza, which the earlier poets seem to avoid, or to use unskilfully. But he has many unwarrantable licenses in his metre, and even false quantities, as is common to the great majority of these Latin versifiers.

70. Gasper Barlæus had as high a name, perhaps, as any Latin poet of this age. His rhythm is indeed excellent; but, if he ever rises to other excellence, I have Barlæus. not lighted on the passages. A greater equality I have never found than in Barlæus: nothing is bad, nothing is striking. It was the practice with Dutchmen on their marriage to purchase epithalamiums in hexameter verse; and the muse of Barlæus was in request. These nuptial songs are of course about Peleus and Thetis, or similar personages, interspersed with fitting praises of the bride and bridegroom. Such poetry is not likely to rise high. The *epicedia*, or funeral lamentations, paid for by the heir, are little, if at all, better than the *epithalamia*; and the panegyrical effusions on public or private events rather worse. The elegies of Barlæus, as we generally find, are superior to the hexameters: he has here the same smoothness of versification, and a graceful gayety which gives us pleasure. In some of his elegies and epistles, he counterfeits the Ovidian style extremely well, so that they might pass for those of his model. Still there is an equability, a recurrence of trivial thoughts and forms, which, in truth, is too much characteristic of modern Latin to be a reproach to Barlæus. He uses the polysyllabic termination less than earlier Dutch poets. One of the *epithalamia* of Barlæus, it may be observed before we leave him, is entitled *Paradisus*, and recounts the nuptials of Adam and Eve. It is possible that Milton may have seen this: the fourth book of the *Paradise Lost* compresses the excessive diffuseness of Barlæus; but the ideas are in great measure the same. Yet, since this must naturally be the case, we cannot presume imitation. Few of the poems of Barlæus are so redundant as this: he has the gift of stringing together mythological parallels and descriptive poetry without stint; and his discretion does not inform him where to stop.

71. The eight books of *Sylvæ* by Balde, a German eccle-

Groto, an Italian dramatist of the sixteenth century.¹ The story, the characters, the incidents, almost every successive scene, many thoughts, descriptions, and images, are taken from this original; but it is a very free translation, or rather differs from what can be called a translation. The tragedy of Groto is shortened; and Alabaster has thrown much into another form, besides introducing much of his own. The plot is full of all the accumulated horror and slaughter in which the Italians delighted on their stage. I rather prefer the original tragedy. Alabaster has spirit and fire, with some degree of skill; but his notion of tragic style is of the "King Cambyzes' vein:" he is inflated and hyperbolical to excess, which is not the case with Groto.

74. But the first Latin poetry which England can vaunt is May's Supplement to Lucan, in seven books, which carry down the history of the Pharsalia to the death of Cæsar. This is not only a very spirited poem, but, in many places at least, an excellent imitation. The versification, though it frequently reminds us of his model, is somewhat more negligent. May seems rarely to fall into Lucan's tumid extravagances, or to emulate his philosophical grandeur: but the narration is almost as impetuous and rapid, the images as thronged; and sometimes we have rather a happy imitation of the ingenious sophisms Lucan is apt to employ. The death of Cato and that of Cæsar are among the passages well worthy of praise. In some lines on Cleopatra's intrigue with Cæsar, while married to her brother, he has seized, with felicitous effect, not only the broken cadences, but the love of moral paradox, we find in Lucan.²

75. Many of the Latin poems of Milton were written in early life; some even at the age of seventeen. His name, and the just curiosity of mankind to trace the development of a

¹ I am indebted for the knowledge of this to a manuscript note I found in the copy of Alabaster's *Roxana* in the British Museum: "Haud multum abest hæc tragedia a pura versione tragediæ Italici Ludovici Groti Cæci Hadriensis cui titulus *Didida*." This induced me to read the tragedy of Groto, which I had not previously done.

The title of *Roxana* runs thus: "*Roxana tragedia a plagiaris unguibus vindicata aucta et agnita ab autore Gul. Alabastro. Lond. 1682*"

² "Nec crimen inesse
Concubitu nimium tall, Cleopatra, putabunt
Qui Ptolemæorum thalamos, consuetaque jura
Incestæ novere domûs, fratremque sorori
Conjugio junctam, sacræ sub nomine tædæ
Majus adulterio delictum; turpius inest,
Quis credat? justî ad thalamos Cleopatra
mariti,
Utque minus lecto peccaret, adultera facta est."

imagery genius would naturally attract our regard. They are flows in themselves and in classical measure, if thoughts and sagacity and meaning of a higher order with some power from the patterns of ancient poetry, if a versification remarkably well calculated and general to the ear. There is in them without a marked originality, which Latin verse can rarely admit but at the price of some ineffectualness or impropriety, a more intimate display of the poet's mind than we usually find. "In the elegies," it is said by Warton, a very competent judge of Latin poetry, "Ovid was perfectly Milton: match in language and versification. They are not, however, a perpetual and uniform tissue of Ovidian paraphrase. With Ovid in view, he has an original manner and character of his own, which exhibits a remarkable peculiarity of construction, a native facility and fluency. Nor does his observation of Roman *moribus* express or destroy our great poet's inherent powers of invention and sentiment. I value these pieces as much for their fancy and genius as for their style and expression. That Ovid, among the Latin poets, was Milton's favorite, appears not only from his elegiac but his hexametric poetry. The versification of our author's hexameters has yet a different structure from that of the *Metamorphoses*: Milton's is more clear, intelligible, and flowing; less desultory, less familiar, and less embarrassed with a frequent recurrence of periods. Ovid is at once rapid and abrupt."¹ Why Warton should have at once supposed Ovid to be Milton's favorite model in hexameters, and yet so totally different as he represents him to be, seems hard to say. The structure of our poet's hexameters is much more Virgilian; nor do I see the least resemblance in them to the manner of Ovid. These Latin poems of Milton bear some traces of juvenility, but, for the most part, such as please us for that very reason: it is the spring-time of an ardent and brilliant fancy, before the stern and sour spirit of polemical Puritanism had gained entrance into his mind,—the voice of the Allegro and of *Comus*.

¹ Warton's essay on the Latin poetry of Milton, inserted at length in Todd's edition.

CHAPTER VI.

HISTORY OF DRAMATIC LITERATURE FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I. — ON THE ITALIAN AND SPANISH DRAMA.

Character of the Italian Theatre in this Age — Bonarelli — The Spanish Theatre —
Calderon — Appreciation of his Merits as a Dramatic Poet.

1. THE Italian theatre, if we should believe one of its historians, fell into total decay during the whole course of the seventeenth century, though the number of dramatic pieces of various kinds was by no means small. He makes a sort of apology for inserting in a copious list of dramatic performances any that appeared after 1600, and stops entirely with 1650.¹ But in this he seems hardly to have done justice to a few, which, if not of remarkable excellence, might be selected from the rest. Andreini is perhaps best known by name in England, and that for one only of his eighteen dramas, the *Adamo*, which has been supposed, on too precarious grounds, to have furnished the idea of *Paradise Lost* in the original form, as it was planned by its great author. The *Adamo* was first published in 1613, and afterwards with amplification in 1641. It is denominated "A Sacred Representation;" and, as Andreini was a player by profession, must be presumed to have been brought upon the stage. It is, however, asserted by Riccoboni, that those who wrote regular tragedies did not cause them to be represented: probably he might have scrupled to give that epithet to the *Adamo*. Hayler and Walker have reckoned it a composition of considerable beauty.

2. The majority of Italian tragedies in the seventeenth century were taken, like the *Adamo*, from sacred subjects,

¹ Riccoboni *Hist. du Théâtre Italien*, vol. I.

most readers do not taste its excellence; nor does it follow that they may not greatly admire Pope and Dryden, or even Virgil and Homer. It is, however, somewhat remarkable that Johnson, who has committed his critical reputation by the most contemptuous depreciation of this poem, had, in an earlier part of his life, selected the tenth eclogue of Virgil for peculiar praise,¹ — the tenth eclogue, which, beautiful as it is, belongs to the same class of pastoral and personal allegory, and requires the same sacrifice of reasoning criticism, as the *Lycidas* itself. In the age of Milton, the poetical world had been accustomed by the Italian and Spanish writers to a more abundant use of allegory than has been pleasing to their posterity; but *Lycidas* is not so much in the nature of an allegory as of a masque: the characters pass before our eyes in imagination, as on the stage; they are chiefly mythological, but not creations of the poet. Our sympathy with the fate of *Lycidas* may not be much stronger than for the desertion of Gallus by his mistress; but many poems will yield an exquisite pleasure to the imagination that produce no emotion in the heart, or none at least except through associations independent of the subject.

61. The introduction of St. Peter, after the fabulous deities of the sea, has appeared an incongruity deserving of censure to some admirers of this poem. It would be very reluctantly that we could abandon to this criticism the most splendid passage it presents. But the censure rests, as I think, on too narrow a principle. In narrative or dramatic poetry, where something like illusion or momentary belief is to be produced, the mind requires an objective possibility, a capacity of real existence, not only in all the separate portions of the imagined story, but in their coherency and relation to a common whole. Whatever is obviously incongruous, whatever shocks our previous knowledge of possibility, destroys, to a certain extent, that acquiescence in the fiction, which it is the true business of the fiction to produce. But the case is not the same in such poems as *Lycidas*. They pretend to no credibility; they aim at no illusion: they are read with the willing abandonment of the imagination to a waking dream, and require only that general possibility, that combination of images which common experience does not reject as incompatible, without which the fancy of the poet would

¹ *Advertiser*, No. 52.

be only like that of the lunatic. And it had been so usual to blend sacred with mythological personages in allegory, that no one probably in Milton's age would have been struck by the objection.

62. The *Allegro* and *Penseroso* are perhaps more familiar to us than any part of the writings of Milton. *Allegro and Penseroso.* They satisfy the critics, and they delight mankind. The choice of images is so judicious, their succession so rapid, the allusions are so various and pleasing, the leading distinction of the poems is so felicitously maintained, the versification is so animated, that we may place them at the head of that long series of descriptive poems which our language has to boast. It may be added, as in the greater part of Milton's writings, that they are sustained at an uniform pitch, with few blemishes of expression, and scarce any feebleness; a striking contrast, in this respect, to all the contemporaneous poetry, except perhaps that of Waller. Johnson has thought, that, while there is no mirth in his melancholy, he can detect some melancholy in his mirth. This seems to be too strongly put; but it may be said that his *Allegro* is rather cheerful than gay, and that even his cheerfulness is not always without effort. In these poems he is indebted to Fletcher, to Burton, to Browne, to Wither, and probably to more of our early versifiers; for he was a great collector of sweets from those wild flowers.

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the expression is sometimes harsh, and sometimes obscure; sometimes too much of pedantic allusion interferes with the sentiment; nor am I reconciled to his frequent deviations from the best Italian structure. But such blemishes are lost in the majestic simplicity, the holy calm, that ennoble many of these short compositions.

65. Many anonymous songs, many popular lays, both of Scottish and English minstrelsy, were poured forth in this period of the seventeenth century. Those of Scotland became, after the union of the crowns, and he consequent cessation of rude border frays, less warlike than before: they are still, however, imaginative, pathetic, and natural. It is probable that the best even of this class are a little older; but their date is seldom determinable with much precision. The same may be said of the English ballads, which, so far as of a merely popular nature, appear, by their style and other circumstances, to belong more frequently to the reign of James I. than any other period.

SECT. VI.—ON LATIN POETRY.

Latin Poets of France and other Countries — Of England — May — Milton.

66. FRANCE, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, had been remarkably fruitful of Latin poetry: it was the pride of her scholars, and sometimes of her statesmen. In the age that we have now in review, we do not find so many conspicuous names; but the custom of academical institutions, and especially of the seminaries conducted by the Jesuits, kept up a facility of Latin versification, which it was by no means held pedantic or ridiculous to exhibit in riper years. The French enumerate several with praise: Guijon; Bourbon (Borbonius), whom some have compared with the best of the preceding century, and among whose poems that on the death of Henry IV. is reckoned the best; Cerisantes, equal, as some of his admirers think, to Sarmenius, and superior, as others presume, to Horace; and Petavius, who, having solaced his leisure hours with Greek

and Hebrew, as well as Latin versification, has obtained in the last the general suffrage of critics.¹ I can speak of none of these from direct knowledge, except of Borbonius, whose *Diræ* on the death of Henry have not appeared, to my judgment, deserving of so much eulogy.

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1. The first of these is the fact that the
2. The second is the fact that the
3. The third is the fact that the
4. The fourth is the fact that the
5. The fifth is the fact that the
6. The sixth is the fact that the
7. The seventh is the fact that the
8. The eighth is the fact that the
9. The ninth is the fact that the
10. The tenth is the fact that the

[illegible]

1. The following names have been noted:

Isidoreus melleus virentissimus her-

Wissenschaftliche Methode, als komplexes
Ganzes

And a superb linguistic jargon ma-

Tachysternus latro postus intactum

Virginia subitus ora perfundit re-
bus,

Les deux matris virginis cruce
partat.

A critique on the poems of Heineken will be found in the *Retrospective Review*, vol. 1, p. 49: but notwithstanding the laudatory spirit, which is for the most part too indiscriminating in that publication, the reviewer has not done justice to Heineken, and hardly seems, perhaps, a very competent judge of Latin verse. The suffrages of those who were so, in favor of this Batavian poet, are collected by Baillet, n. 1452.

language the commonplaces with which his subject happens to furnish him. He is to a certain degree, in Latin poetry, what Chiabrera is in Italian, but does not deserve so high a place. Sarbievius was perhaps the first who succeeded much in the Alcaic stanza, which the earlier poets seem to avoid, or to use unskilfully. But he has many unwarrantable licenses in his metre, and even false quantities, as is common to the great majority of these Latin versifiers.

70. Gasper Barlæus had as high a name, perhaps, as any Latin poet of this age. His rhythm is indeed excellent; but, if he ever rises to other excellence, I have not lighted on the passages. A greater equality I have never found than in Barlæus: nothing is bad, nothing is striking. It was the practice with Dutchmen on their marriage to purchase epithalamiums in hexameter verse; and the muse of Barlæus was in request. These nuptial songs are of course about Peleus and Thetis, or similar personages, interspersed with fitting praises of the bride and bridegroom. Such poetry is not likely to rise high. The *epicedia*, or funeral lamentations, paid for by the heir, are little, if at all, better than the *epithalamia*; and the panegyrical effusions on public or private events rather worse. The elegies of Barlæus, as we generally find, are superior to the hexameters: he has here the same smoothness of versification, and a graceful gayety which gives us pleasure. In some of his elegies and epistles, he counterfeits the Ovidian style extremely well, so that they might pass for those of his model. Still there is an equability, a recurrence of trivial thoughts and forms, which, in truth, is too much characteristic of modern Latin to be a reproach to Barlæus. He uses the polysyllabic termination less than earlier Dutch poets. One of the *epithalamia* of Barlæus, it may be observed before we leave him, is entitled *Paradisus*, and recounts the nuptials of Adam and Eve. It is possible that Milton may have seen this: the fourth book of the *Paradise Lost* compresses the excessive diffuseness of Barlæus; but the ideas are in great measure the same. Yet, since this must naturally be the case, we cannot presume imitation. Few of the poems of Barlæus are so redundant as this: he has the gift of stringing together mythological parallels and descriptive poetry without stint; and his discretion does not inform him where to stop.

71. The eight books of *Sylvæ* by Balde, a German eccle-

Groto, an Italian dramatist of the sixteenth century.¹ The story, the characters, the incidents, almost every successive scene, many thoughts, descriptions, and images, are taken from this original; but it is a very free translation, or rather differs from what can be called a translation. The tragedy of Groto is shortened; and Alabaster has thrown much into another form, besides introducing much of his own. The plot is full of all the accumulated horror and slaughter in which the Italians delighted on their stage. I rather prefer the original tragedy. Alabaster has spirit and fire, with some degree of skill; but his notion of tragic style is of the "King Cambyses' vein:" he is inflated and hyperbolic to excess, which is not the case with Groto.

74. But the first Latin poetry which England can vaunt is May's Supplement to Lucan, in seven books, which carry down the history of the Pharsalia to the death of Cæsar. This is not only a very spirited poem, but, in many places at least, an excellent imitation. The versification, though it frequently reminds us of his model, is somewhat more negligent. May seems rarely to fall into Lucan's tumid extravagances, or to emulate his philosophical grandeur: but the narration is almost as impetuous and rapid, the images as thronged; and sometimes we have rather a happy imitation of the ingenious sophisms Lucan is apt to employ. The death of Cato and that of Cæsar are among the passages well worthy of praise. In some lines on Cleopatra's intrigue with Cæsar, while married to her brother, he has seized, with felicitous effect, not only the broken cadences, but the love of moral paradox, we find in Lucan.²

75. Many of the Latin poems of Milton were written in early life; some even at the age of seventeen. His name, and the just curiosity of mankind to trace the development of a

¹ I am indebted for the knowledge of this to a manuscript note I found in the copy of Alabaster's *Roxana* in the British Museum: "Haud multum abest hæc tragedia a pura versione tragediæ Italianæ Ludovici Groti Cæci Hadriensis cui titulus *Didia*." This induced me to read the tragedy of Groto, which I had not previously done.

The title of *Roxana* runs thus: "*Roxana tragedia a plagiarii unguibus vindicata aucta et agnita ab autore Gul. Alabastro. Lond. 1682*"

² "Nec crimen inesse
Concubitu nimium tali, Cleopatra, putabunt
Qui Ptolemæorum thalamos, consuetaque
Iura
Incestæ novere domûs, fratremque sorori
Conjugio junctam, sacræ sub nomine tædæ
Majus adulterio delictum; turpius læset,
Quis credat? justî ad thalamos Cleopatra
mariti,
Utque minus lecto peccaret, adultera facta
est."

mighty genius, would naturally attract our regard. They are in themselves full of classical elegance, of thoughts natural and pleasing, of a diction culled with taste from the gardens of ancient poetry, of a versification remarkably well cadenced and grateful to the ear. There is in them, without a marked originality, which Latin verse can rarely admit but at the price of some incorrectness or impropriety, a more individual display of the poet's mind than we usually find. "In the elegies," it is said by Warton, a very competent judge of Latin poetry, "Ovid was professedly Milton's model for language and versification. They are not, however, a perpetual and uniform tissue of Ovidian phraseology. With Ovid in view, he has an original manner and character of his own, which exhibit a remarkable perspicuity of contexture, a native facility and fluency. Nor does his observation of Roman models oppress or destroy our great poet's inherent powers of invention and sentiment. I value these pieces as much for their fancy and genius as for their style and expression. That Ovid, among the Latin poets, was Milton's favorite, appears not only from his elegiac but his hexametric poetry. The versification of our author's hexameters has yet a different structure from that of the *Metamorphoses*: Milton's is more clear, intelligible, and flowing; less desultory, less familiar, and less embarrassed with a frequent recurrence of periods. Ovid is at once rapid and abrupt."¹ Why Warton should have at once supposed Ovid to be Milton's favorite model in hexameters, and yet so totally different as he represents him to be, seems hard to say. The structure of our poet's hexameters is much more Virgilian; nor do I see the least resemblance in them to the manner of Ovid. These Latin poems of Milton bear some traces of juvenility, but, for the most part, such as please us for that very reason: it is the spring-time of an ardent and brilliant fancy, before the stern and sour spirit of polemical Puritanism had gained entrance into his mind,—the voice of the *Allegro* and of *Comus*.

¹ Warton's essay on the Latin poetry of Milton, inserted at length in Todd's edition

CHAPTER VI.

HISTORY OF DRAMATIC LITERATURE FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I. — ON THE ITALIAN AND SPANISH DRAMA.

Character of the Italian Theatre in this Age — Bonarelli — The Spanish Theatre —
Calderon — Appreciation of his Merits as a Dramatic Poet.

1. THE Italian theatre, if we should believe one of its historians, fell into total decay during the whole course of the seventeenth century, though the number of dramatic pieces of various kinds was by no means small. He makes a sort of apology for inserting in a copious list of dramatic performances any that appeared after 1600, and stops entirely with 1650.¹ But in this he seems hardly to have done justice to a few, which, if not of remarkable excellence, might be selected from the rest. Andreini is perhaps best known by name in England, and that for one only of his eighteen dramas, the *Adamo*, which has been supposed, on too precarious grounds, to have furnished the idea of *Paradise Lost* in the original form, as it was planned by its great author. The *Adamo* was first published in 1613, and afterwards with amplification in 1641. It is denominated "A Sacred Representation;" and, as Andreini was a player by profession, must be presumed to have been brought upon the stage. It is, however, asserted by Riccoboni, that those who wrote regular tragedies did not cause them to be represented: probably he might have scrupled to give that epithet to the *Adamo*. Hayler and Walker have reckoned it a composition of considerable beauty.

2. The majority of Italian tragedies in the seventeenth century were taken, like the *Adamo*, from sacred subjects,

¹ Riccoboni *Hist. du Théâtre Italien*, vol. I.

including such as ecclesiastical legends abundantly supplied. Few of these gave sufficient scope either by action or character for the liberality of exclamation which the stage demands. Tragedies more truly deserving that name were the *Sulimano* of Bonarelli, the *Tamerlani* of Campeggio, the *Demetrio* of Rossi, which Salfi prefers to the rest, and the *Aristodemo* of Carlo de' Dottori. A drama by Testi, *L'Isola di Alcina*, had some reputation; but in this, which the title betrays not to be a legitimate tragedy, he introduced musical airs, and thus trod on the boundaries of a civil art.¹ It has been suggested with no inconsiderable probability, that, in her passion for the melodrama, Italy lost all reason for the graver tone of tragedy. Music, at least the music of the opera, conspired with many more important circumstances to spread an effeminate over the public character.

3. The pastoral drama had always been allied to musical sentiment, even though it might be without accompaniment. The feeling it inspired was nearly that of the opera. In this style we find one imitation of Tasso and Guarini, inferior in most qualities, yet deserving some regard, and once popular even with the critics of Italy. This was the *Filii di Sciro* of Bonarelli, published at Ferrara—a city already fallen into the hands of priests, but round whose deserted palaces the traditions of poetical glory still lingered—in 1697, and represented by an academy in the same place soon afterwards. It passed through numerous editions, and was admired, even beyond the Alps, during the whole century, and perhaps still longer. It displays much of the bad taste and affectation of that period. Bonarelli is as strained in the construction of history, and in his characters, as he is in his style. Celia, the heroine of this pastoral, struggles with a double love; the original idea, as he might truly think, of his drama, which he wrote a long dissertation in order to justify. It is, however, far less conformable to the truth of nature than to the sophisticated society for which he wrote. A wanton capricious court-lady might perhaps waver, with some warmth of inclination towards both, between two lovers, “*Alme dell’ alma mia*,” as Celia calls them, and be very willing to possess either. But what is morbid in moral affection seldom creates sympathy, or is fit either for narrative poetry or the stage.

¹ Salfi, *Continuation de l'ingénue*, vol. the Italian stage, *Saggio Storico-Critico* xii. chap. 12. Besides this larger work, della Commedia Italiana. Salfi published in 1820 a short essay on

Bonarelli's diction is studied and polished to the highest degree; and, though its false refinement and affected graces often displease us, the real elegance of insulated passages makes us pause to admire. In harmony and sweetness of sound, he seems fully equal to his predecessors, Tasso and Guarini; but he has neither the pathos of the one, nor the fertility of the other. The language and turn of thought seems, more than in the *Pastor Fido*, to be that of the opera; wanting, indeed, nothing but the intermixture of air to be perfectly adapted to music. Its great reputation, which even Crescimbeni does his utmost to keep up, proves the decline of good taste in Italy, and the lateness of its revival.¹

4. A new fashion, which sprung up about 1620, both marks the extinction of a taste for genuine tragedy, and, by furnishing a substitute, stood in the way of its revival. Translations of Spanish dramas. Translations from Spanish tragedies and tragi-comedies, those of Lope de Vega and his successors, replaced the native muse of Italy. These were in prose and in three acts, irregular of course, and with very different characteristics from those of the Italian school. "The very name of tragedy," says Riccoboni, "became unknown in our country: the *monsters* which usurped the place did not pretend to that glorious title. Tragi-comedies rendered from the Spanish, such as *Life is a Dream* (of Calderon), the *Samson*, the *Guest of Stone*, and others of the same class, were the popular ornaments of the Italian stage."²

5. The extemporaneous comedy had always been the amusement of the Italian populace, not to say of all who wished to unbend their minds.³ An epoch in this art was made in 1611 by Flaminio Scala, who first published the outline or canvas of a series of these pieces; the dialogue being, of course, reserved for the ingenious performers.⁴ This outline was not quite so short as that sometimes given in Italian play-bills: it explained the

¹ *Istoria della volgar Poesia*, iv. 147. He places the *Fili di Sciro* next to the *Aminta*.

² *Hist. du Théâtre Italien*, i. 47.

³ The extemporaneous comedy was called *Commedia dell'Arte*. "It consisted," says Salfi, "in a mere sketch or plan of a dramatic composition, the parts in which, having been hardly shadowed out, were assigned to different actors who were

to develop them in extemporaneous dialogue." Such a sketch was called a *scenario*, containing the subject of each scene, and those of Flaminio Scala were celebrated. *Saggio Storico-Critico*, p. 28. The pantomime, as it exists among us, is the descendant of this extemporaneous comedy, but with little of the wit and spirit of its progenitor.

⁴ Salfi, p. 40.

the collective edition of 1726, besides 127 of his regular plays. In one year, 1635, it is said that twelve of his comedies appeared; but the authenticity of so large a number has been questioned. He is said to have given a list of his sacred plays, at the age of eighty, consisting of only 68. No collection was published by himself. Some of his comedies, in the Spanish sense of the word, it may be observed, turn more or less on religious subjects, as their titles show: *El Purgatorio de San Patricio*; *La Devocion de la Cruz*; *Judas Maccabeus*; *La Cisma de Inghilterra*. He did not dislike contemporary subjects. In *El Sitio de Breda*, we have *Spinola*, *Nassau*, and others then living, on the scene. Calderon's metre is generally trochaic, of eight or seven syllables, not always rhyming; but verses *de arte mayor*, as they were called, or anapestic lines of eleven or twelve syllables, and also hendecasyllables, frequently occur.

7. The comedies, those properly so called, *de capa y espada*, which represent manners, are full of incident, but not perhaps crowded so as to produce any confusion: the characters have nothing very salient, but express the sentiments of gentlemen with frankness and spirit. We find in every one a picture of Spain,—gallantry, jealousy, quick resentment of insult, sometimes deep revenge. The language of Calderon is not unfrequently poetical, even in these lighter dramas; but hyperbolical figures and insipid conceits deform its beauty. The *gracioso*, or witty servant, is an unfailing personage; but I do not know (my reading, however, being extremely limited) that Calderon displays much brilliancy or liveliness in his sallies.

8. The plays of Calderon required a good deal of theatrical apparatus, unless the good nature of the audience dispensed with it. But this kind of comedy must have led to scenical improvements. They seem to contain no indecency; nor do the intrigues ever become criminal, at least in effect: most of the ladies, indeed, are unmarried. Yet they have been severely censured by later critics on the score of their morality, which is no doubt that of the stage, but considerably purified in comparison with the Italian and French of the sixteenth century. Calderon seems to bear no resemblance to any English writer of his age, except, in a certain degree, to Beaumont and Fletcher; and, as he wants their fertility of wit and humor, we cannot, I presume, place the best of his come-

does on a level with even the second class of theirs. But I shall speak perhaps, with more reserve of an author, very few of whose plays I have read, and with whose language I am very imperfectly acquainted: nor should I have ventured so far, if the opinion of many European critics had not seemed to warrant my frigid character of one who has sometimes been so much applauded.

9. *La Vida es Sueño* rises, in its subject as well as style, above the ordinary comedies of Calderon. Basilus, ^{Basilio} King of Poland, a deep philosopher, has, by consulting the stars, had the misfortune of ascertaining that his unborn son Sigismund would be under some extraordinary influence of evil passion. He resolves, in consequence, to conceal his birth, and to bring him up in a horrible solitude, where, it hardly appears why, he is laden with chains, and covered with skins of beasts; receiving meantime an excellent education, and becoming able to converse on every subject, though destitute of all society but that of his keeper Clotaldo. The inheritance of the crown of Poland is supposed to have devolved on Astolfo, Duke of Moscovy; or on his cousin Estrella, who, as daughter of an elder branch, contests it with him. The play opens by a scene, in which Rosaura, a Moscovite lady, who, having been betrayed by Astolfo, has fled to Poland in man's attire, descends the almost impassable precipices which overhang the small castle wherein Sigismund is confined. This scene, and that in which he first appears, are impressive and full of beauty, even now that we are become accustomed in excess to these theatrical wonders. Clotaldo discovers the prince in conversation with a stranger, who, by the king's general order, must be detained, and probably for death. A circumstance leads him to believe that this stranger is his son; but the Castilian loyalty transferred to Poland forbids him to hesitate in obeying his instructions. The king, however, who has fortunately determined to release his son, and try an experiment upon the force of the stars, coming in at this time, sets Rosaura at liberty.

10. In the next act, Sigismund, who, by the help of a sleeping potion, has been conveyed to the palace, wakes in a bed of down, and in the midst of royal splendor. He has little difficulty in understanding his new condition, but preserves a not unnatural resentment of his former treatment. The malign stars prevail: he treats Astolfo with the utmost arro-

gance, reviles and threatens his father, throws one of his servants out of the window, attempts the life of Clotaldo and the honor of Rosaura. The king, more convinced than ever of the truth of astrology, directs another soporific draught to be administered; and, in the next scene, we find the prince again in his prison. Clotaldo, once more at his side, persuades him that his late royalty has passed in a dream; wisely observing, however, that, asleep or awake, we should always do what is right.

11. Sigismund, after some philosophical reflections, prepares to submit to the sad reality which has displaced his vision. But, in the third act, an unforeseen event recalls him to the world. The army, become acquainted with his rights, and indignant that the king should transfer them to Astolfo, break into his prison, and place him at their head. Clotaldo expects nothing but death. A new revolution, however, has taken place. Sigismund, corrected by the dismal consequences of giving way to passion in his former dream, and apprehending a similar waking once more, has suddenly overthrown the sway of the sinister constellations that had enslaved him: he becomes generous, mild, and master of himself; and, the only pretext for his disinheritance being removed, it is easy that he should be reconciled to his father; that Astolfo, abandoning a kingdom he can no longer claim, should espouse the injured Rosaura; and that the reformed prince should become the husband of Estrella. The incidents which chiefly relate to these latter characters have been omitted in this slight analysis.

12. This tragi-comedy presents a moral not so contemptible in the age of Calderon as it may now appear,—that the stars may influence our will, but do not oblige it. If we could extract an allegorical meaning from the chimeras of astrology, and deem the stars but names for the circumstances of birth and fortune which affect the character as well as condition of every man, but yield to the persevering energy of self-correction, we might see in this fable the shadow of a permanent and valuable truth. As a play, it deserves considerable praise: the events are surprising without excessive improbability, and succeed each other without confusion; the thoughts are natural, and poetically expressed; and it requires, on the whole, less allowance for the different standard of national taste than is usual in the Spanish drama.

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13. A secreto Agravio secreta Vengança is a domestic tragedy, which turns on a common story,—a husband's revenge on one whom he erroneously believes to be still a favored, and who had been once an accepted lover. It is something like *Tancred and Sigismunda*, except that the lover is killed instead of the husband. The latter puts him to death secretly, which gives name to the play. He afterwards sets fire to his own house, and, in the confusion, designedly kills his wife. A friend communicates the fact to his sovereign, Sebastian, King of Portugal, who applauds what has been done. It is an atrocious play, and speaks terrible things as to the state of public sentiment in Spain, but abounds with interesting and touching passages.

14. It has been objected to Calderon, and the following style of defence of Bouterwek seems very insufficient, that his servants converse in a poetical style like their masters. "The spirit, on these particular occasions," says that judicious but lenient critic, "must not be misunderstood. The servants in Calderon's comedies always imitate the language of their masters. In most cases, they express themselves like the latter, in the natural language of real life, and often divested of that coloring of the ideas, without which a dramatic work ceases to be a poem. But whenever romantic gallantry speaks in the language of tenderness, admiration, or flattery, then, according to Spanish custom, every idea becomes a metaphor; and Calderon, who was a thorough Spaniard, seized these opportunities to give the reins to his fancy, and to suffer it to take a bold lyric flight beyond the boundaries of nature. On such occasions, the most extravagant metaphoric language, in the style of the Italian Marinists, did not appear unnatural to a Spanish audience; and even Calderon himself had for that style a particular fondness, to the gratification of which he sacrificed a chaster taste. It was his ambition to become a more refined Lope de Vega or a Spanish Marini. Thus in his play, *Bien vengas Mal si vengas solo*, a waiting-maid, addressing her young mistress who has risen in a gay humor, says 'Aurora would not have done wrong had she slumbered that morning in her snowy crystal, for that the sight of her mistress's charms would suffice to draw aside the curtains from the couch of Sol.' She adds, that, using a Spanish idea, 'it might then,

indeed, be said that the sun had risen in her lady's eyes.' Valets, on the like occasion, speak in the same style; and when lovers address compliments to their mistresses, and these reply in the same strain, the play of far-fetched metaphors is aggravated by antitheses to a degree which is intolerable to any but a Spanish-formed taste. But it must not be forgotten, that this language of gallantry was, in Calderon's time, spoken by the fashionable world, and that it was a vernacular property of the ancient national poetry."¹ What is this but to confess that Calderon had not genius to raise himself above his age, and that he can be read only as a "Triton of the minnows;" one who is great but in comparison with his neighbors? It will not convert bad writing into good, to tell us, as is perpetually done, that we must place ourselves in the author's position, and make allowances for the taste of his age or the temper of his nation. All this is true relatively to the author himself, and may be pleaded against a condemnation of his talents; but the excuse of the man is not that of the work.

15. The fame of Calderon has been latterly revived in Europe through the praise of some German critics, but especially the unbounded panegyric of one of their greatest men, William Schlegel. The passage is well known for its brilliant eloquence. Every one must differ with reluctance and respect from this accomplished writer; and an Englishman, acknowledging with gratitude and admiration what Schlegel has done for the glory of Shakspeare, ought not to grudge the laurels he showers upon another head. It is, however, rather as a poet than a dramatist that Calderon has received this homage; and, in his poetry, it seems to be rather bestowed on the mysticism, which finds a responsive chord in so many German hearts, than on what we should consider a more universal excellence,—a sympathy with, and a power over, all that is true and beautiful in nature and in man. Sismondi (but the distance between Weimar and Geneva in matters of taste is incomparably greater than by the public road), dissenting from this eulogy of Schlegel, which he fairly lays before the reader, stigmatizes Calderon as eminently the poet of the age wherein he lived,—

¹ P. 507. It has been ingeniously hinted in the *Quarterly Review*, vol. xxv., that the high-flown language of servants in Spanish dramas is a parody on that of their masters, and designed to make it ridiculous. But this is probably too refined an excuse.

the age of Philip IV. Salfi goes so far as to say we can hardly read Calderon without indignation; since he seems to have had no view but to make his genius subservient to the lowest prejudices and superstitions of his country.¹ In the twenty-fifth volume of the Quarterly Review, an elaborate and able critique on the plays of Calderon seems to have estimated him without prejudice on either side. "His boundless and inexhaustible fertility of invention, his quick power of seizing and prosecuting every thing with dramatic effect, the unfailing animal spirits of his dramas (if we may venture on the expression), the general loftiness and purity of his sentiments, the rich facility of his verse, the abundance of his language, and the clearness and precision with which he embodies his thoughts in words and figures, entitle him to a high rank as to the imagination and creative faculty of a poet; but we cannot consent to enrol him among the mighty masters of the human breast."² His total want of truth to nature, even the ideal nature which poetry embodies, justifies at least this sentence. "The wildest flights of Biron and Romeo," it is observed, "are tame to the heroes of Calderon: the Asiatic pomp of expression, the exuberance of metaphor, the perpetual recurrence of the same figures (which the poetry of Spain derived from its intercourse with the Arabian conquerors of the peninsula), are lavished by him in all their fulness. Every address of a lover to a mistress is thickly studded with stars and flowers: her locks are always nets of gold, her lips rubies, and her heart a rock, which the rivers of his tears attempt in vain to melt. In short, the language of the heart is entirely abandoned for that of the fancy: the brilliant but false *conceits* which have infected the poetical literature of every country, and which have been universally exploded by pure taste, glitter in every page, and intrude into every speech."³

¹ Hist. Litt. de Ginguéné, vol. xii. p. 490.

² P. 24.

³ P. 14.

SECT. II.—ON THE FRENCH DRAMA.

Early French Dramatists of this Period—Cornelle—His principal Tragedies—
Rotrou.

16. AMONG the company who performed at the second theatre of Paris, that established in the Marais, was Hardy, who, like Shakspeare, uniting both arts, was himself the author of 600, or, as some say, 800 dramatic pieces. It is said that forty-one of these are extant in the collection of his works, which I have never seen. Several of them were written, learned by heart, and represented within a week. His own inventions are the worst of all: his tragedies and tragi-comedies are borrowed, with as close an adherence to the original text as possible, from Homer or Plutarch or Cervantes. They have more incident than those of his predecessors, and are somewhat less absurd; but Hardy is a writer of little talent. The Marianne is the most tolerable of his tragedies. In these he frequently abandoned the chorus; and, even where he introduces it, does not regularly close the act with an ode.¹

17. In the comedies of Hardy, and in the many burlesque farces represented under Henry IV. and Louis XIII., no regard was paid to decency, either in the language or the circumstances. Few persons of rank, especially ladies, attended the theatres.² These were first attracted by pastoral representations, of which Racan gave a successful example in his *Artenice*. It is hardly, however, to be called a drama.³ But the stage being no longer abandoned to the populace, and a more critical judgment in French literature gaining ground (encouraged by Richelieu, who built a large room in his palace for the representation of *Mirame*, an indifferent tragedy, part

¹ Fontenelle, *Hist. du Théâtre François*, (in *Œuvres de Fontenelle*, III. 72); Suard, *Mélanges de Littérature*, vol. iv.

² Suard, p. 184. Rotrou boasts, that, since he wrote for the theatre, it had become so well regulated, that respectable women might go to it with as little scruple as to the Luxembourg Garden. Cornelle, however, has, in general, the credit of having purified the stage: after his second piece, *Clitandre*, he admitted no-

thing licentious in his comedies. The only remain of grossness, Fontenelle observes, was that the lovers *se tutoyoient*; but, as he gravely goes on to remark, "*le tutoyement ne choque pas les bonnes mœurs; il ne choque que la politesse et la vraie galanterie.*"—p. 91. But the last instance of this heinous offence is in *Le menteur*.

³ Suard, *ubi supra*.

of which was suspected to be his own". the ancient theatre began to be studied: rules were laid down, and partially observed: a perfect decorum replaced the licentiousness and gross language of the old writers. Mairet and Rotrou, though without rising in their first plays much above Hardy, just served to prepare the way for the father and founder of the national theatre.¹

18. The *Mérite* of Corneille, his first production, was represented in 1629, when he was twenty-three years of age. This is only distinguished, as some say, from those of Hardy by a greater vigor of style; but Fontenelle gives a very different opinion. It had at least a success which caused a new troop of actors to be established in the Marais. His next, *Clitandre*, it is agreed, is not so good. But *La Veuve* is much better: irregular in action, but with spirit, character, and well-invented situations, it is the first model of the higher comedy.² These early comedies must, in fact, have been relatively of considerable merit, since they raised Corneille to high reputation, and connected him with the literary men of his time. The *Medea*, though much borrowed from Seneca, gave a tone of grandeur and dignity unknown before to French tragedy. This appeared in 1635, and was followed by the *Cid* next year.

19. Notwithstanding the defence made by La Harpe, I cannot but agree with the French Academy in their criticism on this play, that the subject is essentially ill chosen. No circumstances can be imagined, no skill can be employed, that will reconcile the mind to the marriage of a daughter with one that has shed her father's blood; and the law of unity of time, which crowds every event of the drama within a few hours, renders the promised consent of Chimène (for such it is) to this union still more revolting and improbable.³ The knowledge of this termination re-acts on the reader during a second perusal, so as to give an irresistible impression of her insincerity in her previous solicitations for his death. She seems indeed, in several passages, little else

¹ Fontenelle, pp. 84, 96.

² Id. p. 78. It is difficult in France, as it is with us, to ascertain the date of plays, because they were often represented for years before they came from the press. It is conjectured by Fontenelle, that one or two pieces of Mairet and Rotrou may have preceded any by Corneille.

³ Buard; Fontenelle; La Harpe.

⁴ La Harpe has said that Chimène does not promise at last to marry Rodrigue, though the spectator perceives that she will do so. He forgets that she has commissioned her lover's sword in the duel with Don Sancho:—

"Sors vainqueur d'un combat dont Chimène est le prix."—Act v. sc. 1.

than a tragic coquette, and one of the most odious kind.¹ The English stage at that time was not exempt from great violations of nature and decorum: yet, had the subject of the Cid fallen into the hands of Beaumont and Fletcher (and it is one which they would have willingly selected, for the sake of the effective situations and contrasts of passion it affords), the part of Chimène would have been managed by them with great warmth and spirit, though probably not less incongruity and extravagance; but I can scarcely believe that the conclusion would have been so much in the style of comedy. Her death, or retirement into a monastery, would have seemed more consonant to her own dignity and to that of a tragic subject. Corneille was, however, borne out by the tradition of Spain, and by the authority of Guillen de Castro, whom he imitated.

20. The language of Corneille is elevated; his sentiments, if sometimes hyperbolical, generally noble, when he has not to deal with the passion of love. ^{Style of} Conscious of the nature of his own powers, he has avoided subjects wherein this must entirely predominate: it was to be, as he thought, an accessory but never a principal source of dramatic interest. In this, however, as a general law of tragedy, he was mistaken: love is by no means unfit for the chief source of tragic distress, but comes in generally with a cold and feeble effect as a subordinate emotion. In those Roman stories which he most affected, its expression could hardly be otherwise than insipid and incongruous. Corneille probably would have dispensed with it, like Shakspeare in Coriolanus and Julius Cæsar; but the taste of his contemporaries, formed in the pedantic school of romance, has imposed fetters on his genius in almost every drama. In the Cid, where the subject left him no choice, he has perhaps succeeded better in the delineation of love than on any other occasion; yet even here we often find the cold exaggerations of complimentary verse, instead of the voice of nature. But other scenes of this play, especially in the first act, which bring forward the proud Castilian characters of the two fathers of Rodrigo and Chi-

¹ In these lines, for example, of the third act, scene 4th:—

“ *Malgré les feux si beaux qui rompent ma colère,
Je ferai mon possible à bien venger mon père;
Mais malgré la rigueur d’un si cruel devoir,
Mon unique souhait est de ne rien pouvoir.* ”

It is true that he found this in his Spanish original; but that does not render the imitation judicious, or the sentiment either moral, or even theatrically specious.

mène, are full of the nervous eloquence of Corneille; and the general style, though it may not have borne the fastidious criticism either of the Academy or of Voltaire, is so far above any thing which had been heard on the French stage, that it was but a very frigid eulogy in the former to say that it "had acquired a considerable reputation among works of the kind." It had at that time astonished Paris: but the prejudices of Cardinal Richelieu and the envy of inferior authors, joined perhaps to the proverbial unwillingness of critical bodies to commit themselves by warmth of praise, had some degree of influence on the judgment which the Academy pronounced on the *Cid*; though I do not think it was altogether so unjust and uncandid as has sometimes been supposed.

21. The next tragedy of Corneille, *Les Horaces*, is hardly open to less objection than the *Cid*; not so much because there is, as the French critics have discovered, a want of unity in the subject, which I do not quite perceive, nor because the fifth act is tedious and uninteresting, as from the repulsiveness of the story, and the jarring of the sentiments with our natural sympathies. Corneille has complicated the legend in Livy with the marriage of the younger Horatius to the sister of the Curiatii, and thus placed his two female personages in a nearly similar situation, which he has taken little pains to diversify by any contrast in their characters. They speak, on the contrary, nearly in the same tone; and we see no reason why the hero of the tragedy should not, as he seems half disposed, have followed up the murder of his sister by that of his wife. More skill is displayed in the opposition of character between the combatants themselves; but the mild, though not less courageous or patriotic, Curiatius attaches the spectator, who cares nothing for the triumph of Rome, or the glory of the Horatian name. It must be confessed, that the elder Horatius is nobly conceived: the Roman energy, of which we find but a caricature in his brutish son, shines out in him with an admirable dramatic spirit. I shall be accused, nevertheless, of want of taste, when I confess that his celebrated *Qu'il mourût* has always seemed to me less eminently sublime than the general suffrage of France has declared it. There is nothing very novel or striking in the proposition, that a soldier's duty is to die in the field rather than desert his post by flight; and, in a tragedy full of the hyperboles of Roman patriotism, it appears strange that we

should be astonished at that which is the principle of all military honor. The words are emphatic in their position, and calculated to draw forth the actor's energy: but this is an artifice of no great skill; and one can hardly help thinking, that a spectator in the pit would spontaneously have anticipated the answer of a warlike father to the feminine question, —

"Que voulez-vous qu'il fit contre trois?"

The style of this tragedy is reckoned by the critics superior to that of the *Cid*; the nervousness and warmth of Corneille is more displayed; and it is more free from incorrect and trivial expression.

22. *Cinna*, the next in order of time, is probably that tragedy of Corneille which would be placed at the *Cinna* head by a majority of suffrages. His eloquence reached here its highest point; the speeches are longer, more vivid in narration, more philosophical in argument, more abundant in that strain of Roman energy which he had derived chiefly from Lucan, more emphatic and condensed in their language and versification. But, as a drama, this is deserving of little praise: the characters of *Cinna* and *Maximus* are contemptible, that of *Emilia* is treacherous and ungrateful. She is indeed the type of a numerous class who have followed her in works of fiction, and sometimes, unhappily, in real life; the female patriot, theoretically, at least, an assassin, but commonly compelled, by the iniquity of the times, to console herself in practice with safer transgressions. We have had some specimens; and other nations, to their shame and sorrow, have had more. But even the magnanimity of *Augustus*, whom we have not seen exposed to instant danger, is uninteresting; nor do we perceive why he should bestow his friendship as well as his forgiveness on the detected traitor that cowers before him. It is one of those subjects which might, by the invention of a more complex plot than history furnishes, have better excited the spectator's attention, but not his sympathy.

23. A deeper interest belongs to *Polyeucte*; and this is the only tragedy of Corneille wherein he affects the *Polyeucte* heart. There is, indeed, a certain incongruity, which we cannot overcome, between the sanctity of Christian martyrdom and the language of love, especially when the latter is

rather the more prominent of the two in the conduct of the drama.¹ But the beautiful character of Pauline would redeem much greater defects than can be ascribed to this tragedy. It is the noblest, perhaps, on the French stage, and conceived with admirable delicacy and dignity.² In the style, however, of *Polyeucte*, there seems to be some return towards the languid tone of commonplace which had been wholly thrown off in *Cinna*.³

24. *Rodogune* is said to have been a favorite with the author. It can hardly be so with the generality of his readers. The story has all the atrocity of the older school, from which *Corneille*, in his earlier plays, had emancipated the stage. It borders even on ridicule. Two princes, kept by their mother, one of those furies whom our own *Webster* or *Marston* would have delighted to draw, in ignorance which is the elder, and consequently entitled to the throne, are enamoured of *Rodogune*. Their mother makes it a condition of declaring the succession, that they should shed the blood of this princess. Struck with horror at such a proposition, they refer their passion to the choice of *Rodogune*, who, in her turn, demands the death of their mother. The embarrassment of these amiable youths may be conceived. *La Harpe* extols the fifth act of this tragedy, and it may perhaps be effective in representation.

25. *Pompey*, sometimes inaccurately called the *Death of Pompey*, is more defective in construction than even any other tragedy of *Corneille*. The hero, if *Pompey* is such, never appears on the stage; and, his death being recounted at the beginning of the second act, the real subject of the piece, so far as it can be said to have one, is the punishment of his assassins; a retribution demanded by the moral

¹ The coterie at the *Hôtel Rambouillet* thought that *Polyeucte* would not succeed, on account of its religious character. *Corneille*, it is said, was about to withdraw his tragedy, but was dissuaded by an actor of so little reputation that he did not even bear a part in the performance. *Fontenelle*, p. 101.

² *Fontenelle* thinks that it shows "un grand attachement à son devoir, et un grand caractère" in Pauline to desire that *Severus* should save her husband's life, instead of procuring the latter to be executed that she might marry her lover. *Réflexions sur la Poétique*, sect. 16. This is rather an odd notion of what is suffi-

cient to constitute an heroic character. It is not the conduct of Pauline, which, in every Christian or virtuous woman, must naturally be the same, but the fine sentiments and language which accompany it, that render her part so noble.

³ In the second scene of the second act, between *Severus* and Pauline, two characters of the most elevated class, the former quits the stage with this line, —

"Adieu, trop vertueux objet, et trop charmant."

The latter replies, —

"Adieu, trop malheureux et trop parfait amant."

sense of the spectator, but hardly important enough for dramatic interest. The character of Cæsar is somewhat weakened by his passion for Cleopatra, which assumes more the tone of devoted gallantry than truth or probability warrants; but Cornelia, though with some Lucanic extravagance, is full of a Roman nobleness of spirit, which renders her, after Pauline, but at a long interval, the finest among the female characters of Corneille. The language is not beneath that of his earlier tragedies.

26. In *Heraclius* we begin to find an inferiority of style. Few passages, especially after the first act, are written with much vigor; and the plot, instead of the faults we may ascribe to some of the former dramas, a too great simplicity and want of action, offends by the perplexity of its situations, and still more by their nature; since they are wholly among the proper resources of comedy. The true and the false *Heraclius*, each uncertain of his paternity, each afraid to espouse one who may or may not be his sister; the embarrassment of Phocas, equally irritated by both, but aware that, in putting either to death, he may punish his own son; the art of Leontine, who produces this confusion, not by silence, but by a series of inconsistent falsehoods,—all these are in themselves ludicrous, and such as in comedy could produce no other effect than laughter.

27. *Nicomède* is generally placed by the critics below *Heraclius*; an opinion in which I should hardly concur. The plot is feeble and improbable, but more tolerable than the strange entanglements of *Heraclius*; and the spirit of Corneille shines out more in the characters and sentiments. None of his later tragedies deserve much notice, except that we find one of his celebrated scenes in *Sertorius*, a drama of little general merit. *Nicomède* and *Sertorius* were both first represented after the middle of the century.

28. Voltaire has well distinguished "the fine scenes of Corneille, and the fine tragedies of Racine." It can perhaps hardly be said, that, with the exception of *Polyeucte*, the former has produced a single play which, taken as a whole, we can commend. The keys of the passions were not given to his custody. But in that which he introduced upon the French stage, and which long continued to be its boast,—impressive, energetic declamation, thoughts masculine, bold, and sometimes sublime, conveyed in

Heraclius.

Nicomède.

Faults and beauties of Corneille.

a style for the most part clear, condensed, and noble, and in a rhythm sonorous and satisfactory to the ear,—he has not since been equalled. Lucan, it has always been said, was the favorite study of Corneille. No one, perhaps, can admire one who has not a strong relish for the other. That the tragedian has ever surpassed the highest flights of his Roman prototype, it might be difficult to prove: but, if his fire is not more intense, it is accompanied by less smoke; his hyperboles, for such he has, are less frequent and less turgid; his taste is more judicious; he knows better, especially in description, what to choose and where to stop. Lucan, however, would have disdained the politeness of the amorous heroes of Corneille; and though often tedious, often offensive to good taste, is never languid or ignoble.

29. The first French comedy written in polite language, *Le Menteur*, without low wit or indecency, is due to Corneille, or rather, in some degree, to the Spanish author whom he copied in *Le Menteur*. This has been improved a little by Goldoni; and our own well-known farce, *The Liar*, is borrowed from both. The incidents are diverting, but it belongs to the subordinate class of comedy; and a better moral would have been shown in the disgrace of the principal character. Another comedy about the same time, *Le Pédant Joué*, by Cyrano de Bergerac, had much success. It has been called the first comedy in prose, and the first wherein a provincial dialect is introduced: the remark, as to the former circumstance, shows a forgetfulness of *Larivey*. *Molière* has borrowed freely from this play.

30. The only tragedies, after those of Corneille, anterior to 1650, which the French themselves hold worthy of remembrance, are the *Sophonisbe* of Mairet, in which some characters and some passages are vigorously conceived, but the style is debased by low and ludicrous thoughts, which later critics never fail to point out with severity;¹ the *Scevole* of Duryer,—the best of several good tragedies, full of lines of great simplicity in expression, but which seem to gain force through their simplicity,—by one who, though never sublime, adopted with success the severe and reasoning style of Corneille;² the *Marianne* of Tristan, which, at its appearance in 1637, passed for a rival of the *Cid*, and remained for a century on the stage, but is now

¹ Suard, *ubi supra*.

² Suard, p. 196.

ridiculed for a style alternately turgid and ludicrous; and the Wenceslas of Rotrou, which had not ceased perhaps thirty years since to be represented.

31. This tragedy, the best work of a fertile dramatist, who did himself honor by a ready acknowledgment of Wenceslas the superiority of Corneille, instead of canvassing of Rotrou. the suffrages of those who always envy genius, is by no means so much below that great master, as, in the unfortunate efforts of his later years, he was below himself. Wenceslas was represented in 1647. It may be admitted, that Rotrou had conceived his plot, which is wholly original, in the spirit of Corneille: the masculine energy of the sentiments, the delineation of bold and fierce passions, of noble and heroic love, the attempt even at political philosophy, are copies of that model. It seems, indeed, that in several scenes Rotrou must, out of mere generosity to Corneille, have determined to outdo one of his most exceptionable passages, the consent of Chimène to espouse the Cid. His own curtain drops on the vanishing reluctance of his heroine to accept the hand of a monster whom she hated, and who had just murdered her lover in his own brother. It is the Lady Anne of Shakespeare; but Lady Anne is not a heroine. Wenceslas is not unworthy of comparison with the second class of Corneille's tragedies. But the ridiculous tone of language and sentiment which the heroic romance had rendered popular, and from which Corneille did not wholly emancipate himself, often appears in this piece of Rotrou; the intrigue is rather too complex, in the Spanish style, for tragedy; the diction seems frequently obnoxious to the most indulgent criticism; but, above all, the story is essentially ill contrived, ending in the grossest violation of poetical justice ever witnessed on the stage, the impunity and even the triumph of one of the worst characters that was ever drawn.

never wholly put down, was now abandoned, and is not even tolerated by the Declaration of Sports. The several companies of players, who, in her reign, had been under the nominal protection of some men of rank, were now denominated the servants of the king, the queen, or other royal personages.¹ They were relieved from some of the vexatious control they had experienced, and subjected only to the gentle sway of the Master of the Revels. It was his duty to revise all dramatic works before they were represented, to exclude profane and unbecoming language, and specially to take care that there should be no interference with matters of state. The former of these corrective functions must have been rather laxly exercised; but there are instances in which a license was refused on account of very recent history being touched in a play.

35. The reigns of James and Charles were the glory of our theatre. Public applause, and the favor of princes, were well bestowed on those bright stars of our literature who then appeared. In 1623, when Sir Henry Herbert became Master of the Revels, there were five companies of actors in London. This, indeed, is something less than at the accession of James; and the latest historian of the drama suggests the increase of Puritanical sentiments as a likely cause of this apparent decline. But we find little reason to believe, that there was any decline in the public taste for the theatre; and it may be as probable an hypothesis, that the excess of competition, at the end of Elizabeth's reign, had rendered some undertakings unprofitable; the greater fishes, as usual in such cases, swallowing up the less. We learn from Howes, the continuator of Stow, that, within sixty years before 1631, seventeen play-houses had been built in the metropolis. These were now larger and more convenient than before. They were divided into public and private: not that the former epithet was inapplicable to both; but those styled public were not completely roofed, nor well provided with seats, nor were the performances by can-

General
taste for
the stage.

¹ Collier, i. 347. But the privilege of peers to grant licences to itinerant players, given by statute 14 Elis. c. 5, and 39 Elis. c. 4, was taken away by 1 Jac. I. c. 7, so that they became liable to be treated as vagrants. Accordingly there were no established theatres in any provincial city; and strollers, though dear to the lovers of

the buskin, were always obnoxious to grave magistrates. The license, however, granted to Burbage, Shakspeare, Hemmings, and others, in 1608, authorized them to act plays not only at the usual house, but in any other part of the kingdom. Burbage was reckoned the best actor of his time, and excelled as Richard III.

dle-light: they resembled more the rude booths we still see at fairs, or the constructions in which interludes are represented by day in Italy; while private theatres, such as that of the Black Friars, were built in nearly the present form. It seems to be the more probable opinion, that movable scenery was unknown on these theatres. "It is a fortunate circumstance," Mr. Collier has observed, "for the poetry of our old plays, that it was so: the imagination of the auditor only was appealed to; and we owe to the absence of painted canvas many of the finest descriptive passages in Shakspeare, his contemporaries, and immediate followers. The introduction of scenery gives the date to the commencement of the decline of our dramatic poetry." In this remark, which seems as original as just, I entirely concur. Even in this age, the prodigality of our theatre in its peculiar boast, scene-painting, can hardly keep pace with the creative powers of Shakspeare: it is well that he did not live when a manager was to estimate his descriptions by the cost of realizing them on canvas, or we might never have stood with Lear on the cliffs of Dover, or amidst the palaces of Venice with Shylock and Antonio. The scene is perpetually changed in our old drama, precisely because it was not changed at all. A powerful argument might otherwise have been discovered in favor of the unity of place, that it is very cheap.

36. Charles, as we might expect, was not less inclined to this liberal pleasure than his predecessors. It was to his own cost that Prynne assaulted the stage in his immense volume, the *Histriomastix*. Even Milton, before the foul spirit had wholly entered into him, extolled the learned sock of Jonson, and the wild wood-notes of Shakspeare. But these days were soon to pass away; the ears of Prynne were avenged: by an order of the two houses of parliament, Sept. 2, 1642, the theatres were closed as a becoming measure during the season of public calamity and impending civil war; but, after some unsuccessful attempts to evade this prohibition, it was thought expedient, in the complete success of the party who had always abhorred the drama, to put a stop to it altogether; and another ordinance of Jan. 22, 1648, reciting the usual objections to all such entertainments, directed the theatres to be rendered unserviceable. We must refer the reader to the valuable work which has supplied the sketch of these pages for further

Theatres
closed by
the parlia-
ment.

knowledge:¹ it is more our province to follow the track of those who most distinguished a period so fertile in dramatic genius; and first that of the greatest of them all.

37. Those who originally undertook to marshal the plays of Shakspeare according to chronological order, always attending less to internal evidence than to the very ^{Shakspeare's} Twelfth Night, fallible proofs of publication they could obtain, placed Twelfth Night last of all, in 1612 or 1613. It afterwards rose a little higher in the list; but Mr. Collier has finally proved that it was on the stage early in 1602, and was at that time chosen, probably as rather a new piece, for representation at one of the Inns of Court.² The general style resembles, in my judgment, that of *Much Ado about Nothing*, which is referred with probability to the year 1600. Twelfth Night, notwithstanding some very beautiful passages, and the humorous absurdity of Malvolio, has not the coruscations of wit, and spirit of character, that distinguish the excellent comedy it seems to have immediately followed; nor is the plot nearly so well constructed. Viola would be more interesting, if she had not indelicately, as well as unfairly towards Olivia, determined to win the Duke's heart before she had seen him. The part of Sebastian has all that improbability which belongs to mistaken identity, without the comic effect for the sake of which that is forgiven in Plautus and in the *Comedy of Errors*.

38. The *Merry Wives of Windsor* is that work of Shakspeare in which he has best displayed English manners; for though there is something of this in the ^{Merry Wives of Windsor.} historical plays, yet we rarely see in them such a picture of actual life as comedy ought to represent. It may be difficult to say for what cause he has abstained from a source of gayety whence his prolific invention, and keen eye for the diversities of character, might have drawn so much. The Masters Knowell and Wellborn, the young gentlemen who spend their money freely and make love to rich widows (an insipid race of personages, it must be owned), recur for ever in the old plays of James's reign; but Shakspeare threw

¹ I have made no particular references to Mr. Collier's *double* work, *The History of English Dramatic Poetry*, and *Annals of the Stage*: it will be necessary for the reader to make use of his index; but few books lately published contain so much valuable and original information, though

not entirely arranged in the most convenient manner. He seems, nevertheless, to have obligations to Dodaley's preface to his *Collection of Old Plays*, or rather perhaps to Reed's edition of it.

² Vol. i. p. 327.

an ideality over this class of characters, the Bassanios, the Valentines, the Gratianos, and placed them in scenes which neither by dress nor manners recalled the prose of ordinary life.¹ In this play, however, the English gentleman, in age and youth, is brought upon the stage, slightly caricatured in Shallow, and far more so in Slender. The latter, indeed, is a perfect satire, and I think was so intended, on the brilliant youth of the provinces, such as we may believe it to have been before the introduction of newspapers and turnpike roads; awkward and boobyish among civil people, but at home in rude sports, and proud of exploits at which the town would laugh, yet perhaps with more courage and good-nature than the laughers. No doubt can be raised that the family of Lucy is ridiculed in Shallow; but those who have had recourse to the old fable of the deer-stealing, forget that Shakspeare never lost sight of his native county, and went, perhaps, every summer, to Stratford. It is not impossible that some arrogance of the provincial squires towards a player, whom, though a gentleman by birth and the recent grant of arms, they might not reckon such, excited his malicious wit to those admirable delineations.

39. The *Merry Wives of Windsor* was first printed in 1602, but very materially altered in a subsequent edition. It is wholly comic; so that Dodd, who published the beauties of Shakspeare, confining himself to poetry, says it is the only play which afforded him nothing to extract. This play does not excite a great deal of interest; for Anne Page is but a sample of a character not very uncommon, which, under a garb of placid and decorous mediocrity, is still capable of pursuing its own will. But, in wit and humorous delineation, no other goes beyond it. If Falstaff seems, as Johnson has intimated, to have lost some of his powers of merriment, it is because he is humiliated to a point where even his invention and impudence cannot bear him off victorious. In the first acts, he is still the same Jack Falstaff of the Boar's Head. Jonson's earliest comedy, *Every Man in his Humor*, had appeared a few years before the *Merry Wives of Windsor*: they both turn on English life in the middle classes, and on

¹ "No doubt," says Coleridge, "they (Beaumont and Fletcher) imitated the ease of gentlemanly conversation better than Shakspeare, who was unable not to be too much associated to succeed in this." — *Table Talk*, II. 396. I am not quite sure that I understand this expression; but probably the meaning is not very different from what I have said.

the same passion of jealousy. If, then, we compare these two productions of our greatest comic dramatists, the vast superiority of Shakspeare will appear undeniable. Kately, indeed, has more energy, more relief, more excuse, perhaps, in what might appear, to his temper, matter for jealousy, than the wretched, narrow-minded Ford; he is more of a gentleman, and commands a certain degree of respect: but dramatic justice is better dealt upon Ford by rendering him ridiculous, and he suits better the festive style of Shakspeare's most amusing play. His light-hearted wife, on the other hand, is drawn with more spirit than Dame Kately; and the most ardent admirer of Jonson would not oppose Master Stephen to Slender, or Bobadil to Falstaff. The other characters are not parallel enough to admit of comparison; but in their diversity (nor is Shakspeare perhaps in any one play more fertile) and their amusing peculiarity, as well as in the construction and arrangement of the story, the brilliancy of the wit, the perpetual gayety of the dialogue, we perceive at once to whom the laurel must be given. Nor is this comparison instituted to disparage Jonson, whom we have praised, and shall have again to praise so highly, but to show how much easier it was to vanquish the rest of Europe than to contend with Shakspeare.

40. Measure for Measure, commonly referred to the end of 1603, is perhaps, after Hamlet, Lear, and Macbeth, *Measure for the play in which Shakspeare struggles, as it were, Measure.* most with the over-mastering power of his own mind; the depths and intricacies of being, which he has searched and sounded with intense reflection, perplex and harass him; his personages arrest their course of action to pour forth, in language the most remote from common use, thoughts which few could grasp in the clearest expression; and thus he loses something of dramatic excellence in that of his contemplative philosophy. The Duke is designed as the representative of this philosophical character. He is stern and melancholy by temperament, averse to the exterior shows of power, and secretly conscious of some unfitness for its practical duties. The subject is not very happily chosen, but artfully improved by Shakspeare. In most of the numerous stories of a similar nature, which before or since his time have been related, the sacrifice of chastity is really made, and made in vain. There is, however, something too coarse and disgusting in such a

story; and it would have deprived him of a splendid exhibition of character. The virtue of Isabella, inflexible and independent of circumstance, has something very grand and elevated: yet one is disposed to ask, whether, if Claudio had been really executed, the spectator would not have gone away with no great affection for her; and at least we now feel that her reproaches against her miserable brother, when he clings to life like a frail and guilty being, are too harsh. There is great skill in the invention of Mariana; and, without this, the story could not have had any thing like a satisfactory termination: yet it is never explained how the Duke had become acquainted with this secret, and, being acquainted with it, how he had preserved his esteem and confidence in Angelo. His intention, as hinted towards the end, to marry Isabella, is a little too commonplace: it is one of Shakspeare's hasty half-thoughts. The language of this comedy is very obscure, and the text seems to have been printed with great inaccuracy. I do not value the comic parts highly: Lucio's impudent profligacy, the result rather of sensual debasement than of natural ill disposition, is well represented; but Elbow is a very inferior repetition of Dogberry. In dramatic effect, *Measure for Measure* ranks high: the two scenes between Isabella and Angelo, that between her and Claudio, those where the Duke appears in disguise, and the catastrophe in the fifth act, are admirably written and very interesting; except so far as the spectator's knowledge of the two stratagems which have deceived Angelo may prevent him from participating in the indignation at Isabella's imaginary wrong, which her lamentations would excite. Several of the circumstances and characters are borrowed from the old play of *Whetstone*, *Promos* and *Cassandra*; but very little of the sentiments or language. What is good in *Measure for Measure* is Shakspeare's own.

41. If originality of invention did not so much stamp
 Lear. almost every play of Shakspeare that to name one
 as the most original seems a disparagement to
 others, we might say, that this great prerogative of genius
 was exercised above all in *Lear*. It diverges more from the
 model of regular tragedy than *Macbeth* or *Othello*, and even
 more than *Hamlet*; but the fable is better constructed than
 in the last of these, and it displays full as much of the almost
 superhuman inspiration of the poet as the other two. *Lear*

himself is, perhaps, the most wonderful of dramatic conceptions; ideal to satisfy the most romantic imagination, yet idealized from the reality of nature. Shakspeare, in preparing us for the most intense sympathy with this old man, first abases him to the ground: it is not Œdipus, against whose respected age the gods themselves have conspired; it is not Orestes, noble-minded and affectionate, whose crime has been virtue; it is a headstrong, feeble, and selfish being, whom, in the first act of the tragedy, nothing seems capable of redeeming in our eyes; nothing but what follows,—intense woe, unnatural wrong. Then comes on that splendid madness, not absurdly sudden, as in some tragedies, but in which the strings that keep his reasoning power together give way one after the other in the frenzy of rage and grief. Then it is that we find, what in life may sometimes be seen, the intellectual energies grow stronger in calamity, and especially under wrong. An awful eloquence belongs to unmerited suffering. Thoughts burst out, more profound than Lear in his prosperous hour could ever have conceived; inconsequent, for such is the condition of madness, but in themselves fragments of coherent truth, the reason of an unreasonable mind.

42. Timon of Athens is cast, as it were, in the same mould as Lear: it is the same essential character, the same ^{Timon of Athens} generosity more from wanton ostentation than love of others, the same fierce rage under the smart of ingratitude, the same rousing up in that tempest of powers that had slumbered unsuspected in some deep recess of the soul; for, had Timon or Lear known that philosophy of human nature in their calmer moments which fury brought forth, they would never have had such terrible occasion to display it. The thoughtless confidence of Lear in his children has something in it far more touching than the self-beggary of Timon; though both one and the other have prototypes enough in real life. And as we give the old king more of our pity, so a more intense abhorrence accompanies his daughters and the evil characters of that drama, than we spare for the miserable sycophants of the Athenian. Their thanklessness is anticipated, and springs from the very nature of their calling: it verges on the beaten road of comedy. In this play there is neither a female personage, except two courtezans, who hardly speak; nor is there any prominent character (the honest steward is not such) redeemed by virtue enough to be estima-

ble; for the cynic Apemantus is but a cynic, and ill replaces the noble Kent of the other drama. The fable, if fable it can be called, is so extraordinarily deficient in action, a fault of which Shakspeare is not guilty in any other instance, that we may wonder a little how he should have seen in the single delineation of Timon a counterbalance for the manifold objections to this subject. But there seems to have been a period of Shakspeare's life when his heart was ill at ease, and ill content with the world or his own conscience; the memory of hours misspent, the pang of affection misplaced or unrequited, the experience of man's worse nature which intercourse with unworthy associates, by choice or circumstance, peculiarly teaches,—these, as they sank down into the depths of his great mind, seem not only to have inspired into it the conception of Lear and Timon, but that of one primary character, the censurer of mankind. This type is first seen in the philosophic melancholy of Jaques, gazing with an undiminished serenity, and with a gayety of fancy, though not of manners, on the follies of the world. It assumes a graver cast in the exiled Duke of the same play, and next one rather more severe in the Duke of Measure for Measure. In all these, however, it is merely contemplative philosophy. In Hamlet this is mingled with the impulses of a perturbed heart under the pressure of extraordinary circumstances; it shines no longer as in the former characters, with a steady light, but plays in fitful coruscations amidst feigned gayety and extravagance. In Lear it is the flash of sudden inspiration across the incongruous imagery of madness; in Timon it is obscured by the exaggerations of misanthropy. These plays all belong to nearly the same period; *As You Like It* being usually referred to 1600, Hamlet, in its altered form, to about 1602, Timon to the same year, Measure for Measure to 1603, and Lear to 1604. In the later plays of Shakspeare, especially in Macbeth and the Tempest, much of moral speculation will be found; but he has never returned to this type of character in the personages. Timon is less read and less pleasing than the great majority of Shakspeare's plays; but it abounds with signs of his genius. Schlegel observes, that, of all his works, it is that which has most satire; comic in representation of the parasites, indignant and Juvenalian in the bursts of Timon himself.

43. Pericles is generally reckoned to be in part, and only in

part, the work of Shakspeare. From the poverty and bad management of the fable, the want of any effective or distinguishable character (for Marina is no more than Pericles. the common form of female virtue, such as all the dramatists of that age could draw), and a general feebleness of the tragedy as a whole, I should not believe the structure to have been Shakspeare's. But many passages are far more in his manner than in that of any contemporary writer with whom I am acquainted; and the extrinsic testimony, though not conclusive, being of some value, I should not dissent from the judgment of Steevens and Malone, that it was, in no inconsiderable degree, repaired and improved by his touch. Drake has placed it under the year 1590, as the earliest of Shakspeare's plays, for no better reason, apparently, than that he thought it inferior to all the rest. But if, as most will agree, it were not quite his own, this reason will have less weight; and the language seems to me rather that of his second or third manner than of his first. Pericles is not known to have existed before 1609.

44. The majority of readers, I believe, assign to *Macbeth*, which seems to have been written about 1606, the pre-eminence among the works of Shakspeare: many, however, would rather name *Othello*, one of his latest, which is referred to 1611; and a few might prefer *Lear* to either. The great epic drama, as the first may be called, deserves, in my own judgment, the post it has attained; as being, in the language of Drake, "the greatest effort of our author's genius, the most sublime and impressive drama which the world has ever beheld." It will be observed, that Shakspeare had now turned his mind towards the tragic drama. No tragedy but *Romeo and Juliet* belongs to the sixteenth century: ten, without counting *Pericles*, appeared in the first eleven years of the present. It is not my design to distinguish each of his plays separately; and it will be evident that I pass over some of the greatest. No writer, in fact, is so well known as Shakspeare, or has been so abundantly, and, on the whole, so ably criticised: I might have been warranted in saying even less than I have done.

45. Shakspeare was, as I believe, conversant with the better class of English literature which the reign of Elizabeth afforded. Among other books, the translation by North of Amyot's *Plutarch* seems to have fallen into his hands about

1607. It was the source of three tragedies founded on the lives of Brutus, Antony, and Coriolanus; the first bearing the name of Julius Cæsar. In this the plot wants even that historical unity which the romantic drama requires; the third and fourth acts are ill connected; it is deficient in female characters, and in that combination which is generally apparent amidst all the intricacies of his fable. But it abounds in fine scenes and fine passages: the spirit of Plutarch's Brutus is well seized, the predominance of Cæsar himself is judiciously restrained, the characters have that individuality which Shakspeare seldom misses; nor is there, perhaps, in the whole range of ancient and modern eloquence a speech more fully realizing the perfection that orators have striven to attain than that of Antony.

46. Antony and Cleopatra is of rather a different order; it does not furnish, perhaps, so many striking beauties as the last, but is at least equally redolent of the genius of Shakspeare. Antony, indeed, was given him by history; and he has but embodied in his own vivid colors the irregular mind of the Triumvir, ambitious and daring against all enemies but himself. In Cleopatra he had less to guide him: she is another incarnation of the same passions, more lawless and insensible to reason and honor as they are found in women. This character being not one that can please, its strong and spirited delineation has not been sufficiently observed. It has, indeed, only a poetical originality: the type was in the courtesan of common life; but the resemblance is that of Michael Angelo's Sibyls to a muscular woman. In this tragedy, like Julius Cæsar, as has been justly observed by Schlegel, the events that do not pass on the stage are scarcely made clear enough to one who is not previously acquainted with history, and some of the persons appear and vanish again without sufficient reason. He has, in fact, copied Plutarch too exactly.

47. This fault is by no means discerned in the third Roman tragedy of Shakspeare, — Coriolanus. He luckily found an intrinsic historical unity which he could not have destroyed, and which his magnificent delineation of the chief personage has thoroughly maintained. Coriolanus himself has the grandeur of sculpture: his proportions are colossal; nor would less than this transcendent superiority, by which he towers over his fellow-citizens, warrant, or seem for

the moment to warrant, his haughtiness and their pusillanimity. The surprising judgment of Shakspeare is visible in this. A dramatist of the second class (for he alone is in the first), a Corneille, a Schiller, or an Alfieri, would not have lost the occasion of representing the plebeian form of courage and patriotism. A tribune would have been made to utter noble speeches, and some critics would have extolled the balance and contrast of the antagonist principles. And this might have degenerated into the general saws of ethics and politics which philosophical tragedians love to pour forth. But Shakspeare instinctively perceived, that to render the arrogance of Coriolanus endurable to the spectator, or dramatically probable, he must abase the plebeians to a contemptible populace. The sacrifice of historic truth is often necessary for the truth of poetry. The citizens of early Rome, *rusticorum mascula militum proles*, are indeed calumniated in his scenes, and might almost pass for burgesses of Stratford; but the unity of emotion is not dissipated by contradictory energies. Coriolanus is less rich in poetical style than the other two, but the comic parts are full of humor. In these three tragedies it is manifest, that Roman character, and still more Roman manners, are not exhibited with the precision of a scholar; yet there is something that distinguishes them from the rest, something of a *grandiosity* in the sentiments and language, which shows us that Shakspeare had not read that history without entering into its spirit.

48. Othello, or perhaps the Tempest, is reckoned by many the latest of Shakspeare's works. In the zenith of his faculties, in possession of fame disproportionate, indeed, to what has since accrued to his memory, but beyond that of any contemporary, at the age of about forty-seven, he ceased to write, and settled himself at a distance from all dramatic associations in his own native town; a home of which he had never lost sight, nor even permanently quitted, the birthplace of his children, and to which he brought what might then seem affluence in a middle station, with the hope, doubtless, of a secure decline into the yellow leaf of years. But he was cut off in 1616, not probably in the midst of any schemes for his own glory, but to the loss of those enjoyments which he had accustomed himself to value beyond it. His descendants, it is well known, became extinct in little more than half a century.

His retirement and death.

49. The name of Shakspeare is the greatest in our literature,—it is the greatest in all literature. No man ever came near to him in the creative powers of the mind; no man had ever such strength at once, and such variety of imagination. Coleridge has most felicitously applied to him a Greek epithet, given before to I know not whom, certainly none so deserving of it, *μυρίωνος*, the thousand-souled Shakspeare.¹ The number of characters in his plays is astonishingly great, without reckoning those who, although transient, have often their individuality, all distinct, all types of human life in well-defined differences. Yet he never takes an abstract quality to embody it, scarcely perhaps a definite condition of manners, as Jonson does; nor did he draw much, as I conceive, from living models: there is no manifest appearance of personal caricature in his comedies, though in some slight traits of character this may not improbably have been the case. Above all, neither he nor his contemporaries wrote for the stage in the worst, though most literal, and of late years the most usual, sense; making the servants and handmaids of dramatic invention to lord over it, and limiting the capacities of the poet's mind to those of the performers. If this poverty of the representative department of the drama had hung like an incumbent fiend on the creative power of Shakspeare, how would he have poured forth with such inexhaustible prodigality the vast diversity of characters that we find in some of his plays? This it is in which he leaves far behind not the dramatists alone, but all writers of fiction. Compare with him Homer, the tragedians of Greece, the poets of Italy, Plautus, Cervantes, Molière, Addison, Le Sage, Fielding, Richardson, Scott, the romancers of the elder or later schools,—one man has far more than surpassed them all. Others may have been as sublime, others may have been more pathetic, others may have equalled him in grace and purity of language, and have shunned some of its faults; but the philosophy of Shakspeare, his intimate searching out of the human heart, whether in the gnomic form of sentence or in the dramatic exhibition of character, is a gift peculiarly his own. It is, if not entirely wanting, very little manifested in comparison with him, by the English

¹ Table Talk, vol. II. p. 301. Coleridge had previously spoken of Shakspeare's oceanic mind, which, if we take it in the sense of multitudinous unity, *ποικίλων* *κυμάτων ἀνθρώπων γέλασμα*, will present the same idea as *μυρίωνος* in a beautiful image.

dramatists of his own and the subsequent period, whom we are about to approach.

50. These dramatists, as we shall speedily perceive, are hardly less inferior to Shakspeare in judgment. To ^{his judg-} this quality I particularly advert, because foreign ^{ment.} writers, and sometimes our own, have imputed an extraordinary barbarism and rudeness to his works. They belong, indeed, to an age sufficiently rude and barbarous in its entertainments, and are of course to be classed with what is called the romantic school, which has hardly yet shaken off that reproach. But no one who has perused the plays anterior to those of Shakspeare, or contemporary with them, or subsequent to them, down to the closing of the theatres in the civil war, will pretend to deny that there is far less regularity, in regard to every thing where regularity can be desired, in a large proportion of these (perhaps in all the tragedies) than in his own. We need only repeat the names of the Merchant of Venice, Romeo and Juliet, Macbeth, Othello, the Merry Wives of Windsor, Measure for Measure. The plots in these are excellently constructed, and in some with uncommon artifice. But, even where an analysis of the story might excite criticism, there is generally an unity of interest which tones the whole. The Winter's Tale is not a model to follow; but we feel that the Winter's Tale is a single story: it is even managed as such with consummate skill. It is another proof of Shakspeare's judgment, that he has given action enough to his comedies, without the bustling intricacy of the Spanish stage. If his plots have any little obscurity in some parts, it is from copying his novel or history too minutely.

51. The idolatry of Shakspeare has been carried so far of late years, that Drake and perhaps greater authorities have been unwilling to acknowledge any faults in his plays. This, however, is an extravagance rather derogatory to the critic than honorable to the poet. Besides the blemishes of construction in some of his plots, which are pardonable, but still blemishes, there are too many in his style. His conceits and quibbles often spoil the effect of his scenes, and take off from the passion he would excite. In the last act of Richard II., the Duke of York is introduced demanding the punishment of his son Aumale for a conspiracy against the king, while the Duchess implores mercy. The scene is ill conceived and worse executed throughout; but one line is both atrocious

and contemptible. The Duchess having dwelt on the word *pardon*, and urged the king to let her hear it from his lips, York takes her up with this stupid quibble:—

“*Speak it in French, King: say, Pardonne-moi.*”

It would not be difficult to find several other instances, though none, perhaps, quite so bad, of verbal equivocations, misplaced and inconsistent with the person's, the author's, the reader's sentiment.

52. Few will defend these notorious faults. But is there ^{his obsc.} not one, less frequently mentioned, yet of more continual recurrence,—the extreme obscurity of Shakspeare's diction? His style is full of new words and new senses. It is easy to pass this over as obsolescence: but though many expressions are obsolete, and many provincial; though the labor of his commentators has never been so profitably, as well as so diligently, employed as in tracing this by the help of the meanest and most forgotten books of the age,—it is impossible to deny, that innumerable lines in Shakspeare were not more intelligible in his time than they are at present. Much of this may be forgiven, or rather is so incorporated with the strength of his reason and fancy, that we love it as the proper body of Shakspeare's soul. Still, can we justify the very numerous passages which yield to no interpretation, knots which are never unloosed, which conjecture does but cut, or even those which, if they may at last be understood, keep the attention in perplexity till the first emotion has passed away? And these occur not merely in places where the struggles of the speaker's mind may be well denoted by some obscurities of language, as in the soliloquies of Hamlet and Macbeth, but in dialogues between ordinary personages, and in the business of the play. We learn Shakspeare, in fact, as we learn a language, or as we read a difficult passage in Greek, with the eye glancing on the commentary; and it is only after much study that we come to forget a part, it can be but a part, of the perplexities he has caused us. This was no doubt one reason that he was less read formerly; his style passing for obsolete, though in many parts, as we have just said, it was never much more intelligible than it is.¹

¹ “Shakspeare's style is so pastored with figurative expressions that it is as affected as it is obscure. It is true that in his later plays he had worn off somewhat of this rust” — Dryden's Works (Malone), vol. II. part II. p. 202. This is by no means the truth, but rather the reverse of it. Dryden knew not at all which were earlier, or which later, of Shakspeare's plays.

53. It does not appear probable, that Shakspeare was ever placed below, or merely on a level with, the other dramatic writers of this period.¹ That his plays were not so frequently represented as those of Fletcher, is little to the purpose: they required a more expensive decoration, a larger company of good performers, and, above all, they were less intelligible to a promiscuous audience. Yet it is certain, that throughout the seventeenth century, and even in the writings of Addison and his contemporaries, we seldom or never meet with that complete recognition of his supremacy, that unhesitating preference of him to all the world, which has become the faith of the last and the present century. And it is remarkable, that this apotheosis, so to speak, of Shakspeare, was originally the work of what has been styled a frigid and tasteless generation, the age of George II. Much is certainly due to the stage itself, when those appeared who could guide and control the public taste, and discover that in the poet himself which sluggish imaginations could not have reached. The enthusiasm for Shakspeare is nearly coincident with that for Garrick: it was kept up by his followers, and especially by that highly gifted family which has but recently been withdrawn from our stage.

54. Among the commentators on Shakspeare, Warburton, always striving to display his own acuteness, and scorn of others, deviates more than any one else from the meaning. Theobald was the first who did a little. Johnson explained much well; but there is something magisterial in the manner wherein he dismisses each play like a boy's exercise, that irritates the reader. His criticism is frequently judicious, but betrays no ardent admiration for Shakspeare. Malone and Steevens were two laborious com-

¹ A certain William Cartwright, in commendatory verses addressed to Fletcher, has the assurance to say, —

"Shakspeare to thee was dull, whose best wit lies
I' th' ladies' questions and the fools' replies."

But the suffrage of Jonson himself, of Milton, and of many more that might be quoted, tends to prove that his genius was esteemed beyond that of any other, though some might compare inferior writers to him in certain qualifications of the dramatist. Even Dryden, who came in a worse period, and had no undue reverence

for Shakspeare, admits that "he was the man who, of all modern and perhaps ancient poets, had the largest and most comprehensive soul. All the images of nature were still present to him, and he drew them not laboriously, but luckily: when he describes any thing, you more than see it, you feel it too. Those who accuse him to have wanted learning give him the greater commendation: he was naturally learned; he needed not the spectacles of books to read Nature; he looked inwards, and found her there." — Dryden's *Prose Works* (Malone's edition), vol. i. part II. p. 99.

mentators on the meaning of words and phrases; one dull, the other clever: but the dulness was accompanied by candor and a love of truth; the cleverness, by a total absence of both. Neither seems to have had a full discernment of Shakspeare's genius. The numerous critics of the last age who were not editors have poured out much that is trite and insipid, much that is hypercritical and erroneous; yet collectively they not only bear witness to the public taste for the poet, but taught men to judge and feel more accurately than they would have done for themselves. Hurd and Lord Kaimes, especially the former, may be reckoned among the best of this class;¹ Mrs. Montagu, perhaps, in her celebrated Essay, not very far from the bottom of the list. In the present century, Coleridge and Schlegel, so nearly at the same time that the question of priority and even plagiarism has been mooted, gave a more philosophical, and at the same time a more intrinsically exact, view of Shakspeare than their predecessors. What has since been written has often been highly acute and æsthetic, but occasionally with an excess of refinement which substitutes the critic for the work. Mrs. Jameson's *Essays on the Female Characters of Shakspeare* are among the best. It was right that this province of illustration should be reserved for a woman's hand.

55. Ben Jonson, so generally known by that familiar description that some might hardly recognize him
Ben Jonson. without it, was placed next to Shakspeare by his own age. They were much acquainted, and belonged to the oldest, perhaps, and not the worst of clubs, formed by Sir Walter Raleigh about the beginning of the century, which met at the Mermaid in Friday Street. We may easily believe the testimony of one of its members, that it was a feast of the most subtle and brilliant wit.² Jonson had abundant powers of poignant and sarcastic humor, besides extensive reading; and Shakspeare must have brought to the Mermaid the brightness of his fancy. Selden and Camden, the former in early youth, are reported to have given the ballast of their strong sense

¹ Hurd, in his notes on Horace's *Art of Poetry*, vol. i. p. 52, has some very good remarks on the diction of Shakspeare, suggested by the *callida junctura* of the Roman poet, illustrated by many instances. These remarks both serve to bring out the skill of Shakspeare, and to explain the disputed passage in Horace. Hurd justly

maintains the obvious construction of that passage: "Notum si callida verbum Reddiderit junctura novum." That proposed by Lambinus and Beattie, which begins with *novum*, is inadmissible, and gives a worse sense.
² Gifford's *Life of Jonson*, p. 65; Collier, iii. 275.

and learning to this cluster of poets. There has been, however, a prevalent tradition that Jonson was not without some malignant and envious feelings towards Shakspeare. Gifford has repelled this imputation with considerable success, though we may still suspect that there was something caustic and saturnine in the temper of Jonson.

56. The Alchemist is a play which long remained on the stage, though I am not sure that it has been represented since the days of Garrick, who was famous in The Alchemist. Abel Drugger. Notwithstanding the indiscriminate and injudicious panegyric of Gifford, I believe there is no reader of taste but will condemn the outrageous excess of pedantry with which the first acts of this play abound; pedantry the more intolerable, that it is not even what, however unfit for the English stage, scholars might comprehend, but the gibberish of obscure treatises on alchemy, which, whatever the commentators may choose to say, was as unintelligible to all but a few half-witted dupes of that imposture as it is at present. Much of this, it seems impossible to doubt, was omitted in representation. Nor is his pedantic display of learning confined to the part of the Alchemist, who had certainly a right to talk in the style of his science, if he had done it with some moderation. Sir Epicure Mammon, a worldly sensualist, placed in the author's own age, pours out a torrent of gluttonous cookery from the kitchens of Heliogabalus and Apicius: his dishes are to be camels' heels, the beards of barbels and dissolved pearl, crowning all with the paps of a sow. But, while this habitual error of Jonson's vanity is not to be overlooked, we may truly say, that it is much more than compensated by the excellences of this comedy. The plot, with great simplicity, is continually animated and interesting; the characters are conceived and delineated with admirable boldness, truth, spirit, and variety; the humor, especially in the two Puritans, a sect who now began to do penance on the stage, is amusing; the language, when it does not smell too much of book-learning, is forcible and clear. The Alchemist is one of the three plays which usually contest the superiority among those of Jonson.

57. The second of these is The Fox, which, according to general opinion, has been placed above the Alchemist, or Volpone, or The Fox. Notwithstanding the dissent of Gifford, I should concur in this suffrage. The fable belongs to a higher

class of comedy. Without minutely inquiring whether the Roman hunters after the inheritance of the rich, so well described by Horace, and especially the costly presents by which they endeavored to secure a better return, are altogether according to the manners of Venice, where Jonson has laid his scene, we must acknowledge, that he has displayed the base cupidity, of which there will never be wanting examples among mankind, in such colors as all other dramatic poetry can hardly rival. Cumberland has blamed the manner in which Volpone brings ruin on his head by insulting, in disguise, those whom he had duped. In this, I agree with Gifford, there is no violation of nature. Besides their ignorance of his person, so that he could not necessarily foresee the effects of Voltore's rage, it has been well and finely said by Cumberland, that there is a moral in a villain's outwitting himself. And this is one that many dramatists have displayed.

58. In the choice of subject, *The Fox* is much inferior to *Tartuffe*, to which it bears some very general analogy. Though the *Tartuffe* is not a remarkably agreeable play, *The Fox* is much less so: five of the principal characters are wicked almost beyond any retribution that comedy can dispense; the smiles it calls forth are not those of gayety, but scorn; and the parts of an absurd English knight and his wife, though very humorous, are hardly prominent enough to enliven the scenes of guilt and fraud which pass before our eyes. But, though too much pedantry obtrudes itself, it does not overspread the pages with nonsense as in the *Alchemist*; the characters of Celia and Bonario excite some interest; the differences, one can hardly say the gradations, of villany are marked with the strong touches of Jonson's pen; the incidents succeed rapidly and naturally; the dramatic effect, above all, is perceptible to every reader, and rises in a climax through the last two acts to the conclusion.

59. *The Silent Woman*, which has been named by some with the *Alchemist* and the *Fox*, falls much below them in vigorous delineation and dramatic effect. It has more diversity of manner than of character; the amusing scenes border sometimes on farce, as where two cowardly knights are made to receive blows in the dark, each supposing them to come from his adversary; and the catastrophe is neither pleasing nor probable. It is written with a great deal

of spirit, and has a value as the representation of London life in the higher ranks at that time. But, upon the whole, I should be inclined to give to *Every Man in his Humor* a much superior place. It is a proof of Jonson's extensive learning, that the story of this play, and several particular passages, have been detected in a writer so much out of the beaten track as Libanius.¹

60. The pastoral drama of the *Sad Shepherd* is the best testimony to the poetical imagination of Jonson. ^{*Sad Shepherd.*} Superior in originality, liveliness, and beauty to the *Faithful Shepherdess* of Fletcher, it reminds us rather, in language and imagery, of the *Midsummer Night's Dream*; and perhaps no other poetry has come so near to that of Shakespeare. Jonson, like him, had an extraordinary command of English, in its popular and provincial idioms, as well as what might be gained from books; and, though his invincible pedantry now and then obtrudes itself into the mouths of shepherds, it is compensated by numerous passages of the most natural and graceful expression. This beautiful drama is imperfect, hardly more than half remaining, or, more probably, having ever been written. It was also Jonson's last song: age and poverty had stolen upon him; but, as one has said who experienced the same destiny, "the life was in the leaf," and his laurel remained verdant amidst the snow of his honored head. The beauties of the *Sad Shepherd* might be reckoned rather poetical than dramatic; yet the action is both diversified and interesting to a degree we seldom find in the pastoral drama: there is little that is low in the comic speeches, nothing that is inflated in the serious.

61. Two men once united by friendship, and for ever by fame, the Dioscuri of our zodiac, Beaumont and Fletcher, rose upon the horizon, as the star of ^{*Beaumont and Fletcher.*} Shakespeare, though still in its fullest brightness, was declining in the sky. The first in order of time, among more than fifty plays published with their joint names, is the *Woman-Hater*, represented, according to Langbaine, in 1607,

¹ Gifford discovered this. Dryden, who has given an examination of the *Silent Woman*, in his *Essay on Dramatic Poetry*, takes Morose for a real character, and says that he had so been informed. It is possible that there might be some foundation of truth in this: the skeleton is in Libanius, but Jonson may have filled it up from the life. Dryden gives it as his opinion that there is more wit and acuteness of fancy in this play than in any of Ben Jonson's, and that he has described the conversation of gentlemen with more gayety and freedom than in the rest of his comedies, p. 107

class of comedy. Without minutely inquiring whether the Roman hunters after the inheritance of the rich, so well described by Horace, and especially the costly presents by which they endeavored to secure a better return, are altogether according to the manners of Venice, where Jonson has laid his scene, we must acknowledge, that he has displayed the base cupidity, of which there will never be wanting examples among mankind, in such colors as all other dramatic poetry can hardly rival. Cumberland has blamed the manner in which Volpone brings ruin on his head by insulting, in disguise, those whom he had duped. In this, I agree with Gifford, there is no violation of nature. Besides their ignorance of his person, so that he could not necessarily foresee the effects of Voltore's rage, it has been well and finely said by Cumberland, that there is a moral in a villain's outwitting himself. And this is one that many dramatists have displayed.

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and ascribed to Beaumont alone by Seward, though, I believe, merely on conjecture.¹ Beaumont died at the age of thirty, in 1615; Fletcher, in 1625. No difference of manner is perceptible, or at least no critic has perceived any, in the plays that appeared between these two epochs: in fact, the greater part were not printed till 1647, and it is only through the records of the play-house that we distinguish their dates. The tradition, however, of their own times, as well as the earlier death of Beaumont, give us reason to name Fletcher, when we mention one singly, as the principal author of all these plays; and of late years this has perhaps become more customary than it used to be. A contemporary copy of verses, indeed, seems to attribute the greater share in the *Maid's Tragedy*, *Philaster*, and *King and No King*, to Beaumont. But testimony of this kind is very precarious. It is sufficient that he bore a part in these three.

62. Of all our early dramatic poets, none have suffered such mangling by the printer as Beaumont and Fletcher. Their style is generally elliptical, and not very perspicuous; they use words in peculiar senses; and there seems often an attempt at pointed expression, in which its meaning has deserted them. But, after every effort to comprehend their language, it is continually so remote from all possibility of bearing a rational sense, that we can only have recourse to one hypothesis,—that of an extensive and irreparable corruption of the text. Seward and Simpson, who, in 1750, published the first edition in which any endeavor was made at illustration or amendment, though not men of much taste, and too fond of extolling their authors, showed some acuteness, and have restored many passages in a probable manner, though often driven out at sea to conjecture something, where the received reading furnished not a vestige which they could trace. No one since has made any great progress in this criticism, though some have carped at these editors for not performing more. The problem of

¹ Vol. i. p. 3. He also thinks *The Nice Valour* exclusively Beaumont's. These two appear to me about the worst in the collection.

[The latest editor of Beaumont and Fletcher is inclined to modify this opinion, latterly prevalent, as to the respective shares of the two poets. *The Woman-Hater*, he thinks, was "in all probability the

unassisted composition of Fletcher." On the other hand, he says, "not the slightest doubt can be entertained that of the earlier plays in the present collection (and among those plays are the best), Beaumont contributed a large (perhaps the weightier) portion."—*Some Account of the Lives and Writings of Beaumont and Fletcher*, prefixed to Mr. Dyce's edition. — 1847.

actual restoration in most places, where the printers or transcribers have made such strange havoc, must evidently be insoluble.¹

63. The first play in the collected works of Beaumont and Fletcher, though not the earliest, is the *Maid's Tragedy*; and it is among the best. None of their female characters, though they are often very successful in beautiful delineations of virtuous love, attaches our sympathy like Aspasia. Her sorrows are so deep, so pure, so unmerited; she sustains the breach of plighted faith in Amyntor, and the taunts of vicious women, with so much resignation, so little of that termagant resentment which these poets are apt to infuse into their heroines; the poetry of her speeches is so exquisitely imaginative,—that, of those dramatic persons who are not prominent in the development of a story, scarce any, even in Shakspeare, are more interesting. Nor is the praise due to the *Maid's Tragedy* confined to the part of Aspasia. In *Melantius* we have Fletcher's favorite character, the brave, honest soldier, incapable of suspecting evil till it becomes impossible to be ignorant of it, but unshrinking in its punishment. That of *Evadne* well displays the audacious security of guilt under the safeguard of power: it is highly theatrical, and renders the success of this tragedy not surprising in times when its language and situations could be endured by the audience. We may remark in this tragedy, as in many others of these dramatists, that, while pouring out the unlimited loyalty fashionable at the court of James, they are full of implied satire, which could hardly escape observation. The warm eulogies on military glory, the scorn of slothful peace, the pictures of dissolute baseness in courtiers, seem to spring from a sentiment very usual among the English gentry, a rank to which they both belonged, of dislike to that ignominious government; and, though James was far enough removed from such voluptuous tyrants as Fletcher has portrayed in this and some other plays, they did not serve to exemplify the advantages of monarchy in the most attractive manner.

64. The *Maid's Tragedy*, unfortunately, beautiful and essentially moral as it is, cannot be called a tragedy for maids, and indeed should hardly be read by any respecta-

¹ [The recent edition of Mr. Dyce has gone far towards a restoration of the genuine text. — 1847.]

ble woman. It abounds with that studiously protracted indecency which distinguished Fletcher beyond all our early dramatists, and is so much incorporated with his plays, that very few of them can be so altered as to become tolerable at present on the stage. In this he is strikingly contrasted with Shakspeare, whose levities of this kind are so transitory, and so much confined to language, that he has borne the process of purification with little detriment to his genius, or even to his wit.

65. *Philaster* has been, in its day, one of the best known and most popular of Fletcher's plays.¹ This was owing to the pleasing characters of *Philaster* and *Bellario*, and to the frequent sweetness of the poetry. It is, nevertheless, not a first-rate play. The plot is most absurdly managed. It turns on the suspicion of *Arethusa's* infidelity; and the sole ground of this is, that an abandoned woman, being detected herself, accuses the princess of unchastity. Not a shadow of presumptive evidence is brought to confirm this impudent assertion; which, however, the lady's father, her lover, and a grave, sensible courtier, do not fail implicitly to believe. How unlike the chain of circumstance, and the devilish cunning, by which the Moor is wrought up to think his *Desdemona* false! *Bellario* is suggested by *Viola*; there is more picturesqueness, more dramatic importance, not perhaps more beauty and sweetness of affection, but a more eloquent development of it, in Fletcher: on the other hand, there is still more of that improbability which attends a successful concealment of sex by mere disguise of clothes, though no artifice has been more common on the stage. Many other circumstances in the conduct of Fletcher's story are ill contrived. It has less wit than the greater part of his comedies; for among such, according to the old distinction, it is to be ranked, though the subject is elevated and serious.

66. *King and No King* is, in my judgment, inferior to *Philaster*. The language has not so much of poetical beauty. The character of *Arbaces* excites no sympathy: it is a compound of vain-glory and violence, which

¹ Dryden says, but I know not how truly, that *Philaster* was "the first play that brought Beaumont and Fletcher in esteem; for, before that, they had written two or three very unsuccessfully." —

p. 100. *Philaster* was not printed, according to Langbaine, till 1630: I do not know that we have any evidence of the date of its representation.

rather demands disgrace from poetical justice than reward. Panthea is innocent, but insipid; Mardonius, a good specimen of what Fletcher loves to exhibit, the plain, honest courtier. As for Bessus, he certainly gives occasion to several amusing scenes; but his cowardice is a little too glaring: he is neither so laughable as Bobadil, nor so sprightly as Parolles. The principal merit of this play, which rendered it popular on the stage for many years, consists in the effective scenes where Arbaces reveals his illicit desire. That especially with Mardonius is artfully and elaborately written. Shakspeare had less of this skill; and his tragedies suffer for it in their dramatic effect. The scene between John and Hubert is an exception, and there is a great deal of it in Othello; but, in general, he may be said not to have exerted the power of detaining the spectator in that anxious suspense, which creates almost an actual illusion, and makes him tremble at every word, lest the secret which he has learned should be imparted to the imaginary person on the stage. Of this there are several fine instances in the Greek tragedians, the famous scene in the *Œdipus Tyrannus* being the best; and it is possible that the superior education of Fletcher may have rendered him familiar with the resources of ancient tragedy. These scenes in the present play would have been more highly powerful, if the interest could have been thrown on any character superior to the selfish braggart Arbaces. It may be said, perhaps, that his humiliation through his own lawless passions, after so much insolence of success, affords a moral: he seems, however, but imperfectly cured at the conclusion, which is also hurried on with unsatisfactory rapidity.

67. The Elder Brother has been generally reckoned among the best of Fletcher's comedies. It displays in a The Elder Brother. new form an idea not very new in fiction: the power of love, on the first sight of a woman, to vivify a soul utterly ignorant of the passion. Charles, the Elder Brother, much unlike the Cymon of Dryden, is absorbed in study; a mere scholar without a thought beyond his books. His indifference, perhaps, and ignorance about the world, are rather exaggerated, and border on stupidity; but it was the custom of the dramatists in that age to produce effect in representation by very sudden developments, if not changes, of character. The other persons are not ill-conceived: the honest, testy Miramont, who admires learning without much more of it than

enables him to sign his name; the two selfish, worldly fathers of Charles and Angelina, believing themselves shrewd, yet the easy dupes of coxcomb manners from the court; the spirited Angelina; the spoiled but not worthless Eustace,—show Fletcher's great talent in dramatic invention. In none of his mere comedies has he sustained so uniformly elegant and pleasing a style of poetry: the language of Charles is naturally that of a refined scholar; but now and then, perhaps, we find old Miramont talk above himself. The underplot hits to the life the licentious endeavors of an old man to seduce his inferior; but, as usual, it reveals vice too broadly. This comedy is of very simple construction, so that Cibber was obliged to blend it with another, *The Custom of the Country*, in order to compose from the two his *Love Makes a Man*; by no means the worst play of that age. The two plots, however, do not harmonize very well.

68. *The Spanish Curate* is, in all probability, taken from one of those comedies of intrigue which the fame of Lope de Vega had made popular in Europe.¹ It is one of the best specimens of that manner: the plot is full of incident and interest, without being difficult of comprehension, nor, with fair allowance for the conventions of the stage and manners of the country, improbable. The characters are in full relief, without caricature. Fletcher, with an artifice of which he is very fond, has made the fierce resentment of Violante break out unexpectedly from the calmness she had shown in the first scenes; but it is so well accounted for, that we see nothing unnatural in the development of passions for which there had been no previous call. Ascanio is again one of Fletcher's favorite delineations; a kind of Bellario in his modest, affectionate disposition; one in whose prosperity the reader takes so much pleasure, that he forgets it is, in a worldly sense, inconsistent with that of the honest-hearted Don Jamie. The doting husband, Don Henrique, contrasts well with the jealous Bartolus; and both afford by their fate the sort of moral which is looked for in comedy. The underplot of the lawyer and his wife, while it shows how licentious in principle as well as indecent in language the stage had become, is conducted with incomparable humor and amusement. Con-

¹ [The *Spanish Curate*, Mr. Dyce informs us, is founded on Gerardo, the Unfortunate Spaniard, a novel by Gonzalo de Cespedes, of which an English translation, by Leonard Digges, appeared in 1622. — 1847.]

greve borrowed part of this in the *Old Bachelor*, without by any means equalling it. Upon the whole, as a comedy of this class, it deserves to be placed in the highest rank.

69. The *Custom of the Country* is much deformed by obscenity, especially the first act. But it is full of nobleness in character and sentiment, of interesting situations, of unceasing variety of action. Fletcher has never shown what he so much delights in drawing, — the contrast of virtuous dignity with ungoverned passion in woman, — with more success than in *Zenocia* and *Hippolyta*. Of these three plays we may say, perhaps, that there is more poetry in the *Elder Brother*, more interest in the *Custom of the Country*, more wit and spirit in the *Spanish Curate*.

70. The *Loyal Subject* ought also to be placed in a high rank among the works of Beaumont and Fletcher. There is a play by Heywood, *The Royal King and the Loyal Subject*, from which the general idea of several circumstances of this has been taken. That Heywood's was the original, though the only edition of it is in 1637, while the *Loyal Subject* was represented in 1618, cannot bear a doubt. The former is expressly mentioned in the epilogue as an old play, belonging to a style gone out of date, and not to be judged with rigor. Heywood has therefore the praise of having conceived the character of Earl Marshal, upon which Fletcher somewhat improved in *Archas*; a brave soldier, of that disinterested and devoted loyalty which bears all ingratitude and outrage at the hands of an unworthy and misguided sovereign. In the days of James, there could be no more courtly moral. In each play, the prince, after depriving his most deserving subject of honors and fortune, tries his fidelity by commanding him to send two daughters, whom he had educated in seclusion, to the court, with designs that the father may easily suspect. The loyalty, however, of these honest soldiers submits to encounter this danger; and the conduct of the young ladies soon proves that they might be trusted in the fiery trial. In the *Loyal Subject*, Fletcher has beautifully, and with his light touch of pencil, sketched the two virtuous sisters: one high-spirited, intrepid, undisguised; the other shrinking with maiden modesty, a tremulous dew-drop in the cup of a violet. But, unfortunately, his original taint betrays itself, and the elder sister cannot display her scorn of licentiousness without borrowing some of its language. If Shak-

speare had put these loose images into the mouth of Isabella, how differently we should have esteemed her character !

71. We find in the *Loyal Subject* what is neither pleasing nor probable, the disguise of a youth as a girl. This was, of course, not offensive to those who saw nothing else on the stage. Fletcher did not take this from Heywood. In the whole management of the story he is much superior: the nobleness of Archas, and his injuries, are still more displayed than those of the Earl Marshal; and he has several new characters, especially Theodore, the impetuous son of the *Loyal Subject*, who does not brook the insults of a prince as submissively as his father, which fill the play with variety and spirit. The language is in some places obscure and probably corrupt, but abounding with that kind of poetry which belongs to Fletcher.

72. *Beggar's Bush* is an excellent comedy; the serious parts interesting, the comic diverting. Every character supports itself well: if some parts of the plot have been suggested by *As You Like It*, they are managed so as to be original in spirit. Few of Fletcher's plays furnish more proofs of his characteristic qualities. It might be represented with no great curtailment.

73. *The Scornful Lady* is one of those comedies which exhibit English domestic life, and have therefore a value independent of their dramatic merit. It does not equal *Beggar's Bush*, but is full of effective scenes, which, when less regard was paid to decency, must have rendered it a popular play. Fletcher, in fact, is as much superior to Shakspeare in his knowledge of the stage, as he falls below him in that of human nature.¹ His fertile invention was

¹ [Mr. Dyce, as well as an earlier editor of Beaumont and Fletcher, thinks the greater part of this comedy written by Beaumont. Mr. Dyce adds: "In the edition of 1760, Theobald has a note concerning the steward Savil, where he says, 'The ingenious Mr. Addison, I remember, told me that he sketched out his character of Vellum, in the comedy called the Drummer, purely from this model.'" It is said of some plagiarists, that they are like gypsies, who steal children, and disfigure them that they may not be known. "The ingenious Mr. Addison" went another way to work: when he took any one's silver, he turned it into gold. I doubt whether Theobald reported his ingenious friend's words rightly; for the inimitable formality of Vellum has no prototype in

Savil. But, while making this avowal, why did not he add, that the Waiting-Woman in the *Scornful Lady* is called Abigail? Here was a heinous theft; and, after its concealment, I fear that we must refuse absolution. After all, however, there is a certain resemblance in these comedies, which may lead us to believe that Addison had his predecessors in his head. Since this was written, I have observed that Mr. Dyce, in *Some Account of the Lives and Writings of Beaumont and Fletcher*, prefixed to his edition, p. 41, has remarks to the same purport. Mr. Dyce adds, that when "the *Spectator* and *Tatler* are hastening to oblivion" (*pudet hæc opprobria*), "it cannot be expected that the reader will know much of The Drummer."—1847.]

turned to the management of his plot (always with a view to representation), the rapid succession of incidents, the surprises and embarrassments which keep the spectator's attention alive. His characters are but vehicles to the story: they are distinguished, for the most part, by little more than the slight peculiarities of manner, which are easily caught by the audience; and we do not often meet, especially in his comedies, with the elaborate delineations of Jonson, or the marked idiosyncrasies of Shakspeare. Of these, his great predecessors, one formed a deliberate conception of a character, whether taken from general nature or from manners, and drew his figure, as it were, in his mind, before he transferred it to the canvas: with the other, the idea sprang out of the depths of his soul, and, though suggested by the story he had chosen, became so much the favorite of his genius as he wrote, that in its development he sometimes grew negligent of his plot.

74. No tragedy of Fletcher would deserve higher praise than Valentinian, if he had not, by an inconceivable want of taste and judgment, descended from ^{Valentinian.} beauty and dignity to the most preposterous absurdities. The matron purity of the injured Lucina, the ravages of unrestrained self-indulgence on a mind not wholly without glimpses of virtue in Valentinian, the vileness of his courtiers, the spirited contrast of unconquerable loyalty in Ætius, with the natural indignation at wrong in Maximus, are brought before our eyes in some of Fletcher's best poetry, though in a text that seems even more corrupt than usual. But after the admirable scene in the third act, where Lucina (the Lucretia of this story) reveals her injury,—perhaps almost the only scene in this dramatist, if we except the Maid's Tragedy, that can move us to tears,—her husband Maximus, who even here begins to forfeit our sympathy by his ready consent, in the Spanish style of perverted honor, to her suicide, becomes a treacherous and ambitious villain, the loyalty of Ætius turns to downright folly, and the rest of the play is but such a series of murders as Marston or the author of *Andronicus* might have devised. If Fletcher meant, which he very probably did, to inculcate as a moral, that the worst of tyrants are to be obeyed with unflinching submission, he may have gained applause at court, at the expense of his reputation with posterity.

76. The Faithful Shepherdess, deservedly among the most celebrated productions of Fletcher, stands alone in its class, and admits of no comparison with any other play. It is a pastoral drama, in imitation of the Pastor Fido, at that time very popular in England. The Faithful Shepherdess, however, to the great indignation of all the poets, did not succeed on its first representation. There is nothing in this surprising: the tone of pastoral is too far removed from the possibilities of life for a stage, which appealed, like ours, to the boisterous sympathies of a general audience. It is a play very characteristic of Fletcher, being a mixture of tenderness, purity, indecency, and absurdity. There is some justice in Schlegel's remark, that it is an immodest eulogy on modesty. But this critic, who does not seem to appreciate the beauty of Fletcher's poetry, should hardly have mentioned Guarini as a model whom he might have followed. It was by copying the Corisca of the Pastor Fido that Fletcher introduced the character of the vicious shepherdess Cloe; though, according to his times, and we must own, to his disposition, he has greatly aggravated the faults to which just exception has been taken in his original.

77. It is impossible to withhold our praise from the poetical beauties of this pastoral drama. Every one knows that it contains the germ of Comus: the benevolent Satyr, whose last proposition to "stray in the middle air, and stay the sailing rack, or nimbly take hold of the moon," is not much in the character of those sylvans, has been judiciously metamorphosed by Milton to an attendant spirit; and a more austere as well as more uniform language has been given to the speakers. But Milton has borrowed largely from the imagination of his predecessor; and, by quoting the lyric parts of the Faithful Shepherdess, it would be easy to deceive any one not accurately familiar with the songs of Comus. They abound with that rapid succession of ideal scenery, that darting of the poet's fancy from earth to heaven, those picturesque and novel metaphors, which distinguish much of the poetry of this age,

be found; and I believe that it is a subject upon which there will long be a difference of opinion.

[Coleridge has said, "I have no doubt whatever, that the first act and the first scene of the second act, of the Two Noble Kinsmen, are Shakespeare's."—Table Talk, vol. ii. p. 119.—1824.]

[Mr. Dyce concurs with Mr. Spalding as to the share of Shakespeare, which they both think to have been the first, and a part, if not all, of the fifth, but not much of the intermediate parts. The hypothesis of a joint production is open to much difficulty, which Mr. Dyce hardly removes.—1847.]

and which are ultimately, perhaps, in great measure referable to Shakspeare.

78. *Rule a Wife and Have a Wife* is among the superior comedies of its class. That it has a prototype on the Spanish theatre must appear likely; but I should be surprised if the variety and spirit of character, the vivacity of humor, be not chiefly due to our own authors.¹ Every personage in this comedy is drawn with a vigorous pencil; so that it requires a good company to be well represented. It is indeed a mere picture of roguery; for even Leon, the only character for whom we can feel any sort of interest, has gained his ends by stratagem: but his gallant spirit redeems this in our indulgent views of dramatic morality, and we are justly pleased with the discomfiture of fraud and effrontery in Estifania and Margarita.

79. *The Knight of the Burning Pestle* is very diverting, and more successful, perhaps, than any previous plays. attempt to introduce a drama within a drama. I should hardly except the Introduction to the *Taming of a Shrew*. The burlesque, though very ludicrous, does not transgress all bounds of probability. The *Wild-geese Chase*, *The Chances*, *The Humorous Lieutenant*, *Women Pleased*, *Wit without Money*, *Monsieur Thomas*, and several other comedies, deserve to be praised for the usual excellences of Fletcher, — his gayety, his invention, his ever-varying rapidity of dialogue and incident. None are without his defects; and we may add, what is not in fairness to be called a defect of his, since it applies perhaps to every dramatic writer except Shakspeare and Molière, that, being cast as it were in a common mould, we find both a monotony in reading several of these plays, and a difficulty of distinguishing them in remembrance.

80. The later writers, those especially after the Restoration, did not fail to appropriate many of the inventions of Fletcher. He and his colleague are the proper founders of our comedy of intrigue, which prevailed through the seventeenth century; the comedy of Wycherley, Dryden, Behn, and Shadwell. Their manner, if not their actual plots, may still be observed in many pieces that are produced on our stage. But few of those imitators came up to the spright-

¹ [It is taken, in part, from one of the novels of Cervantes. See Mr. Dyce's Introduction, p. 7. — 1847.]

liness of their model. It is to be regretted, that it is rarely practicable to adapt any one of his comedies to representation, without such changes as destroy their original raciness, and dilute the geniality of their wit.

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enables him to sign his name; the two selfish, worldly fathers of Charles and Angelina, believing themselves shrewd, yet the easy dupes of coxcomb manners from the court; the spirited Angelina; the spoiled but not worthless Eustace,— show Fletcher's great talent in dramatic invention. In none of his mere comedies has he sustained so uniformly elegant and pleasing a style of poetry: the language of Charles is naturally that of a refined scholar; but now and then, perhaps, we find old Miramont talk above himself. The underplot hits to the life the licentious endeavors of an old man to seduce his inferior; but, as usual, it reveals vice too broadly. This comedy is of very simple construction, so that Cibber was obliged to blend it with another, *The Custom of the Country*, in order to compose from the two his *Love Makes a Man*; by no means the worst play of that age. The two plots, however, do not harmonize very well.

68. *The Spanish Curate* is, in all probability, taken from one of those comedies of intrigue which the fame of Lope de Vega had made popular in Europe.¹ It is one of the best specimens of that manner: the plot is full of incident and interest, without being difficult of comprehension, nor, with fair allowance for the conventions of the stage and manners of the country, improbable. The characters are in full relief, without caricature. Fletcher, with an artifice of which he is very fond, has made the fierce resentment of Violante break out unexpectedly from the calmness she had shown in the first scenes; but it is so well accounted for, that we see nothing unnatural in the development of passions for which there had been no previous call. Ascanio is again one of Fletcher's favorite delineations; a kind of Bellario in his modest, affectionate disposition; one in whose prosperity the reader takes so much pleasure, that he forgets it is, in a worldly sense, inconsistent with that of the honest-hearted Don Jamie. The doting husband, Don Henrique, contrasts well with the jealous Bartolus; and both afford by their fate the sort of moral which is looked for in comedy. The underplot of the lawyer and his wife, while it shows how licentious in principle as well as indecent in language the stage had become, is conducted with incomparable humor and amusement. Con-

¹ [The Spanish Curate, Mr. Dyce informs us, is founded on Gerardo, the Unfortunate Spaniard, a novel by Gonzalo de Caspides, of which an English translation, by Leonard Digges, appeared in 1622. — 1847.]

greve borrowed part of this in the *Old Bachelor*, without by any means equalling it. Upon the whole, as a comedy of this class, it deserves to be placed in the highest rank.

69. The *Custom of the Country* is much deformed by obscenity, especially the first act. But it is full of nobleness in character and sentiment, of interesting situations, of unceasing variety of action. Fletcher has never shown what he so much delights in drawing, — the contrast of virtuous dignity with ungoverned passion in woman, — with more success than in *Zenobia* and *Hippolyta*. Of these three plays we may say, perhaps, that there is more poetry in the *Elder Brother*, more interest in the *Custom of the Country*, more wit and spirit in the *Spanish Curate*.

70. The *Loyal Subject* ought also to be placed in a high rank among the works of Beaumont and Fletcher. There is a play by Heywood, *The Royal King and Loyal Subject*, from which the general idea of several circumstances of this has been taken. That Heywood's was the original, though the only edition of it is in 1637, while the *Loyal Subject* was represented in 1618, cannot bear a doubt. The former is expressly mentioned in the epilogue as an old play, belonging to a style gone out of date, and not to be judged with rigor. Heywood has therefore the praise of having conceived the character of *Earl Marshal*, upon which Fletcher somewhat improved in *Archas*; a brave soldier, of that disinterested and devoted loyalty which bears all ingratitude and outrage at the hands of an unworthy and misguided sovereign. In the days of James, there could be no more courtly moral. In each play, the prince, after depriving his most deserving subject of honors and fortune, tries his fidelity by commanding him to send two daughters, whom he had educated in seclusion, to the court, with designs that the father may easily suspect. The loyalty, however, of these honest soldiers submits to encounter this danger; and the conduct of the young ladies soon proves that they might be trusted in the fiery trial. In the *Loyal Subject*, Fletcher has beautifully and with his light touch of pencil, sketched the two virtuous sisters: one high-spirited, intrepid, undisguised; the other shrinking with maiden modesty, a tremulous dew-drop in the cup of a violet. But, unfortunately, his original taint betrays itself, and the elder sister cannot display her scorn of licentiousness without borrowing some of its language. If Shak-

speare had put these loose images into the mouth of Isabella, how differently we should have esteemed her character!

71. We find in the *Loyal Subject* what is neither pleasing nor probable, the disguise of a youth as a girl. This was, of course, not offensive to those who saw nothing else on the stage. Fletcher did not take this from Heywood. In the whole management of the story he is much superior: the nobleness of Archas, and his injuries, are still more displayed than those of the Earl Marshal; and he has several new characters, especially Theodore, the impetuous son of the *Loyal Subject*, who does not brook the insults of a prince as submissively as his father, which fill the play with variety and spirit. The language is in some places obscure and probably corrupt, but abounding with that kind of poetry which belongs to Fletcher.

72. *Beggar's Bush* is an excellent comedy; the serious parts interesting, the comic diverting. Every character supports itself well: if some parts of the plot have been suggested by *As You Like It*, they are managed so as to be original in spirit. Few of Fletcher's plays furnish more proofs of his characteristic qualities. It might be represented with no great curtailment.

73. *The Scornful Lady* is one of those comedies which exhibit English domestic life, and have therefore a value independent of their dramatic merit. It does not equal *Beggar's Bush*, but is full of effective scenes, which, when less regard was paid to decency, must have rendered it a popular play. Fletcher, in fact, is as much superior to Shakspeare in his knowledge of the stage, as he falls below him in that of human nature.¹ His fertile invention was

¹ [Mr. Dyce, as well as an earlier editor of Beaumont and Fletcher, thinks the greater part of this comedy written by Beaumont. Mr. Dyce adds: "In the edition of 1750, Theobald has a note concerning the steward Savil, where he says, 'The ingenious Mr. Addison, I remember, told me that he sketched out his character of Vellum, in the comedy called the Drummer, purely from this model.'" It is said of some plagiarists, that they are like gypsies, who steal children, and disfigure them that they may not be known. "The ingenious Mr. Addison" went another way to work: when he took any one's silver, he turned it into gold. I doubt whether Theobald reported his ingenious friend's words rightly; for the inimitable formality of Vellum has no prototype in

Savil. But, while making this avowal, why did not he add, that the Waiting-Woman in the *Scornful Lady* is called Abigail? Here was a heinous theft; and, after its concealment, I fear that we must refuse absolution. After all, however, there is a certain resemblance in these comedies, which may lead us to believe that Addison had his predecessors in his head. Since this was written, I have observed that Mr. Dyce, in *Some Account of the Lives and Writings of Beaumont and Fletcher*, prefixed to his edition, p. 41, has remarks to the same purport. Mr. Dyce adds, that when "the Spectator and Tatler are hastening to oblivion" (*pueræ hæc opprobria*), "it cannot be expected that the reader will know much of The Drummer."—1847.]

turned to the management of his plot (always with a view to representation), the rapid succession of incidents, the surprises and embarrassments which keep the spectator's attention alive. His characters are but vehicles to the story: they are distinguished, for the most part, by little more than the slight peculiarities of manner, which are easily caught by the audience; and we do not often meet, especially in his comedies, with the elaborate delineations of Jonson, or the marked idiosyncrasies of Shakspeare. Of these, his great predecessors, one formed a deliberate conception of a character, whether taken from general nature or from manners, and drew his figure, as it were, in his mind, before he transferred it to the canvas: with the other, the idea sprang out of the depths of his soul, and, though suggested by the story he had chosen, became so much the favorite of his genius as he wrote, that in its development he sometimes grew negligent of his plot.

74. No tragedy of Fletcher would deserve higher praise than *Valentinian*, if he had not, by an inconceivable want of taste and judgment, descended from beauty and dignity to the most preposterous absurdities. The matron purity of the injured Lucina, the ravages of unrestrained self-indulgence on a mind not wholly without glimpses of virtue in *Valentinian*, the vileness of his courtiers, the spirited contrast of unconquerable loyalty in *Ætius*, with the natural indignation at wrong in *Maximus*, are brought before our eyes in some of Fletcher's best poetry, though in a text that seems even more corrupt than usual. But after the admirable scene in the third act, where Lucina (the Lucretia of this story) reveals her injury,—perhaps almost the only scene in this dramatist, if we except the *Maid's Tragedy*, that can move us to tears,—her husband *Maximus*, who even here begins to forfeit our sympathy by his ready consent, in the Spanish style of perverted honor, to her suicide, becomes a treacherous and ambitious villain, the loyalty of *Ætius* turns to downright folly, and the rest of the play is but such a series of murders as Marston or the author of *Andronicus* might have devised. If Fletcher meant, which he very probably did, to inculcate as a moral, that the worst of tyrants are to be obeyed with unflinching submission, he may have gained applause at court, at the expense of his reputation with posterity.

75. The Two Noble Kinsmen is a play that has been honored by a tradition of Shakspeare's concern in it. The evidence as to this is the titlepage of the first edition; which, though it may seem much at first sight, is next to nothing in our old drama, full of misnomers of this kind. The editors of Beaumont and Fletcher have insisted upon what they take for marks of Shakspeare's style; and Schlegel, after "seeing no reason for doubting so probable an opinion," detects the spirit of Shakspeare in a certain ideal purity which distinguishes this from other plays of Fletcher, and in the conscientious fidelity with which it follows the Knight's Tale in Chaucer. The Two Noble Kinsmen has much of that elevated sense of honor, friendship, fidelity, and love, which belongs, I think, more characteristically to Fletcher, who had drunk at the fountain of Castilian romance, than to one in whose vast mind this conventional morality of particular classes was subordinated to the universal nature of man. In this sense, Fletcher is always, in his tragic compositions, a very ideal poet. The subject itself is fitter for him than for Shakspeare. In the language and conduct of this play, with great deference to better and more attentive critics, I see imitations of Shakspeare rather than such resemblances as denote his powerful stamp. The madness of the gaoler's daughter, where some have imagined they saw the master-hand, is doubtless suggested by that of Ophelia, but with an inferiority of taste and feeling which it seems impossible not to recognize. The painful and degrading symptom of female insanity, which Shakspeare has touched with his gentle hand, is dwelt upon by Fletcher with all his innate impurity. Can any one believe that the former would have written the last scene in which the gaoler's daughter appears on the stage? Schlegel has too fine taste to believe that this character came from Shakspeare, and it is given up by the latest assertor of his claim to a participation in the play.¹

¹ The author of a "Letter on Shakspeare's Authorship of the Drama entitled the Two Noble Kinsmen," Edinburgh, 1883, notwithstanding this title, does not deny a considerable participation to Fletcher. He lays no great stress on the external evidence. But, in arguing from the similarity of style in many passages to that of Shakspeare, the author, Mr. Spalding of Edinburgh, shows so much taste and so competent a knowledge of the two dramatists, that I should perhaps scruple

to set up my own doubts in opposition. His chief proofs are drawn from the force and condensation of language in particular passages, which doubtless is one of the great distinctions between the two. But we might wish to have seen this displayed in longer extracts than such as the author of this Letter has generally given us. It is difficult to say of a man like Fletcher, that he could not have written single lines in the spirit of his predecessor. A few instances, however, of longer passages will

76. The Faithful Shepherdess, deservedly among the most celebrated productions of Fletcher, stands alone in its class, and admits of no comparison with any other play. It is a pastoral drama, in imitation of the Pastor Fido, at that time very popular in England. The Faithful Shepherdess, however, to the great indignation of all the poets, did not succeed on its first representation. There is nothing in this surprising: the tone of pastoral is too far removed from the possibilities of life for a stage, which appealed, like ours, to the boisterous sympathies of a general audience. It is a play very characteristic of Fletcher, being a mixture of tenderness, purity, indecency, and absurdity. There is some justice in Schlegel's remark, that it is an immodest eulogy on modesty. But this critic, who does not seem to appreciate the beauty of Fletcher's poetry, should hardly have mentioned Guarini as a model whom he might have followed. It was by copying the Corisca of the Pastor Fido that Fletcher introduced the character of the vicious shepherdess Cloe; though, according to his times, and we must own, to his disposition, he has greatly aggravated the faults to which just exception has been taken in his original.

77. It is impossible to withhold our praise from the poetical beauties of this pastoral drama. Every one knows that it contains the germ of Comus: the benevolent Satyr, whose last proposition to "stray in the middle air, and stay the sailing rack, or nimbly take hold of the moon," is not much in the character of those sylvans, has been judiciously metamorphosed by Milton to an attendant spirit; and a more austere as well as more uniform language has been given to the speakers. But Milton has borrowed largely from the imagination of his predecessor; and, by quoting the lyric parts of the Faithful Shepherdess, it would be easy to deceive any one not accurately familiar with the songs of Comus. They abound with that rapid succession of ideal scenery, that darting of the poet's fancy from earth to heaven, those picturesque and novel metaphors, which distinguish much of the poetry of this age,

be found; and I believe that it is a subject upon which there will long be a difference of opinion.

[Coleridge has said, "I have no doubt whatever, that the first act and the first scene of the second act, of the Two Noble Kinsmen, are Shakespeare's." — Table Talk, vol. ii. p. 119. — 1824.]

[Mr. Dyce concurs with Mr. Spalding as to the share of Shakespeare, which they both think to have been the first, and a part, if not all, of the fifth, but not much of the intermediate parts. The hypothesis of a joint production is open to much difficulty, which Mr. Dyce hardly removes. — 1847.]

and which are ultimately, perhaps, in great measure referable to Shakspeare.

78. Rule a Wife and Have a Wife is among the superior comedies of its class. That it has a prototype on the Spanish theatre must appear likely; but I should be surprised if the variety and spirit of character, the vivacity of humor, be not chiefly due to our own authors.¹ Every personage in this comedy is drawn with a vigorous pencil; so that it requires a good company to be well represented. It is indeed a mere picture of roguery; for even Leon, the only character for whom we can feel any sort of interest, has gained his ends by stratagem: but his gallant spirit redeems this in our indulgent views of dramatic morality, and we are justly pleased with the discomfiture of fraud and effrontery in Estifania and Margarita.

79. The Knight of the Burning Pestle is very diverting, and more successful, perhaps, than any previous attempt to introduce a drama within a drama. I should hardly except the Introduction to the Taming of a Shrew. The burlesque, though very ludicrous, does not transgress all bounds of probability. The Wild-geese Chase, The Chances, The Humorous Lieutenant, Women Pleased, Wit without Money, Monsieur Thomas, and several other comedies, deserve to be praised for the usual excellences of Fletcher, — his gayety, his invention, his ever-varying rapidity of dialogue and incident. None are without his defects; and we may add, what is not in fairness to be called a defect of his, since it applies perhaps to every dramatic writer except Shakspeare and Molière, that, being cast as it were in a common mould, we find both a monotony in reading several of these plays, and a difficulty of distinguishing them in remembrance.

80. The later writers, those especially after the Restoration, did not fail to appropriate many of the inventions of Fletcher. He and his colleague are the proper founders of our comedy of intrigue, which prevailed through the seventeenth century; the comedy of Wycherley, Dryden, Behn, and Shadwell. Their manner, if not their actual plots, may still be observed in many pieces that are produced on our stage. But few of those imitators came up to the spright-

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86. The comic talents of these authors far exceeded their skill in tragedy. In comedy they founded a new school, at

least in England, the vestiges of which are still to be traced in our theatre. Their plays are at once distinguishable from those of their contemporaries by the regard to dramatic effect which influenced the writer's imagination. Though not personally connected with the stage, they had its picture ever before their eyes. Hence their incidents are numerous and striking; their characters sometimes slightly sketched, not drawn, like those of Jonson, from a pre-conceived design, but preserving that degree of individual distinctness which a common audience requires, and often highly humorous without extravagance; their language brilliant with wit; their measure, though they do not make great use of prose, very lax and rapid, running frequently to lines of thirteen and fourteen syllables. Few of their comedies are without a mixture of grave sentiments or elevated characters; and, though there is much to condemn in their indecency and even licentiousness of principle, they never descend to the coarse buffoonery not unfrequent in their age. Never were dramatic poets more thoroughly gentlemen, according to the standard of their times; and, when we consider the court of James I., we may say that they were above that standard.¹

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¹ "Their plots were generally more regular than Shakspeare's, especially those which were made before Beaumont's death; and they understood and imitated the conversation of gentlemen much better; whose wild debaucheries, and quickness of wit in repartees, no poet before them could paint as they have done. Humor, which Ben Jonson derived from particular persons, they made it not their business to describe: they represented all the passions very lively, but, above all, love. I am apt to believe the English language in

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88. The reputation of Beaumont and Fletcher was at its height, and most of their plays had been given to the stage, when a worthy inheritor of their mantle appeared in Philip Massinger. Of his extant dramas, the *Virgin Martyr*, published in 1622, seems to be the earliest: but we have reason to believe that several are lost; and even this tragedy may have been represented some years before. The far greater part of his remaining pieces followed within ten years: the *Bashful Lover*, which is the latest now known, was written in 1636. Massinger was a gentleman, but in the service, according to the language of those times, of the Pembroke family; his education was at the university, his acquaintance both with books and with the manners of the court is familiar, his style and sentiments are altogether those of a man polished by intercourse of good society.

89. Neither in his own age nor in modern times does Massinger seem to have been put on a level with Fletcher or Jonson. Several of his plays, as has been just observed, are said to have perished in manuscript: few were represented after the Restoration; and it is only in consequence of his having met with more than one editor who has published his

¹ "Shakspeare," says Dryden, "writ better between man and man, Fletcher betwixt man and woman; consequently the one described friendship better, the other, love; yet Shakspeare taught Fletcher to write love, and Juliet and Deidemonia are originals. It is true the scholar had the softest soul, but the master had the kinder. . . . Shakspeare had an universal mind, which comprehended all characters and passions; Fletcher, a more confined and limited: for though he treated love in perfection, yet honor, ambition, revenge, and generally all the stronger passions, he either touched not, or not masterly.

To conclude all, he was a limb of Shakspeare." — p. 301. This comparison is rather generally than strictly just, as is often the case with the criticisms of Dryden. That Fletcher wrote better than Shakspeare "between man and woman," or in displaying love, will be granted when he shall be shown to have excelled Ferdinand and Miranda, or Posthumus and Imogen. And, on the other hand, it is unjust to deny him credit for having sometimes touched the stronger emotions, especially honor and ambition, with great skill, though much inferior to that of Shakspeare.

Montreville in the Unnatural Combat has nearly its counterpart in that of Francesco in the Duke of Milan, and is again displayed with more striking success in Luke. This last villain, indeed, and that original, masterly, inimitable conception, Sir Giles Overreach, are sufficient to establish the rank of Massinger in this great province of dramatic art. But his own disposition led him more willingly to pictures of moral beauty. A peculiar refinement, a mixture of gentleness and benignity with noble daring, belong to some of his favorite characters, to Pisander in the Bondman, to Antonio in A Very Woman, to Charolois in the Fatal Dowry. It may be readily supposed, that his female characters are not wanting in these graces. It seems to me, that he has more variety in his women than in the other sex, and that they are less mannered than the heroines of Fletcher. A slight degree of error or passion in Sophia, Eudocia, Marcelia, without weakening our sympathy, serves both to prevent the monotony of perpetual rectitude, so often insipid in fiction, and to bring forward the development of the story.

92. The subjects chosen by Massinger are sometimes historical; but others seem to have been taken from ^{His sub-} French or Italian novels, and those so obscure that ^{jects.} his editor Gifford, a man of much reading and industry, has seldom traced them. This, indeed, was an usual practice of our ancient dramatists. Their works have, consequently, a romantic character, presenting as little of the regular Plautine comedy as of the Greek forms of tragedy. They are merely novels in action, following probably their models with no great variation, except the lower and lighter episodes which it was always more or less necessary to combine with the story. It is from this choice of subjects, perhaps, as much as from the peculiar temper of the poets, that love is the predominant affection of the mind which they display; not cold and conventional, as we commonly find it on the French stage, but sometimes, as the novelists of the South were prone to delineate its emotions, fiery, irresistible, and almost resembling the fatalism of ancient tragedy; sometimes a subdued captive at the chariot wheels of honor or religion. The range of human passion is, consequently, far less extensive than in Shakspeare; but the variety of circumstance, and the modifications of the paramount affection itself, compensated for this deficiency.

especially in the celebrated speech of Sforza before the Emperor, has never been surpassed by him. Many, however, place the Fatal Dowry still higher. This tragedy furnished Rowe with the story of his Fair Penitent. The superiority of the original, except in suitableness for representation, has long been acknowledged. In the Unnatural Combat, probably among the earliest of Massinger's works, we find a greater energy, a bolder strain of figurative poetry, more command of terror, and perhaps of pity, than in any other of his dramas. But the dark shadows of crime and misery which overspread this tragedy belong to rather an earlier period of the English stage than that of Massinger, and were not congenial to his temper. In the Virgin Martyr, he has followed the Spanish model of religious Autos, with many graces of language and a beautiful display of Christian heroism in Dorothea; but the tragedy is in many respects unpleasing.

96. The Picture, The Bondman, and A Very Woman, may be reckoned among the best of the tragi-comedies of Massinger. But the general merits as well as ^{And of his other plays.} defects of this writer are perceptible in all; and the difference between these and the rest is not such as to be apparent to every reader. Two others are distinguishable as more English than the rest; the scene lies at home, and in the age; and to these the common voice has assigned a superiority. They are A New Way to Pay Old Debts and The City Madam. A character drawn, as it appears, from reality, and, though darkly wicked, not beyond the province of the higher comedy, Sir Giles Overreach, gives the former drama a striking originality and an impressive vigor. It retains, alone among the productions of Massinger, a place on the stage. Gifford inclines to prefer the City Madam; which, no doubt, by the masterly delineation of Luke, a villain of a different order from Overreach, and a larger portion of comic humor and satire than is usual with this writer, may dispute the palm. But there seems to be more violent improbability in the conduct of the plot, than in A New Way to Pay Old Debts.

97. Massinger, as a tragic writer, appears to me second only to Shakspeare: in the higher comedy, I can hardly think him inferior to Jonson. In wit and ^{Ford.} sprightly dialogue, as well as in knowledge of theatrical effect, he falls very much below Fletcher. These, however, are the

great names of the English stage. At a considerable distance below Massinger we may place his contemporary John Ford. In the choice of tragic subjects from obscure fictions, which have to us the charm of entire novelty, they resemble each other: but in the conduct of their fable, in the delineation of their characters, each of these poets has his distinguishing excellences. "I know," says Gifford, "few things more difficult to account for than the deep and lasting impression made by the more tragic portions of Ford's poetry." He succeeds, however, pretty well in accounting for it: the situations are awfully interesting, the distress intense, the thoughts and language becoming the expression of deep sorrow. Ford, with none of the moral beauty and elevation of Massinger, has, in a much higher degree, the power over tears: we sympathize even with his vicious characters, with Giovanni and Annabella and Bianca. Love, and love in guilt or sorrow, is almost exclusively the emotion he portrays: no heroic passion, no sober dignity, will be found in his tragedies. But he conducts his stories well and without confusion; his scenes are often highly wrought and effective; his characters, with no striking novelty, are well supported: he is seldom extravagant or regardless of probability. The Broken Heart has generally been reckoned his finest tragedy: and if the last act had been better prepared, by bringing the love of Calantha for Iphigene more fully before the reader in the earlier part of the play, there would be very few passages of deeper pathos in our dramatic literature. "The style of Ford," it is said by Gifford, "is altogether original and his own. Without the majestic march which distinguishes the poetry of Massinger, and with little or none of that light and playful humor which characterizes the dialogue of Fletcher, or even of Shirley, he is yet elegant and easy and harmonious; and though rarely sublime, yet sufficiently elevated for the most pathetic tones of that passion on whose romantic energies he chiefly delighted to dwell." Yet he censures afterwards Ford's affectation of unworldly phrases, and perplexity of language. Of comic ability this writer does not display one particle. Nothing can be sadder than those portions of his dramas, which, in compliance with the prescribed rules of that age, he devotes to the dialogue of servants or buffoons.

28. Shirley is a dramatic writer much inferior to those who have been mentioned, but has acquired some degree of reputa-

tion, or at least notoriety of name, in consequence of the new edition of his plays. These are between twenty and thirty in number; some of them, however, written in conjunction with his fellow-dramatists. A few of these are tragedies, a few are comedies drawn from English manners; but in the greater part we find the favorite style of that age, the characters foreign and of elevated rank, the interest serious, but not always of buskined dignity, the catastrophe fortunate; all, in short, that has gone under the vague appellation of tragi-comedy. Shirley has no originality, no force in conceiving or delineating character, little of pathos, and less perhaps of wit: his dramas produce no deep impression in reading, and of course can leave none in the memory. But his mind was poetical; his better characters, especially females, express pure thoughts in pure language; he is never tumid or affected, and seldom obscure; the incidents succeed rapidly; the personages are numerous; and there is a general animation in the scenes, which causes us to read him with some pleasure. No very good play, nor possibly any very good scene, could be found in Shirley; but he has many lines of considerable beauty. Among his comedies, the *Gamesters* may be reckoned the best. Charles I. is said to have declared, that it was "the best play he had seen these seven years;" and it has even been added, that the story was of his royal suggestion. It certainly deserves praise both for language and construction of the plot, and it has the advantage of exposing vice to ridicule; but the ladies of that court, the fair forms whom Vandyke has immortalized, must have been very different indeed from their posterity if they could sit it through. The *Ball*, and also some more among the comedies of Shirley, are so far remarkable and worthy of being read, that they bear witness to a more polished elegance of manners, and a more free intercourse in the higher class, than we find in the comedies of the preceding reign. A queen from France, and that queen Henrietta Maria, was better fitted to give this tone than Anne of Denmark. But it is not from Shirley's pictures that we can draw the most favorable notions of the morals of that age.

99. Heywood is a writer still more fertile than Shirley: between forty and fifty plays are ascribed to him. We have mentioned one of the best in the second volume, ante-dating, perhaps, its appearance by a few years. In the *English Traveller* he has returned to something like

seldom extravagant beyond the limits of conceivable nature; we find guilt, or even the atrocity, of human passions, but not that incarnation of evil spirits which some more ordinary dramatists loved to exhibit. In the character of the Duchess of Malfy herself, there wants neither originality, nor skill of management; and I do not know that any dramatist after Shakspeare would have succeeded better in the difficult scene where she discloses her love to an inferior. There is perhaps a little failure in dignity and delicacy, especially towards the close; but the Duchess of Malfy is not drawn as an Isabella or a Portia: she is a love-sick widow, virtuous and true-hearted, but more intended for our sympathy than our reverence.

102. The White Devil, or Vittoria Corombona, is not much inferior in language and spirit to the Duchess ^{Vittoria} of Malfy; but the plot is more confused, less inter-^{Corombona.}esting, and worse conducted. Mr. Dyce, the late editor of Webster, praises the dramatic vigor of the part of Vittoria, but justly differs from Lamb, who speaks of "the innocence-resembling boldness" she displays in the trial scene. It is rather a delineation of desperate guilt, losing in a counterfeited audacity all that could seduce or conciliate the tribunal. Webster's other plays are less striking: in Appius and Virginia he has done perhaps better than any one who has attempted a subject not on the whole very promising for tragedy; several of the scenes are dramatic and effective; the language, as is usually the case with Webster, is written so as to display an actor's talents, and he has followed the received history sufficiently to abstain from any excess of slaughter at the close. Webster is not without comic wit, as well as a power of imagination: his plays have lately met with an editor of taste enough to admire his beauties, and not very over-partial in estimating them.

103. Below Webster, we might enumerate a long list of dramatists under the first Stuarts. Marston is a tumid and ranting tragedian, a wholesale dealer in murders and ghosts. Chapman, who assisted Ben Jonson and some others in comedy, deserves but limited praise for his Bussy d'Amboise. The style in this and in all his tragedies is extravagantly hyperbolic: he is not very dramatic, nor has any power of exciting emotion except in those who sympathize with a tumid pride and self-confidence. Yet he has more thinking than

least in England, the vestiges of which are still to be traced in our theatre. Their plays are at once distinguishable from those of their contemporaries by the regard to dramatic effect which influenced the writer's imagination. Though not personally connected with the stage, they had its picture ever before their eyes. Hence their incidents are numerous and striking; their characters sometimes slightly sketched, not drawn, like those of Jonson, from a preconceived design, but preserving that degree of individual distinctness which a common audience requires, and often highly humorous without extravagance; their language brilliant with wit; their measure, though they do not make great use of prose, very lax and rapid, running frequently to lines of thirteen and fourteen syllables. Few of their comedies are without a mixture of grave sentiments or elevated characters; and, though there is much to condemn in their indecency and even licentiousness of principle, they never descend to the coarse buffoonery not unfrequent in their age. Never were dramatic poets more thoroughly gentlemen, according to the standard of their times; and, when we consider the court of James I., we may say that they were above that standard.¹

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collected words in a convenient form, that he is become not only familiar to the general reader. He is, however, far more intelligent than Fletcher: his wit has not given so much entertainment from corruption, and his general style is as pure as we ever find it in the dramatic poets of that age. The flowing passages in Massinger, after the care that Gifford has taken, are by no means frequent.

90. Five of his sixteen plays are tragedies, that is are ~~considered~~ ^{concluded} in death: of the rest, no one belongs to ~~the class of~~ ^{the class of} mere comedy, but by the depth of the ~~as shown~~ ^{as shown} interest, the danger of the virtuous, or the atrocity of the vicious characters, as well as the elevation of the general style, must be ranked with the serious drama, or, as it was ~~originally termed~~ ^{originally termed} *tragi-comedy*. A shade of melancholy tinges the writings of Massinger; but he sacrifices less than his contemporaries to the public taste for superfluous bloodshed on the stage. In several of his plays, such as the *Picture* or the *Renegado*, where it would have been easy to determine the catastrophe towards tragedy, he has preferred to break the clouds with the radiance of a setting sun. He consulted in this his own genius, not eminently pathetic nor energetic enough to display the utmost intensity of emotion, but abounding in sweetness and dignity, apt to delineate the loveliness of virtue, and to delight in its recompense after trial. It has been surmised, that the religion of Massinger was that of the Church of Rome; a conjecture not improbable, though, considering the ascetic and imaginative piety which then prevailed in that of England, we need not absolutely go so far for his turn of thought in the *Virgin Martyr* or the *Renegado*.

91. The most striking excellence of this poet is his ^{little definition of} ~~con-~~ception of character; and in this I must incline to place him above Fletcher, and, if I may venture to say it, even above Jonson. He is free from the hard outline of the one, and the negligent looseness of the other. He has indeed no great variety, and sometimes repents, with such bare modifications as the story demands, the type of his first design. Thus the extravagance of conjugal affection is portrayed, feeble in Theodosius, frantic in Domitian, selfish in Sforza, suspicious in Mathias; and the same impulses of doting love return upon us in the guilty eulogies of Mallofort on his daughter. The vindictive hypocrisy of

Montreville in the Unnatural Combat has nearly its counterpart in that of Francesco in the Duke of Milan, and is again displayed with more striking success in Luke. This last villain, indeed, and that original, masterly, inimitable conception, Sir Giles Overreach, are sufficient to establish the rank of Massinger in this great province of dramatic art. But his own disposition led him more willingly to pictures of moral beauty. A peculiar refinement, a mixture of gentleness and benignity with noble daring, belong to some of his favorite characters, to Pisander in the Bondman, to Antonio in *A Very Woman*, to Charolois in the Fatal Dowry. It may be readily supposed, that his female characters are not wanting in these graces. It seems to me, that he has more variety in his women than in the other sex, and that they are less mannered than the heroines of Fletcher. A slight degree of error or passion in Sophia, Eudocia, Marcella, without weakening our sympathy, serves both to prevent the monotony of perpetual rectitude, so often insipid in fiction, and to bring forward the development of the story.

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93. Next to the grace and dignity of sentiment in Massinger's *gen.* we must praise those qualities in his style. *his style.* Every modern critic has been struck by the peculiar beauty of his language. In his harmonious swell of numbers, in his pure and genuine idiom, which a text, by good fortune and the diligence of its last editor, far less corrupt than that of Fletcher, enables us to enjoy, we find an unceasing charm. The poetical talents of Massinger were very considerable, his taste superior to that of his contemporaries; the coloring of his imagery is rarely overcharged; a certain redundancy, as some may account it, gives fulness, or what the painters call *imposto*, to his style, and, if it might not always conduce to effect on the stage, is on the whole suitable to the character of his composition.¹

94. The comic powers of this writer are not on a level with the serious: with some degree of humorous *Inferiority of his comic powers.* conception, he is too apt to aim at exciting ridicule by caricature; and his dialogue wants altogether the sparkling wit of Shakspeare and Fletcher. Whether from a consciousness of this defect, or from an unhappy compliance with the viciousness of the age, no writer is more contaminated by gross indecency. It belongs indeed chiefly, not perhaps exclusively, to the characters he would render odious; but upon them he has bestowed this flower of our early theatre with no sparing hand. Few, it must be said, of his plays are incapable of representation merely on this account; and the offence is therefore more incurable in Fletcher.

95. Among the tragedies of Massinger, I should incline to prefer the Duke of Milan. The plot borrows *Some of his tragedies particularly good.* enough from history to give it dignity, and to counterbalance in some measure the predominance of the passion of love which the invented parts of the drama exhibit. The characters of Sforza, Marcelia, and Francesco, are in Massinger's best manner; the story is skilfully and not improbably developed; the pathos is deeper than we generally find in his writings; the eloquence of language,

¹ [I quote the following criticism from Coleridge, without thoroughly assenting to it: "The styles of Massinger's plays and the *Samson Agonistes* are the two extremes of the arc within which the diction of dramatic poetry may oscillate. Shakspeare in his great plays is the midpoint. In the *Samson Agonistes*, colloquial language is left at the greatest distance; yet something of it is preserved, to render the dialogue probable: in Massinger the style is diffused, but diffused in the smallest degree possible, from animated conversation, by the vein of poetry." — *Table Talk*, vol. II. p. 121.—1842.]

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the subject of *A Woman killed with Kindness*, but with less success. This play is written in verse, and with that ease and perspicuity, seldom rising to passion or figurative poetry, which distinguishes this dramatist. Young Geraldine is a beautiful specimen of the Platonic, or rather inflexibly virtuous lover, whom the writers of this age delighted to portray. On the other hand, it is difficult to pronounce whether the lady is a thorough-paced hypocrite in the first acts, or falls from virtue, like Mrs. Frankfort, on the first solicitation of a stranger. In either case, the character is unpleasing, and, we may hope, improbable. The underplot of this play is largely borrowed from the *Mostellaria* of Plautus, and is diverting, though somewhat absurd. Heywood seldom rises to much vigor of poetry; but his dramatic invention is ready, his style is easy, his characters do not transgress the boundaries of nature, and it is not surprising that he was popular in his own age.

100. Webster belongs to the first part of the reign of James. He possessed very considerable powers, and ought to be ranked, I think, the next below Ford. With less of poetic grace than Shirley, he had incomparably more vigor; with less of nature and simplicity than Heywood, he had a more elevated genius and a bolder pencil. But the deep sorrows and terrors of tragedy were peculiarly his province. "His imagination," says his last editor, "had a fond familiarity with objects of awe and fear. The silence of the sepulchre, the sculptures of marble monuments, the knolling of church bells, the ceremonies of the corpse, the yew that roots itself in dead men's graves, are the illustrations that most readily present themselves to his imagination." I think this well-written sentence a little one-sided, and hardly doing justice to the variety of Webster's power; but, in fact, he was as deeply tainted as any of his contemporaries with the savage taste of the Italian school, and, in the *Duchess of Malfy*, scarcely leaves enough on the stage to bury the dead.

101. This is the most celebrated of Webster's dramas. The ~~His Duchess~~ story is taken from *Bandello*, and has all that accumulation of wickedness and horror which the Italian novelists perversely described, and our tragedians as perversely imitated. But the scenes are wrought up with skill, and produce a strong impression. Webster has a superiority in delineating character above many of the old dramatists; he is

seldom extravagant beyond the limits of conceivable nature ; we find guilt, or even the atrocity, of human passions, but not that incarnation of evil spirits which some more ordinary dramatists loved to exhibit. In the character of the Duchess of Malfy herself, there wants neither originality, nor skill of management ; and I do not know that any dramatist after Shakspeare would have succeeded better in the difficult scene where she discloses her love to an inferior. There is perhaps a little failure in dignity and delicacy, especially towards the close ; but the Duchess of Malfy is not drawn as an Isabella or a Portia : she is a love-sick widow, virtuous and true-hearted, but more intended for our sympathy than our reverence.

102. The White Devil, or Vittoria Corombona, is not much inferior in language and spirit to the Duchess ^{Vittoria} of Malfy ; but the plot is more confused, less inter- ^{Corombona}esting, and worse conducted. Mr. Dyce, the late editor of Webster, praises the dramatic vigor of the part of Vittoria, but justly differs from Lamb, who speaks of "the innocence-resembling boldness" she displays in the trial scene. It is rather a delineation of desperate guilt, losing in a counterfeited audacity all that could seduce or conciliate the tribunal. Webster's other plays are less striking : in Appius and Virginia he has done perhaps better than any one who has attempted a subject not on the whole very promising for tragedy ; several of the scenes are dramatic and effective ; the language, as is usually the case with Webster, is written so as to display an actor's talents, and he has followed the received history sufficiently to abstain from any excess of slaughter at the close. Webster is not without comic wit, as well as a power of imagination : his plays have lately met with an editor of taste enough to admire his beauties, and not very over-partial in estimating them.

103. Below Webster, we might enumerate a long list of dramatists under the first Stuarts. Marston is a tumid and ranting tragedian, a wholesale dealer in murders and ghosts. Chapman, who assisted Ben Jonson and some others in comedy, deserves but limited praise for his Bussy d'Amboise. The style in this and in all his tragedies is extravagantly hyperbolical : he is not very dramatic, nor has any power of exciting emotion except in those who sympathize with a tumid pride and self-confidence. Yet he has more thinking than

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF POLITE LITERATURE IN PROSE, FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECTION I.

Italian Writers—Boccalini—Grammatical and Critical Works—Gracian—French Writers—Balmé—Voiture—French Academy—Vaugelas—Patru and Le Maître—Style of English Prose—Earl of Essex—Knolles—Several other English Writers.

1. It would be vain probably to inquire from what general causes we should deduce the decline of taste in Italy. None, at least, have occurred to my mind, relating to political or social circumstances, upon which we could build more than one of those sophistical theories which assume a casual relation between any concomitant events. Bad taste, in fact, whether in literature or the arts, is always ready to seize upon the public, being in many cases no more than a pleasure in faults which are really fitted to please us, and of which it can only be said that they hinder or impair the greater pleasure we should derive from beauties. Among these critical sins, none are so dangerous as the display of ingenious and novel thoughts or turns of phrase; for, as such enter into the definition of good writing, it seems very difficult to persuade the world that they can ever be the characteristics of bad writing. The metes and bounds of ornament, the fine shades of distinction which regulate a judicious choice, are only learned by an attentive as well as a naturally susceptible mind; and it is no rare case for an unprepared multitude to prefer the worse picture, the worse building, the worse poem, the worse speech, to the better. Education, an acquaintance with just criticism, and still more the habitual observation of what is truly beautiful in nature or art, or in the literature of taste, will sometimes generate almost a national tact that rejects the temptations of a meretricious and false style; but

Decline of
taste in
Italy.

collected works in a convenient form, that he is become tolerably familiar to the general reader. He is, however, far more intelligible than Fletcher: his text has not given so much embarrassment from corruption, and his general style is as perspicuous as we ever find it in the dramatic poets of that age. The obscure passages in Massinger, after the care that Gifford has taken, are by no means frequent.

90. Five of his sixteen plays are tragedies, that is, are concluded in death: of the rest, no one belongs to the class of mere comedy, but by the depth of the interest, the danger of the virtuous, or the atrocity of the vicious characters, as well as the elevation of the general style, must be ranked with the serious drama, or, as it was commonly termed, tragi-comedy. A shade of melancholy tinges the writings of Massinger; but he sacrifices less than his contemporaries to the public taste for superfluous bloodshed on the stage. In several of his plays, such as the *Picture* or the *Renegado*, where it would have been easy to determine the catastrophe towards tragedy, he has preferred to break the clouds with the radiance of a setting sun. He consulted in this his own genius, not eminently pathetic nor energetic enough to display the utmost intensity of emotion, but abounding in sweetness and dignity, apt to delineate the loveliness of virtue, and to delight in its recompense after trial. It has been surmised, that the religion of Massinger was that of the Church of Rome; a conjecture not improbable, though, considering the ascetic and imaginative piety which then prevailed in that of England, we need not absolutely go so far for his turn of thought in the *Virgin Martyr* or the *Renegado*.

91. The most striking excellence of this poet is his conception of character; and in this I must incline to place him above Fletcher, and, if I may venture to say it, even above Jonson. He is free from the hard outline of the one, and the negligent looseness of the other. He has indeed no great variety, and sometimes repeats, with such bare modifications as the story demands, the type of his first design. Thus the extravagance of conjugal affection is portrayed, feeble in *Theodosius*, frantic in *Domitian*, selfish in *Sforza*, suspicious in *Mathias*; and the same impulses of doting love return upon us in the guilty eulogies of *Mallefort* on his daughter. The vindictive hypocrisy of

General
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his drama.

His delineations
of
character.

Montreville in the *Unnatural Combat* has nearly its counterpart in that of Francesco in the Duke of Milan, and is again displayed with more striking success in Luke. This last villain, indeed, and that original, masterly, inimitable conception, Sir Giles Overreach, are sufficient to establish the rank of Massinger in this great province of dramatic art. But his own disposition led him more willingly to pictures of moral beauty. A peculiar refinement, a mixture of gentleness and benignity with noble daring, belong to some of his favorite characters, to Pisander in the *Bondman*, to Antonio in *A Very Woman*, to Charolois in the *Fatal Dowry*. It may be readily supposed, that his female characters are not wanting in these graces. It seems to me, that he has more variety in his women than in the other sex, and that they are less mannered than the heroines of Fletcher. A slight degree of error or passion in Sophia, Eudocia, Marcellia, without weakening our sympathy, serves both to prevent the monotony of perpetual rectitude, so often insipid in fiction, and to bring forward the development of the story.

92. The subjects chosen by Massinger are sometimes historical; but others seem to have been taken from ^{His sub-}French or Italian novels, and those so obscure that ^{jects.}his editor Gifford, a man of much reading and industry, has seldom traced them. This, indeed, was an usual practice of our ancient dramatists. Their works have, consequently, a romantic character, presenting as little of the regular Plautine comedy as of the Greek forms of tragedy. They are merely novels in action, following probably their models with no great variation, except the lower and lighter episodes which it was always more or less necessary to combine with the story. It is from this choice of subjects, perhaps, as much as from the peculiar temper of the poets, that love is the predominant affection of the mind which they display; not cold and conventional, as we commonly find it on the French stage, but sometimes, as the novelists of the South were prone to delineate its emotions, fiery, irresistible, and almost resembling the fatalism of ancient tragedy; sometimes a subdued captive at the chariot wheels of honor or religion. The range of human passion is, consequently, far less extensive than in Shakspeare; but the variety of circumstance, and the modifications of the paramount affection itself, compensated for this deficiency.

especially in the celebrated speech of Sforza before the Emperor, has never been surpassed by him. Many, however, place the *Fatal Dowry* still higher. This tragedy furnished Rowe with the story of his *Fair Penitent*. The superiority of the original, except in suitableness for representation, has long been acknowledged. In the *Unnatural Combat*, probably among the earliest of Massinger's works, we find a greater energy, a bolder strain of figurative poetry, more command of terror, and perhaps of pity, than in any other of his dramas. But the dark shadows of crime and misery which overspread this tragedy belong to rather an earlier period of the English stage than that of Massinger, and were not congenial to his temper. In the *Virgin Martyr*, he has followed the Spanish model of religious Autos, with many graces of language and a beautiful display of Christian heroism in Dorothea; but the tragedy is in many respects unpleasing.

96. *The Picture*, *The Bondman*, and *A Very Woman*, may be reckoned among the best of the tragi-comedies of ^{And of his} Massinger. But the general merits as well as ^{other plays.} defects of this writer are perceptible in all; and the difference between these and the rest is not such as to be apparent to every reader. Two others are distinguishable as more English than the rest; the scene lies at home, and in the age; and to these the common voice has assigned a superiority. They are *A New Way to Pay Old Debts* and *The City Madam*. A character drawn, as it appears, from reality, and, though darkly wicked, not beyond the province of the higher comedy, *Sir Giles Overreach*, gives the former drama a striking originality and an impressive vigor. It retains, alone among the productions of Massinger, a place on the stage. Gifford inclines to prefer the *City Madam*; which, no doubt, by the masterly delineation of Luke, a villain of a different order from *Overreach*, and a larger portion of comic humor and satire than is usual with this writer, may dispute the palm. But there seems to be more violent improbability in the conduct of the plot, than in *A New Way to Pay Old Debts*.

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great names of the English stage. At a considerable distance below Massinger we may place his contemporary John Ford. In the choice of many subjects from obscure histories, which have to us the charm of entire novelty, they resemble each other; but in the treatment of their fables, in the delineation of their characters, each of these poets has his distinguishing excellences. "I know," says Gifford, "few things more difficult to account for than the deep and lasting impression made by the more tragic portions of Ford's poetry." He succeeds, however, pretty well in accounting for it: the situations are awfully interesting, the distress intense, the thoughts and language becoming the expressive of deep sorrow. Ford, with none of the moral beauty and elevation of Massinger, has, in a much higher degree, the power over tears: we sympathize even with his vicious characters, with Giovanni and Annabella and Bianca. Love, and love in guilt or sorrow, is almost exclusively the emotion he portrays: no heroic passion, no sober dignity, will be found in his tragedies. But he conducts his stories well and without confusion; his scenes are often highly wrought and effective; his characters, with no striking novelty, are well supported; he is seldom extravagant or regardless of probability. The Broken Heart has generally been reckoned his finest tragedy: and if the last act had been better prepared, by bringing the love of Calantha for Ithocles more fully before the reader in the earlier part of the play, there would be very few passages of deeper pathos in our dramatic literature. "The style of Ford," it is said by Gifford, "is altogether original and his own. Without the majestic march which distinguishes the poetry of Massinger, and with little or none of that light and playful humor which characterizes the dialogue of Fletcher, or even of Shirley, he is yet elegant and easy and harmonious; and though rarely sublime, yet sufficiently elevated for the most pathetic tones of that passion on whose romantic energies he chiefly delighted to dwell." Yet he censures afterwards Ford's affectation of uncouth phrases, and perplexity of language. Of comic ability this writer does not display one particle. Nothing can be meaner than those portions of his dramas, which, in compliance with the prescribed rules of that age, he devotes to the dialogue of servants or buffoons.

98. Shirley is a dramatic writer much inferior to those who have been mentioned, but has acquired some degree of reputa-

tion, or at least notoriety of name, in consequence of the new edition of his plays. These are between twenty and thirty in number; some of them, however, written ^{Shirley.} in conjunction with his fellow-dramatists. A few of these are tragedies, a few are comedies drawn from English manners; but in the greater part we find the favorite style of that age, the characters foreign and of elevated rank, the interest serious, but not always of buskined dignity, the catastrophe fortunate; all, in short, that has gone under the vague appellation of *tragi-comedy*. Shirley has no originality, no force in conceiving or delineating character, little of pathos, and less perhaps of wit: his dramas produce no deep impression in reading, and of course can leave none in the memory. But his mind was poetical; his better characters, especially females, express pure thoughts in pure language; he is never tumid or affected, and seldom obscure; the incidents succeed rapidly; the personages are numerous; and there is a general animation in the scenes, which causes us to read him with some pleasure. No very good play, nor possibly any very good scene, could be found in Shirley; but he has many lines of considerable beauty. Among his comedies, the *Gamesters* may be reckoned the best. Charles I. is said to have declared, that it was "the best play he had seen these seven years;" and it has even been added, that the story was of his royal suggestion. It certainly deserves praise both for language and construction of the plot, and it has the advantage of exposing vice to ridicule; but the ladies of that court, the fair forms whom Vandyke has immortalized, must have been very different indeed from their posterity if they could sit it through. The *Ball*, and also some more among the comedies of Shirley, are so far remarkable and worthy of being read, that they bear witness to a more polished elegance of manners, and a more free intercourse in the higher class, than we find in the comedies of the preceding reign. A queen from France, and that queen Henrietta Maria, was better fitted to give this tone than Anne of Denmark. But it is not from Shirley's pictures that we can draw the most favorable notions of the morals of that age.

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many of the old tragedies, and the traces of one of the others to which attention was called, is not without some foundation. That we "could in our present circumstances in the nature of man and the world," there is also a "poetic immensity" in Chapman, which is the substance of the observation of Coleridge by which we are invited to do. The *Tragedies*, *All Fives* and *The Gentleman Usher* are perhaps superior to his tragedies. *Lawley* and *Le Tricorne*, especially the former, have *very many good lines*: but we should say that they were very inferior tragedies. *Lawley*, however, was often in comic partnership with Massinger. *Lawley* merits a higher rank: he *compares* with Massinger in some of his plays, and manifests in his own some energy of passion and some comic humor. Middleton belongs to the lower class of dramatic writers: his tragedy entitled "*Women beware Women*" is founded on the story of *Benvenuto Cellini*: it is full of action, but the characters are all too vicious to be interesting, and the language does not rise much above mediocrity. In comedy, Middleton deserves more praise. "*A Trick to catch the Old One*," and several others that bear his name, are amusing and spirited. But Middleton wrote chiefly in conjunction with others, and sometimes with Jonson and Massinger.

¹ Chapman is well reviewed, and at length, in an article of the *Retrospective Review*, vol. iv. p. 222, and again in vol. v.

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF POLITE LITERATURE IN PROSE, FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECTION I.

Italian Writers — Boccacini — Grammatical and Critical Works — Gracian — French Writers — Balzac — Voltire — French Academy — Vaugelas — Patru and Le Maître — Style of English Prose — Earl of Essex — Knolles — Several other English Writers.

1. It would be vain probably to inquire from what general causes we should deduce the decline of taste in Italy. None, at least, have occurred to my mind, relating to political or social circumstances, upon which we could build more than one of those sophistical theories which assume a casual relation between any concomitant events. Bad taste, in fact, whether in literature or the arts, is always ready to seize upon the public, being in many cases no more than a pleasure in faults which are really fitted to please us, and of which it can only be said that they hinder or impair the greater pleasure we should derive from beauties. Among these critical sins, none are so dangerous as the display of ingenious and novel thoughts or turns of phrase; for, as such enter into the definition of good writing, it seems very difficult to persuade the world that they can ever be the characteristics of bad writing. The metes and bounds of ornament, the fine shades of distinction which regulate a judicious choice, are only learned by an attentive as well as a naturally susceptible mind; and it is no rare case for an unprepared multitude to prefer the worse picture, the worse building, the worse poem, the worse speech, to the better. Education, an acquaintance with just criticism, and still more the habitual observation of what is truly beautiful in nature or art, or in the literature of taste, will sometimes generate almost a national tact that rejects the temptations of a meretricious and false style; but

experience has shown that this happy state of public feeling will not be very durable. Whatever might be the cause of it, this age of the Italian *scientisti* has been reckoned almost as inauspicious to good writing in prose as in verse. "If we except," says Tiraboschi, "the Tuscans and a very few more, never was our language so neglected as in this period. We can scarce bear to read most of the books that were published, so rude and full of barbarisms is their style. Few had any other aim than to exercise their wit in conceits and metaphors; and, so long as they could scatter them profusely over their pages, cared nothing for the choice of phrases or the purity of grammar. Their eloquence on public occasions was intended only for admiration and applause, not to persuade or move."¹ And this, he says, is applicable alike to their Latin and Italian, their sacred and profane harangues. The academical discourses, of which Dati has collected many in his *Prose Fiorentine*, are poor in comparison with those of the sixteenth.²

2. A later writer than Tiraboschi has thought this sentence against the *scientisti* a little too severe, and, condemning equally with him the bad taste characteristic of that age, endeavors to rescue a few from the general censure.³ It is at least certain that the insipidity of the cinque cento writers, their long periods void of any but the most trivial meaning, their affectation of the faults of Cicero's manner in their own language, ought not to be overlooked or wholly pardoned, while we dwell on an opposite defect of their successors. — the perpetual desire to be novel, brilliant, or profound. This may doubtless be the more offensive of the two; but it is, perhaps, not less likely to be mingled with something really worth reading.

8. It will not be expected that we can mention many Italian books, after what has been said, which come very precisely within the class of polite literature, or claim any praise on the ground of style. Their greatest luminary, Galileo, wrote with clearness, elegance, and spirit; no one among the moderns had so entirely rejected a dry and technical manner of teaching, and thrown such attractions round the form of truth. Himself a poet and a critic, he did not hesitate to ascribe his own philosophical perspicuity to the constant perusal of Ariosto. This I have mentioned in

¹ Vol. xi. p. 418.² Id.³ Salt, xiv. 11.

another place: but we cannot too much remember that all objects of intellectual pursuit are as bodies acting with reciprocal forces in one system, being all in relation to the faculties of the mind, which is itself but one; and that the most extensive acquaintance with the various provinces of literature will not fail to strengthen our dominion over those we more peculiarly deem our own. The school of Galileo, especially Torricelli and Redi, were not less distinguished than himself for their union of elegance with philosophy.¹

4. The letters of Bentivoglio are commonly known. This epistolary art was always cultivated by the Italians, first in the Latin tongue, and afterwards in their own. Bentivoglio has written with equal dignity and ease. Galileo's letters are also esteemed on account of their style as well as of what they contain. In what is more peculiarly called eloquence, the Italians of this age are rather emulous of success than successful: the common defects of taste in themselves, and in those who heard or read them, as well as, in most instances, the uninteresting nature of their subjects, exclude them from our notice.

5. Trajan Boccalini was by his disposition inclined to political satire, and possibly to political intrigue; but we have here only to mention the work by which he is best known, *Advices from Parnassus* (*Ragguagli di Parnaso*). If the idea of this once popular and celebrated book is not original, which I should rather doubt, though without immediately recognizing a similarity to any thing earlier (Lucian, the common prototype, excepted), it has at least been an original source. In the general turn of Boccalini's fictions, and perhaps in a few particular instances, we may sometimes perceive what a much greater man has imitated: they bear a certain resemblance to those of Addison, though the vast superiority of the latter in felicity of execution and variety of invention may almost conceal it. The *Ragguagli* are a series of despatches from the court of Apollo on Parnassus, where he is surrounded by eminent men of all ages. This fiction becomes in itself very cold and monotonous; yet there is much variety in the subjects of the decisions made by the god with the advice of his counsellors, and some strokes of satire are well hit, though more perhaps fail of effect. But we cannot now catch the force of every passage.

¹ *Sals*, xiv. 12.

Boccalini is full of allusions to his own time, even where the immediate subject seems ancient. This book was published at Venice in 1612, at a time when the ambition of Spain was regarded with jealousy by patriotic Italians, who thought that pacific republic their bulwark and their glory. He inveighs, therefore, against the military spirit and the profession of war; "necessary sometimes, but so fierce and inhuman that no fine expressions can make it honorable."¹ Nor is he less severe on the vices of kings, nor less ardent in his eulogies of liberty; the government of Venice being reckoned, and not altogether untruly, an asylum of free thought and action in comparison with that of Spain. Aristotle, he reports in one of his despatches, was besieged in his villa on Parnassus by a number of armed men belonging to different princes, who insisted on his retracting the definition he had given of a tyrant, that he was one who governed for his own good and not that of the people, because it would apply to every prince, all reigning for their own good. The philosopher, alarmed by this demand, altered his definition; which was to run thus, that tyrants were certain persons of old time, whose race was now quite extinct.² Boccalini, however, takes care, in general, to mix something of playfulness with his satire, so that it could not be resented without apparent ill-nature. It seems, indeed, to us, free from invective, and rather meant to sting than to wound. But this, if a common rumor be true, did not secure him against a beating of which he died. The style of Boccalini is said by the critics to be clear and fluent, rather than correct or elegant; and he displays the taste of his times by extravagant metaphors. But to foreigners, who regard this less, his *Advices from Parnassus*, unequal of course, and occasionally tedious, must appear to contain many ingenious allusions, judicious criticisms, and acute remarks.

6. The *Pietra del Paragone* by the same author is an odd, and rather awkward, mixture of reality and fiction, all levelled at the court of Spain, and designed to keep alive a jealousy of its ambition. It is a kind of episode or supplement to the *Ragguagli di Parnaso*, the leading invention being preserved. Boccalini is an interesting writer, on account of the light he throws on the history and sentiments of Italy. He is in this work a still bolder writer than in the former; not only censuring Spain without mercy,

¹ *Ragg.* 76.² *Id.* 76.

but even the Venetian aristocracy, observing upon the insolence of the young nobles towards the citizens, though he justifies the senate for not punishing the former more frequently with death by public execution, which would lower the nobility in the eyes of the people. They were, however, he says, as severely punished, when their conduct was bad, by exclusion from offices of trust. The *Pietra del Paragone* is a kind of political, as the *Ragguagli* is a critical, miscellany.

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¹ Vol. xiii. p. 440.

² Corniani, vii. 156; Salfi, xiii. 426.

number of far-fetched expressions, though there is more than one French translation of it. El Politico Fernando, a panegyric on Ferdinand the Catholic, seems as empty as it is affected and artificial. The style of Gracian is always pointed, emphatic, full of that which looks like profundity or novelty, though neither deep nor new. He seems to have written on a maxim he recommends to the man of the world: "If he desires that all should look up to him, let him permit himself to be known, but not to be understood."¹ His treatise entitled *Agudeza y Arte di Ingenio* is a system of *conceits*, digested under their different heads, and selected from Latin, Italian, and Spanish writers of that and the preceding age. It is said in the *Biographie Universelle*, that this work, though too metaphysical, is useful in the critical history of literature. Gracian obtained a certain degree of popularity in France and England.

15. The general taste of French writers in the sixteenth century, as we have seen, was simple and lively, full of sallies of natural wit and a certain archness of observation, but deficient in those higher qualities of language which the study of the ancients had taught men to admire. In public harangues, in pleadings, and in sermons, these characteristics of the French manner were either introduced out of place, or gave way to a tiresome pedantry. Du Vair was the first who endeavored to bring in a more elaborate and elevated diction. Nor was this confined to the example he gave. In 1607 he published a treatise on French eloquence, and on the causes through which it had remained at so low a point. This work relates chiefly to the eloquence of the bar, or at least that of public speakers; and the causes which he traces are chiefly such as would operate on that kind alone. But some of his observations are applicable to style in the proper sense; and his treatise has been reckoned the first which gave France the rules of good writing, and the desire to practise them.² A modern critic, who censures the Latinisms of Du Vair's style, admits that his treatise on eloquence makes an epoch in the language.³

French
prose :
Du Vair.

¹ "Si quiere que le veneren todos, permitase al conocimiento, no á la comprehension."

² Gilbert, *Jugemens des Savans sur les auteurs qui ont traité de la rhétorique*. This work is annexed to some editions of

Balliet. Goujet has copied or abridged Gilbert, without distinct acknowledgment, and not always carefully preserving the sense.

³ Neufchâteau, *préface aux Œuvres de Pascal*, p. 181.

the cadence of his periods is harmonious, but too artificial and uniform: on the whole, he approaches to the tone of a languid sermon, and leaves a tendency to yawn. But, in his time, superficial truths were not so much proscribed as at present: the same want of depth belongs to almost all the moralists in Italian and in modern Latin. Balzac is a moralist with a pure heart, and a love of truth and virtue (somewhat alloyed by the spirit of flattery towards persons, however he may declaim about courts and courtiers in general), a competent erudition, and a good deal of observation of the world. In his *Aristippe*, addressed to Christina, and consequently a late work, he deals much in political precepts and remarks, some of which might be read with advantage. But he was accused of borrowing his thoughts from the ancients, which the author of an *Apology for Balzac* seems not wholly to deny. This apology indeed had been produced by a book on the Conformity of the eloquence of M. Balzac with that of the ancients.

17. The letters of Balzac are in twenty-seven books: they begin in 1620, and end about 1653; the first portion having appeared in 1625. "He passed all his life," ^{His letters.} says Vigneul-Marville, "in writing letters, without ever catching the right characteristics of that style."¹ This demands a peculiar ease and naturalness of expression, for want of which they seem no genuine exponents of friendship or gallantry, and hardly of polite manners. His wit was not free from pedantry, and did not come from him spontaneously. Hence he was little fitted to address ladies, even the Rambouillets; and indeed he had acquired so labored and artificial a way of writing letters, that even those to his sister, though affectionate, smell too much of the lamp. His advocates admit, that they are to be judged rather by the rules of oratorical than epistolary composition.

18. In the moral dissertations, such as that entitled the *Prince*, this elaborate manner is, of course, not less discernible, but not so unpleasant or out of place. Balzac has been called the father of the French language, the master and model of the great men who have followed him. But it is confessed by all, that he wanted the fine taste to regulate his

¹ *Mélanges de Littérature*, vol. i. p. 126. He adds, however, that Balzac had "un talent particulier pour embellir notre langue." The writer whom I quote under

the name of Vigneul-Marville, which he assumed, was D'Argonne, a Benedictine of Rouen

style according to the subject. Hence he is pompous and inflated upon ordinary topics; and, in a country so quick to seize the ridiculous as his own, not all his nobleness and purity of style, not the passages of eloquence which we often find, have been sufficient to redeem him from the sarcasms of those who have had more power to amuse. The stateliness, however, of Balzac is less offensive and extravagant than the affected intensity of language which distinguishes the style of the present age on both sides of the Channel, and which is in fact a much worse modification of the same fault.

19. A contemporary and rival of Balzac, though very unlike in most respects, was Voiture. Both one and the other were received with friendship and admiration in a celebrated society of Paris, the first which, on this side of the Alps, united the aristocracy of rank and of genius in one circle, that of the Hôtel Rambouillet. Catherine de Vivonne, widow of the Marquis de Rambouillet, was the owner of this mansion. It was frequented, during the long period of her life, by all that was distinguished in France, by Richelieu and Condé, as much as by Corneille, and a long host of inferior men of letters. The heiress of this family, Julie d'Angennes, beautiful and highly accomplished, became the central star of so bright a galaxy. The love of intellectual attainments, both in mother and daughter, the sympathy and friendship they felt for those who displayed them, as well as their moral worth, must render their names respectable; but these were in some measure sullied by false taste, and what we may consider an habitual affectation even in their conduct. We can scarcely give another name to the caprice of Julia, who, in the fashion of romance, compelled the Duke of Montausier to carry on a twelve years' courtship, and only married him in the decline of her beauty. This patient lover, himself one of the most remarkable men in the court of Louis XIV., had, many years before, in 1633, presented her with what has been called the Garland of Julia, a collection to which the poets and wits of Paris had contributed. Every flower, represented in a drawing, had its appropriate little poem; and all conspired to the praise of Julia.¹

20. Voiture is chiefly known by his letters: his other writings at least are inferior. These begin about 1627, and are

¹ [Two copies were made of the *Guirlande de Julie*; but, in the usual style of the Rambouillets, no one was admitted to see either, but as a remarkable favor Huet, who tells us this, was one. *Huetiana*, p. 104. — 1842.]

addressed to Madame de Rambouillet and to several other persons of both sexes. Though much too labored and affected, they are evidently the original type of the French epistolary school, including those in England who have formed themselves upon it. Pope very frequently imitated Voiture; Walpole not so much in his general correspondence, but he knew how to fall into it. The object was to say what meant little, with the utmost novelty in the mode, and with the most ingenious compliment to the person addressed; so that he should admire himself and admire the writer. They are, of course, very tiresome after a short time; yet their ingenuity is not without merit. Balzac is more solemn and dignified, and it must be owned that he has more meaning. Voiture seems to have fancied that good sense spoils a man of wit. But he has not so much wit as *esprit*; and his letters serve to exemplify the meaning of that word. Pope, in addressing ladies, was nearly the ape of Voiture. It was unfortunately thought necessary, in such a correspondence, either to affect despairing love, which was to express itself with all possible gayety, or, where love was too presumptuous, as with the Rambouillets, to pour out a torrent of nonsensical flattery, which was to be rendered tolerable by far-fetched turns of thought. Voiture has the honor of having rendered this style fashionable. But, if the bad taste of others had not perverted his own, Voiture would have been a good writer. His letters, especially those written from Spain, are sometimes truly witty, and always vivacious. Voltaire, who speaks contemptuously of Voiture, might have been glad to have been the author of some of his *jeux d'esprit*; that, for example, addressed to the Prince of Condé in the character of a pike, founded on a game where the prince had played that fish. We should remember, also, that Voiture held his place in good society upon the tacit condition that he should always strive to be witty.¹

21. But the Hôtel Rambouillet, with its false theories of taste derived in a great measure from the romances of Scudery and Calprenède, and encouraged by the agreeably artificial manner of Voiture, would have produced, in all pro-

¹ Nothing, says Olivet, could be more opposite than Balzac and Voiture. "L'un se portoit toujours au sublime, l'autre toujours au délicat. L'un avoit une imagination élevée qui jetoit de la noblesse dans les moindres choses; l'autre, une imagination enjouée, qui faisoit prendre à toutes ses pensées un air de galanterie. L'un, même lorsqu'il vouloit plaisanter, étoit toujours grave; l'autre, dans les occasions même sérieuses, trouvoit à rire." Hist. de l'Académie, p. 88.

experience has shown that this happy state of public feeling will not be very durable. Whatever might be the cause of it, this age of the Italian *scientisti* has been reckoned almost as inauspicious to good writing in prose as in verse. "If we except," says Tiraboschi, "the Tuscans and a very few more, never was our language so neglected as in this period. We can scarce bear to read most of the books that were published, so rude and full of barbarisms is their style. Few had any other aim than to exercise their wit in conceits and metaphors; and, so long as they could scatter them profusely over their pages, cared nothing for the choice of phrases or the purity of grammar. Their eloquence on public occasions was intended only for admiration and applause, not to persuade or move."¹ And this, he says, is applicable alike to their Latin and Italian, their sacred and profane, harangues. The academical discourses, of which Dati has collected many in his *Prose Fiorentine*, are poor in comparison with those of the sixteenth.²

2. A later writer than Tiraboschi has thought this sentence against the *scientisti* a little too severe, and, condemning equally with him the bad taste characteristic of that age, endeavors to rescue a few from the general censure.³ It is at least certain that the insipidity of the cinque cento writers, their long periods void of any but the most trivial meaning, their affectation of the faults of Cicero's manner in their own language, ought not to be overlooked or wholly pardoned, while we dwell on an opposite defect of their successors, — the perpetual desire to be novel, brilliant, or profound. This may doubtless be the more offensive of the two; but it is, perhaps, not less likely to be mingled with something really worth reading.

3. It will not be expected that we can mention many Italian books, after what has been said, which come very precisely within the class of polite literature, or claim any praise on the ground of style. Their greatest luminary, Style of Galileo. Galileo, wrote with clearness, elegance, and spirit; no one among the moderns had so entirely rejected a dry and technical manner of teaching, and thrown such attractions round the form of truth. Himself a poet and a critic, he did not hesitate to ascribe his own philosophical perspicuity to the constant perusal of Ariosto. This I have mentioned in

¹ Vol. xi. p. 415.² *Id.*³ *Saltz*, xiv. 11.

another place: but we cannot too much remember that all objects of intellectual pursuit are as bodies acting with reciprocal forces in one system, being all in relation to the faculties of the mind, which is itself but one; and that the most extensive acquaintance with the various provinces of literature will not fail to strengthen our dominion over those we more peculiarly deem our own. The school of Galileo, especially Torricelli and Redi, were not less distinguished than himself for their union of elegance with philosophy.¹

4. The letters of Bentivoglio are commonly known. This epistolary art was always cultivated by the Italians, Bentivoglio. first in the Latin tongue, and afterwards in their own. Bentivoglio has written with equal dignity and ease. Galileo's letters are also esteemed on account of their style as well as of what they contain. In what is more peculiarly called eloquence, the Italians of this age are rather emulous of success than successful: the common defects of taste in themselves, and in those who heard or read them, as well as, in most instances, the uninteresting nature of their subjects, exclude them from our notice.

5. Trajan Boccalini was by his disposition inclined to political satire, and possibly to political intrigue; but we have here only to mention the work by which he is Boccalini's
News from
Parnassus. best known, *Advices from Parnassus* (*Ragguagli di Parnaso*). If the idea of this once popular and celebrated book is not original, which I should rather doubt, though without immediately recognizing a similarity to any thing earlier (Lucian, the common prototype, excepted), it has at least been an original source. In the general turn of Boccalini's fictions, and perhaps in a few particular instances, we may sometimes perceive what a much greater man has imitated: they bear a certain resemblance to those of Addison, though the vast superiority of the latter in felicity of execution and variety of invention may almost conceal it. The *Ragguagli* are a series of despatches from the court of Apollo on Parnassus, where he is surrounded by eminent men of all ages. This fiction becomes in itself very cold and monotonous; yet there is much variety in the subjects of the decisions made by the god with the advice of his counsellors, and some strokes of satire are well hit, though more perhaps fail of effect. But we cannot now catch the force of every passage.

¹ *Salt*, xiv. 12.

Boccalini is full of allusions to his own time, even where the immediate subject seems ancient. This book was published at Venice in 1612, at a time when the ambition of Spain was regarded with jealousy by patriotic Italians, who thought that pacific republic their bulwark and their glory. He inveighs, therefore, against the military spirit and the profession of war; "necessary sometimes, but so fierce and inhuman that no fine expressions can make it honorable."¹ Nor is he less severe on the vices of kings, nor less ardent in his eulogies of liberty; the government of Venice being reckoned, and not altogether untruly, an asylum of free thought and action in comparison with that of Spain. Aristotle, he reports in one of his despatches, was besieged in his villa on Parnassus by a number of armed men belonging to different princes, who insisted on his retracting the definition he had given of a tyrant, that he was one who governed for his own good and not that of the people, because it would apply to every prince, all reigning for their own good. The philosopher, alarmed by this demand, altered his definition; which was to run thus, that tyrants were certain persons of old time, whose race was now quite extinct.² Boccalini, however, takes care, in general, to mix something of playfulness with his satire, so that it could not be resented without apparent ill-nature. It seems, indeed, to us, free from invective, and rather meant to sting than to wound. But this, if a common rumor be true, did not secure him against a beating of which he died. The style of Boccalini is said by the critics to be clear and fluent, rather than correct or elegant; and he displays the taste of his times by extravagant metaphors. But to foreigners, who regard this less, his *Advices from Parnassus*, unequal of course, and occasionally tedious, must appear to contain many ingenious allusions, judicious criticisms, and acute remarks.

6. The *Pietra del Paragone* by the same author is an odd, and rather awkward, mixture of reality and fiction, all levelled at the court of Spain, and designed to keep alive a jealousy of its ambition. It is a kind of episode or supplement to the *Ragguagli di Parnaso*, the leading invention being preserved. Boccalini is an interesting writer, on account of the light he throws on the history and sentiments of Italy. He is in this work a still bolder writer than in the former; not only censuring Spain without mercy,

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but even the Venetian aristocracy, observing upon the insolence of the young nobles towards the citizens, though he justifies the senate for not punishing the former more frequently with death by public execution, which would lower the nobility in the eyes of the people. They were, however, he says, as severely punished, when their conduct was bad, by exclusion from offices of trust. The *Pietra del Paragone* is a kind of political, as the *Ragguagli* is a critical, miscellany.

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And other
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writers.

ings, we may place the *Prolusiones Academicæ* of Famianus Prolusiones Strada. They are agreeably written, and bespeak of Strada a cultivated taste. The best is the sixth of the second book, containing the imitations of six Latin poets, which Addison has made well known (as I hope) to every reader in the 115th and 119th numbers of the *Guardian*. It is here that all may judge of this happy and graceful fiction; but those who have read the Latin imitations themselves will perceive that Strada has often caught the tone of the ancients with considerable felicity. Lucan and Ovid are, perhaps, best counterfeited, Virgil not quite so well, and Lucretius worst of the six. The other two are Statius and Claudian.¹ In almost every instance, the subject chosen is appropriated to the characteristic peculiarities of the poet.

13. The style of Gongora, which deformed the poetry of Spain, extended its influence over prose. A writer named Gracian (it seems to be doubtful which of Spanish prose: Gracian. two brothers, Lorenzo and Balthazar) excelled Gongora himself in the affectation, the refinement, the obscurity of his style. "The most voluminous of his works," says Bouterwek, "bears the affected title of *El Criticon*. It is an allegorical picture of the whole course of human life, divided into Crises, that is sections, according to fixed points of view, and clothed in the formal garb of a pompous romance. It is scarcely possible to open any page of this book without recognizing in the author a man who is in many respects far from common, but who, from the ambition of being entirely uncommon in thinking and writing, studiously and ingeniously avoids nature and good taste. A profusion of the most ambiguous subtleties expressed in ostentatious language are scattered throughout the work; and these are the more offensive, in consequence of their union with the really grand view of the relationship of man to nature and his Creator, which forms the subject of the treatise. Gracian would have been an excellent writer, had he not so anxiously wished to be an extraordinary one."²

14. The writings of Gracian seem, in general, to be the quintessence of bad taste. The worst of all, probably, is *El Eroo*, which is admitted to be almost unintelligible by the

¹ A writer, quoted in Blount's *Censura Autorum*, p. 859, praises the imitation of Claudian above the rest, but thinks all excellent.

² *Hist. of Spanish Literature*, p. 538.

number of far-fetched expressions, though there is more than one French translation of it. El Politico Fernando, a panegyric on Ferdinand the Catholic, seems as empty as it is affected and artificial. The style of Gracian is always pointed, emphatic, full of that which looks like profundity or novelty, though neither deep nor new. He seems to have written on a maxim he recommends to the man of the world: "If he desires that all should look up to him, let him permit himself to be known, but not to be understood."¹ His treatise entitled *Agudeza y Arte di Ingenio* is a system of *concelli*, digested under their different heads, and selected from Latin, Italian, and Spanish writers of that and the preceding age. It is said in the *Biographie Universelle*, that this work, though too metaphysical, is useful in the critical history of literature. Gracian obtained a certain degree of popularity in France and England.

15. The general taste of French writers in the sixteenth century, as we have seen, was simple and lively, full of sallies of natural wit and a certain archness of observation, but deficient in those higher qualities of language which the study of the ancients had taught men to admire. In public harangues, in pleadings, and in sermons, these characteristics of the French manner were either introduced out of place, or gave way to a tiresome pedantry. Du Vair was the first who endeavored to bring in a more elaborate and elevated diction. Nor was this confined to the example he gave. In 1607 he published a treatise on French eloquence, and on the causes through which it had remained at so low a point. This work relates chiefly to the eloquence of the bar, or at least that of public speakers; and the causes which he traces are chiefly such as would operate on that kind alone. But some of his observations are applicable to style in the proper sense; and his treatise has been reckoned the first which gave France the rules of good writing, and the desire to practise them.² A modern critic, who censures the Latinisms of Du Vair's style, admits that his treatise on eloquence makes an epoch in the language.³

French
prose:
Du Vair.

¹ "Si quiere que le veneren todos, permitase al conocimiento, no á la comprehension."

² Gilbert, *Jugemens des Savans sur les auteurs qui ont traité de la rhétorique*. This work is annexed to some editions of

Balliet. Goujet has copied or abridged Gilbert, without distinct acknowledgment, and not always carefully preserving the sense.

³ Neufchâteau, *préface aux Œuvres de Pascal*, p. 181.

16. A more distinguished era, however, is dated from 1625, when the letters of Balzac were published.¹ There had indeed been a few intermediate works, which contributed, though now little known, to the improvement of the language. Among these, the translation of *Florus* by Coeffeteau was reckoned a masterpiece of French style; and Vaugelas refers more frequently to this than to any other book. The French were very strong in translations from the classical writers; and to this they are certainly much indebted for the purity and correctness which they reached in their own language. These translators, however, could only occupy a secondary place. Balzac himself is hardly read. "The polite world," it was said a hundred years since, "knows nothing now of these works, which were once its delight."² But his writings are not formed to delight those who wish either to be merry or wise, to laugh or to learn; yet he has real merits, besides those which may be deemed relative to the age in which he came. His language is polished, his sentiments are just, but sometimes common,

Balzac.

Character
of his writ-
ings.

¹ The same writer fixes on this as an epoch, and it was generally admitted in the seventeenth century. The editor of Balzac's Works in 1835 says, after speaking of the unformed state of the French language, full of provincial idioms and incorrect phrases: "M. de Balzac est venu en ce temps de confusion et de désordre, où toutes les lectures qu'il faisoit et toutes les actions qu'il entendoit lui devoient être suspectes, où il avoit à se défier de tous les maîtres et de tous les exemples; et où il ne pouvoit arriver à son but qu'en s'éloignant de tous les chemins battus, ni marcher dans la bonne route qu'après se l'être ouverte à lui-même. Il l'a ouverte en effet, et pour lui et pour les autres; il y a fait entrer un grand nombre d'heureux génies, dont il étoit le guide et le modèle; et si la France voit aujourd'hui que ses écrivains sont plus polis et plus réguliers que ceux d'Espagne et d'Italie, il faut qu'elle en rende l'honneur à ce grand homme, dont la mémoire lui doit être en vénération. . . . La même obligation que nous avons à M. de Malherbe pour la poésie, nous l'avons à M. de Balzac pour la prose; il lui a prescrit des bornes et des règles; il lui a donné de la douceur et de la force, il a montré que l'éloquence doit avoir des accords, aussi-bien que la musique, et il a su mêler si adroitement cette diversité de sons et de cadences, qu'il n'est point de plus délicieux concert que celui de ses paroles. C'est en plaçant

tous les mots avec tant d'ordre et de justesse qu'il ne laisse rien de moi ni de faible dans son discours," &c. This regard to the cadence of his periods is characteristic of Balzac. It has not, in general, been much practised in France, notwithstanding some splendid exceptions, especially in Boesuet. Olivet observes, that it was the peculiar glory of Balzac to have shown the capacity of the language for this rhythm. *Hist. de l'Acad. Française*, p. 84. But has not Du Vair some claim also? Neufchâteau gives a much more limited eulogy of Balzac. "Il avoit pris à la lettre les réflexions de Du Vair sur la trop grande bassesse de notre éloquence. Il s'en forma une haute idée; mais il se trompe d'abord dans l'application, car il porta dans le style épistolaire qui doit être familier et léger, l'enflure hyperbolique, la pompe, et le nombre, qui ne convient qu'aux grandes déclamations et aux harangues oratoires. . . . Ce défaut de Balzac contribua peut-être à son succès; car le goût n'étoit pas formé; mais il se corrigea dans la suite, et en parcourant son recueil on s'aperçoit des progrès sensibles qu'il faisoit avec l'âge. Ce recueil si précieux pour l'histoire de notre littérature a eu long temps une vogue extraordinaire. Nos plus grands auteurs l'avoient bien étudié. Molière lui a emprunté quelques idées."

² Goulet, l. 423.

the cadence of his periods is harmonious, but too artificial and uniform: on the whole, he approaches to the tone of a languid sermon, and leaves a tendency to yawn. But, in his time, superficial truths were not so much proscribed as at present: the same want of depth belongs to almost all the moralists in Italian and in modern Latin. Balzac is a moralist with a pure heart, and a love of truth and virtue (somewhat alloyed by the spirit of flattery towards persons, however he may declaim about courts and courtiers in general), a competent erudition, and a good deal of observation of the world. In his *Aristippe*, addressed to Christina, and consequently a late work, he deals much in political precepts and remarks, some of which might be read with advantage. But he was accused of borrowing his thoughts from the ancients, which the author of an *Apology for Balzac* seems not wholly to deny. This apology indeed had been produced by a book on the Conformity of the eloquence of M. Balzac with that of the ancients.

17. The letters of Balzac are in twenty-seven books: they begin in 1620, and end about 1653; the first portion having appeared in 1625. "He passed all his life," ^{His letters.} says Vigneul-Marville, "in writing letters, without ever catching the right characteristics of that style."¹ This demands a peculiar ease and naturalness of expression, for want of which they seem no genuine exponents of friendship or gallantry, and hardly of polite manners. His wit was not free from pedantry, and did not come from him spontaneously. Hence he was little fitted to address ladies, even the Rambouillets; and indeed he had acquired so labored and artificial a way of writing letters, that even those to his sister, though affectionate, smell too much of the lamp. His advocates admit, that they are to be judged rather by the rules of oratorical than epistolary composition.

18. In the moral dissertations, such as that entitled the *Prince*, this elaborate manner is, of course, not less discernible, but not so unpleasant or out of place. Balzac has been called the father of the French language, the master and model of the great men who have followed him. But it is confessed by all, that he wanted the fine taste to regulate his

¹ *Mélanges de Littérature*, vol. i. p. 126. He adds, however, that Balzac had "un talent particulier pour embellir notre langue." The writer whom I quote under

the name of Vigneul-Marville, which he assumed, was D'Argonne, a Benedictine of Rouen.

style according to the subject. Hence he is pompous and inflated upon military matters, and in a manner so quick to seize the allusion in his own and all his sentences and poetry if it be not the language of eloquence which we know had been sufficient to seduce him from the seriousness of those who have had more power to seduce. The seriousness, however, of Racine is less offensive and extravagant than the affected intensity of language which distinguishes the style of the present age in both sides of the Channel, and which is in fact a much worse modification of the same fault.

19. A contemporary and rival of Racine, though very unlike him in most respects, was Voiture. Each one and the other were received with friendship and admiration in a select society of Paris the first which on this side of the Alps united the aristocracy of rank and of genius in the circle that of the Hôtel Rambouillet. Catherine de Vivonne, widow of the Marquis de Rambouillet, was the owner of this mansion. It was frequented, during the long period of her life, by all that was distinguished in France, by Richelieu and Condé, as much as by Corneille, and a long list of noble men of letters. The heiress of this family, Julie d'Angennes, beautiful and highly accomplished, became the central star of so bright a galaxy. The love of intellectual attainments, both in mother and daughter, the sympathy and friendship they felt for those who displayed them, as well as their moral worth, must render their names respectable; but these were in some measure sullied by false taste, and what we may consider an habitual affectation even in their conduct. We can scarcely give another name to the caprice of Julia, who, in the fashion of romance, compelled the Duke of Montausier to carry on a twelve years' courtship, and only married him in the decline of her beauty. This patient lover, himself one of the most remarkable men in the court of Louis XIV., had, many years before, in 1633, presented her with what has been called the Garland of Julia, a collection to which the poets and wits of Paris had contributed. Every flower, represented in a drawing, had its appropriate little poem; and all conspired to the praise of Julia.¹

20. Voiture is chiefly known by his letters: his other writings at least are inferior. These begin about 1627, and are

¹ [Two copies were made of the *Guirlande de Julie*; but, in the usual style of the *Rambouillet*, no one was admitted to see either, but as a remarkable favor Huot, who tells us this, was one. Huotiana, p. 104. — 1842.]

addressed to Madame de Rambouillet and to several other persons of both sexes. Though much too labored and affected, they are evidently the original type of the French epistolary school, including those in England who have formed themselves upon it. Pope very frequently imitated Voiture; Walpole not so much in his general correspondence, but he knew how to fall into it. The object was to say what meant little, with the utmost novelty in the mode, and with the most ingenious compliment to the person addressed; so that he should admire himself and admire the writer. They are, of course, very tiresome after a short time; yet their ingenuity is not without merit. Balzac is more solemn and dignified, and it must be owned that he has more meaning. Voiture seems to have fancied that good sense spoils a man of wit. But he has not so much wit as *esprit*; and his letters serve to exemplify the meaning of that word. Pope, in addressing ladies, was nearly the ape of Voiture. It was unfortunately thought necessary, in such a correspondence, either to affect despairing love, which was to express itself with all possible gayety, or, where love was too presumptuous, as with the Rambouillets, to pour out a torrent of nonsensical flattery, which was to be rendered tolerable by far-fetched turns of thought. Voiture has the honor of having rendered this style fashionable. But, if the bad taste of others had not perverted his own, Voiture would have been a good writer. His letters, especially those written from Spain, are sometimes truly witty, and always vivacious. Voltaire, who speaks contemptuously of Voiture, might have been glad to have been the author of some of his *jeux d'esprit*; that, for example, addressed to the Prince of Condé in the character of a pike, founded on a game where the prince had played that fish. We should remember, also, that Voiture held his place in good society upon the tacit condition that he should always strive to be witty.¹

21. But the Hôtel Rambouillet, with its false theories of taste derived in a great measure from the romances of Scudery and Calprenède, and encouraged by the agreeably artificial manner of Voiture, would have produced, in all pro-

¹ Nothing, says Olivet, could be more opposite than Balzac and Voiture. "L'un se portoit toujours au sublime, l'autre toujours au délicat. L'un avoit une imagination élevée qui jetoit de la noblesse dans les moindres choses; l'autre, une imagination enjouée, qui faisoit prendre à toutes ses pensées un air de galanterie. L'un, même lorsqu'il vouloit plaisanter, étoit toujours grave; l'autre, dans les occasions même sérieuses, trouvoit à rire." Hist. de l'Académie, p. 88.

bability, but a transient effect. A far more important event was the establishment of the French Academy. France was ruled by a great minister, who loved her glory and his own. This, indeed, has been common to many statesmen; but it was a more peculiar honor to Richelieu, that he felt the dignity which letters conferred on a nation. He was himself not deficient in literary taste: his epistolary style is manly, and not without elegance: he wrote theology in his own name, and history in that of Mezeray; but, what is most to the present purpose, his remarkable fondness for the theatre led him not only to invent subjects for other poets, but, as it has been believed, to compose one forgotten tragi-comedy, *Mirame*, without assistance.¹ He availed himself, fortunately, of an opportunity which almost every statesman would have disregarded, to found the most illustrious institution in the annals of polite literature.

22. The French Academy sprang from a private society of men of letters at Paris, who, about the year 1629, agreed to meet once a week, as at an ordinary visit, conversing on all subjects, and especially on literature. Such among them as were authors communicated their works, and had the advantage of free and fair criticism. This continued for three or four years with such harmony and mutual satisfaction, that the old men, who remembered this period, says their historian, Pelisson, looked back upon it as a golden age. They were but nine in number, of whom Gombauld and Chapelain are the only names by any means famous; and their meetings were at first very private. More by degrees were added, among others Boisrobert, a favorite of Richelieu, who liked to hear from him the news of the town. The Cardinal, pleased with the account of this society, suggested their public establishment. This, it is said, was displeasing to every one of them, and some proposed to refuse it: but the consideration, that the offers of such a man were not to be slighted, overpowered their modesty; and they consented to become a royal institution. They now enlarged their numbers, created officers, and began to keep registers of their proceedings. These records commence on March 13, 1634, and are the basis of Pelisson's history. The name of French Academy was chosen after some deliberation. They were established by letters patent in January, 1635, which the Parliament of Paris

¹ Fontenelle, *Hist. du Théâtre*, p. 96.

enregistered with great reluctance, requiring not only a letter from Richelieu, but an express order from the king; and when this was completed in July, 1637, it was with a singular proviso, that the Academy should meddle with nothing but the embellishment and improvement of the French language, and such books as might be written by themselves, or by others who should desire their interference. This learned body of lawyers had some jealousy of the innovations of Richelieu; and one of them said it reminded him of the satire of Juvenal, where the senate, after ceasing to bear its part in public affairs, was consulted about the sauce for a turbot.¹

23. The professed object of the Academy was to purify the language from vulgar, technical, or ignorant usages, and to establish a fixed standard. The Academicians undertook to guard scrupulously the correctness of their own works, examining the arguments, the method, the style, the structure of each particular word. It was proposed by one that they should swear not to use any word which had been rejected by a plurality of votes. They soon began to labor in their vocation, always bringing words to the test of good usage, and deciding accordingly. These decisions are recorded in their registers. Their number was fixed by the letters patent at forty, having a director, chancellor, and secretary; the two former changed every two, afterwards every three months, the last chosen for life. They read discourses weekly, which, by the titles of some that Pelisson has given us, seem rather trifling and in the style of the Italian academies; but this practice was soon disused. Their more important and ambitious occupations were to compile a dictionary and a grammar: Chapelain drew up the scheme of the former, in which it was determined, for the sake of brevity, to give no quotations, but to form it from about twenty-six good authors in prose, and twenty in verse. Vaugelas was intrusted with the chief direction of this work.

24. The Academy was subjected, in its very infancy, to a severe trial of that literary integrity without which such an institution can only escape from being pernicious to the republic of letters by becoming too despicable and odious to produce mischief. On the appearance of the *Cid*, Richelieu, who had taken up a strong prejudice against it, insisted that the Academy should publish their

Its objects and constitution.

It publishes a critique on the Cid.

¹ Pelisson, *Hist. de l'Académie Française*.

opinion on this play. The more prudent part of that body were very loath to declare themselves at so early a period of their own existence: but the Cardinal was not apt to take excuses; and a committee of three was appointed to examine the *Cid* itself, and the observations upon it which Scudery had already published. Five months elapsed before the *Sentimens de l'Académie Française sur la Tragédie du Cid* were made public in November, 1637.¹ These are expressed with much respect for Corneille, and profess to be drawn up with his assent, as well as at the instance of Scudery. It has been not uncommon to treat this criticism as a servile homage to power. But a perusal of it will not lead us to confirm so severe a reproach. The *Sentimens de l'Académie* are drawn up with great good sense and dignity. The spirit, indeed, of critical orthodoxy is apparent; yet this was surely pardonable in an age when the violation of rules had as yet produced nothing but such pieces as those of Hardy. It is easy to sneer at Aristotle when we have a Shakspeare; but Aristotle formed his rules on the practice of Sophocles. The Academy could not have done better than by inculcating the soundest maxims of criticism; but they were a little too narrow in their application. The particular judgments which they pass on each scene of the play, as well as those on the style, seem for the most part very just, and such as later critics have generally adopted; so that we can really see little ground for the allegation of undue compliance with the Cardinal's prejudices, except in the frigid tone of their praise, and in their omission to proclaim that a great dramatic genius had arisen in France.² But this is so much the common vice or blindness of critics, that it may have sprung less from baseness than from a fear to compromise their own superiority by vulgar admiration. The Academy had great pretensions, and Corneille was not yet the Corneille of France and of the world.

¹ Pellisson. The printed edition bears the date of 1638.

² They conclude by saying, that, in spite of the faults of this play, "la naïveté et la véhémence de ses passions, la force et la délicatesse de plusieurs de ses pensées, et cet agrément inexplicable qui se mêle dans tous ses défauts lui ont acquis un rang considérable entre les poèmes Français de ce genre qui ont le plus donné de satisfaction. Et l'auteur ne doit pas toute sa réputation à son mérite, il ne la

doit pas toute à son bonheur, et la nature lui a été assez libérale pour excuser la fortune si elle lui a été prodigieuse."

The Academy, justly, in my opinion, blames Corneille for making Chimène consent to marry Rodrigue the same day that he had killed her father. "Cela surpasse tout sorte de créance, et ne peut vraisemblablement tomber dans l'âme non seulement d'une sage fille, mais d'une qui servit le plus dépouillée d'honneur et d'humanité," &c. — p. 49.

25. Gibert, Goujet, and other writers enumerate several works on the grammar of the French language in this period. But they were superseded; and we may almost say, that an era was made in the national literature, by the publication of Vaugelas, *Remarques sur la Langue Française*, in 1649. Vaugelas' remarks on the French language. Thomas Corneille, who, as well as Patru, published notes on Vaugelas, observes that the language has only been written with politeness since the appearance of these remarks. They were not at first received with general approbation, and some even in later times thought them too scrupulous; but they gradually became of established authority. Vaugelas is always clear, modest, and ingenuous in stating his opinion. His remarks are 547 in number; no gross fault being noticed, nor any one which is not found in good authors. He seldom mentions those whom he censures. His test of correct language is the manner of speaking in use with the best part (*la plus saine partie*) of the court, conformably with the manner of writing in the best part of contemporary authors. But though we must have recourse to good authors in order to establish an indisputably good usage, yet the court, he thinks, contributes incomparably more than books; the consent of the latter being as it were the seal and confirmation of what is spoken at court, and deciding what is there doubtful. And those who study the best authors get rid of many faults common at court, and acquire a peculiar purity of style. None, however, can dispense with a knowledge of what is reckoned good language at court; since much that is spoken there will hardly be found in books. In writing, it is otherwise; and he admits that the study of good authors will enable us to write well, though we shall write still better by knowing how to speak well. Vaugelas tells us, that his knowledge was acquired by long practice at court, and by the conversation of Cardinal Perron and of Coeffeteau.

26. La Mothe le Vayer, in his *Considérations sur l'Eloquence Française*, 1647, has endeavored to steer a middle course between the old and the new schools of French style, but with a marked desire to withstand the latter. He blames Du Vair for the strange and barbarous words he employs. He laughs also at the nicety of those who were beginning to object to a number of common French words. One would not use the conjunction *Car*; against

THE ... OF ...

THE ... OF ...

¹ This was Gambetta. In whose ... a discovery which does not honor to the ... person who took the pains to make it. ... that this word only occurs three times;

praise what has struck me in the substance of his pleadings ; which, whether read at this day in France or not, are, I may venture to say, worthy to be studied by lawyers, like those to which I have compared them, the strictly forensic portion of Greek oratory. In some speeches of Patru which are more generally praised,—that on his own reception in the Academy, and one complimentary to Christina,—it has seemed to me that he falls very short of his judicial style : the ornaments are commonplace, and such as belong to the panegyric department of oratory ; in all ages less important and valuable than the other two. It should be added, that Patru was not only one of the purest writers, but one of the best critics whom France possessed.¹

28. The forensic speeches of Le Maistre are more eloquent, in a popular sense of the word, more ardent, And of Le more imaginative, than those of Patru. The one Maistre. addresses the judges alone : the other has a view to the audience. The one seeks the success of his cause alone ; the other, that and his own glory together. The one will be more prized by the lovers of legal reasoning ; the other, by the majority of mankind. The one more reminds us of the orations of Demosthenes for his private clients, the other of those of Cicero. Le Maistre is fervid and brilliant,—he hurries us with him ; in all his pleadings, warmth is his first characteristic, and a certain elegance is the second. In the power of statement, I do not perceive that he is inferior to Patru : both are excellent. Wherever great moral or social topics, or extensive views of history and human nature, can be employed, Le Maistre has the advantage. Both are concise, relatively to the common verbosity of the bar ; but Le Maistre has much more that might be retrenched,—not that it is redundant in expression, but unnecessary in substance. This is owing to his ambitious display of general erudition : his quotations are too frequent and too ornamental, partly drawn from the ancients, but more from the fathers. Ambrose, in fact, Jerome and Augustin, Chrysostom, Basil and Gregory, were the models whom the writers of this age were accustomed to study ; and hence they are often, and Le Maistre among the rest, too apt to declaim where they should prove, and to use

¹ Perrault says of Patru, in his *Hommes illustres de France*, vol. ii. p. 66 : “ Ses plaidoyers servent encore aujourd’hui de modèle pour écrire correctement en notre langue.” Yet they were not much above thirty years old,—so much had the language changed, as to rules of writing, within that time.

¹ In Pratt's edition of Bishop Hall's works, we have a glossary of unusual words employed by him. They amount to more than eleven hundred, the greater part being of Latin or Greek origin: some are Gallicisms.

of the most famous, and who may, in a certain degree, be deemed to modify this censure.

30. I will begin with a passage of very considerable beauty, which is here out of its place, since it was written in Earl of Essex. the year 1598. It is found in the Apology for the Earl of Essex. Earl of Essex, published among the works of Lord Bacon, and passing, I suppose, commonly for his. It seems nevertheless, in my judgment, far more probably genuine. We have nowhere in our early writers a flow of words so easy and graceful, a structure so harmonious, a series of antitheses so spirited without affectation, an absence of quaintness, pedantry, and vulgarity so truly gentlemanlike, a paragraph so worthy of the most brilliant man of his age. This could not have come from Bacon, who never divested himself of a certain didactic formality, even if he could have counterfeited that chivalrous generosity which it was not in his nature to feel. It is the language of a soldier's heart, with the unstudied grace of a noble courtier.¹

31. Knolles, already known by a spirited translation of Bodin's Commonwealth, published in 1610 a copious Knolles's History of the Turks. History of the Turks, bringing down his narrative to the most recent times. Johnson, in a paper of the Rambler, has given him the superiority over all English

¹ "A word for my friendship with the chief men of action, and favor generally to the men of war; and then I come to their main objection, which is my crossing of the treaty in hand. For most of them that are accounted the chief men of action, I do confess, I do entirely love them. They have been my companions both abroad and at home; some of them began the wars with me, most have had place under me, and many have had me a witness of their rising from captains, lieutenants, and private men to those charges which since by their virtue they have obtained. Now that I have tried them, I would choose them for friends, if I had them not: before I had tried them, God by his providence chose them for me. I love them for mine own sake; for I find sweetness in their conversation, strong assistance in their employments with me, and happiness in their friendship. I love them for their virtues' sake, and for their greatness of mind (for little minds, though never so full of virtue, can be but a little virtuous), and for their great understanding; for to understand little things, or things not of use, is little better than to understand nothing at all. I love them for their affections: for self-loving men

love ease, pleasure, and profit; but they that love pains, danger, and fame, show that they love public profit more than themselves. I love them for my country's sake; for they are England's best armor of defence, and weapons of offence. If we may have peace, they have purchased it; if we must have war, they must manage it. Yet, while we are doubtful and in treaty, we must value ourselves by what may be done, and the enemy will value us by what hath been done by our chief men of action.

"That generally I am affected to the men of war, it should not seem strange to any reasonable man. Every man doth love them of his own profession. The grave judges favor the students of the law; the reverend bishops, the laborers in the ministry; and I (since her Majesty hath yearly used my service in her late actions) must reckon myself in the number of her men of war. Before action, Providence makes me cherish them for what they can do; in action, necessity makes me value them for the service they do; and after action, experience and thankfulness make me love them for the service they have done."

¹ Rambler, No. 122.

phrase effective: but he is exempt from the usual blemishes of his age; and his command of the language is so extensive, that we should not err in placing him among the first of our elder writers. Comparing, as a specimen of Knolles's manner, his description of the execution of Mustapha, son of Solyman, with that given by Robertson, where the latter historian has been as circumstantial as his limits would permit, we shall perceive that the former paints better his story, and deepens better its interest.¹

32. Raleigh's History of the World is a proof of the respect for laborious learning that had long distinguished Europe. We should expect from the prison-hours of a soldier, a courtier, a busy intriguer in state affairs, a poet and man of genius, something well worth our notice; but hardly a prolix history of the ancient world, hardly disquisitions on the site of Paradise and the travels of Cain. These are probably translated, with little alteration, from some of the learned writings of the Continent: they are by much the least valuable portion of Raleigh's work. The Greek and Roman story is told more fully and exactly than by any earlier English author, and with a plain eloquence which has given this book a classical reputation in our language, though from its length, and the want of that critical sifting of facts which we now justly demand, it is not greatly read. Raleigh has intermingled political reflections, and illustrated his history by episodes from modern times, which perhaps are now the most interesting passages. It descends only to the second Macedonian War: the continuation might have been more generally valuable; but either the death of Prince Henry, as Raleigh himself tells us, or the new schemes of ambition which unfortunately opened upon his eyes, prevented the execution of the large plan he had formed. There is little now obsolete in the words of Raleigh, nor, to any great degree, in his turn of phrase; the periods, when pains have been taken with them, show that artificial structure which we find in Sidney and Hooker; he is less pedantic than most of his contemporaries, seldom low, never affected.

Raleigh's
History of
the World.

¹ Knolles, p. 515. Robertson's Charles observed, that I might have mentioned the Fifth, book xl. [The principal authority for this description appears to be Busbequius in a former volume among the good Latin writers of the sixteenth century. — 1842.] Busbequius, in his excellent Legationis Turcicæ Epistolæ. It has been justly

bability, but a transient effect. A far more important event was the establishment of the French Academy. France was ruled by a great minister, who loved her glory and his own. This, indeed, has been common to many statesmen ; but it was a more peculiar honor to Richelieu, that he felt the dignity which letters conferred on a nation. He was himself not deficient in literary taste : his epistolary style is manly, and not without elegance : he wrote theology in his own name, and history in that of Mezeray ; but, what is most to the present purpose, his remarkable fondness for the theatre led him not only to invent subjects for other poets, but, as it has been believed, to compose one forgotten tragi-comedy, *Mirame*, without assistance.¹ He availed himself, fortunately, of an opportunity which almost every statesman would have disregarded, to found the most illustrious institution in the annals of polite literature.

22. The French Academy sprang from a private society of men of letters at Paris, who, about the year 1629, agreed to meet once a week, as at an ordinary visit, conversing on all subjects, and especially on literature. Such among them as were authors communicated their works, and had the advantage of free and fair criticism. This continued for three or four years with such harmony and mutual satisfaction, that the old men, who remembered this period, says their historian, Pelisson, looked back upon it as a golden age. They were but nine in number, of whom Gombauld and Chapelain are the only names by any means famous ; and their meetings were at first very private. More by degrees were added, among others Boisrobert, a favorite of Richelieu, who liked to hear from him the news of the town. The Cardinal, pleased with the account of this society, suggested their public establishment. This, it is said, was displeasing to every one of them, and some proposed to refuse it : but the consideration, that the offers of such a man were not to be slighted, overpowered their modesty ; and they consented to become a royal institution. They now enlarged their numbers, created officers, and began to keep registers of their proceedings. These records commence on March 13, 1634, and are the basis of Pelisson's history. The name of French Academy was chosen after some deliberation. They were established by letters patent in January, 1635, which the Parliament of Paris

¹ Fontenelle, *Hist. du Théâtre*, p. 96.

enregistered with great reluctance, requiring not only a letter from Richelieu, but an express order from the king; and when this was completed in July, 1637, it was with a singular proviso, that the Academy should meddle with nothing but the embellishment and improvement of the French language, and such books as might be written by themselves, or by others who should desire their interference. This learned body of lawyers had some jealousy of the innovations of Richelieu; and one of them said it reminded him of the satire of Juvenal, where the senate, after ceasing to bear its part in public affairs, was consulted about the sauce for a turbot.¹

23. The professed object of the Academy was to purify the language from vulgar, technical, or ignorant usages, and to establish a fixed standard. The Academicians undertook to guard scrupulously the correctness of their own works, examining the arguments, the method, the style, the structure of each particular word. It was proposed by one that they should swear not to use any word which had been rejected by a plurality of votes. They soon began to labor in their vocation, always bringing words to the test of good usage, and deciding accordingly. These decisions are recorded in their registers. Their number was fixed by the letters patent at forty, having a director, chancellor, and secretary; the two former changed every two, afterwards every three months, the last chosen for life. They read discourses weekly, which, by the titles of some that Pelisson has given us, seem rather trifling and in the style of the Italian academies; but this practice was soon disused. Their more important and ambitious occupations were to compile a dictionary and a grammar: Chapelain drew up the scheme of the former, in which it was determined, for the sake of brevity, to give no quotations, but to form it from about twenty-six good authors in prose, and twenty in verse. Vaugelas was intrusted with the chief direction of this work.

24. The Academy was subjected, in its very infancy, to a severe trial of that literary integrity without which such an institution can only escape from being pernicious to the republic of letters by becoming too despicable and odious to produce mischief. On the appearance of the Cid, Richelieu, who had taken up a strong prejudice against it, insisted that the Academy should publish their

*Its objects
and constitution.*

*It publishes
a critique
on the Cid.*

¹ Pelisson, *Hist. de l'Académie Française*.

opinion on this play. The more prudent part of that body were very loath to declare themselves at so early a period of their own existence: but the Cardinal was not apt to take excuses; and a committee of three was appointed to examine the *Cid* itself, and the observations upon it which Scudery had already published. Five months elapsed before the *Sentimens de l'Académie Française sur la Tragédie du Cid* were made public in November, 1637.¹ These are expressed with much respect for Corneille, and profess to be drawn up with his assent, as well as at the instance of Scudery. It has been not uncommon to treat this criticism as a servile homage to power. But a perusal of it will not lead us to confirm so severe a reproach. The *Sentimens de l'Académie* are drawn up with great good sense and dignity. The spirit, indeed, of critical orthodoxy is apparent; yet this was surely pardonable in an age when the violation of rules had as yet produced nothing but such pieces as those of Hardy. It is easy to sneer at Aristotle when we have a Shakspeare; but Aristotle formed his rules on the practice of Sophocles. The Academy could not have done better than by inculcating the soundest maxims of criticism; but they were a little too narrow in their application. The particular judgments which they pass on each scene of the play, as well as those on the style, seem for the most part very just, and such as later critics have generally adopted; so that we can really see little ground for the allegation of undue compliance with the Cardinal's prejudices, except in the frigid tone of their praise, and in their omission to proclaim that a great dramatic genius had arisen in France.² But this is so much the common vice or blindness of critics, that it may have sprung less from baseness than from a fear to compromise their own superiority by vulgar admiration. The Academy had great pretensions, and Corneille was not yet the Corneille of France and of the world.

¹ Pellisson. The printed edition bears the date of 1638.

² They conclude by saying, that, in spite of the faults of this play, "la naïveté et la véhémence de ses passions, la force et la délicatesse de plusieurs de ses pensées, et cet agrément inexplicable qui se mêle dans tous ses défauts lui ont acquis un rang considérable entre les poèmes Français de ce genre qui ont le plus donné de satisfaction. Si l'auteur ne doit pas toute sa réputation à son mérite, il ne la

doit pas toute à son bonheur, et la nature lui a été assez libérale pour excuser la fortune si elle lui a été prodigue."

The Academy, justly, in my opinion, blames Corneille for making Chimène consent to marry Rodrigue the same day that he had killed her father. "Cela surpasse tout sorte de créance, et ne peut vraisemblablement tomber dans l'âme non seulement d'une sage fille, mais d'une qui seroit le plus dépouillée d'honneur et d'humanité," &c. — p. 49.

25. Gibert, Goujet, and other writers enumerate several works on the grammar of the French language in this period. But they were superseded; and we may almost say, that an era was made in the national literature, by the publication of Vaugelas, *Remarques sur la Langue Française*, in 1649. Thomas Corneille, who, as well as Patru, published notes on Vaugelas, observes that the language has only been written with politeness since the appearance of these remarks. They were not at first received with general approbation, and some even in later times thought them too scrupulous; but they gradually became of established authority. Vaugelas is always clear, modest, and ingenuous in stating his opinion. His remarks are 547 in number; no gross fault being noticed, nor any one which is not found in good authors. He seldom mentions those whom he censures. His test of correct language is the manner of speaking in use with the best part (*la plus saine partie*) of the court, conformably with the manner of writing in the best part of contemporary authors. But though we must have recourse to good authors in order to establish an indisputably good usage, yet the court, he thinks, contributes incomparably more than books; the consent of the latter being as it were the seal and confirmation of what is spoken at court, and deciding what is there doubtful. And those who study the best authors get rid of many faults common at court, and acquire a peculiar purity of style. None, however, can dispense with a knowledge of what is reckoned good language at court; since much that is spoken there will hardly be found in books. In writing, it is otherwise; and he admits that the study of good authors will enable us to write well, though we shall write still better by knowing how to speak well. Vaugelas tells us, that his knowledge was acquired by long practice at court, and by the conversation of Cardinal Perron and of Coeffeteau.

26. La Mothe le Vayer, in his *Considérations sur l'Eloquence Française*, 1647, has endeavored to steer a middle course between the old and the new schools of French style, but with a marked desire to withstand the latter. He blames Du Vair for the strange and barbarous words he employs. He laughs also at the nicety of those who were beginning to object to a number of common French words. One would not use the conjunction *Car*; against

Vaugelas' remarks on the French language.

La Mothe le Vayer.

praise what has struck me in the substance of his pleadings ; which, whether read at this day in France or not, are, I may venture to say, worthy to be studied by lawyers, like those to which I have compared them, the strictly forensic portion of Greek oratory. In some speeches of Patru which are more generally praised,—that on his own reception in the Academy, and one complimentary to Christina,—it has seemed to me that he falls very short of his judicial style : the ornaments are commonplace, and such as belong to the panegyrical department of oratory ; in all ages less important and valuable than the other two. It should be added, that Patru was not only one of the purest writers, but one of the best critics whom France possessed.¹

28. The forensic speeches of Le Maistre are more eloquent, in a popular sense of the word, more ardent, ^{And of Le} more imaginative, than those of Patru. The one ^{Maistre.} addresses the judges alone : the other has a view to the audience. The one seeks the success of his cause alone ; the other, that and his own glory together. The one will be more prized by the lovers of legal reasoning ; the other, by the majority of mankind. The one more reminds us of the orations of Demosthenes for his private clients, the other of those of Cicero. Le Maistre is fervid and brilliant,—he hurries us with him ; in all his pleadings, warmth is his first characteristic, and a certain elegance is the second. In the power of statement, I do not perceive that he is inferior to Patru : both are excellent. Wherever great moral or social topics, or extensive views of history and human nature, can be employed, Le Maistre has the advantage. Both are concise, relatively to the common verbosity of the bar ; but Le Maistre has much more that might be retrenched,—not that it is redundant in expression, but unnecessary in substance. This is owing to his ambitious display of general erudition : his quotations are too frequent and too ornamental, partly drawn from the ancients, but more from the fathers. Ambrose, in fact, Jerome and Augustin, Chrysostom, Basil and Gregory, were the models whom the writers of this age were accustomed to study ; and hence they are often, and Le Maistre among the rest, too apt to declaim where they should prove, and to use

¹ Ferrault says of Patru, in his *Hommes Illustres de France*, vol. II. p. 66 : “ Ses plaidoyers servent encore aujourd’hui de modèle pour écrire correctement en notre langue.” Yet they were not much above thirty years old,—so much had the language changed, as to rules of writing, within that time.

arguments from analogy, rather striking to the common hearer, than likely to weigh much with a tribunal. He has less simplicity, less purity of taste, than Patru; his animated language would, in our courts, be frequently effective with a jury, but would seem too indefinite and commonplace to the judges: we should crowd to hear Le Maistre, we should be compelled to decide with Patru. They are both, however, very superior advocates, and do great honor to the French bar.

29. A sensible improvement in the general style of English writers had come on before the expiration of the sixteenth century; the rude and rough phrases, sometimes almost requiring a glossary, which lie as spots of rust on the pages of Latimer, Grafton, Aylmer, or even Ascham, had been chiefly polished away: if we meet in Sidney, Hooker, or the prose of Spenser, with obsolete expressions or forms, we find none that are in the least unintelligible, none that give us offence. But to this next period belong most of those whom we commonly reckon our old English writers; men often of such sterling worth for their sense, that we might read them with little regard to their language, yet, in some instances at least, possessing much that demands praise in this respect. They are generally nervous and effective, copious to redundancy in their command of words, apt to employ what seemed to them ornament with much imagination rather than judicious taste, yet seldom degenerating into commonplace and indefinite phraseology. They have, however, many defects; some of them, especially the most learned, are full of pedantry, and deform their pages by an excessive and preposterous mixture of Latinisms unknown before;¹ at other times, we are disgusted by colloquial and even vulgar idioms or proverbs; nor is it uncommon to find these opposite blemishes not only in the same author, but in the same passages. Their periods, except in a very few, are ill-constructed and tediously prolonged; their ears (again with some exceptions) seem to have been insensible to the beauty of rhythmical prose; grace is commonly wanting; and their notion of the artifices of style, when they thought at all about them, was not congenial to our own language. This may be deemed a general description of the English writers under James and Charles: we shall now proceed to mention some

¹ In Pratt's edition of Bishop Hall's works, we have a glossary of unusual words employed by him. They amount to more than eleven hundred, the greater part being of Latin or Greek origin: some are Gallicisms.

of the most famous, and who may, in a certain degree, be deemed to modify this censure.

30. I will begin with a passage of very considerable beauty, which is here out of its place, since it was written in ^{Earl of Essex.} the year 1598. It is found in the Apology for the Earl of Essex, published among the works of Lord Bacon, and passing, I suppose, commonly for his. It seems nevertheless, in my judgment, far more probably genuine. We have nowhere in our early writers a flow of words so easy and graceful, a structure so harmonious, a series of antitheses so spirited without affectation, an absence of quaintness, pedantry, and vulgarity so truly gentlemanlike, a paragraph so worthy of the most brilliant man of his age. This could not have come from Bacon, who never divested himself of a certain didactic formality, even if he could have counterfeited that chivalrous generosity which it was not in his nature to feel. It is the language of a soldier's heart, with the unstudied grace of a noble courtier.¹

31. Knolles, already known by a spirited translation of Bodin's Commonwealth, published in 1610 a copious ^{Knolles's History of the Turks.} History of the Turks, bringing down his narrative to the most recent times. Johnson, in a paper of the Rambler, has given him the superiority over all English

¹ "A word for my friendship with the chief men of action, and favor generally to the men of war; and then I come to their main objection, which is my crossing of the treaty in hand. For most of them that are accounted the chief men of action, I do confess, I do entirely love them. They have been my companions both abroad and at home; some of them began the wars with me, most have had place under me, and many have had me a witness of their rising from captains, lieutenants, and private men to those charges which since by their virtue they have obtained. Now that I have tried them, I would choose them for friends, if I had them not: before I had tried them, God by his providence chose them for me. I love them for mine own sake; for I find sweetness in their conversation, strong assistance in their employments with me, and happiness in their friendship. I love them for their virtues' sake, and for their greatness of mind (for little minds, though never so full of virtue, can be but a little virtuous), and for their great understanding; for to understand little things, or things not of use, is little better than to understand nothing at all. I love them for their affections: for self-loving men

love ease, pleasure, and profit; but they that love pains, danger, and fame, show that they love public profit more than themselves. I love them for my country's sake; for they are England's best armor of defence, and weapons of offence. If we may have peace, they have purchased it; if we must have war, they must manage it. Yet, while we are doubtful and in treaty, we must value ourselves by what may be done, and the enemy will value us by what hath been done by our chief men of action.

"That generally I am affected to the men of war, it should not seem strange to any reasonable man. Every man doth love them of his own profession. The grave judges favor the students of the law; the reverend bishops, the laborers in the ministry; and I (since her Majesty hath yearly used my service in her late actions) must reckon myself in the number of her men of war. Before action, Providence makes me cherish them for what they can do; in action, necessity makes me value them for the service they do; and after action, experience and thankfulness make me love them for the service they have done."

historians. "He has displayed all the excellences that narration can admit. His style, though somewhat obscured by time, and vitiated by false wit, is pure, nervous, elevated, and clear. . . . Nothing could have sunk this author into obscurity but the remoteness and barbarity of the people whose story he relates. It seldom happens that all circumstances concur to happiness or fame. The nation which produced this great historian has the grief of seeing his genius employed upon a foreign and uninteresting subject; and that writer who might have secured perpetuity to his name by a history of his own country, has exposed himself to the danger of oblivion, by recounting enterprises and revolutions of which none desire to be informed."¹ The subject, however, appeared to Knolles, and I know not how we can say erroneously, one of the most splendid that he could have selected. It was the rise and growth of a mighty nation, second only to Rome in the constancy of success, and in the magnitude of empire; a nation fierce and terrible in that age, the present scourge of half Christendom, and, though from our remoteness not very formidable to ourselves, still one of which not the bookish man in his closet or the statesman in council had alone heard, but the smith at his anvil, and the husbandman at his plough. A long decrepitude of the Turkish Empire on one hand, and our frequent alliance with it on the other, have since obliterated the apprehensions and interests of every kind which were awakened throughout Europe by its youthful fury and its mature strength. The subject was also new in England, yet rich in materials; various, in comparison with ordinary history, though not perhaps so fertile of philosophical observation as some others, and furnishing many occasions for the peculiar talents of Knolles. These were displayed, not in depth of thought, or copiousness of collateral erudition, but in a style and in a power of narration which Johnson has not too highly extolled. His descriptions are vivid and animated; circumstantial, but not to feebleness: his characters are drawn with a strong pencil. It is, indeed, difficult to estimate the merits of an historian very accurately without having before our eyes his original sources: he may probably have translated much that we admire, and he had shown that he knew how to translate. In the style of Knolles, there is sometimes, as Johnson has hinted, a slight excess of desire to make every

¹ Rambler, No. 122.

phrase effective: but he is exempt from the usual blemishes of his age; and his command of the language is so extensive, that we should not err in placing him among the first of our elder writers. Comparing, as a specimen of Knolles's manner, his description of the execution of Mustapha, son of Solyman, with that given by Robertson, where the latter historian has been as circumstantial as his limits would permit, we shall perceive that the former paints better his story, and deepens better its interest.¹

32. Raleigh's History of the World is a proof of the respect for laborious learning that had long distinguished Europe. We should expect from the prison-hours of a soldier, a courtier, a busy intriguer in state affairs, a poet and man of genius, something well worth our notice; but hardly a prolix history of the ancient world, hardly disquisitions on the site of Paradise and the travels of Cain. These are probably translated, with little alteration, from some of the learned writings of the Continent: they are by much the least valuable portion of Raleigh's work. The Greek and Roman story is told more fully and exactly than by any earlier English author, and with a plain eloquence which has given this book a classical reputation in our language, though from its length, and the want of that critical sifting of facts which we now justly demand, it is not greatly read. Raleigh has intermingled political reflections, and illustrated his history by episodes from modern times, which perhaps are now the most interesting passages. It descends only to the second Macedonian War: the continuation might have been more generally valuable; but either the death of Prince Henry, as Raleigh himself tells us, or the new schemes of ambition which unfortunately opened upon his eyes, prevented the execution of the large plan he had formed. There is little now obsolete in the words of Raleigh, nor, to any great degree, in his turn of phrase; the periods, when pains have been taken with them, show that artificial structure which we find in Sidney and Hooker; he is less pedantic than most of his contemporaries, seldom low, never affected.

¹ Knolles, p. 515. Robertson's Charles the Fifth, book xi. [The principal authority for this description appears to be Busbequius, in his excellent *Legationis Turcicæ Epistolæ*. It has been justly

observed, that I might have mentioned Busbequius in a former volume among the good Latin writers of the sixteenth century. — 1843.]

The style of Henry has an imperfection which we must admit from its origin. It has nearly indeed lost all its original character of simplicity and directness, and it has of secondary character, that the sentence itself has its own very direct and unobscured, as well as its meaning the representation of an individuality that distinguishes that type of thought. Bacon is elaborate, unobscured, more varied, more methodical; nothing could be more so; his sentences are generally striking and novel; his style is more precise, freer; yet there is some degree of ~~artificiality~~ ^{artificiality} in it, and in more language, he is inferior to *Keats*. The History of Henry VII. admirable as many passages are, seems to be written rather too ambitiously, and with too great an absence of simplicity.

35. The polemical writings of Milton, which chiefly fall within this period, contain several bursts of his splendid imagination and grandeur of soul. They ^{Milton.} are, however, much inferior to the *Areopagitica*, or *Plea for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing*. Many passages in this famous tract are admirably eloquent; an intense love of liberty and truth glows through it; the majestic soul of Milton breathes such high thoughts as had not been uttered before: yet even here he frequently sinks in a single instant, as is usual with our old writers, from his highest flights to the ground; his intermixture of familiar with learned phraseology is unpleasing, his structure is affectedly elaborate, and he seldom reaches any harmony. If he turns to invective, as sometimes in this treatise, and more in his *Apology for Smectymnus*, it is mere ribaldrous vulgarity blended with pedantry: his wit is always poor and without ease. An absence of idiomatic grace, and an use of harsh inversions violating the rules of the language, distinguish in general the writings of Milton, and require, in order to compensate them, such high beauties as will sometimes occur.

36. The *History of Clarendon* may be considered as belonging rather to this than to the second period of the ^{Clarendon.} century, both by the probable date of composition and by the nature of its style. He is excellent in every thing that he has performed with care; his characters are beautifully delineated; his sentiments have often a noble gravity, which the length of his periods, far too great in itself, seems to befit; but, in the general course of his narration, he is negligent of grammar and perspicuity, with little choice of words, and therefore sometimes idiomatic without ease or elegance. The official papers on the royal side, which are generally attributed to him, are written in a masculine and majestic tone, far superior to those of the parliament. The latter had, however, a writer who did them honor: May's *History of the Parliament* is a good model of genuine English; he is plain, terse, and vigorous, never slovenly, though with few remarkable passages, and is, in style as well as substance, a kind of contrast to Clarendon.

37. The famous *Icon Basilice*, ascribed to Charles I., may deserve a place in literary history. If we could ^{The Icon Basilice.} trust its panegyrist, few books in our language have done it more credit by dignity of sentiment, and beauty

of style. It can hardly be necessary for me to express my unhesitating conviction, that it was solely written by Bishop Gauden, who, after the Restoration, unequivocally claimed it as his own. The folly and impudence of such a claim, if it could not be substantiated, are not to be presumed as to any man of good understanding, fair character, and high station, without stronger evidence than has been alleged on the other side; especially when we find that those who had the best means of inquiry, at a time when it seems impossible that the falsehood of Gauden's assertion should not have been demonstrated, if it were false, acquiesced in his pretensions. We have very little to place against this, except secondary testimony; vague, for the most part, in itself, and collected by those whose veracity has not been put to the test like that of Gauden.¹ The style also of the *Icon Basilice* has been identified by Mr. Todd with that of Gauden by the use of several phrases so peculiar, that we can hardly conceive them to have suggested themselves to more than one person. It is, nevertheless, superior to his acknowledged writings. A strain of majestic melancholy is well kept up; but the personated sovereign is rather too theatrical for real nature, the language is too rhetorical and amplified, the periods too artificially elaborated. None but scholars and practised writers employ such a style as this.

38. Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* belongs, by its systematic divisions and its accumulated quotations, to the class of mere erudition: it seems at first sight like those tedious Latin folios into which scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries threw the materials of their *Adversaria*, or commonplace-books, painfully selected and arranged by the labor of many years. But writing fortunately in English, and in a style not by any means devoid of point and terseness, with much good sense and observation of men as well as of books, and having also

Burton's
Anatomy
of Melan-
choly.

¹ There is only one claimant, in a proper sense, for the *Icon Basilice*, which is Gauden himself: the king neither appears by himself nor representative. And, though we may find several instances of plagiarism in literary history (one of the grossest being the publication by a Spanish friar, under another title, of a book already in print with the name of Hyperius of Marburg, its real author), yet I cannot call to mind any, where a man known to the world has asserted in terms his own authorship of a book not written by himself, but universally ascribed to another, and which had never been in his possession. A story is told, and I believe truly, that a young man assumed the credit of Mackenzie's *Man of Feeling* while it was still anonymous. But this is widely different from the case of the *Icon Basilice*. We have had an interminable discussion as to the *Letters of Junius*; but no one has ever claimed this derelict property to himself, or told the world, "I am Junius."

the skill of choosing his quotations for their rareness, oddity, and amusing character, without losing sight of their pertinence to the subject, he has produced a work of which, as is well known, Johnson said that it was the only one which had ever caused him to leave his bed earlier than he had intended. Johnson, who seems to have had some turn for the singularities of learning which fill the *Anatomy of Melancholy*, may perhaps have raised the credit of Burton higher than his desert. He is clogged by excess of reading, like others of his age; and we may peruse entire chapters without finding more than a few lines that belong to himself. This becomes a wearisome style; and, for my own part, I have not found much pleasure in glancing over the *Anatomy of Melancholy*. It may be added, that he has been a collector of stories, far more strange than true, from those records of figments, the old medical writers of the sixteenth century, and other equally deceitful sources. Burton lived at Oxford, and his volumes are apparently a great sweeping of miscellaneous literature from the Bodleian Library.

39. John Earle, after the Restoration, Bishop of Worcester, and then of Salisbury, is author of *Microcosmographia*, or a Piece of the Worlde discovered in Earle's Characters. *Essays and Characters*, published anonymously in 1628. In some of these short characters, Earle is worthy of comparison with La Bruyère; in others, perhaps the greater part, he has contented himself with pictures of ordinary manners, such as the varieties of occupation, rather than of intrinsic character, supply. In all, however, we find an acute observation and a happy humor of expression. The chapter entitled the Sceptic is best known: it is witty, but an insult throughout on the honest searcher after truth, which could have come only from one that was content to take up his own opinions for ease or profit. Earle is always gay, and quick to catch the ridiculous, especially that of exterior appearances: his style is short, describing well with a few words, but with much of the affected quaintness of that age. It is one of those books which give us a picturesque idea of the manners of our fathers at a period now become remote; and for this reason, were there no other, it would deserve to be read.

40. But the *Microcosmography* is not an original work in its plan or mode of execution: it is a close imitation of the *Characters* of Sir Thomas Overbury. They both belong to

SECT. II.—ON FICTION.

Cervantes — French Romances — Calprenède — Scuderi — Latin and English Works of Fiction.

42. THE first part of *Don Quixote* was published in 1605. We have no reason, I believe, to suppose that it was written long before. It became immediately popular; and the admiration of the world raised up envious competitors, one of whom, *Avelleda*, published a continuation in a strain of invective against the author. Cervantes, who cannot be imagined to have ever designed the leaving his romance in so unfinished a state, took time about the second part, which did not appear till 1615.

43. *Don Quixote* is almost the only book in the Spanish language which can now be said to possess so much of an European reputation as to be popularly read in every country. It has, however, enjoyed enough to compensate for the neglect of the rest. It is to Europe in general what *Ariosto* is to Italy, and *Shakspeare* to England; the one book to which the slightest allusions may be made without affectation, but not missed without discredit. Numerous translations and countless editions of them, in every language, bespeak its adaptation to mankind: no critic has been paradoxical enough to withhold his admiration, no reader has ventured to confess a want of relish for that in which the young and old, in every climate, have, age after age, taken delight. They have doubtless believed, that they understood the author's meaning; and, in giving the reins to the gayety that his fertile invention and comic humor inspired, never thought of any deeper meaning than he announces, or delayed their enjoyment for any metaphysical investigation of his plan.

44. A new school of criticism, however, has of late years arisen in Germany, acute, ingenious, and sometimes eminently successful in philosophical, or, as they denominate it, æsthetic analysis of works of taste, but gliding too much into refinement and conjectural hypothesis, and with a tendency to mislead men of inferior capacities for this kind of investigation into mere paradox and absurdity. An instance is supplied, in my opinion, by some remarks of

[illegible]

³ *Littérature du Mex.*, vol. II, p. 209.

not accompanied by common sense, will seldom be very serviceable to ourselves or to others; that men who, ^{Probably} in their heroism and care for the oppressed, would ^{erroneous.} throw open the cages of lions, and set galley-slaves at liberty, not forgetting to break the limbs of harmless persons whom they mistake for wrong-doers, are a class of whom Don Quixote is the real type; and that, the world being much the worse for such heroes, it might not be immoral, notwithstanding their benevolent enthusiasm, to put them out of countenance by a little ridicule. This, however, is not, as I conceive, the primary aim of Cervantes; nor do I think that the exhibition of one great truth, as the predominant but concealed moral of a long work, is in the spirit of his age. He possessed a very thoughtful mind and a profound knowledge of humanity; yet the generalization which the hypothesis of Bouterwek and Sismondi requires for the leading conception of Don Quixote, besides its being a little inconsistent with the valorous and romantic character of its author, belongs to a more advanced period of philosophy than his own. It will at all events, I presume, be admitted, that we cannot reason about Don Quixote except from the book; and I think it may be shown in a few words, that these ingenious writers have been chiefly misled by some want of consistency which circumstances produced in the author's delineation of his hero.

47. In the first chapter of this romance, Cervantes, with a few strokes of a great master, sets before us the pauper gentleman, an early riser and keen sportsman, who, "when he was idle, which was most part of the year," gave himself up to reading books of chivalry till he lost his wits. The events that follow are in every one's recollection: his lunacy consists, no doubt, only in one idea; but this is so absorbing that it perverts the evidence of his senses, and predominates in all his language. It is to be observed, therefore, in relation to the nobleness of soul ascribed to Don Quixote, that every sentiment he utters is borrowed with a punctilious rigor from the romances of his library; he resorts to them on every occasion for precedents: if he is intrepidly brave, it is because his madness and vanity have made him believe himself unconquerable; if he bestows kingdoms, it is because Amadis would have done the same; if he is honorable, courteous, a redresser of wrongs, it is in pursuance of

Difference
between
the two
parts.

have a strange notion of the word); but the thoughtlessness of mankind, rather than their insensibility (for they do not connect madness with misery), furnishes some apology for the first two volumes. In proportion as we perceive, below the veil of mental delusion, a noble intellect, we feel a painful sympathy with its humiliation: the character becomes more complicated and interesting, but has less truth and naturalness; an objection which might also be made, comparatively speaking, to the incidents in the latter volumes, wherein I do not find the admirable probability that reigns through the former. But this contrast of wisdom and virtue with insanity in the same subject would have been repulsive in the primary delineation; as I think any one may judge, by supposing that Cervantes had, in the first chapter, drawn such a picture of Quixote as Bouterwek and Sismondi have drawn for him.

49. I must therefore venture to think, as, I believe, the world has generally thought for two centuries, that Cervantes had no more profound aim than he proposes to the reader. If the fashion of reading bad romances of chivalry perverted the taste of his contemporaries, and rendered their language ridiculous, it was natural that a zealous lover of good literature should expose this folly to the world by exaggerating its effects on a fictitious personage. It has been said by some modern writer, though I cannot remember by whom, that there was a *prose side* in the mind of Cervantes. There was indeed a side of calm strong sense, which some take for unpoetical. He thought the tone of those romances extravagant. It might naturally occur how absurd any one must appear who should attempt to realize in actual life the adventures of Amadis. Already a novelist, he perceived the opportunities this idea suggested. It was a necessary consequence that the hero must be represented as literally insane, since his conduct would have been extravagant beyond the probability of fiction on any other hypothesis; and from this happy conception germinated, in a very prolific mind, the whole history of Don Quixote. Its simplicity is perfect: no limit could be found save the author's discretion or sense that he had drawn sufficiently on his imagination; but the death of Quixote, which Cervantes has been said to have determined upon, lest some one else should a second time presume to continue the story, is in fact the only possible termination that could be given, after he had elevated the

arguments from analogy, rather striking to the common hearer, than likely to weigh much with a tribunal. He has less simplicity, less purity of taste, than Patru; his animated language would, in our courts, be frequently effective with a jury, but would seem too indefinite and commonplace to the judges: we should crowd to hear Le Maistre, we should be compelled to decide with Patru. They are both, however, very superior advocates, and do great honor to the French bar.

29. A sensible improvement in the general style of English writers had come on before the expiration of the sixteenth century; the rude and rough phrases, sometimes almost requiring a glossary, which lie as spots of rust on the pages of Latimer, Grafton, Aylmer, or even Ascham, had been chiefly polished away: if we meet in Sidney, Hooker, or the prose of Spenser, with obsolete expressions or forms, we find none that are in the least unintelligible, none that give us offence. But to this next period belong most of those whom we commonly reckon our old English writers; men often of such sterling worth for their sense, that we might read them with little regard to their language, yet, in some instances at least, possessing much that demands praise in this respect. They are generally nervous and effective, copious to redundancy in their command of words, apt to employ what seemed to them ornament with much imagination rather than judicious taste, yet seldom degenerating into commonplace and indefinite phraseology. They have, however, many defects; some of them, especially the most learned, are full of pedantry, and deform their pages by an excessive and preposterous mixture of Latinisms unknown before;¹ at other times, we are disgusted by colloquial and even vulgar idioms or proverbs; nor is it uncommon to find these opposite blemishes not only in the same author, but in the same passages. Their periods, except in a very few, are ill-constructed and tediously prolonged; their ears (again with some exceptions) seem to have been insensible to the beauty of rhythmical prose; grace is commonly wanting; and their notion of the artifices of style, when they thought at all about them, was not congenial to our own language. This may be deemed a general description of the English writers under James and Charles: we shall now proceed to mention some

¹ In Pratt's edition of Bishop Hall's works, we have a glossary of unusual words employed by him. They amount to more than eleven hundred, the greater part being of Latin or Greek origin: some are Gallicisms.

of the most famous, and who may, in a certain degree, be deemed to modify this censure.

30. I will begin with a passage of very considerable beauty, which is here out of its place, since it was written in Earl of Essex. the year 1598. It is found in the Apology for the Earl of Essex, published among the works of Lord Bacon, and passing, I suppose, commonly for his. It seems nevertheless, in my judgment, far more probably genuine. We have nowhere in our early writers a flow of words so easy and graceful, a structure so harmonious, a series of antitheses so spirited without affectation, an absence of quaintness, pedantry, and vulgarity so truly gentlemanlike, a paragraph so worthy of the most brilliant man of his age. This could not have come from Bacon, who never divested himself of a certain didactic formality, even if he could have counterfeited that chivalrous generosity which it was not in his nature to feel. It is the language of a soldier's heart, with the unstudied grace of a noble courtier.¹

31. Knolles, already known by a spirited translation of Bodin's Commonwealth, published in 1610 a copious Knolles's History of the Turks. History of the Turks, bringing down his narrative to the most recent times. Johnson, in a paper of the Rambler, has given him the superiority over all English

¹ "A word for my friendship with the chief men of action, and favor generally to the men of war; and then I come to their main objection, which is my crossing of the treaty in hand. For most of them that are accounted the chief men of action, I do confess, I do entirely love them. They have been my companions both abroad and at home; some of them began the wars with me, most have had place under me, and many have had me a witness of their rising from captains, lieutenants, and private men to those charges which since by their virtue they have obtained. Now that I have tried them, I would choose them for friends, if I had them not: before I had tried them, God by his providence chose them for me. I love them for mine own sake; for I find sweetness in their conversation, strong assistance in their employments with me, and happiness in their friendship. I love them for their virtues' sake, and for their greatness of mind (for little minds, though never so full of virtue, can be but a little virtuous), and for their great understanding; for to understand little things, or things not of use, is little better than to understand nothing at all. I love them for their affections: for self-loving men

love ease, pleasure, and profit; but they that love pains, danger, and fame, show that they love public profit more than themselves. I love them for my country's sake; for they are England's best armor of defence, and weapons of offence. If we may have peace, they have purchased it; if we must have war, they must manage it. Yet, while we are doubtful and in treaty, we must value ourselves by what may be done, and the enemy will value us by what hath been done by our chief men of action.

"That generally I am affected to the men of war, it should not seem strange to any reasonable man. Every man doth love them of his own profession. The grave judges favor the students of the law; the reverend bishops, the laborers in the ministry; and I (since her Majesty hath yearly used my service in her late actions) must reckon myself in the number of her men of war. Before action, Providence makes me cherish them for what they can do; in action, necessity makes me value them for the service they do; and after action, experience and thankfulness make me love them for the service they have done."

historians. "He has displayed all the excellences that narration can admit. His style, though somewhat obscured by time, and vitiated by false wit, is pure, nervous, elevated, and clear. . . . Nothing could have sunk this author into obscurity but the remoteness and barbarity of the people whose story he relates. It seldom happens that all circumstances concur to happiness or fame. The nation which produced this great historian has the grief of seeing his genius employed upon a foreign and uninteresting subject; and that writer who might have secured perpetuity to his name by a history of his own country, has exposed himself to the danger of oblivion, by recounting enterprises and revolutions of which none desire to be informed."¹ The subject, however, appeared to Knolles, and I know not how we can say erroneously, one of the most splendid that he could have selected. It was the rise and growth of a mighty nation, second only to Rome in the constancy of success, and in the magnitude of empire; a nation fierce and terrible in that age, the present scourge of half Christendom, and, though from our remoteness not very formidable to ourselves, still one of which not the bookish man in his closet or the statesman in council had alone heard, but the smith at his anvil, and the husbandman at his plough. A long decrepitude of the Turkish Empire on one hand, and our frequent alliance with it on the other, have since obliterated the apprehensions and interests of every kind which were awakened throughout Europe by its youthful fury and its mature strength. The subject was also new in England, yet rich in materials; various, in comparison with ordinary history, though not perhaps so fertile of philosophical observation as some others, and furnishing many occasions for the peculiar talents of Knolles. These were displayed, not in depth of thought, or copiousness of collateral erudition, but in a style and in a power of narration which Johnson has not too highly extolled. His descriptions are vivid and animated; circumstantial, but not to feebleness: his characters are drawn with a strong pencil. It is, indeed, difficult to estimate the merits of an historian very accurately without having before our eyes his original sources: he may probably have translated much that we admire, and he had shown that he knew how to translate. In the style of Knolles, there is sometimes, as Johnson has hinted, a slight excess of desire to make every

¹ Rambler, No. 122.

phrase effective: but he is exempt from the usual blemishes of his age; and his command of the language is so extensive, that we should not err in placing him among the first of our elder writers. Comparing, as a specimen of Knolles's manner, his description of the execution of Mustapha, son of Solyman, with that given by Robertson, where the latter historian has been as circumstantial as his limits would permit, we shall perceive that the former paints better his story, and deepens better its interest.¹

32. Raleigh's *History of the World* is a proof of the respect for laborious learning that had long distinguished Europe. We should expect from the prison-hours of a soldier, a courtier, a busy intriguer in state affairs, a poet and man of genius, something well worth our notice; but hardly a prolix history of the ancient world, hardly disquisitions on the site of Paradise and the travels of Cain. These are probably translated, with little alteration, from some of the learned writings of the Continent: they are by much the least valuable portion of Raleigh's work. The Greek and Roman story is told more fully and exactly than by any earlier English author, and with a plain eloquence which has given this book a classical reputation in our language, though from its length, and the want of that critical sifting of facts which we now justly demand, it is not greatly read. Raleigh has intermingled political reflections, and illustrated his history by episodes from modern times, which perhaps are now the most interesting passages. It descends only to the second Macedonian War: the continuation might have been more generally valuable; but either the death of Prince Henry, as Raleigh himself tells us, or the new schemes of ambition which unfortunately opened upon his eyes, prevented the execution of the large plan he had formed. There is little now obsolete in the words of Raleigh, nor, to any great degree, in his turn of phrase; the periods, when pains have been taken with them, show that artificial structure which we find in Sidney and Hooker; he is less pedantic than most of his contemporaries, seldom low, never affected.

Raleigh's
History of
the World.

¹ Knolles, p. 515. Robertson's Charles observed, that I might have mentioned the Fifth, book xi. [The principal authority for this description appears to be Busbequius, in his excellent *Legationis Turcicæ Epistolæ*. It has been justly Busbequius in a former volume among the good Latin writers of the sixteenth century.—1842.]

33. Daniel's History of England from the Conquest to the Reign of Edward III., published in 1618, is deserving of some attention on account of its language. Daniel's History of England. It is written with a freedom from all stiffness, and a purity of style, which hardly any other work of so early a date exhibits. These qualities are indeed so remarkable, that it would require a good deal of critical observation to distinguish it even from writings of the reign of Anne; and, where it differs from them (I speak only of the secondary class of works, which have not much individuality of manner), it is by a more select idiom, and by an absence of the Gallicism or vulgarity which are often found in that age. It is true that the merits of Daniel are chiefly negative; he is never pedantic or antithetical or low, as his contemporaries were apt to be: but his periods are ill-constructed; he has little vigor or elegance; and it is only by observing how much pains he must have taken to reject phrases which were growing obsolete, that we give him credit for having done more than follow the common stream of easy writing. A slight tinge of archaism, and a certain majesty of expression, relatively to colloquial usage, were thought by Bacon and Raleigh congenial to an elevated style: but Daniel, a gentleman of the king's household, wrote as the court spoke; and his facility would be pleasing if his sentences had a less negligent structure. As an historian, he has recourse only to common authorities; but his narration is fluent and perspicuous, with a regular vein of good sense, more the characteristic of his mind, both in verse and prose, than any commanding vigor.

34. The style of Bacon has an idiosyncrasy which we might expect from his genius. It can rarely indeed happen, and only in men of secondary talents, that the language they use is not by its very choice and collocation, as well as its meaning, the representative of an individuality that distinguishes their turn of thought. Bacon is elaborate, sententious, often witty, often metaphorical; nothing could be spared; his analogies are generally striking and novel; his style is clear, precise, forcible; yet there is some degree of stiffness about it, and, in mere language, he is inferior to Raleigh. The History of Henry VII., admirable as many passages are, seems to be written rather too ambitiously, and with too great an absence of simplicity.

35. The polemical writings of Milton, which chiefly fall within this period, contain several bursts of his splendid imagination and grandeur of soul. They are, however, much inferior to the *Areopagitica*, or *Plea for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing*. Many passages in this famous tract are admirably eloquent; an intense love of liberty and truth glows through it; the majestic soul of Milton breathes such high thoughts as had not been uttered before: yet even here he frequently sinks in a single instant, as is usual with our old writers, from his highest flights to the ground; his intermixture of familiar with learned phraseology is unpleasing, his structure is affectedly elaborate, and he seldom reaches any harmony. If he turns to invective, as sometimes in this treatise, and more in his *Apology for Smectymnuus*, it is mere ribaldrous vulgarity blended with pedantry: his wit is always poor and without ease. An absence of idiomatic grace, and an use of harsh inversions violating the rules of the language, distinguish in general the writings of Milton, and require, in order to compensate them, such high beauties as will sometimes occur.

36. The *History of Clarendon* may be considered as belonging rather to this than to the second period of the century, both by the probable date of composition and by the nature of its style. He is excellent in every thing that he has performed with care; his characters are beautifully delineated; his sentiments have often a noble gravity, which the length of his periods, far too great in itself, seems to befit; but, in the general course of his narration, he is negligent of grammar and perspicuity, with little choice of words, and therefore sometimes idiomatic without ease or elegance. The official papers on the royal side, which are generally attributed to him, are written in a masculine and majestic tone, far superior to those of the parliament. The latter had, however, a writer who did them honor: *May's History of the Parliament* is a good model of genuine English; he is plain, terse, and vigorous, never slovenly, though with few remarkable passages, and is, in style as well as substance, a kind of contrast to *Clarendon*.

37. The famous *Icon Basilice*, ascribed to Charles I., may deserve a place in literary history. If we could trust its panegyrist, few books in our language have done it more credit by dignity of sentiment, and beauty

of style. It can hardly be necessary for me to express my unhesitating conviction, that it was solely written by Bishop Gauden, who, after the Restoration, unequivocally claimed it as his own. The folly and impudence of such a claim, if it could not be substantiated, are not to be presumed as to any man of good understanding, fair character, and high station, without stronger evidence than has been alleged on the other side; especially when we find that those who had the best means of inquiry, at a time when it seems impossible that the falsehood of Gauden's assertion should not have been demonstrated, if it were false, acquiesced in his pretensions. We have very little to place against this, except secondary testimony; vague, for the most part, in itself, and collected by those whose veracity has not been put to the test like that of Gauden.¹ The style also of the Icon Basilice has been identified by Mr. Todd with that of Gauden by the use of several phrases so peculiar, that we can hardly conceive them to have suggested themselves to more than one person. It is, nevertheless, superior to his acknowledged writings. A strain of majestic melancholy is well kept up; but the personated sovereign is rather too theatrical for real nature, the language is too rhetorical and amplified, the periods too artificially elaborated. None but scholars and practised writers employ such a style as this.

38. Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy belongs, by its systematic divisions and its accumulated quotations, to the class of mere erudition: it seems at first sight like those tedious Latin folios into which scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries threw the materials of their Adversaria, or commonplace-books, painfully selected and arranged by the labor of many years. But writing fortunately in English, and in a style not by any means devoid of point and terseness, with much good sense and observation of men as well as of books, and having also

Burton's
Anatomy
of Melan-
choly.

¹ There is only one claimant, in a proper sense, for the Icon Basilice, which is Gauden himself: the king neither appears by himself nor representative. And, though we may find several instances of plagiarism in literary history (one of the grossest being the publication by a Spanish friar, under another title, of a book already in print with the name of Hyperius of Marburg, its real author), yet I cannot call to mind any, where a man known to the world has asserted in terms his own authorship of a book not written by himself, but universally ascribed to another, and which had never been in his possession. A story is told, and I believe truly, that a young man assumed the credit of Mackenzie's Man of Feeling while it was still anonymous. But this is widely different from the case of the Icon Basilice. We have had an interminable discussion as to the Letters of Junius; but no one has ever claimed this derelict property to himself, or told the world, "I am Junius."

the skill of choosing his quotations for their rareness, oddity, and amusing character, without losing sight of their pertinence to the subject, he has produced a work of which, as is well known, Johnson said that it was the only one which had ever caused him to leave his bed earlier than he had intended. Johnson, who seems to have had some turn for the singularities of learning which fill the *Anatomy of Melancholy*, may perhaps have raised the credit of Burton higher than his desert. He is clogged by excess of reading, like others of his age; and we may peruse entire chapters without finding more than a few lines that belong to himself. This becomes a wearisome style; and, for my own part, I have not found much pleasure in glancing over the *Anatomy of Melancholy*. It may be added, that he has been a collector of stories, far more strange than true, from those records of figments, the old medical writers of the sixteenth century, and other equally deceitful sources. Burton lived at Oxford, and his volumes are apparently a great sweeping of miscellaneous literature from the Bodleian Library.

39. John Earle, after the Restoration, Bishop of Worcester, and then of Salisbury, is author of *Microcosmographia*, or a Piece of the Worlde discovered in Earle's Characters. *Essays and Characters*, published anonymously in 1628. In some of these short characters, Earle is worthy of comparison with La Bruyère; in others, perhaps the greater part, he has contented himself with pictures of ordinary manners, such as the varieties of occupation, rather than of intrinsic character, supply. In all, however, we find an acute observation and a happy humor of expression. The chapter entitled the Sceptic is best known: it is witty, but an insult throughout on the honest searcher after truth, which could have come only from one that was content to take up his own opinions for ease or profit. Earle is always gay, and quick to catch the ridiculous, especially that of exterior appearances: his style is short, describing well with a few words, but with much of the affected quaintness of that age. It is one of those books which give us a picturesque idea of the manners of our fathers at a period now become remote; and for this reason, were there no other, it would deserve to be read.

40. But the *Microcosmography* is not an original work in its plan or mode of execution: it is a close imitation of the *Characters* of Sir Thomas Overbury. They both belong to

the favorite style of apothegm, in which every sentence is a point or a witticism. Yet the entire character so delineated produces a certain effect: it is a Dutch picture, a Gerard Dow, somewhat too elaborate. Earle has more natural humor than Overbury, and hits his mark more neatly; the other is more satirical, but often abusive and vulgar. The Fair and Happy Milkmaid, often quoted, is the best of his characters. The wit is often trivial and flat; the sentiments have nothing in them general, or worthy of much remembrance; praise is only due to the graphic skill in delineating character. Earle is as clearly the better, as Overbury is the more original, writer.

41. A book by Ben Jonson, entitled *Timber, or Discoveries*, varies made upon Men and Matter,¹ is altogether miscellaneous, the greater part being general moral remarks, while another portion deserves notice as the only book of English criticism in the first part of the seventeenth century. The observations are unconnected, judicious, sometimes witty, frequently severe. The style is what was called pregnant, leaving much to be filled up by the reader's reflection. Good sense, and a vigorous manner of grappling with every subject, will generally be found in Jonson; but he does not reach any very profound criticism. His *English Grammar* is said by Gifford to have been destroyed in the conflagration of his study. What we have, therefore, under that name, is, he thinks, to be considered as properly the materials of a more complete work that is lost. We have, as I apprehend, no earlier grammar upon so elaborate a plan: every rule is illustrated by examples, almost to redundancy; but he is too copious on what is common to other languages, and perhaps not full enough as to our peculiar idiom.

¹ ["*Timber*," I suppose, is meant as a ludicrous translation of *Syva*. — 1862.]

SECT. II. — ON FICTION.

Cervantes — French Romances — Calprenède — Scuderi — Latin and English Works of Fiction.

42. THE first part of *Don Quixote* was published in 1605. We have no reason, I believe, to suppose that it was written long before. It became immediately popular; and the admiration of the world raised up envious competitors, one of whom, *Avellanada*, published a continuation in a strain of invective against the author. Cervantes, who cannot be imagined to have ever designed the leaving his romance in so unfinished a state, took time about the second part, which did not appear till 1615.

43. *Don Quixote* is almost the only book in the Spanish language which can now be said to possess so much of an European reputation as to be popularly read in every country. It has, however, enjoyed enough to compensate for the neglect of the rest. It is to Europe in general what *Ariosto* is to Italy, and *Shakspeare* to England; the one book to which the slightest allusions may be made without affectation, but not missed without discredit. Numerous translations and countless editions of them, in every language, bespeak its adaptation to mankind: no critic has been paradoxical enough to withhold his admiration, no reader has ventured to confess a want of relish for that in which the young and old, in every climate, have, age after age, taken delight. They have doubtless believed, that they understood the author's meaning; and, in giving the reins to the gayety that his fertile invention and comic humor inspired, never thought of any deeper meaning than he announces, or delayed their enjoyment for any metaphysical investigation of his plan.

44. A new school of criticism, however, has of late years arisen in Germany, acute, ingenious, and sometimes eminently successful in philosophical, or, as they designate it, æsthetic analysis of works of taste, but gliding too much into refinement and conjectural hypothesis, and with a tendency to mislead men of inferior capacities for this kind of investigation into mere paradox and absurdity. An instance is supplied, in my opinion, by some remarks of

Bouterwek, still more explicitly developed by Sismondi, on the design of Cervantes in *Don Quixote*, and which have been repeated in other publications. According to these writers, the primary idea is that of a "man of elevated character, excited by heroic and enthusiastic feelings to the extravagant pitch of wishing to restore the age of chivalry; nor is it possible to form a more mistaken notion of this work than by considering it merely as a satire, intended by the author to ridicule the absurd passion for reading old romances."¹ "The fundamental idea of *Don Quixote*," says Sismondi, "is the eternal contrast between the spirit of poetry and that of prose. Men of an elevated soul propose to themselves as the object of life to be the defenders of the weak, the support of the oppressed, the champions of justice and innocence. Like *Don Quixote*, they find on every side the image of the virtues they worship: they believe that disinterestedness, nobleness, courage, in short, knight-errantry, are still prevalent; and, with no calculation of their own powers, they expose themselves for an ungrateful world, they offer themselves as a sacrifice to the laws and rules of an imaginary state of society."²

45. If this were a true representation of the scheme of *Don Quixote*, we cannot wonder that some persons should, as M. Sismondi tells us they do, consider it as the most melancholy book that has ever been written. They consider it also, no doubt, one of the most immoral, as chilling and pernicious in its influence on the social converse of mankind, as the Prince of Machiavel is on their political intercourse. "Cervantes," he proceeds, "has shown us in some measure the vanity of greatness of soul and the delusion of heroism. He has drawn in *Don Quixote* a perfect man (*un homme accompli*), who is, nevertheless, the constant object of ridicule. Brave beyond the fabled knights he imitates, disinterested, honorable, generous, the most faithful and respectful of lovers, the best of masters, the most accomplished and well educated of gentlemen, all his enterprises end in discomfiture to himself, and in mischief to others." M. Sismondi descants upon the perfections of the Knight of La Mancha with a gravity which it is not quite easy for his readers to preserve.

46. It might be answered by a phlegmatic observer, that a mere enthusiasm for doing good, if excited by vanity, and

¹ Bouterwek, p. 334.

² *Littérature du Midi*, vol. III. p. 339.

not accompanied by common sense, will seldom be very serviceable to ourselves or to others; that men who, in their heroism and care for the oppressed, would ^{Probably} throw open the cages of lions, and set galley-slaves at liberty, ^{erroneous.} not forgetting to break the limbs of harmless persons whom they mistake for wrong-doers, are a class of whom Don Quixote is the real type; and that, the world being much the worse for such heroes, it might not be immoral, notwithstanding their benevolent enthusiasm, to put them out of countenance by a little ridicule. This, however, is not, as I conceive, the primary aim of Cervantes; nor do I think that the exhibition of one great truth, as the predominant but concealed moral of a long work, is in the spirit of his age. He possessed a very thoughtful mind and a profound knowledge of humanity; yet the generalization which the hypothesis of Bouterwek and Sismondi requires for the leading conception of Don Quixote, besides its being a little inconsistent with the valorous and romantic character of its author, belongs to a more advanced period of philosophy than his own. It will at all events, I presume, be admitted, that we cannot reason about Don Quixote except from the book; and I think it may be shown in a few words, that these ingenious writers have been chiefly misled by some want of consistency which circumstances produced in the author's delineation of his hero.

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 production and efficiency in the face of
 the most severe economic conditions. This is
 due to a number of factors, including the
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 technical skill. This has enabled them to
 develop a wide range of products which
 are of high quality and which are
 well adapted to the needs of the market.
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1. See, vol. 1, p. 10.

52. France, in the sixteenth century, content with *Amadis de Gaul* and the numerous romances of the Spanish school, had contributed very little to that literature. French romances: *Astrée*. But now she had native writers of both kinds, the pastoral and heroic, who completely superseded the models they had before them. Their earliest essay was the *Astrée* of D'Urfé. Of this pastoral romance the first volume was published in 1610; the second, in 1620: three more came slowly forth, that the world might have due leisure to admire. It contains about 5,500 pages. It would be almost as discreditable to have read such a book through at present, as it was to be ignorant of it in the ages of Louis XIII. Allusions, however, to real circumstances served in some measure to lessen the insipidity of a love-story which seems to equal any in absurdity and want of interest. The style, and I can judge no farther, having read but a few pages, seems easy and not unpleasing: but the pastoral tone is insufferably puerile; and a monotonous solemnity makes us almost suspect, that one source of its popularity was its gentle effect when read in small portions before retiring to rest. It was, nevertheless, admired by men of erudition, like Camus and Huet; or even by men of the world, like Rochefoucault.¹

53. From the union of the old chivalrous romance with this newer style, the courtly pastoral, sprang another kind of fiction, the French heroic romance. Heroic romances. Gomberville. Three nearly contemporary writers, Gomberville, Calprenède, Scuderi, supplied a number of voluminous stories, frequently historical in some of their names, but utterly destitute of truth in circumstances, characters, and manners. Gomberville led the way in his *Polexandre*, first published in 1632, and reaching in later editions to about 6,000 pages. "This," says a modern writer, "seems to have been the model of the works of Calprenède and Scuderi. This ponderous work may be regarded as a sort of intermediate production between the later compositions and the ancient fables of chivalry. It has, indeed, a close affinity to the heroic romance; but many of the exploits of the hero are as extravagant as those of a paladin or knight of the Round Table."² No romance in the language has so

¹ Dunlop's *History of Fiction*, vol. III. p. 184; *Biographie Universelle*; Bouterwek, vol. v. p. 295.

² Dunlop, III. 280.

complex an intrigue, insomuch that it is followed with difficulty; and the author has in successive editions capriciously remodelled parts of his story, which is wholly of his own invention.¹

54. Calprenède, a poet of no contemptible powers of imagination, poured forth his stores of rapid invention in several romances more celebrated than that of Gomberville. The first, which is contained in ten octavo volumes, is the *Cassandra*. This appeared in 1642, and was followed by the *Cleopatra*, published, according to the custom of romances, in successive parts, the earliest in 1646. La Harpe thinks this unquestionably the best work of Calprenède; Bouterwek seems to prefer the *Cassandra*; Pharamond is not wholly his own; five out of twelve volumes belong to one De Vaumorière, a continuator.² Calprenède, like many others, had but a life-estate in the temple of fame, and, more happy perhaps than greater men, lived out the whole favor of the world, which, having been largely showered on his head, strewed no memorials on his grave. It became, soon after his death, through the satire of Boileau and the influence of a new style in fiction, a matter of course to turn him into ridicule. It is impossible that his romances should be read again; but those who, for the purposes of general criticism, have gone back to these volumes, find not a little to praise in his genius, and in some measure to explain his popularity. "Calprenède," says Bouterwek, "belonged to the extravagant party, which endeavored to give a triumph to genius at the expense of taste, and by that very means played into the hands of the opposite party, which saw nothing so laudable as the observation of the rules which taste prescribed. We have only to become acquainted with any one of the prolix romances of Calprenède, such, for instance, as the *Cassandra*, to see clearly the spirit which animates the whole invention. We find there again the heroism of chivalry, the enthusiastic raptures of love, the struggle of duty with passion, the victory of magnanimity, sincerity, and humanity, over force, fraud, and barbarism, in the genuine characters and circumstances of romance. The events are skilfully interwoven; and a truly poetical keeping belongs to the whole, however extended it may be. The diction of Calprenède is a little monotonous, but not at all trivial,

¹ Biogr. Univ.

² Dunlop, iii. 259.

and seldom affected. It is like that of old romance, grave, circumstantial, somewhat in the chronicle style, but picturesque, agreeable, full of sensibility and simplicity. Many passages might, if versified, find a place in the most beautiful poem of this class."¹

55. The honors of this romantic literature have long been shared by the female sex. In the age of Richelieu and Mazarin, this was represented by Mademoiselle de Scuderi, a name very glorious for a season, but which unfortunately did not, like that of Calprenède, continue to be such during the whole life-time of her who bore it. The old age of Mademoiselle de Scuderi was ignominiously treated by the pitiless Boileau; and, reaching more than her ninetyeth year, she almost survived her only offspring, those of her pen. In her youth, she had been the associate of the Rambouillet circle, and caught perhaps in some measure from them what she gave back with interest,—a tone of perpetual affectation, and a pedantic gallantry, which could not withstand the first approach of ridicule. Her first romance was *Ibrahim*, published in 1635; but the more celebrated were the *Grand Cyrus* and the *Clelie*. Each of these two romances is in ten volumes.² The persons chiefly connected with the Hôtel Rambouillet sat for their pictures, as Persians or Babylonians, in *Cyrus*. Julie d'Angennes herself bore the name of *Artenice*, by which she was afterwards distinguished among her friends; and it is a remarkable instance not only of the popularity of these romances, but of the respectful sentiment, which, from the elevation and purity no one can deny them to exhibit, was always associated in the gravest persons with their fictions, that a prelate of eminent fame for eloquence, Fléchier, in his funeral sermon on this lady, calls her "the incomparable *Artenice*."³ Such an allusion would appear to us misplaced; but we may presume that it was not so thought. Scuderi's romances seem to have been remarkably the favorites of the clergy: Huet, Mascaron, Godeau, as much as Fléchier, were her ardent admirers. "I find," says the second of these, one of the chief ornaments of the French pulpit, in writing to Mademoiselle de Scuderi, "so much in your works calculated to reform the world, that, in the sermons I am now

¹ Bouterwek, vi. 220.

² Biogr. Univ.; Dunlop; Bouterwek.

³ Sermons de Fléchier, li. 325 (édit. 1690). But probably Bossuet would not have stooped to this allusion.

preparing for the court, you will often be on my table by the side of St. Augustin and St. Bernard."¹ In the writings of this lady, we see the last footstep of the old chivalrous romance. She, like Calprénède, had derived from this source the predominant characteristics of her personages,—an exalted generosity, a disdain of all selfish considerations, a courage which attempts impossibilities and is rewarded by achieving them, a love outrageously hyperbolic in pretence, yet intrinsically without passion; all, in short, that Cervantes has bestowed on Don Quixote. Love, however, or its counterfeit, gallantry, plays a still more leading part in the French romance than in its Castilian prototype; the feats of heroes, though not less wonderful, are less prominent on the canvas; and a metaphysical pedantry replaces the pompous metaphors in which the knight of sorrowful countenance had taken so much delight. The approbation of many persons, far superior judges to Don Quixote, makes it impossible to doubt that the romances of Calprénède and Scuderi were better than his library. But, as this is the least possible praise, it will certainly not tempt any one away from the rich and varied repast of fiction which the last and present century have spread before him. Mademoiselle de Scuderi has perverted history still more than Calprénède, and changed her Romans into languishing Parisians. It is not to be forgotten, that the taste of her party, though it did not, properly speaking, infect Corneille, compelled him to weaken some of his tragedies. And this must be the justification of Boileau's cutting ridicule upon this truly estimable woman. She had certainly kept up a tone of severe and high morality, with which the aristocracy of Paris could ill dispense; but it was one not difficult to feign, and there might be Tartuffes of sentiment as well as of religion. Whatever is false in taste is apt to be allied to what is insincere in character.

56. The Argenis of Barclay, a son of the defender of royal authority against republican theories, is a Latin romance, superior perhaps to those after Cervantes, which the Spanish or French language could boast. It has indeed always been reckoned among political allegories. That

¹ Biogr. Univ. Mademoiselle de Scuderi was not gifted by nature with beauty, or, as this biographer more bluntly says, "était d'une extrême laideur." She would probably have wished this to have been otherwise, but carried off the matter very

well, as appears by her epigram on her own picture by Nanteuil:

"Nanteuil en faisant mon image,
A de son art divin signalé le pouvoir;
Je hais mes yeux dans mon miroir,
Je les aime dans son ouvrage."

the state of France in the last years of Henry III. is partially shadowed in it, can admit of no doubt: several characters are faintly veiled either by anagram or Greek translation of their names; but whether to avoid the insipidity of servile allegory, or to excite the reader by perplexity, Barclay has mingled so much of mere fiction with his story, that no attempts at a regular key to the whole work can be successful; nor in fact does the fable of this romance run in any parallel stream with real events. His object seems, in great measure, to have been the discussion of political questions in feigned dialogue. But, though in these we find no want of acuteness or good sense, they have not at present much novelty in our eyes; and though the style is really pleasing, or, as some have judged, excellent,¹ and the incidents not ill contrived, it might be hard to go entirely through a Latin romance of 700 pages, unless indeed we had no alternative given but the perusal of the similar works in Spanish or French. The *Argenis* was published at Rome in 1622: some of the personages introduced by Barclay are his own contemporaries; a proof that he did not intend a strictly historical allegory of the events of the last age. The *Euphormio* of the same author resembles in some degree the *Argenis*; but, with less of story and character, has a more direct reference to European politics. It contains much political disquisition; and one whole book is employed in a description of the manners and laws of different countries, with no disguise of names.

57. Campanella gave a loose to his fanciful humor in a fiction, entitled *The City of the Sun*, published at Frankfort in 1623, in imitation, perhaps, of the Utopia. The *City of the Sun* is supposed to stand upon a mountain situated in Ceylon, under the equator. A community of goods and women is established in this republic, the principal magistrate of which is styled Sun, and is elected after a strict examination in all kinds of science. Campanella has brought in so much of his own philosophical system, that we may presume that to have been the object of this romance. The Solars, he tells us, abstained at first from flesh, because they thought it cruel to kill animals. "But

¹ Coleridge has pronounced an ardent and rather excessive eulogy on the language of the *Argenis*, preferring it to that of *Livy* or *Tacitus*. Coleridge's *Remains*, vol. i. p. 257. I cannot by any means go this length: it has struck me that the

Latinity is more that of *Petroneus Arbitrarius*; but I am not well enough acquainted with that writer to speak confidently. The same observation seems applicable to the *Euphormio*.

Bouterwek, still more explicitly developed by Sismondi, on the design of Cervantes in Don Quixote, and which have been repeated in other publications. According to these writers, the primary idea is that of a "man of elevated character, excited by heroic and enthusiastic feelings to the extravagant pitch of wishing to restore the age of chivalry; nor is it possible to form a more mistaken notion of this work than by considering it merely as a satire, intended by the author to ridicule the absurd passion for reading old romances."¹ "The fundamental idea of Don Quixote," says Sismondi, "is the eternal contrast between the spirit of poetry and that of prose. Men of an elevated soul propose to themselves as the object of life to be the defenders of the weak, the support of the oppressed, the champions of justice and innocence. Like Don Quixote, they find on every side the image of the virtues they worship: they believe that disinterestedness, nobleness, courage, in short, knight-errantry, are still prevalent; and, with no calculation of their own powers, they expose themselves for an ungrateful world, they offer themselves as a sacrifice to the laws and rules of an imaginary state of society."²

45. If this were a true representation of the scheme of Don Quixote, we cannot wonder that some persons should, as M. Sismondi tells us they do, consider it as the most melancholy book that has ever been written. They consider it also, no doubt, one of the most immoral, as chilling and pernicious in its influence on the social converse of mankind, as the Prince of Machiavel is on their political intercourse. "Cervantes," he proceeds, "has shown us in some measure the vanity of greatness of soul and the delusion of heroism. He has drawn in Don Quixote a perfect man (*un homme accompli*), who is, nevertheless, the constant object of ridicule. Brave beyond the fabled knights he imitates, disinterested, honorable, generous, the most faithful and respectful of lovers, the best of masters, the most accomplished and well educated of gentlemen, all his enterprises end in discomfiture to himself, and in mischief to others." M. Sismondi descants upon the perfections of the Knight of La Mancha with a gravity which it is not quite easy for his readers to preserve.

46. It might be answered by a phlegmatic observer, that a mere enthusiasm for doing good, if excited by vanity, and

¹ Bouterwek, p. 334.

² *Littérature du Midi*, vol. iii. p. 339.

not accompanied by common sense, will seldom be very serviceable to ourselves or to others; that men who, in their heroism and care for the oppressed, would throw open the cages of lions, and set galley-slaves at liberty, not forgetting to break the limbs of harmless persons whom they mistake for wrong-doers, are a class of whom Don Quixote is the real type; and that, the world being much the worse for such heroes, it might not be immoral, notwithstanding their benevolent enthusiasm, to put them out of countenance by a little ridicule. This, however, is not, as I conceive, the primary aim of Cervantes; nor do I think that the exhibition of one great truth, as the predominant but concealed moral of a long work, is in the spirit of his age. He possessed a very thoughtful mind and a profound knowledge of humanity; yet the generalization which the hypothesis of Bouterwek and Sismondi requires for the leading conception of Don Quixote, besides its being a little inconsistent with the valorous and romantic character of its author, belongs to a more advanced period of philosophy than his own. It will at all events, I presume, be admitted, that we cannot reason about Don Quixote except from the book; and I think it may be shown in a few words, that these ingenious writers have been chiefly misled by some want of consistency which circumstances produced in the author's delineation of his hero.

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character to that pitch of mental dignity which we find in the last two volumes.

50. Few books of moral philosophy display as deep an insight into the mechanism of the mind as *Don Quixote*. And when we look also at the fertility of invention, the general probability of the events, and the great simplicity of the story, wherein no artifices are practised to create suspense, or complicate the action, we shall think Cervantes fully deserving of the glory that attends this monument of his genius. It is not merely that he is superior to all his predecessors and contemporaries. This, though it might account for the European fame of his romance, would be an inadequate testimony to his desert. Cervantes stands on an eminence, below which we must place the best of his successors. We have only to compare him with *Le Sage* or *Fielding*, to judge of his vast superiority. To *Scott*, indeed, he must yield in the variety of his power; but, in the line of comic romance, we should hardly think *Scott* his equal.

51. The moral novels of Cervantes, as he calls them (*Novellas Exemplares*), are written, I believe, in a good style, but too short, and constructed with too little artifice to rivet our interest. Their simplicity and truth, as in many of the old novels, have a certain charm; but, in the present age, our sense of satiety in works of fiction cannot be overcome but by excellence. Of the Spanish comic romances, in the *picaresque* style, several remain: *Justina* was the most famous. One that does not strictly belong to this lower class is the *Marcos de Obregon* of *Espinel*. This is supposed to have suggested much to *Le Sage* in *Gil Blas*; in fact, the first story we meet with is that of *Mergellina*, the physician's wife. The style, though not dull, wants the grace and neatness of *Le Sage*. This is esteemed one of the best novels that Spain has produced. Italy was no longer the seat of this literature. A romance of chivalry by *Marini* (not the poet of that name), entitled *Il Caloandro* (1640), was translated but indifferently into French by *Scuderi*, and has been praised by *Salfi* as full of imagination, with characters skilfully diversified, and an interesting, well-conducted story.¹

¹ *Salfi*, vol. xiv. p. 88.

52. France, in the sixteenth century, content with *Amadis de Gaul* and the numerous romances of the Spanish school, had contributed very little to that literature. French romances : Astrée. But now she had native writers of both kinds, the pastoral and heroic, who completely superseded the models they had before them. Their earliest essay was the *Astrée* of D'Urfé. Of this pastoral romance the first volume was published in 1610; the second, in 1620: three more came slowly forth, that the world might have due leisure to admire. It contains about 5,500 pages. It would be almost as discreditable to have read such a book through at present, as it was to be ignorant of it in the ages of Louis XIII. Allusions, however, to real circumstances served in some measure to lessen the insipidity of a love-story which seems to equal any in absurdity and want of interest. The style, and I can judge no farther, having read but a few pages, seems easy and not unpleasing: but the pastoral tone is insufferably puerile; and a monotonous solemnity makes us almost suspect, that one source of its popularity was its gentle effect when read in small portions before retiring to rest. It was, nevertheless, admired by men of erudition, like Camus and Huet; or even by men of the world, like Rochefoucault.¹

53. From the union of the old chivalrous romance with this newer style, the courtly pastoral, sprang another kind of fiction, the French heroic romance. Heroic romances. Gomberville. Three nearly contemporary writers, Gomberville, Calprenède, Scuderi, supplied a number of voluminous stories, frequently historical in some of their names, but utterly destitute of truth in circumstances, characters, and manners. Gomberville led the way in his *Polexandre*, first published in 1632, and reaching in later editions to about 6,000 pages. "This," says a modern writer, "seems to have been the model of the works of Calprenède and Scuderi. This ponderous work may be regarded as a sort of intermediate production between the later compositions and the ancient fables of chivalry. It has, indeed, a close affinity to the heroic romance; but many of the exploits of the hero are as extravagant as those of a paladin or knight of the Round Table."² No romance in the language has so

¹ Dunlop's *History of Fiction*, vol. III. p. 184; *Biographie Universelle*; Bouterwek, vol. v. p. 256.

² Dunlop, III. 280.

complex an intrigue, insomuch that it is followed with difficulty; and the author has in successive editions capriciously remodelled parts of his story, which is wholly of his own invention.¹

54. Calprenède, a poet of no contemptible powers of imagination, poured forth his stores of rapid invention in several romances more celebrated than that of Gomberville. The first, which is contained in ten octavo volumes, is the *Cassandra*. This appeared in 1642, and was followed by the *Cleopatra*, published, according to the custom of romances, in successive parts, the earliest in 1646. La Harpe thinks this unquestionably the best work of Calprenède; Bouterwek seems to prefer the *Cassandra*; Pharamond is not wholly his own; five out of twelve volumes belong to one De Vaumorière, a continuator.² Calprenède, like many others, had but a life-estate in the temple of fame, and, more happy perhaps than greater men, lived out the whole favor of the world, which, having been largely showered on his head, strewed no memorials on his grave. It became, soon after his death, through the satire of Boileau and the influence of a new style in fiction, a matter of course to turn him into ridicule. It is impossible that his romances should be read again; but those who, for the purposes of general criticism, have gone back to these volumes, find not a little to praise in his genius, and in some measure to explain his popularity. "Calprenède," says Bouterwek, "belonged to the extravagant party, which endeavored to give a triumph to genius at the expense of taste, and by that very means played into the hands of the opposite party, which saw nothing so laudable as the observation of the rules which taste prescribed. We have only to become acquainted with any one of the prolix romances of Calprenède, such, for instance, as the *Cassandra*, to see clearly the spirit which animates the whole invention. We find there again the heroism of chivalry, the enthusiastic raptures of love, the struggle of duty with passion, the victory of magnanimity, sincerity, and humanity, over force, fraud, and barbarism, in the genuine characters and circumstances of romance. The events are skilfully interwoven; and a truly poetical keeping belongs to the whole, however extended it may be. The diction of Calprenède is a little monotonous, but not at all trivial,

¹ Biogr. Univ.

² Dunlop, iii. 269.

and seldom affected. It is like that of old romance, grave, circumstantial, somewhat in the chronicle style, but picturesque, agreeable, full of sensibility and simplicity. Many passages might, if versified, find a place in the most beautiful poem of this class."¹

55. The honors of this romantic literature have long been shared by the female sex. In the age of Richelieu and Mazarin, this was represented by Mademoiselle de Scuderi, a name very glorious for a season, but which unfortunately did not, like that of Calprenède, continue to be such during the whole life-time of her who bore it. The old age of Mademoiselle de Scuderi was ignominiously treated by the pitiless Boileau; and, reaching more than her ninetyeth year, she almost survived her only offspring, those of her pen. In her youth, she had been the associate of the Rambouillet circle, and caught perhaps in some measure from them what she gave back with interest,—a tone of perpetual affectation, and a pedantic gallantry, which could not withstand the first approach of ridicule. Her first romance was *Ibrahim*, published in 1635; but the more celebrated were the *Grand Cyrus* and the *Clelie*. Each of these two romances is in ten volumes.² The persons chiefly connected with the Hôtel Rambouillet sat for their pictures, as Persians or Babylonians, in *Cyrus*. Julie d'Angennes herself bore the name of *Artenice*, by which she was afterwards distinguished among her friends; and it is a remarkable instance not only of the popularity of these romances, but of the respectful sentiment, which, from the elevation and purity no one can deny them to exhibit, was always associated in the gravest persons with their fictions, that a prelate of eminent fame for eloquence, Fléchier, in his funeral sermon on this lady, calls her "the incomparable *Artenice*."³ Such an allusion would appear to us misplaced; but we may presume that it was not so thought. Scuderi's romances seem to have been remarkably the favorites of the clergy: Huet, Mascaron, Godeau, as much as Fléchier, were her ardent admirers. "I find," says the second of these, one of the chief ornaments of the French pulpit, in writing to Mademoiselle de Scuderi, "so much in your works calculated to reform the world, that, in the sermons I am now

¹ Bouterwek, vi. 230.

² Biogr. Univ.; Danlop; Bouterwek.

³ Sermons de Fléchier, li. 326 (édit. 1690). But probably Bossuet would not have stooped to this allusion.

the state of France in the last years of Henry III. is partially shadowed in it, can admit of no doubt: several characters are faintly veiled either by anagram or Greek translation of their names; but whether to avoid the insipidity of servile allegory, or to excite the reader by perplexity, Barclay has mingled so much of mere fiction with his story, that no attempts at a regular key to the whole work can be successful; nor in fact does the fable of this romance run in any parallel stream with real events. His object seems, in great measure, to have been the discussion of political questions in feigned dialogue. But, though in these we find no want of acuteness or good sense, they have not at present much novelty in our eyes; and though the style is really pleasing, or, as some have judged, excellent,¹ and the incidents not ill contrived, it might be hard to go entirely through a Latin romance of 700 pages, unless indeed we had no alternative given but the perusal of the similar works in Spanish or French. The *Argenis* was published at Rome in 1622: some of the personages introduced by Barclay are his own contemporaries; a proof that he did not intend a strictly historical allegory of the events of the last age. The *Euphormio* of the same author resembles in some degree the *Argenis*; but, with less of story and character, has a more direct reference to European politics. It contains much political disquisition; and one whole book is employed in a description of the manners and laws of different countries, with no disguise of names.

57. Campanella gave a loose to his fanciful humor in a fiction, entitled *The City of the Sun*, published at Frankfort in 1623, in imitation, perhaps, of the *Utopia*. The *City of the Sun* is supposed to stand upon a mountain situated in Ceylon, under the equator. A community of goods and women is established in this republic, the principal magistrate of which is styled Sun, and is elected after a strict examination in all kinds of science. Campanella has brought in so much of his own philosophical system, that we may presume that to have been the object of this romance. The Solars, he tells us, abstained at first from flesh, because they thought it cruel to kill animals. "But

¹ Coleridge has pronounced an ardent and rather excessive eulogy on the language of the *Argenis*, preferring it to that of Livy or Tacitus. Coleridge's *Remains*, vol. i. p. 257. I cannot by any means go this length: it has struck me that the Latinity is more that of Petronius Arbiter; but I am not well enough acquainted with that writer to speak confidently. The same observation seems applicable to the *Euphormio*.

afterwards considering that it would be equally cruel to kill plants, which are no less endowed with sensation, so that they must perish by famine, they understood that ignoble things were created for the use of nobler things, and now eat all things without scruple." Another Latin romance had some celebrity in its day, the *Monarchia Solipsorum*, a satire on the Jesuits in the fictitious name of Lucius Cornelius Europeus. It has been ascribed to more than one person: the probable author is one Scotti, who had himself belonged to the order.¹ This book did not seem to me in the least interesting: if it is so in any degree, it must be not as mere fiction, but as a revelation of secrets.

58. It is not so much an extraordinary as an unfortunate deficiency in our own literary annals, that England Few books of fiction in England. should have been destitute of the comic romance, or that derived from real life, in this period; since in fact we may say the same, as has been seen, of France. The *picaresque* novels of Spain were thought well worthy of translation; but it occurred to no one, or no one had the gift of genius, to shift the scene, and imitate their delineation of native manners. Of how much value would have been a genuine English novel, the mirror of actual life in the various ranks of society, written under Elizabeth or under the Stuarts! We should have seen, if the execution had not been very coarse, and the delineation absolutely confined to low characters, the social habits of our forefathers better than by all our other sources of that knowledge,—the plays, the letters, the traditions and anecdotes, the pictures or buildings, of the time. Notwithstanding the interest which all profess to take in the history of manners, our notions of them are generally meagre and imperfect; and hence modern works of fiction are but crude and inaccurate designs when they endeavor to represent the living England of two centuries since. Even Scott, who had a fine instinctive perception of truth and nature, and who had read much, does not appear to have seized the genuine tone of conversation, and to have been a little misled by the style of Shakspeare. This is rather elaborate and removed from vulgar use by a sort of archaism in phrase, and by a pointed turn in the dialogue, adapted to theatrical utterance, but wanting the ease of ordinary speech.

59. I can only produce two books by English authors, in

¹ *Biogr. Univ.*, arts. "Scotti and Inchoffer;" *Nicéron*, vols. xxiv. and xxv.

this first part of the seventeenth century, which fall properly under the class of novels or romances ; and, of these, one is written in Latin. This is the *Mundus Alter et Idem* of Bishop Hall, an imitation of the latter and weaker volumes of Rabelais. A country in Terra Australis is divided into four regions, — Crapulia, Viraginia, Moronea, and Lavernia. Maps of the whole land and of particular regions are given ; and the nature of the satire, not much of which has any especial reference to England, may easily be collected. It is not a very successful effort.

*Mundus
Alter et
Idem of
Hall.*

60. Another prelate, or one who became such, Francis Godwin, was the author of a much more curious story. It is called the *Man in the Moon*, and relates the journey of one Domingo Gonzalez to that planet.

*Godwin's
Journey to
the Moon.*

This was written by Godwin, according to Antony Wood, while he was a student at Oxford.¹ By some internal proofs, it must have been later than 1599, and before the death of Elizabeth in 1603. But it was not published till 1638. It was translated into French, and became the model of *Cyrano de Bergerac*, as he was of *Swift*. Godwin himself had no prototype, as far as I know, but *Lucian*. He resembles those writers in the natural and veracious tone of his lies. The fiction is rather ingenious and amusing throughout ; but the most remarkable part is the happy conjectures, if we must say no more, of his philosophy. Not only does the writer declare positively for the Copernican system, which was uncommon at that time, but he has surprisingly understood the principle of gravitation ; it being distinctly supposed that the earth's attraction diminishes with the distance. Nor is the following passage less curious : " I must let you understand that the globe of the moon is not altogether destitute of an attractive power ; but it is far weaker than that of the earth : as if a man do but spring upwards with all his force, as dancers do when they show their activity by capering, he shall be able to mount fifty or sixty feet high, and then he is quite beyond all attraction of the moon." By this device, Gonzalez returns from his sojourn in the latter, though it required a more complex one to bring him thither. " The moon," he observes, " is covered with a sea, except the parts

¹ *Athenæ Oxonienses*, vol. II. col. 553. work, and takes Domingo Gonzalez for the It is remarkable that Mr. Dunlop has real author. *Hist. of Fiction*, III. 394. been ignorant of Godwin's claim to this

which seem somewhat darker to us, and are dry land." A contrary hypothesis came afterwards to prevail; but we must not expect every thing from our ingenious young student.

61. Though I can mention nothing else in English which comes exactly within our notions of a romance, we may advert to the Dodona's Grove of James Howell.

This is a strange allegory, without any ingenuity in maintaining the analogy between the outer and inner story, which alone can give a reader any pleasure in allegorical writing. The subject is the state of Europe, especially of England, about 1640, under the guise of animated trees in a forest. The style is like the following: "The next morning the royal olives sent some prime elms to attend Prince Rocolino in quality of officers of state; and, a little after, he was brought to the royal palace in the same state Elaiana's kings use to be attended the day of their coronation." The contrivance is all along so clumsy and unintelligible, the invention so poor and absurd, the story, if story there be, so dull an echo of well-known events, that it is impossible to reckon Dodona's Grove any thing but an entire failure. Howell has no wit; but he has abundance of conceits, flat and commonplace enough. With all this, he was a man of some sense and observation. His letters are entertaining; but they scarcely deserve consideration in this volume.

62. It is very possible that some small works belonging to this extensive class have been omitted, which my readers, or myself on second consideration, might think not unworthy of notice. It is also one so miscellaneous, that we might fairly doubt as to some which have a certain claim to be admitted into it. Such are the *Adventures of the Baron de Fæneste*, by the famous Agrippa d'Aubigné (whose autobiography, by the way, has at least the liveliness of fiction); a singular book, written in dialogue, where an imaginary Gascon baron recounts his tales of the camp and the court. He is made to speak a patois not quite easy for us to understand, and not perhaps worth the while; but it seems to contain much that illustrates the state of France about the beginning of the seventeenth century. Much in this book is satirical; and the satire falls on the Catholics, whom Fæneste, a mere foolish gentleman of Gascony, is made to defend against an acute Huguenot.

CHAPTER VIII.

HISTORY OF MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE FROM 1600 TO 1650.

SECTION I.

Invention of Logarithms by Napier — New Geometry of Kepler and Cavalieri — Algebra — Harriott — Descartes — Astronomy — Kepler — Galileo — Copernican System begins to prevail — Cartesian Theory of the World — Mechanical Discoveries of Galileo — Descartes — Hydrostatics — Optics.

1. In the last part of this work, we have followed the progress of mathematical and physical knowledge down to the close of the sixteenth century. The ancient geometers had done so much in their own province of lines and figures, that little more of importance could be effected, except by new methods extending the limits of the science, or derived from some other source of invention. Algebra had yielded a more abundant harvest to the genius of the sixteenth century; yet something here seemed to be wanting to give that science a character of utility and reference to general truth; nor had the formulæ of letters and radical signs that perceptible beauty which often wins us to delight in geometrical theorems of as little apparent usefulness in their results. Meanwhile, the primary laws, to which all mathematical reasonings in their relation to physical truths must be accommodated, lay hidden, or were erroneously conceived; and none of these latter sciences, with the exception of astronomy, were beyond their mere infancy, either as to observation or theory.¹

State of
science in
sixteenth
century.

2. Astronomy, cultivated in the latter part of the sixteenth century with much industry and success, was repressed, among other more insuperable obstacles, by the laborious calcula-

¹ In this chapter my obligations to Montucla are so numerous, that I shall seldom make particular references to his *Histoire des Mathématiques*, which must be understood to be my principal authority as to *facts*.

tions that it required. The trigonometrical tables of sines, tangents, and secants, if they were to produce any tolerable accuracy in astronomical observation, must be computed to six or seven places of decimals, upon which the regular processes of multiplication and division were perpetually to be employed. The consumption of time as well as risk of error which this occasioned was a serious evil to the practical astronomer.

3. John Napier, laird of Merchiston, after several attempts to diminish this labor by devices of his invention, was happy enough to discover his famous method of logarithms. This he first published at Edinburgh in 1614, with the title, *Mirifici Logarithmorum Canonis Descriptio, seu Arithmeticarum Supputationum Mirabilis Abbre-viatio*. He died in 1618; and, in a posthumous edition entitled *Mirifici Logarithmorum Canonis Constructio*, 1619, the method of construction, which had been at first withheld, is given; and the system itself, in consequence, perhaps, of the suggestion of his friend Briggs, underwent some change.

4. The invention of logarithms is one of the rarest instances of sagacity in the history of mankind; and it has been justly noticed as remarkable, that it issued complete from the mind of its author, and has not received any improvement since his time. It is hardly necessary to say that logarithms are a series of numbers, arranged in tables parallel to the series of natural numbers, and of such a construction, that, by adding the logarithms of two of the latter, we obtain the logarithm of their product; by subtracting the logarithm of one number from that of another, we obtain that of their quotient. The longest processes, therefore, of multiplication and division are spared, and reduced to one of mere addition or subtraction.

5. It has been supposed, that an arithmetical fact, said to be mentioned by Archimedes, and which is certainly pointed out in the work of an early German writer, Michael Stifelius, put Napier in the right course for this invention. It will at least serve to illustrate the principle of logarithms. Stifelius shows, that, if in a geometrical progression we add the indices of any terms in the series, we shall obtain the index of the products of those terms. Thus, if we compare the geometrical progression, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, with the arithmetical one which numbers

Tedious-
ness of cal-
culations.

Napier's in-
vention of
logarithms.

Their
nature.

Property of
numbers
discovered
by Stifelius.

the powers of the common ratio, namely, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, we see that by adding two terms of the latter progression, as 2 and 3, to which 4 and 8 correspond in the geometrical series, we obtain 5, to which 32, the product of 4 by 8, corresponds; and the quotient would be obtained in a similar manner. But though this, which becomes self-evident when algebraical expressions are employed for the terms of a series, seemed at the time rather a curious property of numbers in geometrical progression, it was of little value in facilitating calculation.

6. If Napier had simply considered numbers in themselves as repetitions of unity, which is their only intelligible definition, it does not seem that he could ever have carried this observation upon progressive series any farther. Numerically understood, the terms of a geometrical progression proceed *per saltum*; and, in the series 2, 4, 8, 16, it is as unmeaning to say that 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, in any possible sense, have a place, or can be introduced to any purpose, as that $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, $\frac{1}{16}$, or other fractions, are true numbers at all.¹ The case, however, is widely different when we use numbers as merely the signs of something capable of continuous increase or decrease; of space, of duration, of velocity. These are, for our convenience, divided by arbitrary intervals, to which the numerical unit is made to correspond. But, as these intervals are indefinitely divisible, the unit is supposed capable of division into fractional parts, each of them a representation of the ratio which a portion of the interval bears to the whole. And thus also we must see, that, as fractions of the unit bear a relation to uniform quantity, so all the integral numbers which do not enter into the terms of a geometrical progression correspond to certain portions of variable quantity. If a body falling down an inclined plane acquires a velocity at one point which would carry it through two feet in a second, and at

Extended
to magni-
tudes.

¹ Few books of arithmetic, or even algebra, draw the reader's attention at the outset to this essential distinction between discrete and continuous quantity, which is almost sure to be overlooked in all their subsequent reasonings. Wallis has done it properly: after stating very clearly that there are no proper numbers but integers, he meets the objection, that fractions are called intermediate numbers. "Concedo quidem sic responderi posse; concedo etiam numeros quos fractos vo-

cant, sine fractionibus, esse quidam uni et nulli quasi intermedios. Sed addo, quod jam transitur eis à *discreto* *vero*. Respondetur enim non de *quot*, sed de *quantitate*. Pertinet igitur hæc responsio propriè loquendo, non tam ad quantitatem discretam, seu numerum, quam ad continuum; prout hinc supponitur esse quid continuum in partes divisibile, quamvis quidem harum partium ad totum ratio numeris exprimitur." — *Algebra Universalis*, c. 1.

a lower point one which would carry it through four feet in the same time, there must, by the nature of a continually accelerated motion, be some point between these where the velocity might be represented by the number three. Hence, wherever the numbers of a common geometrical series, like 2, 4, 8, 16, represent velocities at certain intervals, the intermediate numbers will represent velocities at intermediate intervals; and thus it may be said, that all numbers are terms of a geometrical progression, but one which should always be considered as what it is, — a progression of continuous, not discrete quantity, capable of being indicated by number, but not number itself.

7. It was a necessary consequence, that, if all numbers could be treated as terms of a progression, and if their indices could be found like those of an ordinary series, the method of finding products of terms by addition of indices would be universal. The means that Napier adopted for this purpose were surprisingly ingenious; but it would be difficult to make them clear to those who are likely to require it, especially without the use of lines. It may suffice to say that his process was laborious in the highest degree, consisting of the interpolation of 6,931,472 mean proportionals between 1 and 2, and repeating a similar and still more tedious operation for all prime numbers. The logarithms of other numbers were easily obtained, according to the fundamental principle of the invention, by adding their factors. Logarithms appear to have been so called because they are the sum of these mean ratios, *λόγων ὑπομέσος*.

8. In the original tables of Napier, the logarithm of 10 was 2.3025850. In those published afterwards (1618), he changed this for 1.0000000; making, of course, that of 100, 2.0000000, and so forth. This construction has been followed since; but those of the first method are not wholly neglected: they are called hyperbolic logarithms from expressing a property of that curve. Napier found a coadjutor well worthy of him in Henry Briggs, professor of geometry at Gresham College. It is uncertain from which of them the change in the form of logarithms proceeded. Briggs, in 1618, published a table of logarithms up to 1,000, calculated by himself. This was followed in 1624 by his greater work, *Arithmetica Logarithmica*, containing the logarithms of all natural numbers as high as 20,000, and

Tables of
Napier and
Briggs.

again from 90,000 to 100,000. These are calculated to fourteen places of decimals; thus reducing the error, which, strictly speaking, must always exist from the principle of logarithmical construction, to an almost infinitesimal fraction. He had designed to publish a second table, with the logarithms of sines and tangents to the 100th part of a degree. This he left in a considerably advanced state; and it was published by Gellibrand in 1633. Gunter had, as early as 1620, given the logarithms of sines and tangents on the sexagesimal scale, as far as seven decimals. Vlacq, a Dutch bookseller, printed in 1628 a translation of Briggs's *Arithmetica Logarithmica*, filling up the interval from 20,000 to 90,000, with logarithms calculated to eleven decimals. He published also, in 1633, his *Trigonometrica Artificialis*; the most useful work, perhaps, that had appeared, as it incorporated the labors of Briggs and Gellibrand. Kepler came like a master to the subject; and, observing that some foreign mathematicians disliked the theory upon which Napier had explained the nature of logarithms, as not rigidly geometrical, gave one of his own, to which they could not object. But it may probably be said, that the very novelty to which the disciples of the ancient geometry were averse, the introduction of the notion of velocity into mathematical reasoning, was that which linked the abstract science of quantity with nature, and prepared the way for that expansive theory of infinites, which bears at once upon the subtlest truths that can exercise the understanding, and the most evident that can fall under the senses.

9. It was, indeed, at this time that the modern geometry, which, if it deviates something from the clearness and precision of the ancient, has incomparably the advantage over it in its reach of application, took its rise. Kepler was the man that led the way. He published in 1615 his *Nova Stereometria Doliorum*, a treatise on the capacity of casks. In this he considers the various solids which may be formed by the revolution of a segment of a conic section round a line which is not its axis; a condition not unfrequent in the form of a cask. Many of the problems which he starts he is unable to solve. But what is most remarkable in this treatise is, that he here suggests the bold idea, that a circle may be deemed to be composed of an infinite number of triangles, having their bases in their circum-

Kepler's
new geo-
metry.

ference, and their common apex in the centre; a cone, in like manner, of infinite pyramids, and a cylinder of infinite prisms.¹ The ancients had shown, as is well known, that a polygon inscribed in a circle, and another described about it, may, by continual bisection of their sides, be made to approach nearer to each other than by any assignable difference. The circle itself lay, of course, between them. Euclid contents himself with saying, that the circle is greater than any polygon that can be inscribed in it, and less than any polygon that can be described about it. The method by which they approximated to the curve space by continual increase or diminution of the rectilineal figure was called exhaustion; and the space itself is properly called by later geometers the limit. As curvilinear and rectilinear spaces cannot possibly be compared by means of superposition, or by showing that their several constituent portions could be made to coincide, it had long been acknowledged by the best geometers impossible to quadrate by a direct process any curve surface. But Archimedes had found, as to the parabola, that there was a rectilineal space, of which he could indirectly demonstrate that it was equal, that is, could not be unequal, to the curve itself.

10. In this state of the general problem, the ancient methods of indefinite approximation having prepared the way, Kepler came to his solution of questions which regarded the capacity of vessels. According to Fabroni, he supposed solids to consist of an infinite number of surfaces, surfaces of an infinity of lines, lines of infinite points.² If this be strictly true, he must have left little, in point of invention, for Cavalieri. So long as geometry is employed as a method of logic, an exercise of the understanding on those modifications of quantity which the imagination cannot grasp, such as points, lines, infinities, it must appear almost an offensive absurdity to speak of a circle as a polygon with an infinite number of sides. But when it becomes the handmaid of practical art, or even of physical science, there can be no other objection than always arises from incongruity and incorrectness of language. It has been

¹ Fabroni, *Vitæ Itatorum*, l. 272.
² "Idem quoque solida cogitavit ex infinito numero superficierum existere, superficies autem ex lineis infinitis, ac lineis ex infinitis punctis. Ostendit ipse quantum ea ratione brevior fieri via posset ad vera quandam captu difficiliora, cum

antiquarum demonstrationum circulus ac methodus inter se comparandi figuras circumscriptas et inscriptas his planis aut solidis, quæ mensuranda essent, ita delinearentur." — Fabroni, *Vitæ Itatorum*, l. 272.

found possible to avoid the expressions attributed to Kepler: but they seem to denote, in fact, nothing more than those of Euclid or Archimedes, — that the difference between a magnitude and its limit may be regularly diminished, till, without strictly vanishing, it becomes less than any assignable quantity, and may consequently be disregarded in reasoning upon actual bodies.

11. Galileo, says Fabroni, trod in the steps of Kepler, and in his first dialogue on mechanics, when treating of a cylinder cut out of an hemisphere, became con-^{Adopted by Galileo.} versant with indivisibles (*familiarem habere cœpit cum indivisibilibus usum*). But in that dialogue he confused the metaphysical notions of divisible quantity, supposing it to be composed of unextended indivisibles; and, not venturing to affirm that infinities could be equal or unequal to one another, he preferred to say that words denoting equality or excess could only be used as to finite quantities. In his fourth dialogue, on the centre of gravity, he comes back to the exhaustive method of Archimedes.¹

12. Cavalieri, professor of mathematics at Bologna, the generally reputed father of the new geometry, though Kepler seems to have so greatly anticipated him,^{Extended by Cavalieri.} had completed his *Method of Indivisibles* in 1626. The book was not published till 1635. His leading principle is, that solids are composed of an infinite number of surfaces placed one above another as their indivisible elements. Surfaces are formed in like manner by lines, and lines by points. This, however, he asserts with some excuse and explanation; declaring that he does not use the words so strictly as to have it supposed that divisible quantities truly and literally consist of indivisibles, but that the ratio of solids is the same as that of an infinite number of surfaces, and the ratio of surfaces the same as that of an infinite number of lines; and, to put an end to cavil, he demonstrated that the same consequences would follow, if a method should be adopted, borrowing nothing from the consideration of indivisibles.² This explanation

¹ Fabroni, *Vite Italorum*.

² "Non eo rigore a se voces adhiberi, ac si dividuæ quantitates verè ac propriè ex indivisibilibus existerent; verumtamen id sibi duntaxat velle, ut proportio solidorum eadem esset ac ratio superficialium omnium numero infinitarum, et proportio superficialium eadem ac illa

infinitarum linearum: denique ut omnia, quæ contra dici poterant, in radice præcideret, demonstravit, easdem omnino conclusiones erui, si methodi aut rationes adhiberentur omnino diversæ, quæ nihil ab indivisibilium consideratione penderent." — Fabroni.

"Il n'est aucun cas dans la géométrie

seems to have been given after his method had been attacked by Guldin in 1640.

13. It was a main object of Cavalieri's geometry to demonstrate the proportions of different solids. This is partly done by Euclid, but generally in an indirect manner. A cone, according to Cavalieri, is composed of an infinite number of circles decreasing from the base to the summit; a cylinder, of an infinite number of equal circles. He seeks, therefore, the ratio of the sum of all the former to that of all the latter. The method of summing an infinite series of terms in arithmetical progression was already known. The diameters of the circles in the cone decreasing uniformly were in arithmetical progression, and the circles would be as their squares. He found, that, when the number of terms is infinitely great, the sum of all the squares described on lines in arithmetical progression is exactly one-third of the greatest square multiplied by the number of terms. Hence the cone is one-third of a cylinder of the same base and altitude; and similar proof may be given as to the ratios of other solids.

14. This bolder geometry was now very generally applied in difficult investigations. A proof was given in the celebrated problems relative to the cycloid, which served as a test of skill to the mathematicians of that age. The cycloid is the curve described by a point in a circle, while it makes one revolution along an horizontal base, as in the case of a carriage-wheel. It was far more difficult to determine its area. It was at first taken for the segment of a circle. Galileo considered it, but with no success. Mersenne, who was also unequal to the problem, suggested it to a very good geometer, Roberval, who after some years, in 1634, demonstrated that the area of the cycloid is equal to thrice the area of the generating circle. Mersenne communicated this discovery to Descartes, who, treating the matter as easy, sent a short demonstration of his own. On Roberval's intimating that he had been aided by a knowledge of the solution, Descartes found out the tangents of the curve, and challenged Roberval and Fermat to do the same. Fermat succeeded in

des indivisibles, qu'on ne puisse facilement réduire à la forme ancienne de démonstration. Ainsi, c'est s'arrêter à l'écorce que de chicaner sur le mot d'indivisibles. Il est impropre si l'on veut la géométrie; et loin de conduire à l'erreur, cette méthode, au contraire, a été utile pour atteindre à des vérités qui avoient échappé jusqu'alors aux efforts des géomètres." — *Montaigne*, vol. II. p. 30.

this; but Roberval could not achieve the problem, in which Galileo also and Cavalieri failed, though it seems to have been solved afterwards by Viviani. "Such," says Montucla, "was the superiority of Descartes over all the geometers of his age, that questions which most perplexed them cost him but an ordinary degree of attention." In this problem of the tangents (and it might not perhaps have been worth while to mention it otherwise in so brief a sketch), Descartes made use of the principle introduced by Kepler, considering the curve as a polygon of an infinite number of sides, so that an infinitely small arc is equal to its chord. The cycloid has been called by Montucla the Helen of geometers. This beauty was at least the cause of war, and produced a long controversy. The Italians claim the original invention as their own; but Montucla seems to have vindicated the right of France to every solution important in geometry. Nor were the friends of Roberval and Fermat disposed to acknowledge so much of the exclusive right of Descartes as was challenged by his disciples. Pascal, in his history of the cycloid, enters the lists on the side of Roberval. This was not published till 1658.

15. Without dwelling more minutely on geometrical treatises of less importance, though in themselves valuable, such as that of Gregory St. Vincent in 1647, or ^{Progress of} ~~Algebra~~ the Cyclometricus of Willebrod Snell in 1621, we come to the progress of analysis during this period. The works of Vieta, it may be observed, were chiefly published after the year 1600. They left, as must be admitted, not much in principle for the more splendid generalizations of Harriott and Descartes. It is not unlikely that the mere employment of a more perfect notation would have led the acute mind of Vieta to truths which seem to us who are acquainted with them but a little beyond what he discovered.

16. Briggs, in his *Arithmetica Logarithmica*, was the first who clearly showed what is called the Binomial ^{Briggs;} ~~Theorem~~, or a compendious method of involution, by ^{Girard.} means of the necessary order of co-efficients in the successive powers of a binomial quantity. Cardan had partially, and Vieta more clearly, seen this; nor, as far as his notation went, was it likely to escape the profound mind of the latter. Albert Girard, a Dutchman, in his *Invention Nouvelle en Algèbre*, 1629, conceived a better notion of negative roots

than his predecessors. Even Vieta had not paid attention to them in any solution. Girard, however, not only assigns their form, and shows that, in a certain class of cubic equations, there must always be one or two of this description, but uses this remarkable expression: "A negative solution means in geometry that the *minus* recedes as the *plus* advances."¹ It seems manifest, that, till some such idea suggested itself to the minds of analysts, the consideration of negative roots, though they could not possibly avoid perceiving their existence, would merely have confused their solutions. It cannot, therefore, be surprising that not only Cardan and Vieta, but Harriott himself, should have paid little attention to them.

17. Harriott, the companion of Sir Walter Raleigh in Virginia, and the friend of the Earl of Northumberland, in whose house he spent the latter part of his life, was destined to make the last great discovery in the pure science of algebra. Though he is mentioned here after Girard, since the *Artis Analyticæ Praxis* was not published till 1631, this was ten years after the author's death. Harriott arrived at a complete theory of the genesis of equations, which Cardan and Vieta had but partially conceived. By bringing all the terms on one side, so as to make them equal to zero, he found out that every unknown quantity in an equation has as many values as the index of its powers in the first term denotes; and that these values, in a necessary sequence of combinations, form the co-efficients of the succeeding terms into which the decreasing powers of the unknown quantity enter, as they do also, by their united product, the last or known term of the equation. This discovery facilitated the solution of equations by the necessary composition of their terms which it displayed. It was evident, for example, that each integral root of an equation must be a factor, and consequently a divisor, of the last term.²

18. Harriott introduced the use of small letters instead of capitals in algebra; he employed vowels for unknown, consonants for known quantities, and joined them to express their

¹ "La solution par moins s'explique en géométrie en rétrogradant, et le moins recule où le plus avance." — Montucla, p. 112.

² Harriott's book is a thin folio of a hundred and eighty pages, with very little besides examples; for his principles are shortly and obscurely laid down. Whoever is the author of the preface to this

work cannot be said to have suppressed or extenuated the merits of Vieta, or to have claimed any thing for Harriott but what he is allowed to have deserved. Montucla justly observes, that Harriott very rarely makes an equation equal to zero, by bringing all the quantities to one side of the equation.

product.¹ There is certainly not much in this; but its evident convenience renders it wonderful that it should have been reserved for so late an era. Wallis, in his *History of Algebra*, ascribes to Harriott a long list of discoveries, which have been reclaimed for Cardan and Vieta, the great founders of the higher algebra, by Cossali and Montucla.² The latter of these writers has been charged, even by foreigners, with similar injustice towards our countryman; and that he has been provoked by what he thought the unfairness of Wallis to something like a depreciation of Harriott, seems as clear as that he has himself robbed Cardan of part of his due credit in swelling the account of Vieta's discoveries. From the general integrity, however, of Montucla's writings, I am much inclined to acquit him of any wilful partiality.

19. Harriott had shown what were the hidden laws of algebra, as the science of symbolical notation. But one man, the pride of France and wonder of his contemporaries, was destined to flash light upon the labors of the analyst, and to point out what those symbols, so darkly and painfully traced, and resulting commonly in irrational or even impossible forms, might represent and explain. The use of numbers, or of letters denoting numbers, for lines and rectangles capable of division into aliquot parts, had long been too obvious to be overlooked, and is only a compendious abbreviation of geometrical proof. The next step made was the perceiving that irrational numbers, as they are called, represent incommensurable quantities; that is, if unity be taken for the side of a square, the square-root of two will represent its diagonal. Gradually, the application of numerical and algebraical calculation to the solution of problems respecting magnitude became more frequent and refined.³ It is certain, however, that no one before Descartes had employed algebraic formulæ in the construction of curves; that is, had taught the inverse process, not only how to express diagrams by algebra, but how to turn algebra into diagrams. The ancient geometers, he observes, were scrupulous about using the language of arithmetic in geometry,

¹ Oughtred, in his *Clavis Mathematicæ*, published in 1631, abbreviated the rules of Vieta, though he still used capital letters. He also gave succinctly the praxis of algebra, or the elementary rules we find in our common books, which, though what are now first learned, were, from the singular course of algebraical history,

discovered late. They are, however, given also by Harriott. Wallis's *Algebra*.

² These may be found in the article "Harriott" of the *Biographia Britannica*. Wallis, however, does not suppress the honor due to Vieta quite as much as is intimated by Montucla.

³ See note in vol. II. p. 315.

which could only proceed from their not perceiving the relation between the two; and this has produced a great deal of obscurity and embarrassment in some of their demonstrations.¹

20. The principle which Descartes establishes is, that every curve of those which are called geometrical has its fundamental equation expressing the constant relation between the absciss and the ordinate. Thus the rectangle under the absciss of a diameter of the circle is equal to the square of the ordinate; and the other conic sections, as well as higher curves, have each their leading property, which determines their nature, and shows how they may be generated. A simple equation can only express the relation of straight lines: the solutions of a quadratic must be found in one of the four conic sections, and the higher powers of an unknown quantity lead to curves of a superior order. The beautiful and extensive theory developed by Descartes in this short treatise displays a most consummate felicity of genius. That such a man, endowed with faculties so original, should have encroached on the just rights of others, is what we can only believe with reluctance.

21. It must, however, be owned, that, independently of the suspicions of an unacknowledged appropriation of what others had thought before him, which unfortunately hang over all the writings of Descartes, he has taken to himself the whole theory of Harriott on the nature of equations, in a manner which, if it is not a remarkable case of simultaneous invention, can only be reckoned a very unwarrantable plagiarism. For not only he does not name Harriott, but he evidently introduces the subject as an important discovery of his own, and, in one of his letters, asserts his originality in the most positive language.² Still

¹ Œuvres de Descartes, v. 323.
² "Tant s'en faut que les choses que j'ai écrites puissent être aisément tirées de Viète, qu'au contraire ce qui est cause que mon traité est difficile à entendre, c'est que j'ai tâché à n'y rien mettre que ce que j'ai cru n'avoir point été au ni par lui ni par aucun autre; comme on peut voir si on confère ce que j'ai écrit du nombre des racines qui sont en chaque équation, dans la page 372, qui est l'endroit où je commence à donner les règles de mon algèbre, avec ce que Viète en a écrit tout à la fin de son livre, De Emendatione Equationum; car on verra que

je le détermine généralement toutes équations, au lieu que lui n'en ayant donné que quelques exemples particuliers, dont il fait toutefois si grand état qu'il a voulu conclure son livre par là, il a montré qu'il ne le pouvoit déterminer en général. Et ainsi j'ai commencé où il avoit achevé, ce que j'ai fait toutefois sans y penser; car j'ai plus feuilleté Viète depuis que j'ai reçu votre dernière que je n'avois jamais fait auparavant, l'ayant trouvé ici par hasard entre les mains d'un de mes amis; et entre nous, je ne trouve pas qu'il en ait tant su que je pensois, nonobstant qu'il fût fort ha-

it is quite possible, that, prepared as the way had been by Vieta, and gifted as Descartes was with a wonderfully intuitive acuteness in all mathematical reasoning, he may in this, as in other instances, have divined the whole theory by himself. Montucla extols the algebra of Descartes, that is, so much of it as can be fairly claimed for him without any precursor, very highly; and some of his inventions in the treatment of equations have long been current in books on that science. He was the first who showed what were called impossible or imaginary roots, though he never assigns them, deeming them no quantities at all. He was also, perhaps, the first who fully understood negative roots, though he still retains the appellation, false roots, which is not so good as Harriott's epithet, privative. According to his panegyrist, he first pointed out, that, in every equation (the terms being all on one side) which has no imaginary roots, there are as many changes of signs as positive roots, as many continuations of them as negative.

22. The geometer next in genius to Descartes, and perhaps nearer to him than to any third, was Fermat, a man of various acquirements, of high rank in the Par-^{Fermat}liament of Toulouse, and of a mind incapable of envy, forgiving of detraction, and delighting in truth, with almost too much indifference to praise. The works of Fermat were not published till long after his death in 1665; but his frequent discussions with Descartes, by the intervention of their common correspondent Mersenne, render this place more appropriate for the introduction of his name. In these controversies, Descartes never behaved to Fermat with the respect due to his talents: in fact, no one was ever more jealous of his own pre-eminence, or more unwilling to acknowledge the claims of those who scrupled to follow him implicitly, and who might in any manner be thought rivals of his fame. Yet it is this unhappy temper of Descartes which ought to render us more

ble." This is in a letter to Mersenne in 1637. (*Œuvres de Descartes*, vol. vi. p. 300.)

The charge of plagiarism from Harriott was brought against Descartes in his lifetime: Roberval, when an English gentleman showed him the *Artis Analyticæ Praxis*, exclaimed eagerly, "Il l'a vu! il l'a vu!" It is also a very suspicious circumstance, if true, as it appears to be, that Descartes was in England the year (1631) that Harriott's work appeared. Carcavi, a friend of Roberval, in a letter

to Descartes in 1649, plainly intimates to him that he has only copied Harriott as to the nature of equations. (*Œuvres de Descartes*, vol. x. p. 373. To this accusation Descartes made no reply. See *Biographie Britannica*, art. "Harriott." The *Biographie Universelle* unfairly suppresses all mention of this, and labors to depreciate Harriott.

See Leibnitz's catalogue of the supposed thefts of Descartes in vol. iii. p. 100 of this work.

slow to credit the suspicions of his designed plagiarism from the discoveries of others; since this, combined with his unwillingness to acknowledge their merits, and affected ignorance of their writings, would form a character we should not readily ascribe to a man of great genius, and whose own writings give many apparent indications of sincerity and virtue. But, in fact, there was in this age a great probability of simultaneous invention in science, from developing principles that had been partially brought to light. Thus Roberval discovered the same method of indivisibles as Cavalieri, and Descartes must equally have been led to his theory of tangents by that of Kepler. Fermat also, who was in possession of his principal discoveries before the geometry of Descartes saw the light, derived from Kepler his own celebrated method, *de maximis et minimis*; a method of discovering the greatest or least value of a variable quantity, such as the ordinate of a curve. It depends on the same principle as that of Kepler. From this he deduced a rule for drawing tangents to curves different from that of Descartes. This led to a controversy between the two geometers, carried on by Descartes, who yet is deemed to have been in the wrong, with his usual quickness of resentment. Several other discoveries, both in pure algebra and geometry, illustrate the name of Fermat.¹

23. The new geometry of Descartes was not received with the universal admiration it deserved. Besides its conciseness, and the inroad it made on old prejudices as to geometrical methods, the general boldness of the author's speculations in physical and metaphysical philosophy, as well as his indiscreet temper, alienated many who ought to have appreciated it; and it was in his own country, where he had ceased to reside, that Descartes had the fewest admirers. Roberval made some objections to his rival's algebra, but with little success. A commentary on the treatise of Descartes by Schooten, professor of geometry at Leyden, first appeared in 1649.

24. Among those who devoted themselves ardently and successfully to astronomical observations at the end of the sixteenth century, was John Kepler, a native of Wirtemberg, who had already shown that he was likely to inherit the mantle of Tycho Brahe. He published some

¹ A good article on Fermat by M. Maurice will be found in the *Biographie Universelle*.

astronomical treatises of comparatively small importance in the first years of the present period; but in 1609 he made an epoch in that science by his *Astronomia Nova αἰτιολογητὴς*, or Commentaries on the Planet Mars. It had been always assumed, that the heavenly bodies revolve in circular orbits round their centre, whether this were taken to be the sun or the earth. There was, however, an apparent eccentricity or deviation from this circular motion, which it had been very difficult to explain; and, for this, Ptolemy had devised his complex system of epicycles. No planet showed more of this eccentricity than Mars; and it was to Mars that Kepler turned his attention. After many laborious researches, he was brought by degrees to the great discovery, that the motion of the planets, among which, having adopted the Copernican system, he reckoned the earth, is not performed in circular but in elliptical orbits, the sun not occupying the centre, but one of the foci of the curve; and, secondly, that it is performed with such a varying velocity, that the areas described by the radius-vector, or line which joins this focus to the revolving planet, are always proportional to the times. A planet, therefore, moves less rapidly as it becomes more distant from the sun. These are the first and second of the three great laws of Kepler. The third was not discovered by him till some years afterwards. He tells us himself, that on the 8th of May, 1618, after long toil in investigating the proportion of the periodic times of the planetary movements to their orbits, an idea struck his mind, which, chancing to make a mistake in the calculation, he soon rejected; but, a week after, returning to the subject, he entirely established his grand discovery, that the squares of the times of revolution are as the cubes of the mean distances of the planets. This was first made known to the world in his *Mysterium Cosmographicum*, published in 1619; a work mingled up with many strange effusions of a mind far more eccentric than any of the planets with which it was engaged. In the *Epitome Astronomiæ Copernicanæ*, printed the same year, he endeavors to deduce this law from his theory of centrifugal forces. He had no small insight into the principles of universal gravitation, as an attribute of matter; but several of his assumptions as to the laws of motion are not consonant to truth. There seems, indeed, to have been a considerable degree of good fortune in the discoveries of Kepler; yet this may be

deemed the reward of his indefatigable laboriousness, and of the ingenuousness with which he renounced any hypothesis that he could not reconcile with his advancing knowledge of the phenomena.

25. The appearance of three comets in 1618 called once more the astronomers of Europe to speculate on the nature of those anomalous bodies. They still passed for harbingers of worldly catastrophes; and those who feared them least could not interpret their apparent irregularity. Galileo, though Tycho Brahe had formed a juster notion, unfortunately took them for atmospheric meteors. Kepler, though he brought them from the far regions of space, did not suspect the nature of their orbits, and thought that, moving in straight lines, they were finally dispersed, and came to nothing. But a Jesuit, Grassi, in a treatise, *De Tribus Cometis*, Rome, 1619, had the honor of explaining what had baffled Galileo, and first held them to be planets moving in vast ellipses round the sun.¹

26. But, long before this time, the name of Galileo had become immortal by discoveries, which, though they would certainly have soon been made by some other, perhaps far inferior, observer, were happily reserved for the most philosophical genius of the age. Galileo assures us, that, having heard of the invention of an instrument in Holland which enlarged the size of distant objects, but knowing nothing of its construction, he began to study the theory of refractions, till he found by experiment, that, by means of a convex and concave glass in a tube, he could magnify an object threefold. He was thus encouraged to make another which magnified thirty times; and this he exhibited in the autumn of 1609 to the inhabitants of Venice. Having made a present of his first telescope to the senate, who rewarded him with a pension, he soon constructed another; and in one of the first nights of January, 1610, directing it towards the moon, was astonished to see her surface and edges covered with inequalities. These he considered to be mountains, and judged by a sort of measurement that some of them must exceed those of the earth. His next observation was of the milky way; and this he found to derive its nebulous lustre from myriads of stars not distinguishable, through their remoteness, by the unassisted sight of man. The nebulae in

Galileo's
discovery of
Jupiter's
satellites.

Conjectures
as to
comets.

¹ The Biogr. Univ., art. "Grassi," ascribes this opinion to Tycho.

the constellation Orion he perceived to be of the same character. Before his delight at these discoveries could have subsided, he turned his telescope to Jupiter, and was surprised to remark three small stars, which, in a second night's observation, had changed their places. In the course of a few weeks, he was able to determine by their revolutions, which are very rapid, that these are secondary planets, the moons or satellites of Jupiter; and he had added a fourth to their number. These marvellous revelations of nature he hastened to announce in a work, aptly entitled *Sidereus Nuncius*, published in March, 1610. In an age when the fascinating science of astronomy had already so much excited the minds of philosophers, it may be guessed with what eagerness this intelligence from the heavens was circulated. A few, as usual, through envy or prejudice, affected to condemn it. But wisdom was justified of her children. Kepler, in his *Narratio de Observationibus a se Quatuor Jovis Satellitibus*, 1610, confirmed the discoveries of Galileo. Peiresc, an inferior name no doubt, but deserving of every praise for his zeal in the cause of knowledge, having with difficulty procured a good telescope, saw the four satellites in November, 1610; and is said by Gassendi to have conceived at that time the ingenious idea, that their occultations might be used to ascertain the longitude.¹

27. This is the greatest and most important of the discoveries of Galileo. But several others were of the deepest interest. He found that the planet Venus Other discoveries by him. had phases, that is, periodical differences of apparent form, like the moon; and that these are exactly such as would be produced by the variable reflection of the sun's light on the Copernican hypothesis; ascribing also the faint light on that part of the moon which does not receive the rays of the sun, to the reflection from the earth, called by some late writers earth-shine; which, though it had been suggested by Mæstlin, and before him by Leonardo da Vinci, was not generally received among astronomers. Another striking phenomenon, though he did not see the means of explaining it, was the triple appearance of Saturn, as if smaller stars were conjoined, as it were, like wings to the planet. This, of course, was the ring.

28. Meantime the new auxiliary of vision which had

¹ Gassendi, *Vita Peirescii*, p. 77.

appeared in many winters could not be remembered in the names of winters. A parchment of John Fabricius on the sun dated at Würzburg in July, 1610, De Maculis in Sole, was announced a parchment in contradiction of common prejudice. The sun had passed for a body of liquid flame, and it thought would still in a state of perfect ignition. Kepler had some years before observed a spot, which he un-
 luckily mistook for the orb of Mercury in its passage over the solar orb. Fabricius was not permitted to claim this discovery as his own. Scheiner, a Jesuit professor of mathematics at Ingolstadt asserts, in a letter dated 12th of November, 1611, that he first saw the spots in the month of March in that year; but he seems to have paid little attention to them before that of October. Both Fabricius, however, and Scheiner, may be put out of the question. We have evidence that Harriott observed the spots on the sun as early as December 8th, 1610.¹ The motion of the spots suggested the revolution of the sun round its axis completed in twenty-four days, as it is now determined; and their frequent alterations of form as well as occasional disappearance could only be explained by the hypothesis of a luminous atmosphere in commotion, a sea of flame, revealing at intervals the dark central mass of the sun's body which it envelops.

29. Though it cannot be said, perhaps, that the discoveries of Galileo fully prove the Copernican system of the world to those who were already insensible to reasoning from its sufficiency to explain the phenomena, and from the analogies of nature, they served to familiarize the mind to it, and to break down the strong rampart of prejudice which stood in its way. For eighty years, it has been said, this theory of the earth's motion had been maintained without censure; and it could only be the greater boldness of Galileo in its assertion which drew down upon him the notice of the church. But, in these eighty years since the publication of the treatise of Copernicus, his proselytes had been surprisingly few. They were now becoming more numerous: several had written on that side; and Galileo had begun to form a school of Copernicans who were spreading over Italy. The Lincean society, one of the most useful and renowned of Italian academies, founded at Rome

¹ [Montucla, li. 106; Hutton's Dictionary, art. "Harriott." The claim of Harriott had been established by Zach, in Berlin Transactions for 1788. — 1842.]

by Frederic Cesi, a young man of noble birth, in 1603, had as a fundamental law to apply themselves to natural philosophy; and it was impossible that so attractive and rational a system as that of Copernicus could fail of pleasing an acute and ingenious nation strongly bent upon science. The church, however, had taken alarm: the motion of the earth was conceived to be as repugnant to Scripture as the existence of antipodes had once been reckoned; and, in 1616, Galileo, though respected, and in favor with the court of Rome, was compelled to promise that he would not maintain that doctrine in any manner. Some letters that he had published on the subject were put, with the treatise of Copernicus and other works, into the *Index Expurgatorius*, where, I believe, they still remain.¹

30. He seems, notwithstanding this, to have flattered himself, that, after several years had elapsed, he might elude the letter of this prohibition by throwing the arguments in favor of the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems into the form of a dialogue. This was published in 1632; and he might, from various circumstances, not unreasonably hope for impunity. But his expectations were deceived. It is well known that he was compelled by the Inquisition at Rome, into whose hands he fell, to retract in the most solemn and explicit manner the propositions he had so well proved, and which he must have still believed. It is unnecessary to give a circumstantial account, especially as it has been so well done in the *Life of Galileo* by the late Mr. Drinkwater Bethune. The Papal court meant to humiliate Galileo, and through him to strike an increasing class of philosophers with shame and terror; but not otherwise to punish one of whom even the inquisitors must, as Italians, have been proud: his confinement, though Montucla says it lasted for a year, was very short. He continued, nevertheless, under some restraint for the rest of his life, and, though he

His dialogue, and persecution.

¹ Drinkwater Bethune's *Life of Galileo*; Fabroni, *Vite Italiane*, vol. i. The former seems to be mistaken in supposing that Galileo did not endeavor to prove his system compatible with Scripture. In a letter to Christina, the Grand Duchess of Tuscany, the author (Fabroni) of the *Life* in Fabroni's work tells us, he argued very elaborately for that purpose. "In ea videlicet epistola philosophus noster ita dicitur, ut nihil etiam ab hominibus, qui omnem in sacrarum literarum studio

consumpissent mentem, aut subtilitas aut veritas aut etiam accuratius explicatum expectari potuerit." — p. 118. It seems, in fact, to have been this over-desire to prove his theory orthodox, which incensed the church against it. See an extraordinary article on this subject in the eighth number of the *Dublin Review* (1838). Many will tolerate propositions inconsistent with orthodoxy, when they are not brought into immediate juxtaposition with it.

revealed so many wonders could not lie unemployed in the hands of others. A publication by John Fabricius at Wittenberg, in July, 1611, *De Maculis in Sole visis*, announced a phenomenon in contradiction of common prejudice. The sun had passed for a body of liquid flame, or, if thought solid, still in a state of perfect ignition. Kepler had some years before observed a spot, which he unluckily mistook for the orb of Mercury in its passage over the solar orb. Fabricius was not permitted to claim this discovery as his own. Scheiner, a Jesuit, professor of mathematics at Ingolstadt, asserts, in a letter dated 12th of November, 1611, that he first saw the spots in the month of March in that year; but he seems to have paid little attention to them before that of October. Both Fabricius, however, and Scheiner, may be put out of the question. We have evidence that Harriott observed the spots on the sun as early as December 8th, 1610.¹ The motion of the spots suggested the revolution of the sun round its axis completed in twenty-four days, as it is now determined; and their frequent alterations of form as well as occasional disappearance could only be explained by the hypothesis of a luminous atmosphere in commotion, a sea of flame, revealing at intervals the dark central mass of the sun's body which it envelops.

29. Though it cannot be said, perhaps, that the discoveries of Galileo would fully prove the Copernican system of the world to those who were already insensible to reasoning from its sufficiency to explain the phenomena, and from the analogies of nature, they served to familiarize the mind to it, and to break down the strong rampart of prejudice which stood in its way. For eighty years, it has been said, this theory of the earth's motion had been maintained without censure; and it could only be the greater boldness of Galileo in its assertion which drew down upon him the notice of the church. But, in these eighty years since the publication of the treatise of Copernicus, his proselytes had been surprisingly few. They were now becoming more numerous: several had written on that side; and Galileo had begun to form a school of Copernicans who were spreading over Italy. The Lincean society, one of the most useful and renowned of Italian academies, founded at Rome

Copernican system held by Galileo.

¹ [Montucla, li. 106; Hutton's Dictionary, art. "Harriott." The claim of Harriott had been established by Zach, in Berlin Transactions for 1788. — 1842.]

by Frederic Cesi, a young man of noble birth, in 1603, had as a fundamental law to apply themselves to natural philosophy; and it was impossible that so attractive and rational a system as that of Copernicus could fail of pleasing an acute and ingenious nation strongly bent upon science. The church, however, had taken alarm: the motion of the earth was conceived to be as repugnant to Scripture as the existence of antipodes had once been reckoned; and, in 1616, Galileo, though respected, and in favor with the court of Rome, was compelled to promise that he would not maintain that doctrine in any manner. Some letters that he had published on the subject were put, with the treatise of Copernicus and other works, into the *Index Expurgatorius*, where, I believe, they still remain.¹

30. He seems, notwithstanding this, to have flattered himself, that, after several years had elapsed, he might elude the letter of this prohibition by throwing the arguments in favor of the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems into the form of a dialogue. This was published in 1632; and he might, from various circumstances, not unreasonably hope for impunity. But his expectations were deceived. It is well known that he was compelled by the Inquisition at Rome, into whose hands he fell, to retract in the most solemn and explicit manner the propositions he had so well proved, and which he must have still believed. It is unnecessary to give a circumstantial account, especially as it has been so well done in the *Life of Galileo* by the late Mr. Drinkwater Bethune. The Papal court meant to humiliate Galileo, and through him to strike an increasing class of philosophers with shame and terror; but not otherwise to punish one of whom even the inquisitors must, as Italians, have been proud: his confinement, though Montucla says it lasted for a year, was very short. He continued, nevertheless, under some restraint for the rest of his life, and, though he

His dialogue, and persecution.

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lived at his own villa near Florence, was not permitted to enter the city.¹

31. The church was not mistaken in supposing that she should intimidate the Copernicans, but very much alarmed by so in expecting to suppress the theory. Descartes was so astonished at hearing of the sentence on Galileo, that he was almost disposed to burn his papers, or at least to let no one see them. "I cannot collect," he says, "that he who is an Italian, and a friend of the pope, as I understand, has been criminated on any other account than for having attempted to establish the motion of the earth. I know that this opinion was formerly censured by some cardinals; but I thought I had since heard that no objection was now made to its being publicly taught even at Rome."² It seems not at all unlikely that Descartes was induced, on this account, to pretend a greater degree of difference from Copernicus than he really felt, and even to deny, in a certain sense of his own, the obnoxious tenet of the earth's motion.³ He was not without danger of a sentence against truth nearer at hand; Cardinal Richelieu having had the intention of procuring a decree of the Sorbonne to the same effect, which, through the good sense of some of that society, fell to the ground.⁴

32. The progress, however, of the Copernican theory in Europe, if it may not actually be dated from its condemnation at Rome, was certainly not at all slower after that time. Gassendi rather cautiously took that side; the Cartesians brought a powerful re-enforcement; Bouillaud and several other astronomers of note avowed themselves favorable to a doctrine, which, though in Italy it lay under the ban of the Papal power, was readily saved on this side of the Alps by some of the salutary distinctions long in use to evade that authority.⁵ But in the middle of the seventeenth century, and long afterwards, there were mathe-

¹ Fabrini. His Life is written in good Latin, with knowledge and spirit, more than Tiraboschi has ventured to display.

It appears from some of Grotius's Epistles, that Galileo had thoughts, about 1635, of seeking the protection of the United Provinces. But, on account of his advanced age, he gave this up: "Fessus senio constituit manere in quibus est locus, et potius quæ ibi sunt incommode perpeti, quam malæ etati migrandi onus, et novæ parandæ amicitias imponere."

The very idea shows that he must have deeply felt the restraint imposed upon him in his country. Epist. Grot., 407, 446.

² Vol. vi. p. 230: he says here of the motion of the earth, "Je confesse que s'il est faux, tous les fondemens de ma philosophie le sont aussi."

³ Vol. vi. p. 50.

⁴ Montucla, ii. 297.

⁵ Id., ii. 50.

maticians, of no small reputation, who struggled staunchly for the immobility of the earth; and, except so far as Cartesian theories might have come in vogue, we have no reason to believe that any persons unacquainted with astronomy, either in this country or on the Continent, had embraced the system of Copernicus. Hume has censured Bacon for rejecting it; but, if Bacon had not done so, he would have anticipated the rest of his countrymen by a full quarter of a century.

33. Descartes, in his new theory of the solar system, aspired to explain the secret springs of nature, while Kepler and Galileo had merely showed their effects. By what force the heavenly bodies were impelled, by what law they were guided, was certainly a very different question from that of the orbit they described or the period of their revolution. Kepler had evidently some notion of that universally mutual gravitation which Hooke saw more clearly, and Newton established on the basis of his geometry.¹ But Descartes rejected this with contempt. "For," he says, "to conceive this, we must not only suppose that every portion of matter in the universe is animated, and animated by several different souls which do not obstruct one another, but that those souls are intelligent, and even divine; that they may know what is going on in the most remote places without any messenger to give them notice, and that they may exert their powers there."² Kepler, who took the world for a single animal, a leviathan that roared in caverns and breathed in the ocean-tides, might have found it difficult to answer this, which would have seemed no objection at all to Campanella. If Descartes himself had been more patient towards opinions which he had not formed in his own mind, that constant divine agency, to which he was, on other occasions, apt to resort, could not but have suggested a sufficient explanation of the gravity of matter, without endowing it with self-agency. He had, however, fallen upon a complicated and original scheme, the most celebrated, perhaps, though not the most admirable, of the novelties which Descartes brought into philosophy.

34. In a letter to Mersenne, Jan. 9th, 1639, he shortly states that notion of the material universe which he afterwards

¹ "If the earth and moon," he says, "were not retained in their orbits, they would fall one on another; the moon moving about $\frac{1}{2}$ of the way, the earth the rest, supposing them equally dense." By

this attraction of the moon, he accounts for tides. He compares the attraction of the planet towards the sun to that of heavy bodies towards the earth.

² Vol. ix. p. 580.

continent of Europe for nearly a century, till the simplicity of the Newtonian system, and, above all, its conformity to the reality of things, gained an undisputed predominance. Besides the arbitrary suppositions of Descartes, and the various objections that were raised against the absolute plenum of space and other parts of his theory, it has been urged that his vortices are not reconcilable, according to the laws of motion in fluids, with the relation, ascertained by Kepler, between the periods and distances of the planets; nor does it appear why the sun should be in the focus, rather than in the centre of their orbits. Yet within a few years it has seemed not impossible that a part of his bold conjectures will enter once more with soberer steps into the schools of philosophy. His doctrine as to the nature of light, improved as it was by Huygens, is daily gaining ground over that of Newton; that of a subtle ether pervading space, which in fact is nearly the same thing, is becoming a favorite speculation, if we are not yet to call it an established truth; and the affirmative of a problem which an eminent writer has started, whether this ether has a vorticose motion round the sun, would not leave us very far from the philosophy which it has been so long our custom to turn into ridicule.

37. The passage of Mercury over the sun was witnessed by Gassendi in 1631. This phenomenon, though it excited great interest in that age, from its having been previously announced, so as to furnish a test of astronomical accuracy, recurs too frequently to be now considered as of high importance. The transit of Venus is much more rare. It occurred on Dec. 4, 1639, and was then only seen by Horrox, a young Englishman of extraordinary mathematical genius. There is reason to ascribe an invention of great importance, though not perhaps of extreme difficulty, — that of the micrometer, — to Horrox.

38. The satellites of Jupiter and the phases of Venus are not so glorious in the scutcheon of Galileo as his discovery of the true principles of mechanics. These, as we have seen in the preceding volume, were very imperfectly known till he appeared; nor had the additions to that science since the time of Archimedes been important. The treatise of Galileo, *Della Scienza Mecanica*, has been said, I know not on what authority, to have been written in 1592. It was not published, however, till 1634, and then only in a

Transits of
Mercury
and Venus

Laws of
mechanics

French translation by Mersenne; the original not appearing till 1649. This is chiefly confined to statics, or the doctrine of equilibrium: it was in his dialogues on motion, *Della Nuova Scienza*, published in 1638, that he developed his great principles of the science of dynamics, the moving forces of bodies. Galileo was induced to write his treatise on mechanics, as he tells us, in consequence of the fruitless attempts he witnessed in engineers to raise weights by a small force, "as if with their machines they could cheat nature, whose instinct as it were by fundamental law is, that no resistance can be overcome except by a superior force." But as one man may raise a weight to the height of a foot by dividing it into equal portions, commensurate to his power, which many men could not raise at once; so a weight, which raises another greater than itself, may be considered as doing so by successive instalments of force, during each of which it traverses as much space as a corresponding portion of the larger weight. Hence the velocity, of which space uniformly traversed in a given time is the measure, is inversely as the masses of the weights; and thus the equilibrium of the straight lever is maintained, when the weights are inversely as their distance from the fulcrum. As this equilibrium of unequal weights depends on the velocities they would have if set in motion, its law has been called the principle of virtual velocities. No theorem has been of more important utility to mankind. It is one of those great truths of science, which, combating and conquering enemies from opposite quarters, — prejudice and empiricism, — justify the name of philosophy against both classes. The waste of labor and expense in machinery would have been incalculably greater in modern times, could we imagine this law of nature not to have been discovered; and, as their misapplication prevents their employment in a proper direction, we owe, in fact, to Galileo the immense effect which a right application of it has produced. It is possible that Galileo was ignorant of the demonstration given by Stevinus of the law of equilibrium in the inclined plane. His own is different; but he seems only to consider the case when the direction of the force is parallel to that of the plane.

89. Still less was known of the principles of dynamics than of those of statics, till Galileo came to investigate them. The acceleration of falling bodies, whether perpendicularly

or on inclined planes, was evident; but, in what ratio this took place, no one had succeeded in determining. ^{His dyna-} though many had offered conjectures. He showed ^{mics.} that the velocity acquired was proportional to the time from the commencement of falling. This might now be demonstrated from the laws of motion; but Galileo, who did not perhaps distinctly know them, made use of experiment. He then proved by reasoning that the spaces traversed in falling were as the squares of the times or velocities; that their increments in equal times were as the uneven numbers, 1, 3, 5, 7, and so forth; and that the whole space was half what would have been traversed uniformly from the beginning with the final velocity. These are the great laws of accelerated and retarded motion, from which Galileo deduced most important theorems. He showed that the time in which bodies roll down the length of inclined planes is equal to that in which they would fall down the height, and in different planes is proportionate to the height; and that their acquired velocity is in the same ratios. In some propositions he was deceived; but the science of dynamics owes more to Galileo than to any one philosopher. The motion of projectiles had never been understood: he showed it to be parabolic; and, in this, he not only necessarily made use of a principle of vast extent, that of compound motion (which, though it is clearly mentioned in one passage by Aristotle,¹ and may probably be implied, or even asserted, in the reasonings of others, as has been observed in another place with respect to Jordano Bruno, does not seem to have been explicitly laid down by modern writers on mechanical science), but must have seen the principle of curvilinear deflection by forces acting in infinitely small portions of time. The ratio between the times of vibration in pendulums of unequal length had early attracted Galileo's attention. But he did not reach the geometrical exactness of which this subject is capable.² He developed a new principle as to the resistance of solids to the fracture of their parts, which, though Descartes as usual treated it with scorn, is now established in philosophy. "One forms, however," says Playfair, "a very imperfect idea of this philosopher from considering the discoveries and inventions, numerous and splendid as they are, of which he was the undisputed author. It is by following his reasonings, and by pursuing the train of his thoughts,

¹ Drinkwater's *Life of Galileo*, p. 80.

² Fabroni.

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¹ Drinkwater's *Life of Galileo*, p. 80.

² Fabroni.

Nor would he allow that the velocity of a body augments its force, though it is a concomitant.¹

41. Descartes, however, is the first who laid down the laws of motion; especially that all bodies persist in their present state of rest or uniform rectilinear motion till affected by some force. Many had thought, as the vulgar always do, that a continuance of rest was natural to bodies, but did not perceive that the same principle of inertia or inactivity was applicable to them in rectilinear motion. Whether this is deducible from theory, or depends wholly on experience, by which we ought to mean experiment, is a question we need not discuss. The fact, however, is equally certain; and hence Descartes inferred that every curvilinear deflection is produced by some controlling force, from which the body strives to escape in the direction of a tangent to the curve. The most erroneous part of his mechanical philosophy is contained in some propositions as to the collision of bodies, so palpably incompatible with obvious experience that it seems truly wonderful he could ever have adopted them. But he was led into these paradoxes by one of the arbitrary hypotheses which always governed him. He fancied it a necessary consequence, from the immutability of the divine nature, that there should be at all times the same quantity of motion in the universe; and, rather than abandon this singular assumption, he did not hesitate to assert, that two hard bodies striking each other in opposite directions would be reflected with no loss of velocity; and, what is still more outrageously paradoxical, that a smaller body is incapable of communicating motion to a greater; for example, that the red billiard-ball cannot put the white into motion. This manifest absurdity he endeavored to remove by the arbitrary supposition, that when we see, as we constantly do, the reverse of his theorem take place, it is owing to the air, which, according to him, renders bodies more susceptible of motion than they would naturally be.

Laws of motion laid down by Descartes.

bon les nombres impairs, 1, 3, 5, 7, &c., qui est dans Galilée, et que je crois vous avoir aussi écrite autrefois, ne peut être vraie, qu'en supposant deux ou trois choses qui sont très fausses, dont l'une est que le mouvement croît par degrés depuis le plus lent, ainsi que le songe Galilée, et l'autre que la résistance de l'air n'empêche point."—Vol. ix. p. 349.

¹ "Je pense que la vitesse n'est pas la

cause de l'augmentation de la force, encore qu'elle l'accompagne toujours."—Id., p. 356. See also vol. viii. p. 14. He was probably perplexed by the metaphysical notion of causation, which he knew not how to ascribe to mere velocity. The fact that increased velocity is a condition or antecedent of augmented force could not be doubted.

42. Though Galileo, as well as others, must have been acquainted with the laws of the composition of motions, it does not appear that they had ever been

so distinctly enumerated as in Descartes in a passage of his *Discourse*. That the doctrine was in some measure new, may be inferred from the objections of Fermat; and (perhaps) some years afterwards, speaks of persons "not much versed in mathematics, who cannot understand an argument drawn from the nature of compound motion."²

43. Roberval demonstrated what seems to have been assumed by Galileo, and is immediately deducible from the composition of forces, that weights on an inclined or curved lever balance each other, when they are inversely as the perpendiculars drawn from the centre of motion in their direction. Fermat, more versed in geometry than physics, disputed this theorem, which is now quite elementary. Descartes, in a letter to Mersenne, ungraciously records his agreement with it.³ Torricelli, the most illustrious disciple of Galileo, established, that when weights balance each other in all positions, their common centre of gravity does not ascend or descend, and conversely.

44. Galileo, in a treatise entitled *De Caele Caele stanno* in hydrostatics, lays down the principles of hydrostatics already established by Stevin, and among others, what is called the hydrostatical paradox. Whether he was acquainted with Stevin's writings may be perhaps doubted: it does not appear that he mentions them. The more difficult science of hydraulics was entirely created by two disciples of Galileo, — Castelli and Torricelli. It is one everywhere of high importance, and especially in Italy. The work of Castelli, *Della Misura dell'Acque Correnti*, and a continuation, were published at Rome in 1628. His practical skill in hydraulics, displayed in carrying off the stagnant waters of the Arno and in many other public works, seems to have exceeded his theoretical science. An

¹ Vol. v. p. 12.

² Vol. vi. p. 59.

³ "Je suis de l'opinion," says Descartes, "de ceux qui disent que poudra sont en equilibrio quando sunt in ratione reciproca linearum perpendicularium." &c. — Vol. ix. p. 361. He would not name Roberval; one of those little names which appear too frequently in his letters, and in all his writings. Descartes, in fact, could not

bear to think that another, even though not an enemy, had discovered any thing. In the preceding page he says, "C'est une chose ridicule que de vouloir employer la raison du levier dans la pesanteur, ce qui est, si j'ai bonne mémoire, une imagination de Guido Ubaldo." Yet this imagination is demonstrated in all our elementary books on mechanics.

error into which he fell, supposing the velocity of fluids to be as the height down which they had descended, led to false results. Torricelli proved that it was as the square root of the altitude. The latter of these two was still more distinguished by his discovery of the barometer. The principle of the siphon or sucking-pump, and the impossibility of raising water in it more than about thirty-three feet, were both well known; but even Galileo had recourse to the clumsy explanation, that Nature limited her supposed horror of a vacuum to this altitude. It occurred to the sagacity of Torricelli, that the weight of the atmospheric column pressing upon the fluid which supplied the pump was the cause of this rise above its level, and that the degree of rise was consequently the measure of that weight. That the air had weight, was known indeed to Galileo and Descartes; and the latter not only had some notion of determining it by means of a tube filled with mercury, but, in a passage which seems to have been much overlooked, distinctly suggests as one reason why water will not rise above eighteen *brasses* in a pump, "the weight of the water which counterbalances that of the air."¹ Torricelli happily thought of using mercury, a fluid thirteen times heavier, instead of water, and thus invented a portable instrument by which the variations of the mercurial column might be readily observed. These he found to fluctuate between certain well-known limits, and in circumstances which might justly be ascribed to the variations of atmospheric gravity. This discovery he made in 1643; and, in 1648, Pascal, by his celebrated experiment on the Puy de Dôme, established the theory of atmospheric pressure beyond dispute. He found a considerable difference in the height of the mercury at the bottom and the top of that mountain; and a smaller yet perceptible variation was proved on taking the barometer to the top of one of the loftiest churches in Paris.

45. The science of optics was so far from falling behind other branches of physics in this period, that, including the two great practical discoveries which illustrate it, no former or later generation has witnessed such an advance. Kepler began, in the year 1604, by one

¹ Vol. vii. p. 487.

[This seems an error of the press, or of the writer; for, the French *brasse* being of six feet, water does not rise much more than five *brasses*. — 1847.]

Optics :
Discoveries
of Kepler.

of his first works, *Paralipomena ad Vitellionem*, a title somewhat more modest than he was apt to assume. In this supplement to the great Polish philosopher of the middle ages, he first explained the structure of the human eye, and its adaptation to the purposes of vision. Porta and Maurolycus had made important discoveries, but left the great problem untouched. Kepler had the sagacity to perceive the use of the retina as the canvas on which images were painted. In his treatise, says Montucla, we are not to expect the precision of our own age; but it is full of ideas novel, and worthy of a man of genius. He traced the causes of imperfect vision in its two principal cases, where the rays of light converge to a point before or behind the retina. Several other optical phenomena are well explained by Kepler; but he was unable to master the great enigma of the science, — the law of refraction. To this he turned his attention again in 1611, when he published a treatise on *Dioptrics*. He here first laid the foundation of that science. The angle of refraction, which Maurolycus had supposed equal to that of incidence, Descartes assumed to be one-third of it; which, though very erroneous as a general theorem, was sufficiently accurate for the sort of glasses he employed. It was his object to explain the principle of the telescope; and in this he well succeeded. That admirable invention was then quite recent. Whatever endeavors have been made to carry up the art of assisting vision by means of a tube to much more ancient times, it seems to be fully proved that no one had made use of combined lenses for that purpose. The slight benefit which a hollow tube affords by obstructing the lateral ray must have been early familiar, and will account for passages which have been construed to imply what the writers never dreamed of.¹ The real inventor of the telescope is not certainly known. Metius of Alkmaar long enjoyed that honor; but the best claim seems to be that of Zachary Jens, a dealer in spectacles at Middleburg. The date of the invention, or at least of its publicity, is referred beyond dispute to 1609. The news of so wonderful a novelty spread rapidly through Europe; and, in the same year, Galileo, as has been mentioned, having heard of the discovery, con-

Invention
of the
telescope.

¹ Even Dutens, whose sole aim is to depreciate those whom modern science has most revered, cannot pretend to show that the ancients made use of glasses to assist vision. *Origine des Découvertes*, I. 218.

structed, by his own sagacity, the instrument which he exhibited at Venice. It is, however, unreasonable to regard himself as the inventor; and in this respect his Italian panegyrists have gone too far. The original sort of telescope, and the only one employed in Europe for above thirty years, was formed of a convex object-glass with a concave eye-glass. This, however, has the disadvantage of diminishing too much the space which can be taken in at one point of view; "so that," says Montucla, "one can hardly believe that it could render astronomy such service as it did in the hands of a Galileo or a Scheiner." Kepler saw the principle upon which another kind might be framed with both glasses convex. This is now called the astronomical telescope, and was first employed a little before the middle of the century. The former, called the Dutch telescope, is chiefly used for short spying glasses.

46. The microscope has also been ascribed to Galileo; and so far with better cause, that we have no proof of ^{Of the mi-}his having known the previous invention. It appears, ^{croscope.} however, to have originated, like the telescope, in Holland, and perhaps at an earlier time. Cornelius Drebbel, who exhibited the microscope in London about 1620, has often passed for the inventor. It is suspected by Montucla that the first microscopes had concave eye-glasses, and that the present form with two convex glasses is not older than the invention of the astronomical telescope.

47. Antonio de Dominis, the celebrated Archbishop of Spalato, in a book published in 1611, though written ^{Antonio de} several years before, *De Radiis Lucis in Vitris Per-* ^{Dominis.} *spectivis et Iride*, explained more of the phenomena of the rainbow than was then understood. The varieties of color had baffled all inquirers, though the bow itself was well known to be the reflection of solar light from drops of rain. Antonio de Dominis, to account for these varieties, had recourse to refraction, the known means of giving color to the solar ray; and guiding himself by the experiment of placing between the eye and the sun a glass bottle of water, from the lower side of which light issued in the same order of colors as in the rainbow, he inferred, that, after two refractions and one intermediate reflection within the drop, the ray came to the eye tinged with different colors, according to the angle at which it had entered. Kepler, doubtless ignorant of De Dominis's

book had suggested nearly the same. This though not a complete theory of the rainbow, and though it left a great deal to occupy the attention first of Descartes, and afterwards of Newton, was probably just, and carried the explanation as far as the principles then understood allowed it to go. The discovery itself may be considered as an anomaly in science, as it is one of a very refined and subtle nature, made by a man who has given no other indication of much scientific sagacity or acuteness. In many things his writings show great ignorance of principles of optics well known in his time, so that Boscovich, an excellent judge in such matters, has said of him, — *Homo opticearum rerum supra quod patitur eas scire imperitissimus.*¹ Montucla is hardly less severe on De Dominis, who in fact, was a man of more ingenious than solid understanding.

45. Descartes announced to the world in his *Dioptrics*, 1637, that he had at length solved the mystery which had concealed the law of refraction. He showed that the sine of the angle of incidence at which the ray enters, has, in the same medium, a constant ratio to that of the angle at which it is refracted, or bent in passing through. But this ratio varies according to the medium; some having a much more refractive power than others. This was a law of beautiful simplicity as well as extensive usefulness; but such was the fatality, as we would desire to call it, which attended Descartes, that this discovery had been indisputably made twenty years before by a Dutch geometer of great reputation, Willebrod Snell. The treatise of Snell had never been published; but we have the evidence both of Vossius and Huygens, that Hortensius, a Dutch professor, had publicly taught the discovery of his countryman. Descartes had long lived in Holland; privately, it is true, and, by his own account, reading few books: so that in this, as in other instances, we may be charitable in our suspicions; yet it is unfortunate that he should perpetually stand in need of such indulgence.

49. Fermat did not inquire whether Descartes was the original discoverer of the law of refraction, but disputed its truth. Descartes, indeed, had not contented himself with experimentally ascertaining it, but, in his usual manner, endeavored to show the path of the ray by direct

Disputed by Fermat.

¹ Playfair, *Dissertation on Physical Philosophy*, p. 119

reasoning. The hypothesis he brought forward seemed not very probable to Fermat, nor would it be permitted at present. His rival, however, fell into the same error; and, starting from an equally dubious supposition of his own, endeavored to establish the true law of refraction. He was surprised to find, that, after a calculation founded upon his own principle, the real truth of a constant ratio between the sines of the angles came out according to the theorem of Descartes. Though he did not the more admit the validity of the latter's hypothetical reasoning, he finally retired from the controversy with an elegant compliment to his adversary.

50. In the Dioptrics of Descartes, several other curious theorems are contained. He demonstrated that there Curves of Descartes. are peculiar curves, of which lenses may be constructed, by the refraction from whose superficies all the incident rays will converge to a focal point, instead of being spread, as in ordinary lenses, over a certain extent of surface commonly called its spherical aberration. The effect of employing such curves of glass would be an increase of illumination, and a more perfect distinctness of image. These curves were called the ovals of Descartes; but the elliptic or hyperbolic speculum would answer nearly the same purpose. The latter kind has been frequently attempted; but, on account of the difficulties in working them, if there were no other objection, none but spherical lenses are in use. In Descartes' theory, he explained the equality of the angles of incidence and reflection in the case of light, correctly as to the result, though with the assumption of a false principle of his own, that no motion is lost in the collision of hard bodies such as he conceived light to be. Its perfect elasticity makes his demonstration true.

51. Descartes carried the theory of the rainbow beyond the point where Antonio de Dominis had left it. He Theory of the rainbow. gave the true explanation of the outer bow, by a second intermediate reflection of the solar ray within the drop; and he seems to have answered the question most naturally asked, though far from being of obvious solution, why all this refracted light should only strike the eye in two arches with certain angles and diameters, instead of pouring its prismatic lustre over all the rain-drops of the cloud. He found that no pencil of light continued, after undergoing the

processes of refraction and reflection in the drop, to be composed of parallel rays, and consequently to possess that degree of density which fits it to excite sensation in our eyes, except the two which make those angles with the axis drawn from the sun to an opposite point at which the two bows are perceived.

CHAPTER IX.

HISTORY OF SOME OTHER PROVINCES OF LITERATURE FROM
1600 TO 1650.

SECT. I. — ON NATURAL HISTORY.

Zoölogy — Fabricius on Language of Brutes — Botany.

1. THE vast collections of Aldrovandus on zoölogy, though they may be considered as representing to us the ^{Aldrovan-} knowledge of the sixteenth century, were, as has ^{been} seen before, only published in a small part before its close. The fourth and concluding part of his Ornithology appeared in 1603; the History of Insects in 1604. Aldrovandus himself died in 1605. The posthumous volumes appeared at considerable intervals: that on molluscous animals and zoöphytes, in 1606; on fishes and cetacea, in 1613; on whole-hoofed quadrupeds, in 1616; on digitate quadrupeds, both viviparous and oviparous, in 1637; on serpents, in 1640; and on cloven-hoofed quadrupeds, in 1642. There are also volumes on plants and minerals. These were all printed at Bologna, and most of them afterwards at Frankfort; but a complete collection is very rare.

2. In the Exotica of Clusius, 1605, a miscellaneous volume on natural history, chiefly, but not wholly, consisting of translations or extracts from older works, ^{Clusius.} we find several new species of simiæ, the manis, or scaly ant-eater of the old world, the three-toed sloth, and one or two armadillos. We may add also the since-extinguished race, that phoenix of ornithologists, the much-lamented dodo. This portly bird is delineated by Clusius, such as it then existed in the Mauritius.

3. In 1648, Piso on the Materia Medica of Brazil, together

with Marcgraf's Natural History of the same country, was published at Leyden, with notes by De Laet. The descriptions of Marcgraf are good, and enable us to identify the animals. They correct the imperfect notions of Gesner, and add several species which do not appear in his work, or perhaps in that of Aldrovandus: such as the tamandua, or Brazilian ant-eater; several of the family of caviés; the coatimondi, which Gesner had perhaps meant in a defective description; the lama, the pacos, the jaguar, and some smaller feline animals; the prehensile porcupine, and several ruminants. But some at least of these had been already described in the histories of the West Indies, by Hernandez d'Oviedo, Acosta, and Herrera.

4. Jonston, a Pole of Scots origin, collected the information of his predecessors in a Natural History of Animals, published in successive parts from 1648 to 1652. The History of Quadrupeds appeared in the latter year. "The text," says Cuvier, "is extracted, with some taste, from Gesner, Aldrovandus, Marcgraf, and Mouffet; and it answered its purpose as an elementary work in natural history, till Linnæus taught a more accurate method of classifying, naming, and describing animals. Even Linnæus cites him continually."¹ I find in Jonston a pretty good account of the chimpanzee (*Orang-otang Indorum, ab Angola delatus*), taken perhaps from the *Observationes Medicæ* of Tulpus.² The delineations in Jonston being from copper-plates, are superior to the coarse wood-cuts of Gesner, but fail sometimes very greatly in exactness. In his notions of classification, being little else than a compiler, it may be supposed that he did not advance a step beyond his predecessors. The *Theatrum Insectorum* by Mouffet, an English physician of the preceding century, was published in 1634: it seems to be compiled in a considerable degree from the unpublished papers of Gesner and foreign naturalists, whom the author has rather too servilely copied. Haller, however, is said to have

¹ Biogr. Univ.

² Grotius, *Epist. ad Gallos*, p. 21, gives an account of a chimpanzee, "*monstrum hominis dicam an bestie?*" and refers to Tulpus. The doubt of Grotius as to the possible humanity of this *quam similis turpissima bestia nobis*, is not so strange as the much graver language of Linnæus. [In the description of *Homo Troglodytes*, as Linnæus denominates the chimpan-

zee of Angola, we find alarming intimations. "*Cogitat, ratiocinatur, credit sui causa factam tellurem, se aliquando iterum fore imperantem, si unquam fides peregrinatoribus multis.*" — *Systema Naturæ*, Holm. 1766. I rather believe this has been left out by Gmelin. But perhaps it was only a dry way of turning travellers into ridicule. — 1842.]

placed Mouffet above all entomologists before the age of Swammerdam.¹

5. We may place under the head of zoölogy a short essay by Fabricius de Aquapendente, on the language of brutes; a subject very curious in itself, and which has by no means sufficiently attracted notice even in this experimental age. It cannot be said that Fabricius enters thoroughly into the problem, much less exhausts it. He divides the subject into six questions: 1. Whether brutes have a language, and of what kind; 2. How far it differs from that of man, and whether the languages of different species differ from one another; 3. What is its use; 4. In what modes animals express their affections; 5. What means we have of understanding their language; 6. What is their organ of speech. The affirmative of the first question he proves by authority of several writers, confirmed by experience, especially of hunters, shepherds, and cowherds, who know, by the difference of sounds, what animals mean to express. It may be objected that brutes utter sounds, but do not speak. But this is merely as we define speech; and he attempts to show, that brutes, by varying their utterance, do all that we do by *literal* sounds. This leads to the solution of the second question. Men agree with brutes in having speech, and in forming elementary sounds of determinate time: but ours is more complex; these elementary sounds, which he calls *articulos*, or joints of the voice, being quicker and more numerous. Man, again, forms his sounds more by means of the lips and tongue, which are softer in him than they are in brutes. Hence his speech runs into great variety and complication, which we call language, while that of animals within the same species is much more uniform.

6. The question as to the use of speech to brutes is not difficult. But he seems to confine this utility to the expression of particular emotions, and does not meddle with the more curious inquiry, whether they have a capacity of communicating specific facts to one another; and, if they have,

¹ Biogr. Univer.: Chalmers. I am no judge of the merits of the book; but, if the following sentence of the English translation does it no injustice, Mouffet must have taken little pains to do more than transcribe: "In Germany and England I do not hear that there are any grasshoppers at all; but if there be, they

are in both countries called Bow-krickets, or Haulin-krickets." — p. 389. This translation is subjoined to Topsell's *History of Four-footed Beasts*, collected out of Gesner and others, in an edition of 1658. The first edition of Topsell's very ordinary composition was in 1608.

whether this is done through the organs of the voice. The fourth question is, in how many modes animals express their feelings. These are by look, by gesture, by sound, by voice, by language. Fabricius tells us that he had seen a dog, meaning to expel another dog from the place he wished himself to occupy, begin by looking fierce, then use menacing gestures, then growl, and finally bark. Inferior animals, such as worms, have only the two former sorts of communication. Fishes, at least some kinds, have a power of emitting a sound, though not properly a voice: this may be by the fins or gills. To insects also he seems to deny voice, much more language, though they declare their feelings by sound. Even of oxen, stags, and some other quadrupeds, he would rather say that they have voice than language. But cats, dogs, and birds have a proper language. All, however, are excelled by man, who is truly called *ἄνθρωπος*, from his more clear and distinct articulations.

7. In the fifth place, however difficult it may appear to understand the language of brutes, we know that they understand what is said to them; how much more, therefore, ought we, superior in reason, to understand them! He proceeds from hence to an analysis of the passions, which he reduces to four,—joy, desire, grief, and fear. Having thus drawn our map of the passions, we must ascertain by observation what are the articulations of which any species of animals is capable, which cannot be done by description. His own experiments were made on the dog and the hen. Their articulations are sometimes complex; as, when a dog wants to come into his master's chamber, he begins by a shrill small yelp, expressive of desire, which becomes deeper, so as to denote a mingled desire and annoyance, and ends in a lamentable howl of the latter feeling alone. Fabricius gives several other rules deduced from observation of dogs, but ends by confessing that he has not fully attained his object, which was to furnish every one with a compendious method of understanding the language of animals: the inquirer must therefore proceed upon these rudiments, and make out more by observation and good canine society. He shows, finally, from the different structure of the organs of speech, that no brute can ever rival man; the chief instrument being the throat, which we use only for vowel sounds. Two important questions are hardly touched in this little treatise: first, as has been said,

whether brutes can communicate specific facts to each other; and, secondly, to what extent they can associate ideas with the language of man. These ought to occupy our excellent naturalists.

8. Columna, belonging to the Colonna family, and one of the greatest botanists of the sixteenth century, main- ^{Botany:} tained the honor of that science during the present ^{Columna.} period, which his long life embraced. In the Academy of the Lincei, to which the revival of natural philosophy is greatly due, Columna took a conspicuous share. His *Ecphrasis*, a history of rare plants, was published in two parts at Rome, in 1606 and 1616. In this he laid down the true basis of the science, by establishing the distinction of genera, which Gesner, Cæsalpin, and Joachim Camerarius had already conceived, but which it was left for Columna to confirm and employ. He alone, of all the contemporary botanists, seems to have appreciated the luminous ideas which Cæsalpin had bequeathed to posterity.¹ In his posthumous observations on the Natural History of Mexico by Hernandez, he still further developed the philosophy of botanical arrangements. Columna is the first who used copper instead of wood to delineate plants; an improvement which soon became general. This was in the *Πυροβάλαρος*, sive *Plantarum aliquot Historia*, 1594. There are errors in this work; but it is remarkable for the accuracy of the descriptions, and for the correctness and beauty of the figures.²

9. Two brothers, John and Gaspar Bauhin, inferior in philosophy to Columna, made more copious additions to the nomenclature and description of plants. The ^{John and Gaspar Bauhin.} elder, who was born in 1541, and had acquired some celebrity as a botanist in the last century, lived to complete, but not to publish, an *Historia Plantarum Universalis*, which did not appear till 1650. It contains the descriptions of 5,000 species, and the figures of 3,577, but small and ill-executed. His brother, though much younger, had preceded him, not only by the *Phytopinax* in 1596, but by his chief work, the *Pinax Theatri Botanici*, in 1623. "Gaspar Bauhin," says a modern botanist, "is inferior to his brother in his descriptions and in sagacity; but his delineations are better, and his synonymes more complete. They are both below Clusius in description, and below several older botanists in

¹ *Biogr. Univ.*² *Id. Sprengel.*

their figures. In their arrangement they follow Lobel, and have neglected the lights which Cæsalpin and Columna had held out. Their chief praise is to have brought together a great deal of knowledge acquired by their predecessors; but the merit of both has been exaggerated."¹

10. Johnson, in 1636, published an edition of Gerard's *Herbal*. But the *Theatrum Botanicum* of Parkinson, in 1640, is a work, says Pulteney, of much more originality than Gerard's; and it contains abundantly more matter. We find in it near 3,800 plants; but many descriptions recur more than once. The arrangement is in seventeen classes, partly according to the known or supposed qualities of the plant, and partly according to their external character.² "This heterogeneous classification, which seems to be founded on that of Dodoens, shows the small advances that had been made towards any truly scientific distribution: on the contrary, Gerard, Johnson, and Parkinson had rather gone back, by not sufficiently pursuing the example of Lobel."

SECT. II. — ON ANATOMY AND MEDICINE.

Claims of Early Writers to the Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood — Harvey
— Lacteal Vessels discovered by Asellius — Medicine.

11. The first important discovery that was made public in this century was that of the valves of the veins; which is justly ascribed to Fabricius de Aquapendente, a professor at Padua; because, though some of these valves are described even by Berenger, and further observations were made on the subject by Sylvius, Vesalius, and other anatomists, yet Fallopius himself had in this instance thrown back the science by denying their existence; and no one before Fabricius had generalized the discovery. This he did in his public lectures as early as 1524; but

¹ Biogr. Univ. Pulteney speaks more highly of John Bauhin: "That which Gesner performed for zoology, John Bauhin effected in botany. It is, in reality, a repository of all that was valuable in the ancients, in his immediate predecessors, and in the discoveries of his own time, relating to the history of vegetables, and is executed with that accuracy and critical judgment which can only be exhibited by superior talents." — *Hist. of Botany in England*, i. 190.

² P. 146.

his tract *De Venarum Ostiolis* appeared in 1603. This discovery, as well as that of Harvey, has been attributed to Father Paul Sarpi, whose immense reputation in the north of Italy accredited every tale favorable to his glory. But there seems to be no sort of ground for either supposition.

12. The discovery of a general circulation in the blood has done such honor to Harvey's name, and has been claimed for so many others, that it deserves more ^{Theory of the blood's circulation} consideration than we can usually give to anatomical science. According to Galen, and the general theory of anatomists formed by his writings, the arterial blood flows from the heart to the extremities, and returns again by the same channels; the venous blood being propelled, in like manner, to and from the liver. The discovery attributed to Harvey was, that the arteries communicate with the veins, and that all the blood returns to the heart by the latter vessels. Besides this general or systemic circulation, there is one called the pulmonary, in which the blood is carried by certain arteries through the lungs, and returned again by corresponding veins preparatory to its being sent into the general sanguineous system; so that its course is through a double series of ramified vessels, each beginning and terminating at the heart, but not at the same side of the heart: the left side, which from a cavity called its ventricle throws out the arterial blood by the aorta, and by another called its auricle receives that which has passed through the lungs by the pulmonary vein, being separated by a solid septum from the right side, which, by means of similar cavities, receives the blood of all the veins, excepting those of the lungs, and throws it out into the pulmonary artery. It is thus evident that the word "pulmonary circulation" is not strictly proper; there being only one for the whole body.

13. The famous work of Servetus, *Christianismi Restitutio*, has excited the attention of the literary part of the world, not only by the unhappy fate it brought upon the author, and its extreme scarcity, but by a remarkable passage wherein he has been supposed to describe the circulation of the blood. That Servetus had a just idea of the pulmonary circulation and the aeration of the blood in the lungs, is manifest by this passage, and is denied by no one; but it has been the opinion of anatomists, that he did

Sometimes ascribed to Servetus,

not apprehend the return of the mass of the blood through the veins to the right auricle of the heart.¹

14. Columbus is acknowledged to have been acquainted with the pulmonary circulation. He says of his own discovery, that no one had observed or consigned it to writing before. Arantius, according to Portal, has de-

¹ In the first edition of this work. I remarked, vol. i. p. 458, that Levasseur had come much nearer to the theory of a general circulation than Servetus. But the passage in Levasseur, which I knew only from the quotation in Portal, *Hist. de l'Anatomie*, i. 373, does not, on consulting the book itself, bear out the inference which Portal seems to deduce; and he has, not quite rightly, omitted all expressions which he thought erroneous. Thus Levasseur precedes the first sentence of Portal's quotation by the following: "Intus (in corde) sunt sinus seu ventriculi duo tantum, septo quodam medio discreti, per quos foramina sanguis et spiritus communicatur. In utroque duo vas habentur." For this he quotes Galen; and the perforation of the septum of the heart is known to be one of Galen's errors. Upon the whole, there seems no ground for believing that Levasseur was acquainted with the general circulation; and, though his language may at first lead us to believe that he speaks of that through the lungs, even this is not distinctly made out. Sprengel, in his *History of Medicine*, does not mention the name of Levasseur (or Vassens, as he was called in Latin) among those who anticipated in any degree the discovery of circulation. The book quoted by Portal is Vassens in *Anatomen Corporis Humani Tabulae Quatuor*, several times printed between 1540 and 1560.

Andrés (*Origine e Progresso d' ogni Letteratura*, vol. xiv. p. 37) has put in a claim for a Spanish farrier, by name Reyna, who, in a book printed in 1562, but of which there seems to have been an earlier edition (*Libro de Maniscalcheria becho y ordenado por Francisco de la Reyna*), asserts, in few and plain words, as Andrés quotes them in Italian, that the blood goes in a circle through all the limbs. I do not know that the book has been seen by any one else; and it would be desirable to examine the context, since other writers have seemed to know the truth without really apprehending it.

That Servetus was only acquainted with the pulmonary circulation has been the general opinion. Portal, though in one place he speaks with less precision, repeatedly limits the discovery to this; and Sprengel does not entertain the least suspicion that it went farther. Andrés (xiv.

38), not certainly a medical authority, but conversant with such, and very partial to Spanish claimants, asserts the same. If a more general language may be found in some writers, it may be ascribed to their want of distinguishing the two circulations. A medical friend, who, at my request, perused and considered the passage in Servetus, as it is quoted in Allwoerden's life, says in a letter, "All that this passage implies, which has any reference to the greater circulation, may be comprised in the following points: — 1. That the heart transmits a vivifying principle along the arteries and the blood which they contain to the anastomosing veins; 2. That this living principle vivifies the liver and the venous system generally; 3. That the liver produces the blood itself, and transmits it through the vena cava to the heart, in order to obtain the vital principle, by performing the lesser circulation, which Servetus seems perfectly to comprehend."

"Now, according to this view of the passage, all the movement of the blood implied is that which takes place from the liver, through the vena cava to the heart, and that of the lesser circulation. It would appear to me that Servetus is on the brink of the discovery of the circulation; but that his notions respecting the transmission of his *vitalis spiritus* diverted his attention from that great movement of the blood itself which Harvey discovered. . . . It is clear that the quantity of blood sent to the heart for the elaboration of the *vitalis spiritus* is, according to Servetus, only that furnished by the liver to the vena cava inferior. But the blood thus introduced is represented by him as performing the circulation through the lungs very regularly."

It appears singular, that, while Servetus distinctly knew that the septum of the heart, *paries ille medius*, as he calls it, is closed, which Berenger had discovered, and Vesalius confirmed (though the bulk of anatomists long afterwards adhered to Galen's notion of perforation), and consequently that some other means must exist for restoring the blood from the left division of the heart to the right, he should not have seen the necessity of a system of vessels to carry forward this communication.

scribed the pulmonary circulation still better than Columbus; while Sprengel denies that he has described it at all. It is perfectly certain, and is admitted on all sides, that Columbus did not know the systemic circulation: in what manner he disposed of the blood does not very clearly appear; but, as he conceived a passage to exist between the ventricles of the heart, it is probable, though his words do not lead to this inference, that he supposed the aerated blood to be transmitted back in this course.¹

15. Cæsalpin, whose versatile genius entered upon every field of research, has, in more than one of his treatises relating to very different topics, and especially And to Cæsalpin. in that upon plants, some remarkable passages on the same subject, which approach more nearly than any we have seen to a just notion of the general circulation, and have led several writers to insist on his claim as a prior discoverer to Harvey. Portal admits that this might be regarded as a fair pretension, if he were to judge from such passages; but there are others which contradict this supposition, and show Cæsalpin to have had a confused and imperfect idea of the office of the veins. Sprengel, though at first he seems to incline more towards the pretensions of Cæsalpin, comes ultimately almost to the same conclusion; and, giving the reader the words of most importance, leaves him to form his own judgment. The Italians are more confident: Tiraboschi and Corniani, neither of whom are medical authorities, put in an unhesitating claim for Cæsalpin as the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, not without unfair reflections on Harvey.²

¹ The leading passage in Columbus (*De Re Anatomica*, lib. vii. p. 177, edit. 1569), which I have not found quoted by Portal or Sprengel, is as follows: "Inter hos ventriculos septum adret, per quod fere omnes existimant sanguinem a dextro ventriculo ad sinistram additum pateferi; id ut fieret facilius, in transitu ob vitalium spirituum generationem demum reddi; sed longa errant via; nam sanguis per arteriosam venam ad pulmonem fertur; ibique attenuatur; deinde cum aere una per arteriam venalem ad sinistram cordis ventriculum deferitur; quod nemo hactenus aut animadvertit aut scriptum reliquit; licet maxime et ab omnibus animadvertendum." He afterwards makes a remark, in which Servetus had preceded him, that the size of the pulmonary artery (vena arteriosa) is greater than would be required for the nutrition of the lungs

alone. Whether he knew of the passages in Servetus or no, notwithstanding his claim of originality, is not perhaps manifest; the coincidence as to the function of the lungs in aerating the blood is remarkable; but, if Columbus had any direct knowledge of the Christiani-Bonifacii Restitutio, he did not choose to follow it in the remarkable discovery that there is no perforation in the septum between the ventricles.

² Tiraboschi, x. 49; Corniani, vi. 8. He quotes, on the authority of another Italian writer, "Il giudizio di due illustri Inglese, i fratelli Hunter, i quali, esaminato bene il processo di questa causa, si maravigliano della sentenza data in favore del loro concittadino." I must doubt, till more evidence is produced, whether this be true.

The passage in Cæsalpin's *Questiones*

16. It is thus manifest, that several anatomists of the sixteenth century were on the verge of completely detecting the law by which the motion of the blood is governed; and the language of one is so strong, that we must have recourse, in order to exclude his claim, to the irresistible fact that he did not confirm by proof his own theory, nor proclaim it in such a manner as to attract the attention of the world. Certainly, when the doctrine of a general circulation was advanced by Harvey, he both announced it as a paradox, and was not deceived in expecting that it would be so accounted. Those again who strove to depreciate his originality sought intimations in the writings of the ancients, and even spread a rumor that he had stolen the papers of Father Paul; but it does not appear that they talked, like some moderns, of plagiarism from Levasseur or Cæsalpin.

17. William Harvey first taught the circulation of the blood in London in 1619; but his *Exercitatio de Motu Cordis* was not published till 1628. He was induced, as is said, to conceive the probability of this great truth by reflecting on the final cause of those valves, which his master, Fabricius de Aquapendente, had demonstrated in the veins; valves whose structure was such as to prevent the reflux of the blood towards the extremities. Fabricius himself seems to have been ignorant of this structure, and certainly of the circulation; for he presumes that they serve to prevent the blood from flowing like a river towards the feet and hands, and from collecting in one part. Harvey followed

Peripateticæ is certainly the most resembling a statement of the entire truth that can be found in any writer before Harvey. I transcribe it from Dutens's *Origine des Découvertes*, vol. II. p. 23: "Idcirco pulmo per venam arterialem similem ex dextro cordis ventriculo fervidum hauriens sanguinem, eumque per anastomosen arteriarum venarum reddens, quæ in sinistrum cordis ventriculum tendit, transmissa interim aere frigido per asperas arteriarum canales, qui juxta arteriam venalem protenduntur, non tamen oculis communicantes, ut putavit Galenus, solo tactu temperat. Hic sanguinis circulationi ex dextro cordis ventriculo per pulmones in sinistrum ejusdem ventriculi optimè respondent ea quæ ex dissectione apparent. Nam duo sunt vasa in dextrum ventriculum desinentia, duo etiam in sinistrum: duorum autem unum intramittit tantum, alterum

educit, membranis eo ingenio constitutis. Vas igitur intramittens vena est magna quidem in dextro, quæ cava appellatur; parva autem in sinistro ex pulmone introducta, ejus unica est tunica, ut cætera venarum. Vas autem educens arteria est magna quidem in sinistro, quæ aorta appellatur; parva autem in dextro ad pulmones derivans, ejus similiter due sunt tunice, ut in cæteris arteriis."

In the treatise *De Plantis* we have a similar but shorter passage: "Nam in animalibus videmus alimentum per venas duci ad cor tanquam ad officinam caloris insiti, et adepta inibi ultima perfectione, per arterias in universum corpus distribui agente spiritu, qui ex eodem alimento in corde gignitur." I have taken this from the article on Cæsalpin in the *Biographie Universelle*.

his own happy conjecture by a long inductive process of experiments on the effects of ligatures, and on the observed motion of the blood in living animals.

18. Portal has imputed to Harvey an unfair silence as to Servetus, Columbus, Levasseur, and Cæsalpin, who had all preceded him in the same track. Tiraboschi copies Portal; and Corniani speaks of the appropriation of Cæsalpin's discovery by Harvey. It may be replied, that no one can reasonably presume Harvey to have been acquainted with the passage in Servetus. But the imputation of suppressing the merits of Columbus is grossly unjust, and founded upon ignorance or forgetfulness of Harvey's celebrated *Exercitation*. In the proœmium to this treatise, he observes, that almost all anatomists have hitherto supposed, with Galen, that the mechanism of the pulse is the same as that of respiration. But he not less than three times makes an exception for Columbus, to whom he most expressly refers the theory of a pulmonary circulation.¹ Of Cæsalpin he certainly says nothing; but there seems to be no presumption that he was acquainted with that author's writings. Were it even true that he had been guided in his researches by the obscure passages we have quoted, could this set aside the merit of that patient induction by which he established his own theory? Cæsalpin asserts at best, what we may say he divined, but did not know to be true: Harvey asserts what he had demonstrated. The one is an empiric in a philosophical sense; the other, a legitimate minister of truth. It has been justly said, that he alone discovers who proves; nor is there a more odious office or a more sophistical course of reasoning than to impair the credit of great men, as Dutens wasted his erudition in doing, by hunting out equivocal and insulated passages from older writers, in order to depreciate the originality of the real teachers of mankind.² It may indeed be thought wonderful,

Unjustly
doubted to
be original.

¹ "Pars omnes huc usque anatomici medici et philosophi supponunt cum Galeno eundem usum esse pulvis, quam respirationis." But though he certainly claims the doctrine of a general circulation as wholly his own, and counts it a paradox which will startle every one, he as expressly refers (pp. 38 and 41 of the *Exercitation*) that of a pulmonary transmission of the blood to Columbus, *peritissimo doctissimoque anatomico*; and observes, in his proœmium, as an objection to the received theory, "quomodo probable est, uti notavit Rualdus Colum-

bus) tanto sanguine opus esse ad nutritionem pulmonum, cum hoc vas, vena videlicet arteriosa [id est, arteria pulmonalis] exsuperet magnitudine utrumque ramum distributionis vense cavae descendente crurali."—p. 16.

² This is the general character of a really learned and interesting work by Dutens, *Origine des Découvertes attribuées aux Modernes*. Justice is due to those who have first struck out, even without following up, original ideas in any science; but not at the expense of those who, generally without knowledge

that Servetus, Columbus, or Vesalius should not have more distinctly apprehended the consequences of what they maintained, and it seems difficult to believe the latter conclusion without the greatest risk the interference of their views is not to be alleged as a counterbalance to the more steady security of Harvey. The position of their falling so short is that they were not, not indeed pure by guess, but upon insufficient proof, and that the consciousness of this, embarrassing their minds, prevented them from deducing inferences which now appear irresistible. In every department of philosophy, the resources of the first inquirers have often been arrested by similar causes.

18. Harvey is the author of a treatise on generation, wherein he maintains that all animals, including man, are derived from an egg. In this book we first find an argument maintained against spontaneous generation, which, in the case of the lower animals, had been generally received. Sprengel thinks this treatise prefix, and not equal to the author's reputation.¹ It was first published in 1651.

19. Next in importance to the discovery of Harvey is that of Asellius as to the lacteal vessels. Eustachius had observed the thoracic duct in a horse. But Asellius, more by chance, as he owns, than by sagacity, perceived the lacteals in a fat dog whom he opened soon after it had eaten. This was in 1622; and his treatise, *De Lacte*

of what had been said before, have derived the same principles from reasoning or from observation, and carried them out to important consequences. Pacha, quotes Montaigne for the shrewd remark, that we should try a man who says a wise thing, for we may often find that he does not understand it. Those who exerted a morbid jealousy of modern philosophy are glad to avail themselves of such aunter into obscure antiquity as Dureau; and they are recorded by all the enviers, the unexcited, and by many of the unreflecting among mankind. With respect to the immediate question, the passages which Dureau has quoted from Hippocrates and Plato have certainly an appearance of expressing a real circulation of the blood by the words *κρῖδος* and *κρῖδοσμιον αἷματος*; but others, and especially one from *Remedia*, on which some reliance has been placed, mean nothing more than the flux and reflux of the blood, which the contraction and dilatation of the heart

was supposed to produce. See Dureau, vol. i. pp. 8-12. Mr. Coleridge has been deceived in the same manner by some lines of Johannes Bruns, which he takes to describe the circulation of the blood; whereas they merely express its movement to and fro, most of remount, which might be by the same system of vessels.

¹ The biographer of Harvey in the *Bibliothèque Universelle* strongly vindicates his claim. "Tous les hommes instruits conviennent aujourd'hui que Harvey est le véritable auteur de cette belle découverte. . . . Césalpin prétendait la circulation artérielle, en supposant que le sang retourne des extrémités au cœur; mais ces assertions ne furent point prouvées; elles ne se trouverent étayées par aucune expérience, par aucun fait; et l'on peut dire de Césalpin qu'il divisa presque la grande circulation dont les lois lui furent totalement inconnues; la découverte en était réservée à Guillaume Harvey."

² Hist. de la Médecine, iv. 290; Portal, p. 477.

Venis, was published in 1627.¹ Harvey did not assent to this discovery, and endeavored to dispute the use of the vessels; nor is it to his honor, that, even to the end of his life, he disregarded the subsequent confirmation that Pecquet and Bartholin had furnished.² The former detected the common origin of the lacteal and lymphatic vessels in 1647, though his work on the subject was not published till 1651. But Olaus Rudbeck was the first who clearly distinguished these two kinds of vessels.

21. Scheiner proved that the retina is the organ of sight, and that the humors serve only to refract the rays which paint the object on the optic nerve. This was Optical discoveries of Scheiner. in a treatise entitled *Oculus, hoc est, Fundamentum Opticum*, 1619.³ The writings of several anatomists of this period, such as Riolan, Vesling, Bartholin, contain partial accessions to the science; but it seems to have been less enriched by great discoveries, after those already named, than in the preceding century.

22. The mystical medicine of Paracelsus continued to have many advocates in Germany. A new class of enthusiasts sprung from the same school, and, calling themselves Rosicrucians, pretended to cure diseases by faith and imagination. A true Rosicrucian, they held, had only to look on a patient to cure him. The analogy of magnetism, revived in the last and present age, was commonly employed.⁴ Of this school the most eminent was Van Helmont, who combined the Paracelsian superstitions with some original ideas of his own. His general idea of medicine was, that its business was to regulate the archæus, an immaterial principle of life and health; to which, like Paracelsus, he attributed a mysterious being and efficacy. The seat of the archæus is in the stomach; and it is to be effected either by a scheme of diet or through the imagination. Sprengel praises Van Helmont for overthrowing many current errors, and for announcing principles since pursued.⁵ The French physicians

¹ Portal, ii. 461; Sprengel, iv. 201. Peiresc, soon after this, got the body of a man fresh hanged after a good supper, and had the pleasure of confirming the discovery of Asellius by his own eyes. Gavendi, Vita Peirescii, p. 177.

² Sprengel, iv. 203.

³ Id. 270.

⁴ All in nature, says Croll of Hesse, one of the principal theosophists in medicine, is living; all that lives has its vital

force, or astrum, which cannot act without a body, but passes from one to another. All things in the macrocosm are found also in the microcosm. The inward or astral man is Gabalis, from which the science is named. This Gabalis, or imagination, is as a magnet to external objects, which it thus attracts. Medicines act by a magnetic force. Sprengel, iii. 302.

⁵ Vol. v. p. 22.

adhered to the Hippocratic school, in opposition to what Sprengel calls the Chemiatic, which more or less may be reckoned that of Paracelsus. The Italians were still renowned in medicine. Sanctorius, *De Medicina Statica*, 1614, seems the only work to which we need allude. It is loaded with eulogy by Portal, Tiraboschi, and other writers.¹

SECTION III.

On Oriental Literature—Hebrew Learning—Arabic and other Eastern Languages.

23. DURING no period of equal length since the revival of letters has the knowledge of the Hebrew language Diffusion of Hebrew. been apparently so much diffused among the literary world as in that before us. The frequent sprinkling of its characters in works of the most miscellaneous erudition will strike the eye of every one who habitually consults them. Nor was this learning by any means so much confined to the clergy as it has been in later times, though their order naturally furnished the greater portion of those who labored in that field. Some of the chief Hebraists of this age were laymen. The study of this language prevailed most in the Protestant countries of Europe; and it was cultivated with much zeal in England. The period between the last years of Elizabeth and the Restoration may, perhaps, be reckoned that in which a knowledge of Hebrew has been most usual among our divines.

24. Upon this subject I can only assert what I collect to be the verdict of judicious critics.² It seems that the Hebrew language was not yet sufficiently studied in the method most likely to give an insight into its principles, by comparing it with all the cognate tongues, latterly called Semitic, spoken in the neighboring parts of Asia, and manifestly springing from a common source.

¹ Portal, *H.* 301; Tiraboschi, *xi.* 270; Biogr. Univ.

² The fifth volume of Eichhorn's *Geschichte der Cultur* is devoted to the progress of Oriental literature in Europe, not very full in characterizing the various productions it mentions, but analytically arranged, and highly useful for reference. Jomisch, in his preface to Meninski's *Thesaurus* (Vienna, 1780), has traced a sketch of the same subject. We may have trusted in some respects to Simon, *Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament*. The biographical dictionaries, English and French, have of course been resorted to.

Postel, indeed, had made some attempts at this in the last century, but his learning was very slight; and Schindler published in 1612 a *Lexicon Pentaglottum*, in which the Arabic, as well as Syriac and Chaldaic, were placed in apposition with the Hebrew text. Louis de Dieu, whose *Remarks on all the Books of the Old Testament* were published at Leyden in 1648, has frequently recourse to some of the kindred languages, in order to explain the Hebrew.¹ But the first instructors in the latter had been Jewish rabbis; and the Hebraists of the sixteenth age had imbibed a prejudice, not unnatural though unfounded, that their teachers were best conversant with the language of their forefathers.² They had derived from the same source an extravagant notion of the beauty, antiquity, and capacity of the Hebrew; and, combining this with still more chimerical dreams of a mystical philosophy, lost sight of all real principles of criticism.

25. The most eminent Hebrew scholars of this age were the two Buxtorfs of Basle, father and son, both devoted to the rabbinical school. The elder, who had become distinguished before the end of the preceding century, published a grammar in 1609, which long continued to be reckoned the best, and a lexicon of Hebrew, Chaldee, and Syriac, in 1623, which was not superseded for more than a hundred years. Many other works relating to these three dialects, as well as to that of the later Jews, do honor to the erudition of the elder Buxtorf; but he is considered as representing a class of Hebraists, which, in the more comprehensive Orientalism of the eighteenth century, has lost much of its credit. The son trod closely in his father's footsteps, whom he succeeded as professor of Hebrew at Basle. They held this chair between them more than seventy years. The younger Buxtorf was engaged in controversies which had not begun in his father's life-time. Morin, one of those learned Protestants who had gone over to the Church of Rome, systematically labored to establish the authority of those versions which the church had approved, by weakening that of the text which passed for original.³ Hence he endeavored to show, — though this could not logically do much for his object, — that

¹ Simon, *Hist. Critique du Vieux Testament*, p. 494.

² This was not the case with Luther, who rejected the authority of the rabbis, and thought none but Christians could understand the Old Testament. Simon,

p. 375. But Munster, Fagius, and several others, who are found in the *Critici Sacri*, gave way to the prejudice in favor of rabbinical opinions, and their commentaries are consequently too Judaical. — p. 496.

³ Simon, p. 522.

the Samaritan Pentateuch, then lately brought to Europe, which is not in a different language, but merely the Hebrew written in Samaritan characters, is deserving of preference above what is called the Masoretic text, from which the Protestant versions are taken. The variations between these are sufficiently numerous to affect a favorite hypothesis borrowed from the rabbis, but strenuously maintained by the generality of Protestants, that the Hebrew text of the Masoretic recension is perfectly incorrupt.¹ Morin's opinion was opposed by Buxtorf and Hottinger, and by other writers even of the Romish Church. It has, however, been countenanced by Simon and Kennicott. The integrity at least of the Hebrew copies was gradually given up; and it has since been shown that they differ greatly among themselves. The Samaritan Pentateuch was first published in 1645, several years after this controversy began, by Sionita, editor of the Parisian Polyglott. This edition, sometimes called by the name of *Le Jay*, contains most that is in the Polyglott of Antwerp, with the addition of the Syriac and Arabic versions of the Old Testament.

26. An epoch was made in Hebrew criticism by a work of Louis Cappel, professor of that language at Saumur, the *Arcanum Punctuationis Revelatum*, in 1624. He maintained in this an opinion promulgated by Elias Levita, and held by the first reformers and many other Protestants of the highest authority, though contrary to that vulgar orthodoxy which is always omnivorous, that the vowel-points of Hebrew were invented by certain Jews of Tiberias in the sixth century. They had been generally deemed coeval with the language, or at least brought in by Esdras through divine inspiration. It is not surprising that such an hypothesis clashed with the prejudices of mankind; and Cappel was obliged to publish his work in Holland. The Protestants looked upon it as too great a concession in favor of the Vulgate, which, having been translated before the Masoretic punctuation, on Cappel's hypothesis, had been applied to the text, might now claim to stand on higher ground, and was not to be judged by these innovations. After twenty years, the younger Buxtorf endeavored to vindicate the antiquity of vowel-points; but it is now confessed that the victory remained with Cappel, who has been styled the father of Hebrew criti-

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cism. His principal work is the *Critica Sacra*, published at Paris in 1650, wherein he still further discredits the existing manuscripts of the Hebrew Scriptures, as well as the Masoretic punctuation.¹

27. The rabbinical literature, meaning as well the Talmud and other ancient books, as those of the later ages ^{Hebrew} since the revival of intellectual pursuits among the ^{scholars.} Jews of Spain and the East, gave occupation to a considerable class of scholars. Several of these belong to England, such as Ainsworth, Godwin, Lightfoot, Selden, and Pococke. The antiquities of Judaism were illustrated by Cunæus in *Jus Regium Hebræorum*, 1623, and especially by Selden, both in the *Uxor Hebraica* and in the treatise *De Jure Naturali et Gentium juxta Hebræos*. But no one has left a more durable reputation in this literature than Bochart, a Protestant minister at Caen. His *Geographia Sacra*, published in 1646, is not the most famous of his works, but the only one which falls within this period. It displays great learning and sagacity; but it was impossible, as has been justly observed, that he could thoroughly elucidate this subject at a time when we knew comparatively little of modern Asia, and had few good books of travels. A similar observation might of course be applied to his *Hierozoicon*, on the animals mentioned in Scripture. Both these works, however, were much extolled in the seventeenth century.

28. In the Chaldee and Syriac languages, which approach so closely to Hebrew that the best scholars in the ^{Chaldee} latter are rarely unacquainted with them, besides ^{and Syriac.} the Buxtorfs, we find Ferrari, author of a Syriac lexicon, published at Rome in 1622; Louis de Dieu of Leyden, whose Syriac grammar appeared in 1626; and the Syriac translation of the Old Testament in the Parisian Polyglott, edited by Gabriel Sionita, in 1642. A Syriac college for the Maronites of Libanus had been founded at Rome by Gregory XIII.; but it did not as yet produce any thing of importance.

¹ Simon, Eichhorn, &c. A detailed account of this controversy about vowel-points between Cappel and the Buxtorfs will be found in the 12th volume of the *Bibliothèque Universelle*; and a shorter *procès* in Eichhorn's *Einführung in das alte Testament*, vol. i. p. 242.

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25. But a language incomparably more rich in literary treasures, and long neglected in Europe, began now to take a conspicuous place in the annals of learning. Scaliger deserves the glory of being the first real Arabic scholar: for Ponsel, Chiracian, and a very few more of the sixteenth century, not hardly worth notice. His friend Caprillon, who excels his acquirements, as usual, very highly, devoted himself some time to this study. But Scaliger made use of the language chiefly to enlarge his own vast sphere of erudition. He published nothing on the subject: but his collections became the base of Ruyssing's Arabic lexicon, and it is said that they were far more extensive than what appears in that work. He who properly added this language to the domain of learning was Erpenius, a native of Gorcum, who, as an early age, had gained so universal an acquaintance with the Oriental languages as to be appointed professor of them at Leyden, in 1613. He edited, the same year, the above-mentioned lexicon of Ruyssing, and published a grammar, which might not only be accounted the first composed in Europe that deserved the name, but became the guide to most later scholars. Erpenius gave several other works to the world, chiefly connected with the Arabic version of the Scriptures.¹ Golius, his successor in the Oriental chair at Leyden, besides publishing a lexicon of the language, which is said to be still the most copious, elaborate, and complete that has appeared,² and several editions of Arabic writings, poetical and historical, contributed still more extensively to bring the range of Arabian literature before the world. He enriched with a hundred and fifty manuscripts, collected in his travels, the library of Leyden, to which Scaliger had bequeathed forty.³ The manuscripts belonging to Erpenius found their way to Cambridge; while, partly by the munificence of Laud, partly by later accessions, the Bodleian Library at Oxford became extremely rich in this line. The much larger collection in the Escorial seems to have been chiefly formed under Philip III. England was now as conspicuous in Arabian as in Hebrew learning. Selden, Greaves, and Pococke, especially the last, who was probably equal to any Oriental scholar whom Europe had hitherto produced, by translations of the historical and philosophical

¹ Biogr. Univ.

² Jenech. Prefatio in Meusnier Thesaurus Linguarum Orientalium, p. 110.

³ Biogr. Univ.

writings of the Saracenic period, gave a larger compass to general erudition.¹

30. The remaining languages of the East are of less importance. The Turkish had attracted some degree of attention in the sixteenth century: but the first ^{Other Eastern languages.} grammar was published by Megiser, in 1612, a very slight performance; and a better at Paris, by Du Ryer, in 1630.² The Persic grammar was given at Rome by Raimondi, in 1614; by Dieu, at Leyden, in 1639; by Greaves, at London, in 1641 and 1649.³ An Armenian dictionary, by Rivoli, 1621, seems the only accession to our knowledge of that ancient language during this period.⁴ Athanasius Kircher, a man of immense erudition, restored the Coptic, of which Europe had been wholly ignorant. Those farther eastward had not yet begun to enter into the studies of Europe. Nothing was known of the Indian; but some Chinese manuscripts had been brought to Rome and Madrid as early as 1580; and, not long afterwards, two Jesuits, Roger and Ricci, both missionaries in China, were the first who acquired a sufficient knowledge of the language to translate from it.⁵ But scarcely any further advance took place before the middle of the century.

SECTION IV.

On Geography and History.

31. PURCHAS, an English clergyman, imbued by nature, like Hakluyt, with a strong bias towards geographical studies, after having formed an extensive library ^{Purchas's Pilgrim.} in that department, and consulted, as he professes, above 1,200 authors, published the first volume of his *Pilgrim*, a collection of voyages in all parts of the world, in 1613: four more followed in 1625. The accuracy of this useful compiler has been denied by those who have had better means of knowledge, and probably is inferior to that of Hakluyt; but his labor was far more comprehensive. The *Pilgrim* was, at all

¹ Jenisch; Mebhorn; Biogr. Universelle; Biogr. Britannien.

² Mebhorn, v. 367.

³ Id., 320.

⁴ Id., 351.

⁵ Id., 64.

THE
JOURNAL
OF
THE
ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
VOLUME LXXV. PART I. 1905.
LONDON: PUBLISHED BY THE INSTITUTE, 21, BEDFORD SQUARE, W.C.
1905.

34. The best measure, perhaps, of geographical science, are the maps published from time to time, as perfectly ^{Maps of} for the most part, we may presume, as their editors ^{Blaew.} could render them. If we compare the map of the world in the *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum sive Novus Atlas* of Blaew in 1648 with that of the edition of Ortelius published at Antwerp in 1612, the improvements will not appear exceedingly great. America is still separated from Asia by the Straits of Anian, about lat. 60; but the coast to the south is made to trend away more than before: on the N. E. coast we find Davis's Sea, and Estotiland has vanished to give way to Greenland. Canada continues to be most inaccurately laid down, though there is a general idea of lakes and rivers better than in Ortelius. Scandinavia is far better, and tolerably correct. In the South, Terra del Fuego terminates in Cape Horn, instead of being united to Terra Australis: but, in the East, Corea appears as an oblong island; the Sea of Aral is not set down, and the Wall of China is placed north of the fiftieth parallel. India is very much too small, and the shape of the Caspian Sea is wholly inaccurate. But a comparison with the map of Hakluyt, mentioned in our second volume, will not exhibit so much superiority of Blaew's Atlas. The latter, however, shows more knowledge of the interior country, especially in North America, and a better outline in many parts of the Asiatic coast. The maps of particular regions in Europe are on a large scale, and numerous. Speed's maps, 1646, appear by no means inferior to those of Blaew; but several of the errors are the same. Considering the progress of commerce, especially that of the Dutch, during this half-century, we may rather be surprised at the defective state of these maps.

35. Two histories of general reputation were published in the Italian language during these fifty years: one, ^{Davila and} of the civil wars in France by Davila, in 1630; and ^{Bentivoglio.} another, of those in Flanders by Cardinal Bentivoglio. Both of these had the advantage of interesting subjects: they had been sufficiently conversant with the actors to know much and to judge well, without that particular responsibility which tempts an historian to prevarication. They were both men of cool and sedate tempers, accustomed to think policy a game in which the strong play with the weak; obtuse, especially the former, in moral sentiment; but, on this account, not

inclined to calumniate an opposite party, or to withhold admiration from intellectual power. Both these histories may be read over and over with pleasure: if Davila is too refined, if he is not altogether faithful, if his style wants the elegance of some older Italians, he more than redeems all this by the importance of his subject, the variety and picturesqueness of his narration, and the acuteness of his reflections. Bentivoglio is reckoned, as a writer, among the very first of his age.

36. The history of the War of Granada, that is, the rebellion of the Moriscos in 1565, by the famous Diego de Mendoza, was published posthumously in 1610. It is placed by the Spaniards themselves on a level with the most renowned of the ancients. The French have now their first general historian, Mezeray, a writer esteemed for his lively style and bold sense, but little read, of course, in an age like the last or our own, which have demanded an exactness in matter of fact, and an extent of historical erudition, which was formerly unknown. We now began, in England, to cultivate historical composition, and with so much success, that the present period was far more productive of such works as deserve remembrance than a whole century that next followed. But the most considerable of these have already been mentioned. Lord Herbert of Cherbury's History of Henry VIII. ought here to be added to the list, as a book of good authority, relatively at least to any that preceded, and written in a manly and judicious spirit.¹ Camden's Life of Elizabeth is also a solid and valuable history. Bacon's Life of Henry VII. is something more: it is the first instance in our language of the application of philosophy to reasoning on public events in the manner of the ancients and the Italians. Praise upon Henry is too largely bestowed: but it was in the nature of Bacon to admire too much a crafty and selfish policy; and he thought also, no doubt, that so near an ancestor of his own sovereign should not be treated with severe impartiality.

¹ [Lord Herbert's Life of Henry VIII. he wrote any part is not clear. Wood's was composed with great assistance from Athens Oxoniensis (Bliss's edition), vol. III. p. 72. — 1863.] Thomas Masters, of a Gloucestershire family, who collected materials: whether

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37. Of the Italian and other Continental universities, we have little to say beyond what may be collected from ^{Universi-} the general tenor of this literary history, that they ^{ties.} contributed little to those departments of knowledge to which we have paid most attention, and, adhering pertinaciously to their ancient studies, were left behind in the advance of the human mind. They were, indeed, not less crowded with scholars than before, being the necessary and prescribed road to lucrative professions. In theology, law, and medicine, — sciences the two former of which, at least, did not claim to be progressive, — they might sustain a respectable posture: in philosophy, and even in polite letters, they were less prominent.

38. The English universities are, in one point of view, very different from those of the rest of Europe. Their ^{Bodleian} great endowments created a resident class, neither ^{Library} teachers nor students, who might devote an unbroken ^{founded.} leisure to learning with the advantage of that command of books which no other course of life could have afforded. It is true that in no age has the number of these been great; but the diligence of a few is enough to cast a veil over the laziness of many. The century began with an extraordinary piece of fortune to the University of Oxford, which formed in the seventeenth century, whatever it may since have been, one great cause of her literary distinction. Sir Thomas Bodley, with a munificence which has rendered his name more immortal than the foundation of a family could have done, bestowed on the university a library collected by him at great cost, building a magnificent room for its reception, and bequeathed large funds for its increase. The building was completed in 1606; and Casaubon has, very shortly afterwards, given such an account of the university itself, as well as of the Bodleian Library, as will perhaps be interesting to the reader, though it contains some of those mistakes into which a stranger is apt to fall.

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as I remained at Oxford, I passed whole days in the library; for books cannot be taken out, but the library is open to all scholars for seven or eight hours every day. You might always see, therefore, many of these greedily enjoying the banquet prepared for them, which gave me no small pleasure."¹

40. The Earl of Pembroke, Selden, and above all, Archbishop Laud, greatly improved the Bodleian Library. It became, especially through the munificence of that prelate, extremely rich in Oriental manuscripts. The Duke of Buckingham presented a collection made by Erpenius to the public library at Cambridge, which, though far behind that of the sister university, was enriched by many donations, and became very considerable. Usher formed the library of Trinity College, Dublin; an university founded on the English model, with noble revenues, and a corporate body of fellows and scholars to enjoy them.

41. A catalogue of the Bodleian Library was published by James in 1620. It contains about 20,000 articles. ^{Catalogue of Bodleian Library.} Of these, no great number are in English, and such as there are chiefly of a later date than the year 1600: Bodley, perhaps, had been rather negligent of poetry and plays. The editor observes, that there were in the library three or four thousand volumes in modern languages. This catalogue is not classed, but alphabetical; which James mentions as something new, remarking at the same time the difficulty of classification, and that in the German catalogues we find grammars entered under the head of philosophy. One published by Draud, *Bibliotheca Classica, sive Catalogus Officialis*, Frankfort, 1625, is hardly worth mention. It professes to be a general list of printed books; but, as the number seems to be not more than 30,000, all in Latin, it must be very defective. About two-fifths of the whole are theological. A catalogue of the library of Sion College, founded in 1631, was printed in 1650: it contains eight or nine thousand volumes.²

42. The library of Leyden had been founded by the first Prince of Orange. Scaliger bequeathed his own to ^{Continental libraries.} it; and it obtained the Oriental manuscripts of Golius. A catalogue had been printed by Peter Bertius as early as 1597.³ Many public and private libraries either now began

¹ *Cambr. Epist.* 809. ² In *Museo Britannico*. ³ *Jugler, Hist. Littéraire*, c. 8.

the Samaritan Pentateuch, then lately brought to Europe, which is not in a different language, but merely the Hebrew written in Samaritan characters, is deserving of preference above what is called the Masoretic text, from which the Protestant versions are taken. The variations between these are sufficiently numerous to affect a favorite hypothesis borrowed from the rabbis, but strenuously maintained by the generality of Protestants, that the Hebrew text of the Masoretic recension is perfectly incorrupt.¹ Morin's opinion was opposed by Buxtorf and Hottinger, and by other writers even of the Romish Church. It has, however, been countenanced by Simon and Kennicott. The integrity at least of the Hebrew copies was gradually given up; and it has since been shown that they differ greatly among themselves. The Samaritan Pentateuch was first published in 1645, several years after this controversy began, by Sionita, editor of the Parisian Polyglott. This edition, sometimes called by the name of Le Jay, contains most that is in the Polyglott of Antwerp, with the addition of the Syriac and Arabic versions of the Old Testament.

26. An epoch was made in Hebrew criticism by a work of Louis Cappel, professor of that language at Saumur, the *Arcanum Punctuationis Revelatum*, in 1624. He maintained in this an opinion promulgated by Elias Levita, and held by the first reformers and many other Protestants of the highest authority, though contrary to that vulgar orthodoxy which is always omnivorous, that the vowel-points of Hebrew were invented by certain Jews of Tiberias in the sixth century. They had been generally deemed coeval with the language, or at least brought in by Esdras through divine inspiration. It is not surprising that such an hypothesis clashed with the prejudices of mankind; and Cappel was obliged to publish his work in Holland. The Protestants looked upon it as too great a concession in favor of the Vulgate, which, having been translated before the Masoretic punctuation, on Cappel's hypothesis, had been applied to the text, might now claim to stand on higher ground, and was not to be judged by these innovations. After twenty years, the younger Buxtorf endeavored to vindicate the antiquity of vowel-points; but it is now confessed that the victory remained with Cappel, who has been styled the father of Hebrew criti-

Vowel-
points
rejected
by Cappel.

¹ Simon, p. 522; Eubhorn, v. 464.

cism. His principal work is the *Critica Sacra*, published at Paris in 1650, wherein he still further discredits the existing manuscripts of the Hebrew Scriptures, as well as the Masoretic punctuation.¹

27. The rabbinical literature, meaning as well the Talmud and other ancient books, as those of the later ages ^{Hebrew} since the revival of intellectual pursuits among the ^{scholars.} Jews of Spain and the East, gave occupation to a considerable class of scholars. Several of these belong to England, such as Ainsworth, Godwin, Lightfoot, Selden, and Pococke. The antiquities of Judaism were illustrated by Cunæus in *Jus Regium Hebræorum*, 1623, and especially by Selden, both in the *Uxor Hebraica* and in the treatise *De Jure Naturali et Gentium juxta Hebræos*. But no one has left a more durable reputation in this literature than Bochart, a Protestant minister at Caen. His *Geographia Sacra*, published in 1646, is not the most famous of his works, but the only one which falls within this period. It displays great learning and sagacity; but it was impossible, as has been justly observed, that he could thoroughly elucidate this subject at a time when we knew comparatively little of modern Asia, and had few good books of travels. A similar observation might of course be applied to his *Hierozoicon*, on the animals mentioned in Scripture. Both these works, however, were much extolled in the seventeenth century.

28. In the Chaldee and Syriac languages, which approach so closely to Hebrew that the best scholars in the ^{Chaldee} latter are rarely unacquainted with them, besides ^{and Syriac.} the Buxtorfs, we find Ferrari, author of a Syriac lexicon, published at Rome in 1622; Louis de Dieu of Leyden, whose Syriac grammar appeared in 1626; and the Syriac translation of the Old Testament in the Parisian Polyglott, edited by Gabriel Sionita, in 1642. A Syriac college for the Maronites of Libanus had been founded at Rome by Gregory XIII.; but it did not as yet produce any thing of importance.

¹ Simon, Eichhorn, &c. A detailed account of this controversy about vowel-points between Cappel and the Buxtorfs will be found in the 12th volume of the *Bibliothèque Universelle*; and a shorter *procès* in Eichhorn's *Einführung in das alte Testament*, vol. i. p. 242.

[It is not universally agreed, that Cappel was altogether in the right about Hebrew

vowels. Schultens was the first, according to Dathe, who proved that neither party could be reckoned wholly victorious. It seems, however, that the points now in use are acknowledged to be comparatively modern. Dathe, *Præfatio ad Waltoni Prolegomena*, Lips. 1777, p. 27.—1847.]

29. But a language incomparably more rich in literary treasures, and long neglected by Europe, began now to take a conspicuous place in the annals of learning. Scaliger deserves the glory of being the first real Arabic scholar; for Postel, Christman, and a very few more of the sixteenth century, are hardly worth notice. His friend Casaubon, who extols his acquirements, as usual, very highly, devoted himself some time to this study. But Scaliger made use of the language chiefly to enlarge his own vast sphere of erudition. He published nothing on the subject; but his collections became the base of Rapheling's Arabic lexicon, and it is said that they were far more extensive than what appears in that work. He who properly added this language to the domain of learning was Erpenius, a native of Gorcum, who, at an early age, had gained so unrivalled an acquaintance with the Oriental languages as to be appointed professor of them at Leyden, in 1613. He edited, the same year, the above-mentioned lexicon of Rapheling, and published a grammar, which might not only be accounted the first composed in Europe that deserved the name, but became the guide to most later scholars. Erpenius gave several other works to the world, chiefly connected with the Arabic version of the Scriptures.¹ Golius, his successor in the Oriental chair at Leyden, besides publishing a lexicon of the language, which is said to be still the most copious, elaborate, and complete that has appeared,² and several editions of Arabic writings, poetical and historical, contributed still more extensively to bring the range of Arabian literature before the world. He enriched with a hundred and fifty manuscripts, collected in his travels, the library of Leyden, to which Scaliger had bequeathed forty.³ The manuscripts belonging to Erpenius found their way to Cambridge; while, partly by the munificence of Laud, partly by later accessions, the Bodleian Library at Oxford became extremely rich in this line. The much larger collection in the Escorial seems to have been chiefly formed under Philip III. England was now as conspicuous in Arabian as in Hebrew learning. Selden, Greaves, and Pococke, especially the last, who was probably equal to any Oriental scholar whom Europe had hitherto produced, by translations of the historical and philosophical

¹ Biogr. Univ.

² Jenisch. *Præfatio in Meninski Thesaurus Linguarum Orientalium*, p. 110.

³ Biogr. Univ.

writings of the Saracenic period, gave a larger compass to general erudition.¹

30. The remaining languages of the East are of less importance. The Turkish had attracted some degree of attention in the sixteenth century: but the first grammar was published by Megiser, in 1612, a very slight performance; and a better at Paris, by Du Ryer, in 1630.² The Persian grammar was given at Rome by Raimondi, in 1614; by Dieu, at Leyden, in 1639; by Greaves, at London, in 1641 and 1649.³ An Armenian dictionary, by Rivoli, 1621, seems the only accession to our knowledge of that ancient language during this period.⁴ Athanasius Kircher, a man of immense erudition, restored the Coptic, of which Europe had been wholly ignorant. Those farther eastward had not yet begun to enter into the studies of Europe. Nothing was known of the Indian; but some Chinese manuscripts had been brought to Rome and Madrid as early as 1580; and, not long afterwards, two Jesuits, Roger and Ricci, both missionaries in China, were the first who acquired a sufficient knowledge of the language to translate from it.⁵ But scarcely any further advance took place before the middle of the century.

SECTION IV.

On Geography and History.

31. PURCHAS, an English clergyman, imbued by nature, like Hakluyt, with a strong bias towards geographical studies, after having formed an extensive library in that department, and consulted, as he professes, above 1,200 authors, published the first volume of his *Pilgrim*, a collection of voyages in all parts of the world, in 1613: four more followed in 1625. The accuracy of this useful compiler has been denied by those who have had better means of knowledge, and probably is inferior to that of Hakluyt; but his labor was far more comprehensive. The *Pilgrim* was, at all

¹ Jenisch; Meiborn; Biogr. Universelle; Biogr. Britannica.

² Meiborn, v. 367.

³ Id., 320.

⁴ Id., 351.

⁵ Id., 61.

events, a great source of knowledge to the contemporaries of Purchas.¹

32. Olearius was ambassador from the Duke of Holstein to Muscovy and Persia from 1633 to 1639. His travels, in German, were published in 1647, and have been several times reprinted and translated. He has well described the barbarism of Russia and the despotism of Persia; he is diffuse and episodic, but not wearisome; he observes well and relates faithfully; all who have known the countries he has visited are said to speak well of him.² Pietro della Valle is a far more amusing writer. He has thrown his travels over Syria and Persia into the form of letters written from time to time, and which he professes to have recovered from his correspondents. This perhaps is not a very probable story, both on account of the length of the letters, and the want of that reference to the present time and to small passing events, which such as are authentic commonly exhibit. His observations, however, on all the countries he visited, especially Persia, are apparently consistent with the knowledge we have obtained from later travellers. Gibbon says that none have better observed Persia; but his vanity and prolixity are insufferable. Yet I think that Della Valle can hardly be reckoned tedious; and if he is a little egotistical, the usual and almost laudable characteristic of travellers, this gives a liveliness and racy air to his narrative. What his wife, the Lady Maani, an Assyrian Christian, whom he met with at Bagdad, and who accompanied him through his long wanderings, may really have been, we can only judge from his eulogies on her beauty, her fidelity, and her courage; but she throws an air of romance over his adventures, not unpleasing to the reader. The travels of Pietro della Valle took place from 1614 to 1626; but the book was first published at Rome in 1650, and has been translated into different languages.

33. The *Lexicon Geographicum* of Ferrari, in 1627, was the chief general work on geography: it is alphabetical, and contains 9,600 articles. The errors have been corrected in later editions, so that the first would probably be required in order to estimate the knowledge of its author's age.³

¹ Biogr. Univ.; Pinkerton's Collection of Voyages and Travels. The latter does not value Purchas highly for correctness.

² Biogr. Universelle.

³ *Saïd*, xi. 418; Biogr. Universelle.

34. The best measure, perhaps, of geographical science, are the maps published from time to time, as perfectly ^{Maps of} for the most part, we may presume, as their editors ^{Blaew.} could render them. If we compare the map of the world in the *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum sive Novus Atlas* of Blaew in 1648 with that of the edition of Ortelius published at Antwerp in 1612, the improvements will not appear exceedingly great. America is still separated from Asia by the Straits of Anian, about lat. 60; but the coast to the south is made to trend away more than before: on the N. E. coast we find Davis's Sea, and Estotiland has vanished to give way to Greenland. Canada continues to be most inaccurately laid down, though there is a general idea of lakes and rivers better than in Ortelius. Scandinavia is far better, and tolerably correct. In the South, Terra del Fuego terminates in Cape Horn, instead of being united to Terra Australis: but, in the East, Corea appears as an oblong island; the Sea of Aral is not set down, and the Wall of China is placed north of the fiftieth parallel. India is very much too small, and the shape of the Caspian Sea is wholly inaccurate. But a comparison with the map of Hakluyt, mentioned in our second volume, will not exhibit so much superiority of Blaew's Atlas. The latter, however, shows more knowledge of the interior country, especially in North America, and a better outline in many parts of the Asiatic coast. The maps of particular regions in Europe are on a large scale, and numerous. Speed's maps, 1646, appear by no means inferior to those of Blaew; but several of the errors are the same. Considering the progress of commerce, especially that of the Dutch, during this half-century, we may rather be surprised at the defective state of these maps.

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39. "I wrote you word," he says in July, 1613, to one of

his correspondents, "a month since, that I was going to Oxford in order to visit that university and its library, of which I had heard much. Every thing proved beyond my expectation. The colleges are numerous, most of them very rich. The revenues of these colleges maintain above two thousand students, generally of respectable parentage, and some even of the first nobility; for what we call the habits of pedagogues (*pædagogica vitæ ratio*) is not found in these English colleges. Learning is here cultivated in a liberal style; the heads of houses live handsomely, even splendidly, like men of rank. Some of them can spend ten thousand livres [about £1,000 at that time, if I mistake not] by the year. I much approved the mode in which pecuniary concerns are kept distinct from the business of learning.¹ Many still are found, who emulate the liberality of their predecessors. Hence new buildings rise every day; even some new colleges are raised from the foundation; some are enlarged, such as that of Merton, over which Saville presides, and several more. There is one begun by Cardinal Wolsey, which, if it should be completed, will be worthy of the greatest admiration. But he left at his death many buildings, which he had begun, in an unfinished state, and which no one expects to see complete. None of the colleges, however, attracted me so much as the Bodleian Library, a work rather for a king than a private man. It is certain that Bodley, living or dead, must have expended 200,000 livres on that building. The ground-plot is the figure of the letter T. The part which represents the perpendicular stem was formerly built by some prince, and is very handsome: the rest was added by Bodley with no less magnificence. In the lower part is a divinity school, to which perhaps nothing in Europe is comparable. It is vaulted with peculiar skill. The upper story is the library itself, very well built, and fitted with an immense quantity of books. Do not imagine that such plenty of manuscripts can be found here as in the Royal Library (of Paris): there are not a few manuscripts in England, but nothing to what the king possesses. But the number of printed books is wonderful, and increasing every year; for Bodley has bequeathed a considerable revenue for that purpose. As long

¹ "Res studiosorum et rationes separate sunt, quod valde probavi." I have given the translation which seemed best; but I may be mistaken.

as I remained at Oxford, I passed whole days in the library; for books cannot be taken out, but the library is open to all scholars for seven or eight hours every day. You might always see, therefore, many of these greedily enjoying the banquet prepared for them, which gave me no small pleasure."¹

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¹ Cassaub. *Epist.* 899.

² In Museo Britannico.

³ Jugler, *Hist. Litteraria*, c. 8.

to be formed in France, or received great accessions; among the latter, those of the historian De Thou, and the president Seguier.¹ No German library, after that of Vienna, had been so considerable as one formed in the course of several ages by the Electors Palatine at Heidelberg. It contained many rare manuscripts. On the capture of the city by Tilly in 1622, he sent a number of these to Rome; and they long continued to sleep in the recesses of the Vatican. Napoleon, emulous of such a precedent, obtained thirty-eight of the Heidelberg manuscripts by the Treaty of Tolentino, which were transmitted to Paris. On the restitution of these in 1815, it was justly thought that prescription was not to be pleaded by Rome for the rest of the plunder, especially when she was recovering what she had lost by the same right of spoliation; and the whole collection has been replaced in the library of Heidelberg.

43. The Italian academies have been often represented as Italian academies. partaking in the alleged decline of literary spirit during the first part of the seventeenth century. Nor is this reproach a new one. Boccalini, after the commencement of this period, tells us that these institutions once so famous had fallen into decay; their ardent zeal in literary exercises and discussions having abated by time, so that, while they had once been frequented by private men, and esteemed by princes, they were now abandoned and despised by all. They petition Apollo, therefore, in a chapter of his *Ragguagli di Parnasso*, for a reform. But the god replies, that all things have their old age and decay, and as nothing can prevent the neatest pair of slippers from wearing out, so nothing can rescue academies from a similar lot; hence he can only advise them to suppress the worst, and to supply their places by others.² If only such a counsel were required, the institution of academies in general would not perish. And, in fact, we really find that while some societies of this class came to nothing, as is always the case with self-constituted bodies, the seventeenth century had births of its own to boast, not inferior to the older progeny of the last age. The Academy of Humorists at Rome was one of these. It arose casually at the marriage of a young nobleman of the Mancini family, and took the same line as many have done, reciting verses and discourses, or occasionally representing plays.

¹ Jugler, *Hist. Littéraire* c. 3.

² *Ragg.* xviii. c. 1.

The tragedy of Demetrius, by Rocco, one of this academy, is reckoned among the best of the age. The Apatisti of Florence took their name from Fioretti, who had assumed the appellation of Udeno Nisielo, Academico Apatista. The Rozzi of Siena, whom the government had suppressed in 1568, revived again in 1605, and rivalled another society of the same city, the Intronati. The former especially dedicated their time to pastoral in the rustic dialect (*commedia rusticale*), a species of dramatic writing that might amuse at the moment, and was designed for no other end, though several of these farces are extant.¹

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END OF VOL. III

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END OF VOL. III



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END OF VOL. III.

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43. The Italian academies have been often represented as partaking in the alleged decline of literary spirit during the first part of the seventeenth century. Nor is this reproach a new one. Boccacini, after the commencement of this period, tells us that these institutions once so famous had fallen into decay; their ardent zeal in literary exercises and discussions having abated by time, so that, while they had once been frequented by private men, and esteemed by princes, they were now abandoned and despised by all. They petitioned Apollo, therefore, in a chapter of his *Ragguagli di Parnasso*, for a reform. But the god replies, that all things have their old age and decay, and as nothing can prevent the neatest pair of slippers from wearing out, so nothing can rescue academies from a similar lot; hence he can only advise them to suppress the worst, and to supply their places by others.² If only such a counsel were required, the institution of academies in general would not perish. And, in fact, we really find that while some societies of this class came to nothing, as is always the case with self-constituted bodies, the seventeenth century had births of its own to boast, not inferior to the older progeny of the last age. The Academy of Humorists at Rome was one of these. It arose casually at the marriage of a young nobleman of the Mancini family, and took the same line as many have done, reciting verses and discourses, or occasionally representing plays.

¹ Juglar, *Hist. Littéraire* c. 3.

² *Ragg.* xviii. c. 1.

The tragedy of Demetrius, by Rocco, one of this academy, is reckoned among the best of the age. The Apatisti of Florence took their name from Fioretti, who had assumed the appellation of Udeno Nisielo, Academico Apatista. The Rozzi of Siena, whom the government had suppressed in 1568, revived again in 1605, and rivalled another society of the same city, the Intronati. The former especially dedicated their time to pastoral in the rustic dialect (*commedia rusticale*), a species of dramatic writing that might amuse at the moment, and was designed for no other end, though several of these farces are extant.¹

44. The Academy Della Crusca, which had more solid objects for the advantage of letters in view, has been mentioned in another place. But that of the Lincei, ^{The Lincei.} founded by Frederic Cesi, stands upon a higher ground than any of the rest. This young man was born at Rome in 1585, son of the Duke of Acqua Sparta, a father and a family known only for their pride and ignorance. But nature had created in Cesi a philosophic mind: in conjunction with a few of similar dispositions, he gave his entire regard to science, and projected himself, at the age of eighteen, an academy, that is, a private association of friends for intellectual pursuits, which, with reference to their desire of piercing with acute discernment into the depths of truth, he denominated the Lynxes. Their device was that animal, with its eyes turned towards heaven, and tearing a Cerberus with its claws; thus intimating that they were prepared for war against error and falsehood. The church, always suspicious, and inclined to make common cause with all established tenets, gave them some trouble, though neither theology nor politics entered into their scheme. This embraced, as in their academies, poetry and elegant literature; but physical science was their peculiar object. Porta, Galileo, Colonna, and many other distinguished men, both of Italy and the Transalpine countries, were enrolled among the Lynxes; and Cesi is said to have framed rather a visionary plan of a general combination of philosophers, in the manner of the Pythagoreans, which should extend itself to every part of Europe. The constitutions of this imaginary order were even published in 1624: they are such as could not have been realized, but, from the organization and secrecy that seem to have been their ele-

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xii.

ments, might not improbably have drawn down a prosecution upon themselves, or even rendered the name of philosophy obnoxious. Cesi died in 1630; and his Academy of Lynxes did not long survive the loss of their chief.¹

45. The tide of public opinion had hitherto set regularly in one direction; ancient times, ancient learning, ancient wisdom and virtue, were regarded with unqualified veneration; the very course of nature was hardly believed to be the same, and a common degeneracy was thought to have overspread the earth and its inhabitants. This had been at its height in the first century after the revival of letters; the prejudice in favor of the past, always current with the old, who affect to dictate the maxims of experience, conspiring with the genuine lustre of classical literature and ancient history, which dazzled the youthful scholar. But this aristocracy of learning was now assailed by a new power which had risen up in sufficient strength to dispute the pre-eminence. We, said Bacon, are the true ancients: what we call the antiquity of the world was but its infancy. This thought, equally just and brilliant, was caught up and echoed by many: it will be repeatedly found in later works. It became a question whether the moderns had not really left behind their progenitors; and though it has been hinted, that a dwarf on a giant's shoulders sees farther than the giant, this is, in one sense, to concede the point in dispute.²

46. Tassoni was one of the first who combated the established prejudice by maintaining that modern times are not inferior to ancient: it well became his intrepid disposition.³ But Lancilotti, an Italian ecclesiastic, and member of several academies, pursued this subject in an elaborate work, intended to prove,—first, that the world was neither morally worse nor more afflicted by calamities than it had been; secondly, that the intellectual abilities of mankind had not degenerated. It bears the general title, *L'Hoggidi, To-Day*; and is throughout a ridicule of those whom he calls *Hoggidiani*, perpetual declaimers against the present state of things. He is a very copious and learned writer, and no friend to antiquity; each chapter being entitled *Disinganno*, and intended to remove

¹ *Salis*, xi. 102; *Tiraboschi*, xi. 42, 248.

² "Ac quemadmodum pygmaeus humeris gigante insidens longius quam gigas prospicere, neque tamen se gigante majorem habere aut sibi multum tribuere potest, ita nos veterum laboribus vigiliisque

in nostros unus conversus adicere aliquid, non supercilla tollere, aut parvi facere, qui ante nos fuerunt, debemus." — *Cyprianus, Vita Campanellae*, p. 15.

³ *Salis*, xi. 381.

some false prejudice. The first part of this work appeared in 1628; the second, after the author's death, not till 1658. Lancilotti wrote another book, with somewhat a similar object, entitled *Farfalloni degl' Antichi Istorici*, and designed to turn the ancient historians into ridicule; with a good deal of pleasantry, but chiefly on account of stories which no one in his time would have believed. The same ground was taken soon afterwards by an English divine, George Hakewill, in his *Apology, or Declaration of the Power and Providence of God in the Government of the World*, published in 1627. This is designed to prove, that there is not that perpetual and universal decay in nature which many suppose. It is an elaborate refutation of many absurd notions which seem to have prevailed; some believing that even physical nature, the sun and stars, the earth and waters, were the worse for wear. A greater number thought this true of man: his age, his size, his strength, his powers of mind, were all supposed to have been deteriorated. Hakewill patiently and learnedly refuted all this. The moral character of antiquity he shows to be much exaggerated, animadverting especially on the Romans. The most remarkable, and certainly the most disputable, chapters are those which relate to the literary merits of ancient and modern times. He seems to be one of the first who ventured to put in a claim for the latter. In this he anticipates Wotton, who had more to say. Hakewill goes much too far in calling Sidney's *Arcadia* "nothing inferior to the choicest piece among the ancients;" and even thinks "he should not much wrong Virgil by matching him with Du Bartas." The learning shown in this treatise is very extensive; but Hakewill has no taste, and cannot perceive any real superiority in the ancients. Compared with Lancilotti, he is much inferior in liveliness, perhaps even in learning; but I have not observed that he has borrowed any thing from the Italian, whose publication was but four years earlier.

47. Browne's *Inquiry into Vulgar Errors* displays a great deal of erudition, but scarcely raises a high notion of Browne himself as a philosopher, or of the state of physical knowledge in England. The errors he indicates are such as none but illiterate persons, we should think, were likely to hold; and I believe that few on the Continent, so late as 1646, would have required to have them exploded with such an ostentation of proof. Who did not know that

Browne's
Vulgar
Errors.

the phoenix is a fable? Browne was where the learned in Europe had been seventy years before, and seems to have been one of those who saturate their minds with bad books till they have little room for any thing new that is better. A man of so much credulity and such an irregular imagination as Browne was almost sure to believe in witchcraft and all sorts of spiritual agencies. In no respect did he go in advance of his age, unless we make an exception for his declaration against persecution. He seems to have been fond of those trifling questions which the bad taste of the schoolmen and their contemporaries introduced; as whether a man has fewer ribs than a woman, whether Adam and Eve had navels, whether Methusaleh was the oldest man; the problems of children put to adults. With a strong curiosity and a real love of truth, Browne is a striking instance of a merely empirical mind: he is at sea with sails and a rudder, but without a compass or log-book; and has so little notion of any laws of nature, or of any inductive reasoning either as to efficient or final causes, that he never seems to judge any thing to be true or false except by experiment.

48. In concluding our review of the sixteenth century, we selected Pinelli, as a single model of the literary character of which, loving and encouraging knowledge, Peiresc. is yet too little distinguished by any writings to fall naturally within the general subject of these volumes. The period which we now bring to a close will furnish us with a much more considerable instance. Nicolas Peiresc was born in 1580, of an ancient family in Provence, which had for some generations held judicial offices in the Parliament of Aix. An extraordinary thirst for every kind of knowledge characterized Peiresc from his earliest youth; and being of a weak constitution as well as ample fortune, though he retained, like his family, an honorable post in the parliament, his time was principally devoted to the multifarious pursuits of an enlightened scholar. Like Pinelli, he delighted in the rarities of art and antiquity; but his own superior genius, and the vocation of that age towards science, led him on to a far more extensive field of inquiry. We have the life of Peiresc written by his countryman and intimate friend Gassendi; and no one who has any sympathy with science or with a noble character will read it without pleasure. Few books, indeed, of that period are more full of casual information.

49. Peiresc travelled much in the early part of his life: he was at Rome in 1600, and came to England and Holland in 1606. The hard drinking, even of our learned men,¹ disconcerted his southern stomach; but he was repaid by the society of Camden, Saville, and Cotton. The king received Peiresc courteously, and he was present at the opening of parliament. On returning to his native province, he began to form his extensive collections of marbles and medals, but especially of natural history in every line. He was, perhaps, the first who observed the structure of zoöphytes, though he seems not to have suspected their animal nature. Petrifications occupied much of his time; and he framed a theory of them which Gassendi explains at length, but which, as might be expected, is not the truth.² Botany was among his favorite studies; and Europe owes to him, according to Gassendi, the Indian jessamine, the gourd of Mecca, the real Egyptian papyrus, which is not that described by Prosper Alpinus. He first planted ginger, as well as many other Oriental plants, in an European garden, and also the cocoa-nut, from which, however, he could not obtain fruit.

50. Peiresc was not less devoted to astronomy: he had no sooner heard of the discoveries of Galileo than he set himself to procure a telescope, and had, in the course of the same year, 1610, the pleasure of observing the moons of Jupiter. It even occurred to him that these might serve to ascertain the longitude, though he did not follow up the idea. Galileo indeed, with a still more inventive mind, and with more of mathematics, seems to have stood in the way of Peiresc. He took, as far as appears, no great pains to publish his researches; contenting himself with the intercourse of literary men who passed near him, or with whom he could maintain correspondence. Several discoveries are ascribed to him by Gassendi: of their originality I cannot venture to decide. "From his retreat," says another biographer, "Peiresc gave more encouragement to letters than any prince, more even than the Cardinal de Richelieu, who, some time afterwards, founded the French Academy. Worthy to have been called by Bayle the *attorney-general* of literature, he kept always on the level of progressive science, published manuscripts at his own expense, followed the labors of the learned throughout Europe, and gave them an active impulse by his own aid."

¹ Gassendi, *Vita Peirescii*, p. 51.

² P. 147.

Scaliger, Salmasius, Holstenius, Kircher, Mersenne, Grotius, Valois, are but some of the great names of Europe whom he assisted by various kinds of liberality.¹ He published nothing himself; but some of his letters have been collected.

51. The character of Peiresc was amiable and unreserved among his friends; but he was too much absorbed in the love of knowledge for insipid conversation. For the same reason, his biographer informs us, he disliked the society of women, gaining nothing valuable from the trifles and scandal upon which alone they could converse.² Possibly the society of both sexes at Aix, in the age of Peiresc, was such as, with no excessive fastidiousness, he might avoid. In his eagerness for new truths, he became somewhat credulous; an error not perhaps easy to be avoided, while the accumulation of facts proceeded more rapidly than the ascertainment of natural laws. But, for a genuine liberality of mind and extensive attainments in knowledge, very few can be compared to Peiresc; nor, among those who have resembled him in this employment of wealth and leisure, do I know that any names have descended to posterity with equal lustre, except our two countrymen of the next generation, who approached so nearly to his character and course of life,—Boyle and Evelyn.

¹ *Biogr. Universelle*.

² *Gassendi*, p. 219.

END OF VOL. III.



